Studies in the Literature of

THE GREAT VEHICLE

Three Mahāyāna Buddhist Texts

edited by
Luis O. Gómez and Jonathan A. Silk
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Originally:

Thanks to the kindness of the authorities of the Center for South Asian Studies at the University of Michigan, and its director William J. Glover, the rights for the book were returned to Jonathan A. Silk in a letter of June 11, 2019.
STUDIES IN THE LITERATURE OF
THE GREAT VEHICLE

THREE MAHĀYĀNA BUDDHIST TEXTS

Edited by
Luis O. Gómez
and
Jonathan A. Silk

Ann Arbor

Collegiate Institute for the Study of Buddhist Literature
and
Center for South and Southeast Asian Studies
The University of Michigan
1989
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PREFACE

The study of the textual traditions of Indian Buddhism has not yet received the attention in the United States that it continues to receive in Europe and Japan. Although research in Buddhist literature is not the only viable approach to the study of Buddhist history and doctrines, it is an essential element contributing to our understanding of the historical development and complexities of this tradition. To a great extent, research into almost every aspect of premodern Buddhism is dependent on, or must at least utilize, the results of textual studies. The student of contemporary Buddhism can observe rituals, conduct interviews, and otherwise seek an understanding of Buddhist society and culture. But one can travel into the past only through what is left behind, and even the stones that are the research materials of archeologists and art historians could hardly yield much sense without the help of written texts. Texts allow one to, quite literally, contextualize almost every type of evidence. In this sense, textual studies serve as the foundation for research into premodern Buddhism.

In the following pages we offer the reader three studies on Mahāyāna Buddhist texts of India. The first two present sūtra materials. The third concerns itself with śāstra material, that is, philosophical literature. Taken together, the three contributions illustrate different methodologies employed in the study of Buddhist literature, and are motivated by differing aims. From one point of view, then, this volume is intended to furnish several possible models for the textual study of Buddhism.

The translation of the King of Śāmadhis is free of brackets and (it is hoped) Sanskritic English, and the introduction provides an overview of the history of the text. The goal is to make available to both general and scholarly audiences the content of an important Mahāyāna scripture. Professor Schopen’s Vajracchedikā translation, on the other hand, seeks to reproduce the syntax of the Sanskrit text quite literally, and the transcription of the manuscript and the textual notes are geared primarily toward an audience made up of his fellow scholars. Professor
Preface

Ichigō's study, presented in the third part of the volume, seeks to emphasize the philosophical and doctrinal standpoint of Śāntarakṣita’s text. The introduction and translation, though amply provided with documentation from Sanskrit and Tibetan sources, are directed primarily at readers whose interests and abilities tend more toward the philosophical than the philological.

Although each part of the present volume emphasizes a different aspect of the study of Buddhist literature, it should be obvious that no one approach is sufficient to fully elucidate the multiple facets of any text. One of the things that makes the study of texts so fascinating is the endless variety of approaches one can take—each approach illuminating something new about the others. A glance at the list of published studies of the King of Samādhīs Sūtra in Part I will give the reader an idea of some of the kinds of research that can be undertaken. One of the underlying assumptions behind the present group of studies, however, is the notion that any serious “higher criticism” of Buddhist literature (or for that matter of all literature) requires, first, the critical establishment of a philologically correct text and, second, the ability to, in one way or another, render that text intelligible. The papers in this volume illustrate the problems inherent in both of these tasks—the philological and the hermeneutic enterprises.

The first paper in the volume contains a lengthy introduction to the Samādhīrāja-sūtra and a translation of its first four chapters. This translation of the King of Samādhīs is the result of an experiment in group translation, the members of the group consisting of faculty, visiting scholars, and advanced graduate students at the University of Michigan from 1982 to 1983. An effort was made throughout the introduction and translation to make the presentation of these materials accessible to the interested nonspecialist, while still maintaining rigorous scholarly standards. The introduction contains detailed bibliographic information about the sūtra, its classical versions and its modern editions, translations and studies. A text of capital importance for the Mahāyāna philosophical school called Mādhyaṃka, this sūtra is quoted extensively in śāstric literature. These quotations are documented in detail. Furthermore, an outline summary of the whole sūtra is given, chapter by chapter. It is hoped that the availability of some portions of the sūtra in English translation might prompt others to undertake translations of the remaining chapters in the near future.
Preface

For reasons explained in detail in Part I, the text taken as a basis for the translation is the version preserved in the Buddhist Sanskrit manuscripts of Nepal. Since many Mahāyāna sūtras do not survive in their Indian-language originals, Tibetan and Chinese translations provide us with valuable textual materials for the study of Indian Mahāyāna Buddhism. Even in cases like that of the King of Samādhis, for which we still possess a Sanskrit version, careful and judicious use of the Tibetan and Chinese translations can aid our reading of the text. It is important, however, for modern scholars to avoid creating their own new, conflated text of a sūtra. Often scholars will fail to adequately distinguish the various recensions of a given text, using translations not to shed light on one version but to actually rewrite the text. The study in Part I cautions against such a method, and shows in the notes to its translation one approach to the comparative use of classical translations of Indian Buddhist texts.

Part II of the volume contains Gregory Schopen’s edition, notes and translation of the Gilgit text of the Vajracchedikā, a sūtra well known in the West under the title of the Diamond Sūtra. The main object of Professor Schopen’s contribution is to present a critical transcription of the unique, incomplete manuscript of the sūtra discovered at Gilgit in present-day Pakistan. This manuscript represents one of the earliest pieces of evidence we have for the Sanskrit text of the sūtra. Accompanying Professor Schopen’s transcription is a critical apparatus in which he points out the limitations of previous editions of the Gilgit manuscript. These textual notes also draw attention to some of the differences between the Gilgit recension and other Sanskrit texts of the sūtra. Also included in Part II are an English rendering of the transcribed text and notes to this translation. The aim of Professor Schopen’s translation contrasts with that of the translators of the Samādhirāja, since he seeks to represent the literal structure of the Sanskrit text. The notes to the translation explain some English renderings and discuss several of the doctrinal points raised in the text, illustrating these with reference to parallel passages in other texts.

Professor Schopen’s study does not emphasize the doctrinal or philosophical aspects of the Vajracchedikā, although he discusses some relevant points in the notes to his translation. However, this was one of the most influential texts of East Asian Buddhism and, to judge solely by the number of Indian commentaries, of Indian Mahāyāna Buddhism as well. Its importance as a source of philosophical ideas would be hard to
overestimate. By concentrating not on these well-known facets of the Vajracchedikā but rather on its philological problems, Professor Schopen reminds us that before we begin to speak about what a certain text meant to Buddhists of such-and-such a place at such-and-such a time we must determine just what text these people had before them. The text of the Vajracchedikā available in sixth-century Gilgit differed in some significant ways from the Sanskrit text with which we are familiar through the Nepalese or Japanese manuscripts, not to mention the Tibetan and Chinese translations. Without careful and critical textual studies such as that presented here by Professor Schopen, we are bound to base our reconstructions of premodern Buddhism on conflated notions of the Buddhist literary tradition, and in so doing destroy the individual character and achievements of distinct Buddhist communities.

The third contribution to this volume deals with the scholastic elaboration of the Mahāyāna Buddhist tradition. Professor Masamichi Ichigō’s study of Śāntarakṣita’s Madhyamakālāṃkāra contains a detailed introduction, a critical edition of the Tibetan translation of the Madhyamakālāṃkāra-kārikā, and an English translation, the latter two printed on facing pages. The introduction sets out in elaborate detail Śāntarakṣita’s place in the philosophical history of Indian Buddhism. Particular attention is paid to the relationship between Śāntarakṣita, his disciple and commentator Kamalaśīla, and Jñānagarbha, Haribhadra and Bhāvaviveka. From this point of view, what Professor Ichigō presents in his introduction is an outline of the philosophy of the late Indian Buddhist philosophical syncretism called Yogācāra-Mādhyamika. Professor Ichigō believes the Madhyamakālāṃkāra to be Śāntarakṣita’s main work, and the basic source from which one can gain an understanding of Yogācāra-Mādhyamika philosophy. The ninety-seven verses of the Madhyamakālāṃkāra are extant only in Tibetan translation, and it is due to this fact, perhaps, that this text is less well-known than the same author’s Tattvasaṃgraha, extant in Sanskrit. Professor Ichigō, however, has been able to discover the original Sanskrit for a large number of the verses of the Madhyamakālāṃkāra. The references to citations of Śāntarakṣita’s verses in later texts enable us to get some idea of the impact his works had on the tradition that followed him. Among the later Indian authors whose names might be mentioned in this connection are Prajñākaramati, Mokṣākara-gupta, Jñānaśrīmitra, Jītārī and Atiśa.
Preface

Professor Ichigō’s critical edition of the Tibetan text is based on all available Tanjur editions of the bare verses, Śāntarakṣita’s own commentary, and the sub-commentary of Kamalaśīla. In this respect it stands as a model for such editions. The English translation of the often gnomic verses is rendered intelligible and authoritative by the inclusion of explanatory material based on the commentaries. The chapter concludes with a list of sūtras quoted in the commentary and sub-commentary to the text.

Professor Ichigō’s contribution presents yet another approach to the translation of Buddhist texts. While the translators of the Samādhīrāja sought to eliminate altogether the use of bracketed material, and while Professor Schopen sought to be almost mechanically literal, Professor Ichigō has attempted to produce a coherent and philosophically comprehensible rendition of the original. This has been achieved by introducing into the translation material not included in the text itself but provided in its commentaries or required by the sense of the argument.

A first version of Professor Ichigō’s essay, edition and translation was published in 1985 as part of a two-volume study accepted by Kyōto University as Professor Ichigō’s D. Litt. thesis (Madhyamakālaṁkāra and Chūgan Shōgonron no Kenkyū; Kyoto: Buneidō). The editors and the author had originally intended to publish the essay in the present volume simultaneously with Professor Ichigō’s book. Delays in the appearance of the present volume, however, allowed Professor Ichigō to thoroughly revise his entire contribution. Not only the introduction but also the edition and translation include substantial changes and additions not found in the earlier version.

Within certain technical limitations, the editors have sought to make the layout of the volume contribute to its ease of use. Unfortunately, despite (or perhaps because of) computer typesetting techniques, it proved impossible to print the notes as footnotes. The varied natures and emphases of the individual chapters have led to different approaches to format and style. The English translation of the Samādhīrāja has been paragraphed by the translators according to the sense of the text, as has the translation of the Vajracchedikā. The notes to the text of the Vajracchedikā, on the other hand, are treated as a separate section of the study, and are divided according to the folios and lines of the manuscript itself rather than according to the conceptual divisions of the text proper. In the case of the Madhyamakālaṁkāra, the critical notes to the edition are given after each verse and the verses and translation are
Preface

printed on facing pages. References to quotations or parallel passages are found in the notes to the translation. In all three parts, the editions and translations contain references to the pages or folios of the original texts.

This volume is the first product of a project initially authorized as a three-year experiment by the College of Literature, Sciences and the Arts at the University of Michigan. As such, it contains some of the fruits of the individual and collective efforts of the scholars associated with the project in its first two years. Insofar as the seminars and colloquia sponsored by the Institute for the Study of Buddhist Literature fostered the research which resulted in these papers, thereby furthering our understanding of Buddhist traditions in general, the goals of the Institute have been met. For their support of the Institute, its projects and its goals, we wish to express our gratitude to the Deans and the Executive Committee of the College of Literature, Sciences and the Arts of the University of Michigan.

The initial stages of Professor Gregory Schopen's work on the Vajracchedikā were part of a broader study of the Gilgit manuscripts begun under a Translations Grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities in 1979. Professor Masamichi Ichigō was able to visit the University of Michigan during 1982–83 thanks to the generosity of his home institution, Kyōto Sangyō Daigaku. The Institute was happy to be able to host another visit by Professor Ichigō during 1987–88, cosponsored this time by Kyōto Sangyō Daigaku, Higashi Honganji Ōtani-ha and the Institute. Professor Gishin Tokiwa, for one year a member of the team that translated the Samādhīrāja, was able to visit Michigan from his home institution of Hanazono College, Kyoto, thanks to a generous grant from the Japan Foundation. The editors wish to express their personal thanks to Professors Ichigō and Tokiwa for their many contributions to the project. We should also note that their experiences with joint translation projects in Japan proved valuable to the Michigan group's own efforts.

The manuscript of this book has a long and torturous history. During the initial stages of its preparation the Center for Japanese Studies and the Center for Chinese Studies at the University of Michigan generously allowed the use of their word-processing equipment, and for this we are indebted to them. The staff of the Publications Office, especially Barbara Congelosi, deserve our thanks for their technical assistance. The first drafts of the manuscript were typed by Patrick
Preface

Pranke, Belinda Bicknell, Edward Hamlin and Marcella Rose, and to them the editors owe their appreciation. The cooperation and advice of Janet Opdyke, editor of the publications program of the Center for South and Southeast Asian Studies at the University of Michigan, made it possible for the Institute to publish the present volume jointly with the Center.

It is our pleasure to acknowledge the help we received from Wendy Holden, Walter Spink and Karl Pohrt in designing the cover for this volume. The photo, of the left wall of the antechamber of cave seventeen at Ajanta, was kindly provided by the Asian Art Archives of the University of Michigan. The Chinese and Japanese characters were generated on an NEC computer, and we owe our thanks to T. Griffith Foulk for his assistance in this regard.

It remains to express our gratitude last but most certainly not least to Diane Scherer. At various stages over the long life of this volume, and in her present position as an editor at the Center for South and Southeast Asian Studies, she edited, typed and otherwise assisted its publication. It is no exaggeration to say that without her endlessly energetic, careful and dedicated work this volume, had it appeared at all, would have been much more imperfect than it now is.

The Editors
Ann Arbor
February 1989
LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS

Luis O. Gómez is Charles O. Hucker Professor of Buddhist Studies and Chair of the Department of Asian Languages and Cultures at the University of Michigan. His main research interests include Indian Mahāyāna Buddhist literature and early Sino-Tibetan Ch’an. His most recent major publications include “The Direct and Gradual Approaches of Zen Master Mahāyāna: Fragments of the Teachings of Mo-ho-yen,” “Indian Materials on the Doctrine of Sudden Enlightenment,” “From the Extraordinary to the Ordinary: Images of the Bodhisattva in East Asia,” and “Purifying Gold: The Metaphor of Effort and Intuition in Buddhist Thought and Practice.”

Masamichi Ichigō is a professor at Kyōto Sangyō Daigaku in Kyoto, Japan. He holds a D. Litt. degree from Kyōto University, and specializes in Indian Mādhyamika Buddhist philosophy, especially that of Śāntarakṣita. His major publications include Chūgan Shōgonron no Kenkyū [A study of the Madhyamkālaṃkāra], Sanmai-ō kyō [The Samādhīrāja-sūtra], “Yugagyō-Chūgan-ha” [The Yogācāra-Mādyamika], and numerous articles.

Gregory Schopen is Professor of Religious Studies and Adjunct Professor of Tibetan Studies at Indiana University, Bloomington. The recipient of a MacArthur Fellowship, he is particularly interested in the history of Indian Buddhism, and Indian Buddhist literature and inscriptions. He has published extensively, including most recently “Two Problems in the History of Indian Buddhism: The Layman/Monk Distinction and the Doctrines of the Transference of Merit,” “The Bodhi-garbhañākāralaṅkāsa and Vimalaṣṭīṣa Dhāraṇīs in Indian Inscriptions,” and “Burial ‘Ad Sanctos’ and the Physical Presence of the Buddha in Early Indian Buddhism.”

Jonathan A. Silk is a doctoral student in Buddhist Studies at the University of Michigan, specializing in Indian Buddhism.
PART I

The Sūtra of the King of Samādhīs

Chapters I–IV

Translated by
the Staff and Associates of the Institute

Edited, with an introduction and notes by
Luis O. Gómez and Jonathan A. Silk

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ABBREVIATIONS AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

The following list identifies abbreviations used in the text and provides reference information for the works cited in the notes to this study. For those works listed in detail in the sections discussing modern research on the sūtra (5.1.2, 5.2 and 5.3) or in the section treating the sūtra’s position in Mahāyāna literature (3.2), the list below provides only a note to author and date and a reference to the location in the introduction where the complete bibliographic data can be found. The editions used in this study are cited under the names of the texts rather than the editors and the title of the published work is provided only when it differs from that of the original text.

References to classical texts are either to page and line (arabic numerals separated by a period), to volume and page (separated by a colon), or to chapter and verse (separated by a colon).

AN: Aṅguttara-Nikāya.


Aś: Avadānaśataka.

Aṣṭa: Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā.


BCAP: Bodhicaryāvatāra-pañjikā.

Abbreviations and Bibliography

——, ed. 1904. See 3.2.


Bongard-Levin, G., ed. 1979. See 5.1.2.


Chandra Das, Rai Sarat and Pandit Harimohan Vidyabhushan, eds. 1896. See 5.1.2.


**D:** Derge edition of the Tibetan Tripitaka.


**DN:** *Dīgha-Nikāya.*

**Du:** Nalinaksha Dutt’s 1941–54 edition of the *Samādhīrāja.* See 5.1.2.

Dutt, Nalinaksha. 1941–54. See Du and 5.1.2


———. 1963. See 5.2.


**Gv:** *Gaṇḍavyūha-sūtra.*

Hachiriki Hiroki. 1966. See 5.3.


IBK: Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū.


II BhK: Second Bhāvanākrama of Kamalaśīla. Tōh 3916 (D dbu ma, ki, 42a1–55b3).


IIJ: Indo-Iranian Journal.

JA: Journal Asiaticque.


Lv: Lalitavistara.

Ma: Matsunami’s 1975 edition of the Samādhīrāja. See 5.1.2.

MA: Madhyamakālaṃkāra-kārika.


Abbreviations and Bibliography


MAP: Madhyamakālaṁkāra-pañjikā.


——, ed. 1975. See 5.1.2.

Mav: Madhyamakāvatāra and Bhāṣya.

MAV: Madhyamakālaṁkāra-uptoolsī.


Mitsukawa Toyoki. 1967. See 5.3.

MN: Majjhima-Nikāya.

MS(s): manuscripts(s).


Mv: Mahāvastu.

Mvy: Mahāvyutpatti.

NBGN: Nihon Bukkyō Gakkai Nenpō.

**OLZ:** Orientalistische Literaturzeitung.


**Pras:** Prasannapadā.


Régamey, Constantin, ed. 1938. See 5.1.2.

Rockwell, John, Jr. 1980. See 5.1.2.


Schopen, Gregory. 1977. See 5.3.


Śiksā: Śikṣāsamuccaya.


**SN:** Sāmyutta-Nīkāya.

**SOR:** Serie Orientale Roma.

Sr: Samādhirāja-sūtra. References are to Vaidya’s edition, unless otherwise noted. Citations are to chapter and verse (separated by a colon) or to page and line number (separated by a period). See 5.1.2.


s.v.: sub voce.


Taiun Hayashi, trans. 1930. See 5.2.

Tamura Chijun and Ichigō Masamichi. 1975. See 5.2.

Tatz, Mark. 1972. See 5.1.2.

TDKK: Taishō Daigaku Kenkyū Kiyō.

Thakur, Anantalal, ed. 1959. See 3.2.


Vaidya, P. L. See Va and 5.1.2.


The King of Samādhis: Chapters I–IV

INTRODUCTION TO THE ENGLISH TRANSLATION

1. Prefatory Note

The pages following this introduction contain an English translation of the first four chapters of the *Samādhīrāja-sūtra*. This Mahāyāna Buddhist text was composed in an Indic language, probably Sanskrit, perhaps as early as the second century C.E. The text is often referred to in the Buddhist philosophical literature of India and Tibet and was considered an important proof text, especially by the philosophers of the Madhyamaka tradition. Although it is questionable how much the sūtra itself was read in Tibet, it is often cited in Tibetan philosophical literature, probably mostly on the basis of quotations found in Indian texts. The sūtra seems to have had a less glorious history in the Far East, where it was translated several times but was seldom quoted. It is not part of any of the sūtra collections within the Tibetan and Chinese Canons, though it is found as an independent text in both. In Nepal the *Samādhīrāja* was counted as one of the “Nine Dharmas,” a set of texts so highly revered that its manuscripts were used as objects of worship.¹

Apart from its place in the canonical collections of Buddhist literature in Tibet and China, the sūtra is also known from a single manuscript recovered from Gilgit in present-day Pakistan. The intrinsic value of the sūtra, however, may lie in what its contents reveal to us about the beliefs and perhaps even practices of Indian Mahāyāna Buddhism.

1.1 The Translation

The present translation is the result of an experiment in team translation. A committee of from five to nine persons worked on the project
over a one-year period. Strict controls were used in the hope of insuring accuracy and a natural and uniform style; still, the end product is essentially the fruit of collective effort and consensus. The fundamental presupposition of this approach is that a variety of perspectives brings the translation process closer to one of its most important goals—to make a text intelligible to a wide audience. The team approach also seeks to combine the scholarly perspectives and expertise of more than one individual. At the same time, it is hoped that the critical methods adopted by the group have filtered out some of the idiosyncrasies and unnatural English constructions that have become the trademark of modern translations of Buddhist texts.

One member of the team, Luis O. Gómez, served as redactor and was invested with the authority to decide issues where no consensus could be reached. However, since the object of the team approach was to have as much discussion and criticism as possible, and to let the translation grow with the discussion, the redactor’s prerogatives were used only in cases of unreconciled disagreement.

Normally, discussion was allowed to run its course until some form of consensus was reached. We sought to balance the tendency of group effort to settle for the lowest common denominator by the constant use of established critical tools. While consensus was an important consideration, we provided control through the drafting of numerous revisions, always with the original in view, and by leaving the two most fundamental tasks—casting the first draft and redacting the final version—to individual members of the team.

The classical versions of the sūtra were also considered in our discussions, but not as different limbs of some imaginary conflated text. Therefore, the multilingual approach was conceived of as an interpretive tool, not as a criterion for editorial emendation. Only one recension, that of the Nepalese manuscripts, was chosen as the primary object of translation. We utilized the edition of Matsunami, since it is the only critical edition of these manuscripts. Other editions and recensions were used as hermeneutical devices. Only in the most obscure passages, where Matsunami’s text or his manuscripts defied translation, was any attempt made to correct the Nepalese recension, or Matsunami’s edition, in the light of other recensions. Otherwise it was assumed that Matsunami’s readings were “correct,” in the sense that they represent an actual textual tradition, not a mere scribal accident. This principle was followed even when, occasionally, Matsunami’s text appeared to be grammatically irregular or doctrinally inconsistent with other sources.

Accordingly, the translation team abstained from any attempt at reconstructing the “original,” “early” or “complete” version of the text by
conflating the available recensions. In this way we feel we are presenting the translation of a real text, an actual religious object, and not simply a scholar's idea of what the Samādhirāja must have been at some undetermined point in time.

1.2 Critical Apparatus

Notes and Sanskrit terms have been kept to a minimum. On the first occurrence of a key technical term or a problematic translation, we have included the original Sanskrit in parentheses, unless the term has been discussed in a note. We have also abandoned the widespread convention of using brackets to indicate those parts of the English translation that do not have an exact Sanskrit equivalent. This follows from the simple principle that no Sanskrit phrase has a one-to-one English correspondence, and that the consistent recourse to brackets would result in such ubiquitous use that it would interrupt the flow of normal English prose. Likewise, every effort has been made to keep to a bare minimum other matters traditionally included in brackets (e.g., translator's interpolations). It is hoped that this will provide a more readable, yet still accurate, text.

The annotation as well as the introductory material is limited. It is meant only as a guide to the more fundamental and general problems in the study of the text.

Translation Committee:

The following persons participated in this project as members of the translation committee of the University of Michigan's Collegiate Institute for the Study of Buddhist Literature: Madhav Deshpande, Kenneth DeWoskin, Luis O. Gómez, Clair W. Huntington, Masamichi Ichigō, Patrick Pranke, Gregory Schopen, Robert Sharf and Gishin Tokiwa.
2. The Text

2.1 The Sūtra’s Early History

The early history of the sūtra is far from certain, but an educated guess is that the text took form between the second century C.E., when it is generally believed Madhyamaka thought emerged as a distinct philosophical tradition, and the sixth century, the date of the Gilgit manuscript, the earliest extant recension of the text. This does not mean that the text was not in existence in some form before the second century, as “the beginning of the Madhyamaka” is far from being a terminus a quo. Since the relationship between the sūtra and the Madhyamaka as a philosophical school is far from clear, their relative chronologies are not beyond argument, and the dates of Nāgārjuna’s life (assuming that these mark the beginning of the school) are still open to question. Furthermore, a Chinese translation of the sūtra by An Shih-kao (fl. mid-second century C.E.) has been recorded in the catalogues. This fact would make the second century a terminus ante quem. At any rate, it is obvious that the sūtra underwent many changes throughout its history, and that a considerable number of interpolations were added between the time of the Gilgit recension and the ninth century, the date of the Tibetan translation.

Two fragments of a Chinese translation by Hsien Kung of the Liu-Sung dynasty (420–79) represent the earliest extant dated redaction. This is followed by the complete translation in ten scrolls of Narendraśaśas (worked in Honan 557–68) and the Gilgit manuscript, which dates from roughly the same period. Since the present Nepalese text corresponds closely to the Tibetan translation, and has much additional material not found in the ten-scroll Chinese translation, Constantin Régamey offered the hypothesis that the text was constituted in its present form in the period between the sixth and ninth centuries, that is, between Narendraśaśas’s translation and the earliest Nepalese manuscript. But Régamey himself rejected this possibility for three reasons. First, in some passages (e.g., in chapter XXII) the Chinese translation represents a more developed version than either the Nepalese Sanskrit or the Tibetan texts. Second, quotations from the Samādhīrāja in Candrakīrti’s Prasannapadā and in Śāntideva’s Śiksāsamuccaya correspond quite accurately to the modern (nineteenth century) Nepalese manuscript tradition. This suggests that there may have been a different recension, very similar to the recension represented today by the Nepalese or Tibetan texts, as early as the sixth century or, at the latest,
King of Samādhis

by the seventh century. Lastly, in at least one case cited by Régamey (chapter VIII), the Chinese translation omits the gāthās (verses), quoted by Candrakīrti. Régamey concluded that “the Chinese text is either an abridged translation or is based on a shorter recension of the Samādhirāja sūtra.” Moreover, Régamey was writing before the Gilgit manuscript had been published. Today we are able to distinguish three textual traditions represented by (1) the Gilgit manuscript, (2) the Chinese translation, and (3) the Nepalese manuscripts and the Tibetan translation.

Following Régamey’s original suggestion, Shinkan Murakami has assumed a linear development from the Gilgit to the Nepalese recensions, with the Tibetan text representing an intermediate stage. However, this seems unjustified unless one can demonstrate a clear genetic relationship between the various recensions. Furthermore, the Gilgit recension moves in a different direction, close to the extant Chinese, but not exactly in the direction of the recension known to the translators of the Kanjur. Murakami also attempted to show that chapter XXXIV of the sūtra (“Jñānavātī-parivarta”) corresponds to the Yüeh-ming p’u-sa ching, a short, perhaps fragmentary, text translated by Chih Ch’ien in the middle of the third century. It is difficult to see, however, what the correspondences are, apart from a few names that could be Chinese equivalents of some of the names in the Sanskrit chapter.

2.2 Its Titles

In the West scholars have preferred the short title Samādhirāja, but the work is known under several names in Asia. In India the two most common titles are Samādhirāja-sūtra, an allusion to the main theme of the text, and Candrapradipa-sūtra (perhaps an allusion to the main character in the sūtra, the Bodhisattva Candraprabha). The full Tibetan title in the Kanjur is 'Phags-pa chos thams-cad kyi rang-bzhin mnyam-pa-nyid rnam-par spros-pa ting-nge-'dzin gyi rgyal-po zhes bya-ba theg-pa chen-po'i mdo. This corresponds to Sarva-dharma-svabhāva-samatā-vipañcita-samādhirāja-nāma-mahāyāna-sūtra, which is the Sanskrit title given in the sūtra itself. The Chinese have preferred Yüeh-teng san-mei ching, that is to say, *Candrapradipa-samādhi-sūtra.

The sūtra declares its main theme to be a particular samādhi that is supposed to be the key to all elements in the path and to all the virtues and merits of buddhas and bodhisattvas. This state of mind, or spiritual practice, is called “the samādhi that is manifested as the sameness of the
essential nature of all dharmas" (sarva-dharma-svabhava-samatā-vipañcita-samādhi). One may be tempted to assume that this refers to one particular form or state of contemplation; however, here the term “samādhi” is understood in its broadest signification. This samādhi is at the same time the cognitive experience of emptiness, the attainment of the attributes of buddhahood, and the performance of a variety of practices or daily activities of a bodhisattva—including service and adoration at the feet of all buddhas. The word samādhi is also used to mean the sūtra itself. Consequently, we can speak of an equation, sūtra = samādhi = śūnyatā, underlying the text. In this sense the title Samādhirāja expresses accurately the content of the sūtra.

On the other hand, it is not clear why some traditions have chosen to use the name Candrapradīpa as part of the title, for the main character is called Candraprabha, never Candrapradīpa. The two names are almost synonymous, but are not used interchangeably in the main body of the sūtra. Finally, in Śāntarakṣita’s Vṛtti to his Madhyamakālaṃkāra and in Kamalaśīla’s Pañjikā, a verse from the Samādhirāja is quoted under the title Śnying-rje chen-po la ’jug pa’i mdo, which could be reconstructed in Sanskrit as *Mahākaruṇāvatāra-sūtra. This title could be derived from stanza 20 of the sūtra’s third chapter, in which it is stated that “this sūtra is called the entrance into great compassion” (mahākaruṇam otāram idam sūtram nirucyate). This title is attested also at the end of the Sanskrit text, where it is said the sūtra should be remembered under the title of Mahākaruṇāvatara, and at the end of the Chinese translation, where we find “This sūtra should be called The entrance into great compassion,” a phrase corresponding to *Mahākaruṇāvatāra.

The second element in the appellation Samādhirāja-bhaṭṭāraka is an honorific, similar in meaning to the first member of the more common compound Ārya-samādhirāja. Neither of these expressions is to be counted as a title different from Samādhirāja.

2.3 Structure

The Gilgit manuscript and the Chinese translation of the Samādhirāja represent early recensions that are shorter than those of the tradition represented by the Nepalese manuscripts and the Tibetan translation. The Chinese translation has no chapter divisions and the other versions do not always agree with each other with regard to chapter divisions. Still, the bulk of the text and its distribution into chapters is roughly the same in all versions. A summary of the most important differences between the Sanskrit manuscripts and the classical translations is given in Chart 1.
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†The edition of Das and Vidyabhushan is supposedly based on the “Hodgson Manuscript.” Mañjuśrīkṛṣṭi’s commentary and the edition of Das and Vidyabhushan call chapter III “Buddhānumśṛti” and chapter IV “Samādhi.”
‡The abbreviation ch. stands for chüan (scrolls). The Chinese version has no chapter divisions.
2.4 Leading Themes and Narrative Schema

2.4.1 Leading Themes

The most common title for the sūtra, *Samādhirāja*, as well as the samādhi that gives it this name, suggest a unifying theme for the text. At the beginning of the sūtra, in reply to the questions of Candraprabha, the Buddha enters a samādhi called in the Sanskrit version “the samādhi that is manifested as the sameness of the essential nature of all dharmanas.” The Buddha then explains the virtues or extraordinary qualities of this samādhi, urges Candraprabha to practice it, and expounds on the merits of “preserving the samādhi,” a concept that will recur throughout the sūtra and which denotes preserving, in memory or in written form, the text of the sūtra, as well as the variety of spiritual exercises usually associated with the term samādhi. The latter aspect of the practice is defined in chapter III as *buddhānusmṛti*, or meditation on the attributes of the Buddha. But in chapter IV it becomes apparent that the samādhi is also defined by a cognitive experience that entails both insight and power. Having declared this samādhi to be the highest state, the Buddha then explains how all existing things should be seen as having no essence, as being like a dream or a magical show. If one correctly examines in this manner all existence, one attains an awakening that contains the highest merits and powers. This will be the central idea of the core chapters of the sūtra (chapters V–XXXVII).

After chapter IV the text alternates between narrative sections and speculative considerations of the central themes of the first four chapters. The bulk of the sūtra consists of expository passages describing in detail the “preservation of the samādhi” and its fruits, *buddhānusmṛti*, the nature and virtues of a buddha, a buddha’s body, the nature of his speech and silence, his realization of emptiness and so forth. However, one should not underestimate the importance of the narrative sections, both as fine examples of Buddhist literature and as doctrinal statements.

Other topics developed in the sūtra include the following: the manner in which the samādhi is to be practiced, the six perfections, the śīlas and the body of the Buddha. The sūtra also defines, cursorily and in catechetical form, some three hundred problematic words and phrases, which seem to have been culled from various scriptural sources to define the merits and powers of the samādhi. Finally, the sūtra concludes by relating how it was transmitted to Ānanda so that he would pass it on to future generations. This conclusion follows established conventions about the proper ending of a text of this genre. The traditional form and
content of this section (the parīndanā) signal the text’s closure and confirm its sacred origins and purposes.

2.4.2 Outline

The following is a survey of the contents of the sūtra’s forty chapters, according to the Nepalese recension. The English rendering of the title of each chapter is not meant to be an exact translation of the Sanskrit name. It is rather a gloss on the title or, wherever possible, a more accurate epitome of the content of the chapter.

All of the chapters have been summarized in English by Dutt, though his reports are not always accurate. Some of the chapters have been translated into various western languages, as indicated after each of the relevant summaries. More complete bibliographic information is provided below in section 5 of this introduction.

A. Introduction

1. Setting for the Narrative

Chapter I. Nidāna: The Setting

Once, when the Blessed One was staying on Vulture Peak (Grḍhra-kūṭa) near Rājagrha, he was approached by a young man named Candraprabha who asks him how to attain the knowledge possessed by a buddha. The Buddha replies that such knowledge, and all the virtues of a buddha, can be obtained by following a single practice (dharma), a samādhi called “the samādhi that is manifested as the sameness of the essential nature of all dharmas.” This is the King of Samādhis, from which the sūtra takes its name.

The sūtra then gives a list of approximately three hundred synonyms or attributes of this samādhi. (Translated in the present collection.)

2. Further Definition of Samādhi

Chapter II. Sālendrarāja: Previous Life of the Buddha as Sālendrarāja

The Buddha narrates how this samādhi was obtained and preserved by previous buddhas, especially at the time of the former Buddha
Sālendrarāja, when Śākyamuni was reborn as a king. In those times Candraprabha was a powerful monarch who supported the Buddha and learned this samādhi from him.

This chapter includes a short formula of transmission similar to the one found at the end of sūtras.

(Translated in the present collection.)

B. The King of Samādhis

1. The Nature of Samādhi

Chapter III. Bhūtaguṇavaraṇaprakāśana: The Virtues of a Buddha

This chapter deals with a variety of topics, but is meant primarily as a description of the virtues and merits of a buddha. Such descriptions serve as the basis for the practice of contemplating the qualities of a tathāgata (buddhānusmṛti). The sūtra also suggests that meditation on the qualities of the Buddha and the recitation and preservation of the sūtra are synonymous.

This chapter suggests another name for the sūtra—Mahākarunāvatāra-sūtra, the “Sūtra Which Is an Entrance to Great Compassion.”

(Translated in the present collection.)

Chapter IV. Buddhānusmṛti: Different Aspects of Samādhi and Meditation on the Buddha’s Virtues

This chapter defines the term “samādhi” with a series of synonyms. It then discusses some of the practices required for the proper practice of samādhi and expands on the theme of the qualities of a buddha that should be an object of meditation in samādhi.

(Translated in the present collection and by Rockwell.)

2. The Virtues that Accompany this Samādhi

Chapter V. Ghoṣadatta: Story of the Former Buddha Ghoṣadatta

This chapter introduces the former Buddha Ghoṣadatta and King Drḍhabala, both of whom will appear again in other chapters on the former existences of the Buddha (chapters XXXIII and XVII, respectively). The story, however, centers on King Mahābala, who received the teaching on the King of Samādhis from the Tathāgata Ghoṣadatta and,
through the practice of this samādhi, eventually became a tathāgatha named Jñānaśūra.

Chapter VI. Samādhi: Prerequisites for Samādhi

The various practices or virtues necessary for the practice of samādhi (samādhi-parikarma) are discussed in general terms.
(Translated by Rockwell.)

Chapter VII. Triksāntyavatāra: The Three Levels of the Virtue of Patience

This chapter provides a categorization of “patience” (kṣānti) which is unique to this sūtra. The term is used in its broadest signification as meaning patience, composure, understanding, receptivity, etc.
(Translated by Rockwell.)

Chapter VIII. Abhāvasamudgata: Story of the Former Buddha Abhāvasamudgata

A former buddha called Abhāvasamudgata once delivered an inspiring sermon. Prince Mahākarunācintin was so moved by it that he retired from the lay life in order to practice the King of Samādhis. After many lifetimes, and as a result of the practice of this samādhi, the prince was reborn as a buddha called Suvicintitārtha.

The stanzas accompanying this story contain valuable philosophical material reinforcing the connection between the doctrine of emptiness and the practice of the samādhi.
(Translated by Régamey.)

Chapter IX. Gambhīradharmakṣānti: Receptivity to the Profound Dharma

This is a doctrinal chapter on emptiness and the various practices required of one seeking to master the samādhi and to attain enlightenment.
(Translated by Rockwell.)
C. Second Narrative Section

Chapter X. Purapraveśa: The Buddha Visits Candraprabha

Here the Buddha encourages Candraprabha to practice all of the requisites for enlightenment to their fullest extent. Candraprabha invites the Buddha to visit his home in Rājagṛha. The Buddha's entrance into the city is described in detail.

D. Again the Virtues of the Samādhi

Chapter XI. Sūtradhāraṇā: Preserving the Sūtra

In reply to Candraprabha's questions, the Buddha expounds further on the path. His discourse ends with a recommendation to memorize and preserve the sūtra. Such recommendations punctuate the text and are especially obvious in chapters XVIII, XXXII and XL, in which the main topic is the theme of transmission and preservation.

(Translated by Tatz.)

Chapter XII. Samādhyanuśikṣaṇā: Recounting the Virtues of the Buddha through the Practice of Samādhi

The Buddha's virtues and the state of mind that is the liberating samādhi are the same insofar as they are both ungraspable and empty. The chapter further addresses the bodhisattva's detachment.

Chapter XIII. Samādhinirdeśa: Explanation of the True Meaning of Samādhi

The true meaning of the King of Samādhis is the experience of emptiness.

E. The Narrative Resumes

1. Third Narrative Section

Chapter XIV. Smitasamādārśana: The Buddha's Smile

After a brief recasting of the theme of the previous chapter, Candraprabha recites the perfections mastered by the Buddha in his former
existsences and makes a vow to become a buddha himself. Upon hearing this the Buddha smiles. Maitreya then asks about the meaning of the Buddha's smile.

Chapter XV. Smitavyākaraṇa: The Reasons for the Buddha’s Smile

This chapter explains the reasons for the Buddha’s smile. The Buddha predicts Candraprabha’s enlightenment and his future name as a buddha, Vimalaprabha.

Chapter XVI. Pūrvayoga: Previous Existence of the Buddha as the Son of Matirāja

This chapter recounts the story of Prince Matirāja, who was Śākyamuni’s incarnation at the time of the Buddha Śīmhadhvaja. The prince was saved from an incurable disease by the recitation of the Samādhirāja by the reciter (dharmabhāṇaka) Brahmadatta.

The Buddha predicts the future decay of the monastic life among certain monks.

2. Narrative Bridge

Chapter XVII. Bahubuddhanirhārasamādhimukha: Approaches to the Samādhi that Manifests Multiple Buddhas

The Buddha travels to the Vulture Peak to deliver a sermon. Once there, Candraprabha asks for an explanation of the dharmaś required to attain the King of Samādhis. After enumerating and defining four of these dharmaś, the Buddha recounts his previous lives as King Śiribala and as the son of King Drdhhabala. In stanzas 56–129 this chapter also repeats some of the terms enumerated in chapter I and defined in chapters XXXVIII and XXXIX.

Chapter XVIII. Samādhyanuparindana: Transmission of the Samādhi to Candraprabha

This is the first of the two “transmission” chapters (chapters XVIII and XL) and the third of the transmission passages. See also chapters II, XI, XXXII and XL.
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F. Second Doctrinal Section

Chapter XVIX. Acintyabuddhadharmanirdeśa: Explanation of the Inconceivable Dharma of the Buddha

This chapter deals with the impossibility of conceiving the full nature of buddhas or their teachings.
(Translated by Régamey.)

Chapter XX. Indraketudhvajarāja: Teachings of the Former Buddha Indraketu

This is an exposition of the teachings of emptiness and the paradox of teaching and preserving the Dharma with words.

G. Avadāna

Chapter XXI. Pūrvayoga: A Previous Existence

This chapter uses the *mise en scène* of two friends in a previous existence to expound upon the importance of virtuous friends. It is said in some manuscripts that this is the story of an incarnation of Dipankara and Śākyamuni before their meeting as buddha and future buddha.

H. Third Doctrinal Section

1. General Statements

Chapter XXII. Tathāgatakāyanirdeśa: Description of the Body of a Tathāgata

This chapter discusses the bodhisattva’s detachment and the two bodies of a buddha, rūpakāya and dharma-kāya.
(Translated by Régamey.)

Chapter XXIII. Tathāgatācintyanirdeśa: The Inconceivability of the Tathāgata

This is an exposition on the four kinds of “penetrating understanding” (*pratisamveśa*) as a key to the nature of reality and buddhahood, and a discussion of their inconceivability.
Chapter XXIV. Pratisamvidavatāra: Approaches to Penetrating Understanding

This chapter develops the main theme of chapter XXIII.

Chapter XXV. Anumodanā: Rejoicing at the Merit of Others

This chapter concerns (1) the transfer to other beings of the merit of the aspiration toward buddhahood and (2) the merit of taking pleasure in the merit of others.

Chapter XXVI. Dānānuśaṃsā: The Value of Generosity

The practice of the virtue of giving generously and the fruits that result from such a practice are discussed in this chapter.

Chapter XXVII. Śilanirdeśa: Explanation of the Virtue of Morality

This chapter describes the benefits of practicing a pure morality.

Chapter XXVIII. Daśaṃsuśaṃsā: Ten Advantages

This chapter lists the ten advantages to be gained by each of ten different practices of the bodhisattvas. These practices are: (1) patience and benevolence; (2) energy; (3) meditation; (4) discernment; (5) learning; (6) preaching the Dharma; (7) mental cultivation of emptiness; (8) solitude; (9) retiring to the forest; and (10) living on alms.

2. The Virtues of this Samādhi

Chapter XXIX. Tejagunaṇarāja: Previous Life of Śākyamuni at the Time of the Tathāgata Tejagunaṇarāja

The Buddha uses the story of his life as King Drīḍhadatta to recommend the life of the hermit to ruling monarchs. The chapter ends with a long passage praising the virtues of the samādhi.

Chapter XXX. Anuṣaṃsā: Merits of the Samādhi

This chapter continues the last section of the previous chapter.
Introduction

Chapter XXXI. Sarvadharmasvabhāvanirdeśa: Explanation of the Absence of an Essence in all Dharmas

This chapter discusses the sūtra's description of itself as the sūtra of the samādhi that produces the realization of the sameness of all things. The virtues of someone who masters this samādhi are explained in detail.

I. Preserving the Samādhīrāja

Chapter XXXII. Sūtradhāraṇānuṣaṁśa: The Value of Preserving the Sūtra

This chapter first discusses the prerequisites for the full knowledge (mahābhijñā) of enlightenment, and then fully details the ungraspable character of this experience and its expressions. Finally, the sūtra itself is praised as an embodiment of the knowledge of buddhas and bodhisattvas. This chapter explores several topics which on the surface appear to be quite distinct, but probably should be understood to be connected through the equation sūtra = samādhi = śūnyatā.

J. Narrative Section: Avadānas

1. The Bodhisattva’s Perfect Generosity and Sacrifice of Self: Doctrinal Points Illustrated with Exemplary Stories

Chapter XXXIII. Kṣemadatta: The Story of Buddha as Kṣemadatta

The previous incarnation of Śākyamuni as Kṣemadatta, a disciple of Buddha Ghoṣadatta, is recounted. This took place at the time of King Śrīghoṣa, a previous birth of Maitreya. Kṣemadatta showed his dedication and renunciation by burning his right hand.

(Partly translated by Filliozat.)

Chapter XXXIV. Jñānavati: The Story of Jñānavatī

To illustrate the true practice of unattached giving, Śākyamuni tells the story of Jñānavatī, daughter of King Jñānabala who reigned at the time of Buddha Acintyapraṇidhānaviśeṣasamudgataṇā. She cut a piece of her own flesh and offered it as food to a monk named Bhūtamati who was ill and in need of nourishment. Unaware of its origin, the monk ate
the meat and was cured. After several subsequent existences of intense practice, Jñānavatī became a male at the time of Buddha Dipaprabha. Bhūtamati was later reborn as Dīpankara, Jñānabala as Maitreya, and his daughter Jñānavatī as Śākyamuni.

(Partly translated by Weller.)

Chapter XXXV. Supuṣpacandra: The Story of Supuṣpacandra

This chapter contains an avadāna reminiscent of the “Kṣāntivādin-avadāna” of the Jātakamālā. It is the story of Padmottara Buddha when he was reborn as the reciter of the Dharma (dharmabhāṇaka) Supuṣpacandra, at the time of Buddha Ratnapadmacandravīṣudhāhvyudgatarāja. At that time Śākyamuni was a jealous king called Śūradatta who, upon seeing Supuṣpacandra’s success in converting the ladies of his court and harem, suspected him of having dishonest intentions and had him killed. Unlike other stories of the genre, this one does not end with the bodhisattva’s miraculous recovery or return to life.

The main narrative of this chapter is quoted by Prajñākaramati in his Bodhicaryāvatāra-pañjikā, with the notation Supuṣpacandrasya itivṛttake. The title of this chapter is deceptive. Only a few introductory lines refer to the theme of the constituents of morality. Most of the chapter consists of sixty-nine stanzas on the merit of preserving and reciting this sūtra.

K. Praise of the Samādhirāja

Chapter XXXVI. Śīlaskandhanirdeśa: Explanation of the Element of Morality in the Path

At the time of Buddha Gañēśvara there were many corrupt monks who did not practice the true Dharma and resented those who did. The king Varapuṣpa was a devout disciple of the Buddha and had as spiritual guide a monk named Yaśahprabha. The latter’s virtue provoked envy among the less virtuous monks, but they could not harm him because he
was protected by one of the king’s sons. The latter was Puṇyamati Bodhisattva, who would later become Maitraka Buddha. His father, King Varapuṣpa, would become Padmottara Buddha (see chapter XXXV).

**M. Terminological Review**

*Chapter XXXVIII. Kāyavāṃmanaḥsaṅvara: The True Meaning of Restraint of Body, Speech and Mind*

This chapter explains the meaning of self-restraint in Mahāyāna terms. It can be construed as a development of the first three of the “three hundred words” listed in chapters I and XVII as attributes or virtues of the King of Samādhis.

*Chapter XXXIX. Padatrisatanirdeśa: Explanation of the Three Hundred Terms*

This chapter attempts to define most of the remaining terms from the lists in chapters I and XVII.

**N. Coda: Transmission**

*Chapter XL. Parīndanā: Transmission*

This chapter follows the traditional themes of the “transmission” section of a sūtra.

**2.5 Characteristics of Style and Structure**

In many ways the *Samādhīrāja* follows the traditional stylistic and structural model of most Mahāyāna sūtras. The text is loosely held together and there is no obvious overarching thread of argument. Still, it would be inaccurate to limit a description of the text to those features that are common to the genre. Furthermore, the text cannot be explained as a simple expansion of the outline laid down in the introductory chapter (*nīdāna*). The sūtra is not a recasting, by repetition and enumeration, of this catechetic list. To accept such descriptions as exact and complete one would have to ignore the bulk of the text—its argumentative, expository and narrative elements.
King of Samādhis

Our understanding of the function and meaning of Mahāyāna sūtras, as well as our knowledge of their role in the religious life of the community (*Sitz im Leben*), is still imperfect. The *Samādhirāja* certainly does not fit the stereotypes that are often used to explain the peculiarities of sūtra style. This sūtra shows some of the stock phrases that recur in the genre, but it is difficult to see how these repetitions and their purported mnemonic function could explain the most distinctive features of our text. In this sūtra the expository and the formulaic clearly interact with a narrative frame.

As far as literary form is concerned, the *Samādhirāja* is written in mixed prose and verse. In general, these differences in form are not significant. At times the prose provides only a preliminary, and often unnecessary, setting or explanation for the verse. The latter sometimes repeats the prose or, at best, continues the thread of the narrative or the argument with no transparent stylistic purpose. The verse is of mixed quality, but for the most part it is of some aesthetic merit, though never classical in style or form. For the most part figures of speech in the sūtra fit the categories described by Georg von Simson in his study of the so-called Sanskrit Canon.16

In terms of theme and style, the sūtra can be divided into three classes of passages. First, the main narrative or backbone of the text, that is, the events surrounding the Buddha’s meeting with Candraprabha. Only five chapters—I, X, XIV, XV and XL—are dedicated to this narrative theme. Also in a semi-narrative style are the *avadānas* or *pūruayogas* inserted throughout the sūtra—chapters II, V, VIII, XVI, XX, XXI, XXIX, XXXIII, XXXIV, XXXV and XXXVII. This leaves the bulk of the text (twenty-four chapters) for expository prose and verse.

The *Samādhirāja* weaves into its plot a great number of traditional themes, stock phrases and idioms, many of which are common to non-Mahāyāna Buddhist literature as well. In the first four chapters alone we count the following (page and line numbers refer to Vaidya’s edition):

1. formulae establishing the setting of sūtras (*nidāna*):
   a. opening formula and description of the assembly (1.1–22): *evam may ā śrutam* . . .
   b. the formula to introduce the interlocutor (2.5–9): *tena khalu punaḥ samayena tasmīn śrīva parsatamnipātē* . . .
   c. the formula of salutation and questioning (2.9–16): *prceheyam aham* . . .
2. the Dharma that is good in the beginning, the middle and the end (2.3-4): dharmāṁ deśayati sma ādau kalyāṇam madhye kalyāṇam...

3. the single dharma that summarizes all teachings and practices (3.21-25): ekadharmena... samanvāgato bodhisattvo mahāsattvah...

4. a great number of those present attain realization (7.8-14): asmin khalu punaḥ... dharmaparyāye bhagavatā bhaṣyamāne...

5. portents: an earthquake at the end of the Buddha's sermon (7.14-24): ayam ca trīsāhasramahāsāhasro lokadhātuḥ śaḍvikāram kampitaḥ...

6. a buddha's former existence (8.3-10): smarami... purim-abhave... Also 310 (app. I, no. 4): ye smarāmy aham anekāni kalpakoṭiniyutaśatasāhasrāni...

7. epithets of a buddha (13.8-9 and 13.10-19): tathāgato 'rhan samyaksambuddhaḥ...

8. traditional idiom to request and formulate a definition (19.1-3): samādhīḥ samādhir iti bhagavann ucyate, katam asya etad dharmasya adhivacanam samādhir iti... samādhīḥ samādhir iti kumārocyate yad uta cittasya nidhyaptiḥ.

9. formulae to introduce gāthās (2.17-18, 3.26 and 8.1-2): atha khalu... tasyāṁ velāyāṁ... gāthābhīr adhyabhaṣata; atha khalu... tasyāṁ velāyāṁ... bhūyasya mātrayā gāthābhīgitena vistareṇa samprakāśayati sma.

10. formulae associated with recommendations for the future preservation and spread of the doctrine (parindanā formulas):
   a. how the sūtra should be preserved and communicated to others (13.4-6 and 16.9-10): udgrahitavyah paryavāptavyo dhārayitavyah...
   b. the purpose of preserving and spreading the teaching—the good of many beings (16.10-12): bahujanahitāya bahujana-sukhāya lokānukampāyai...
3. The Samādhirāja in Buddhist Literature

3.1 The Samādhirāja and the Madhyamaka

The central role played by Buddhist philosophy in the development of the tradition itself, and then later in the development of western understanding of Buddhism, tends to affect our perception of Buddhist sūtras. It is therefore customary to ask about the scholastic affiliation of any given Mahāyāna sūtra. The Samādhirāja, for instance, has been identified consistently with the Madhyamaka tradition. Similar efforts have been made with regard to the Vimalakīrti and the Heart Sūtra, among others.17

Régamey has shown, however, that the Samādhirāja cannot be considered a clear representative of a single philosophical tradition.18 The sūtra’s doctrinal position cannot be described accurately as unambiguously Mādhyamika, or even as pure śūnyavāda. That is to say, one would find it difficult to show that the sūtra is the product of, or a legitimate representative of, Mādhyamika circles. Still, it is obvious that the sūtra was considered highly authoritative by Mādhyamika scholars and ignored by Yogācāra authors.

In spite of its clearly defined philosophical position, the Samādhirāja does not fit our stereotype of a sectarian document. It is difficult to set it in a specific sectarian context with any degree of historical certainty. Furthermore, in terms of religious types it is eclectic and universalistic, so that it would be pointless to attempt to box it in some general category. It makes room for more than one dimension of Buddhist religion: meditation, worship of the Buddhas, the cult of the Book, philosophical speculation, rehearsal of myth (in avadāna style) and so on.

At the present stage of our knowledge of the history of Mahāyāna sūtra literature, we can only say that the Samādhirāja played an important role as a “proof text” for the Madhyamaka. But it seems unlikely that the text was composed with such a role in mind. It would be more accurate to say that it was conceived as a representative text of general doctrine, with a strong leaning towards a philosophic position that can be described as akin to that of the Madhyamaka. Because of its comprehensive, almost encyclopedic, character, it offered a wider range of ideas from which to quote than did other texts. In this sense, perhaps only a general statement such as the one made by Nalinaksha Dutt in the last volume of his edition of the Samādhirāja would do justice to the text:
Śāntideva in his *Sikṣāsamuccaya* utilized [extracts from the sūtra to illustrate] the ethical teachings of Māhayāna Buddhism while Candrakīrti drew support for the thesis of Nāgārjuna from the highly philosophical verses. This text evidently contains the cream of both ethical and philosophical teachings of Mahāyāna Buddhism.\(^{19}\)

Still, there is another way to express the relationship between the *Samādhirāja* and the Madhyamaka. The Madhyamaka in general can be regarded as a viable exegesis of the sūtra. Candrakīrti quotes it so frequently in his *Prasannapada* that one can construe many of his comments on Nāgārjuna’s *Kārikās* as comments on the sūtra, at least in the sense that they place the sūtra within a wider interpretive context.

However, this approach does not solve the problem we face due to the lack of classical sources that would help us understand the text in its earliest contexts, outside the framework of later Mahāyāna scholasticism. We have neither early commentaries nor related sūtras of proven contemporaneity to rely on for a trustworthy interpretation. Furthermore, the Madhyamaka tends to emphasize only certain aspects of the rich thought and imagery of the sūtra. Some scholastics, like Śāntideva, went beyond the philosophical framework, but even they were not concerned or interested in the text as a whole or as an independent statement.

### 3.2 The Samādhirāja as Quoted in Mahāyāna Literature

As mentioned above, the *Samādhirāja* is often quoted in the works of the Madhyamaka masters, but it is generally ignored by the Yogācāra tradition. Among the works in which the text is quoted, the following have been identified.\(^{20}\) There are undoubtedly many others that could be cited.

**I. Candrakīrti:**

In the *Prasannapada Madhyamaka-vṛtti* the sūtra is cited as *Samādhirāja, Arya-Samādhirāja-Bhaṭṭāraka*, or simply with the words *mahāyaṇa-sūtreṣu, tathā*, etc.:

Sr 7:5 in Pras 44.1–5 (= 276.4–8).
Sr 9:9–10 in Pras 108.12–109.3 (= 472.7–14).
Sr 29:13–19 (including the reading of MS A in Du 361, n. 3) in Pras 109.4–112.4 (in part = 200.4–201.8, 427.12, 549.10–551.12).


Sr 38:11 in Pras 133.8–12 (= 265.9–13, 277.1–4).


Sr 44.11–19 in Pras 142.12–143.8 (in part = 472.3–6).

Sr 13:7, 17 in Pras 166.5–9.

Sr 9:17, 11, 37:28–29 in Pras 177.9–179.8 (first stanza at 178.1–4 not located).21

Sr 29:13–18 in Pras 200.4–201.8 (= 109.4–111.8, 427.12, 549.10–550.4).


Sr 19:15 in Pras 258.1–5.

Sr 38:11 in Pras 265.9–13 (= 133.8–12, 277.1–4).


Sr 7:5 in Pras 276.4–8 (= 44.1–5).

Sr 38:11, 8:1–5 in Pras 276.12–278.12, 279.1–2 (in part = 133.8–12, 265.9–13, 277.1–4; first stanza at 276.13–16 not located = 429.8–11).22

Sr 38:91, 70 in Pras 289.5–14.

Sr 10:39, 41, 87–88ab, 42 in Pras 331.7–333.4.

Sr 37:35 in Pras 354.9–355.2 (= 235.5–8).

Sr 8:4–5 in Pras 367.12–368.3.

Sr 29:13–19 (including the reading of MS A in Du 361, n. 3) in Pras 427.12 (= 109.4–112.4; in part = 200.4–201.8 and 549.10–551.12).

Sr stanza from MS A in Du 361, n. 3 in Pras 428, n. 6 (Tibetan only).


Sr 19:16 in Pras 429.3–7 (stanzas at 429.8–430.4, which are also found at Pras 276.13–16, 133.14–134.4 and 348.14–349.2, were not located in Sr).23
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Sr 44.11-15, 9:9-10, 24:1-6 and 6:12 in Pras 472.3-474.10 (in part = 108.12-109.3). The last stanza, at Pras 474.7-10, was not located in Sr. It is also absent from the Tibetan translation of Pras.24

Sr 9:26 in Pras 522.10-14.

Sr stanza in MSS A and B and in Tibetan (Du 87, n. 2) in Pras 539.10-12.


In the Madhyamakāvatāra:

Sr 29:13cd-14ab in Mav 144.8-11 (= Pras 109.7-10, 200.7-10, 427.12).

Sr 7:5 in Mav 200.6-10 (= Pras 44.2-5, 276.5-8).

Sr 32.5-7 in Mav 200.11-201.4.25

II. Śāntideva:26

In the Śikṣāsamuccaya, mostly cited as Candrapradīpa-sūtra:

Sr 35:3-4 in Śikṣ 16.19-17.4.


Sr 4:16 in Śikṣ 53.19-54.1 (= IBhK 204.20). This passage, printed as prose by Bendall, is in verse.


Sr 27:6cd in Śikṣ 121.2-3. Printed as prose by Bendall.

Sr 28:17-18ab in Śikṣ 121.6-9 (“Dhyānānuśāṃseṣu”).

Sr 34:34 in Śikṣ 134.7-12 (“Jñānavatīparivarta”).

Sr 9:59 in Śikṣ 137.11-15.


Sr 232.13-21 in Śikṣ 166.6-14 (chap. 35, prose).

Sr 18:36-37 in Śikṣ 177.4-8.
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III. Śāntarakṣita:

In the Madhyamakālāṅkāravṛtti:

Sr 9:22a in MAV ad MA 75 (D 74b5), ed. in Ichigō 1985: 250.8-9 under the title Snying-rje chen-po-la 'jug-pa'i mdo, probably *Mahā-karunāvatāra-sūtra.

Sr 44.11–13 in MAV ad MA 83 (D 76b3), ed. in Ichigō 1985: 272.9–11 under the title Zla-ba'i sgron-ma'i ting-nge-'dzin; Sanskrit reconstruction *Candrapradipa-samādhi (this is the same passage that is quoted in Pras 143.1 and 472.3).

Sr 9:47a in MAV ad MA 93 (D 81b8), ed. in Ichigō 1985: 322.20 under the same title as in the previous entry.

Sr (allusion to 7:6) in MAV ad MA 96 (D 82b5), ed. in Ichigō 1985: 330.6 under the same title as in the previous entry.
IV. Kamalaśīla:

In the Madhyamakālaṃkāra-pañjikā:

Sr 9:22 in MAP ad MA 75 (D 122b4), ed. in Ichigō 1985: 251.6–11
under the title Snying-rje chen-po la 'jug-pa'i mdo.
Sr 9:47bcd in MAP ad MA 93 (D 132b3), ed. in Ichigō 1985: 323.5–7.
Sr 7:6 in MAP ad MA 96 (D 132a6), ed. in Ichigō 1985: 331.3–6
(*Candrapradīpā-samādhi).

In the First Bhāvanākrama:

Sr 54.2–3 in IBhK 193.17–20 (Samādhīrāja).
Sr 9:37 in IBhK 198.16–20 (Samādhīrāja).
Sr 4:16 in IBhK 204.20–205.2 (= Śiksā 53.19–54.1) (Samādhīrāja).
Sr 9:36 in IBhK 210.1–4 (yathoktam sūtre).

In the Second Bhāvanākrama:

Sr 9:36–7 in IIBhK 44b3 (= IBhK 198.16, 210.1) (*Samādhīrāja).
Sr 7:10ab in IIBhK 45b1 (*Candrapradīpa).
Sr 4:13 in IIBhK 47b4 (*Samādhīrāja).

In the Third Bhāvanākrama, quoted as Samādhīrāja:

Sr 9:37 in IIBhK 18.3–8 (= IBhK 198.16).

In the Bhāvanāyogāvatāra, quoted with the words ji skad du:

Sr 4:13 in Töh 3918 (dbu ma, ki, 69a5) (= IIBhK 47b4).

V. Prajñākaramati:

In the Bodhicaryāvatāra-pañjikā:

Sr 54.2–3 in BCAP 13.22–24 (= IBhK 193.17) (Samādhīrāja).
Sr 27:6 in BCAP 60.11–13 (Candrapradīpa).
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Sr 9:29 in BCAP 71.1–5 (*Candraśīrāja*).

Sr 24:37–43 in BCAP 83.12–13 (= Śīks 100.13–101.10) (*Candraśīrāja*).

Sr chap. 35, summarized in BCAP 160.23–161.9 (*Supuṣpacandrasya itivṛttake*).

VI. Atiśa:

In the *Bodhisattvadīpa* (*Candraśīrāja*):

Sr 27:6cd in P 5344 (dbu ma, ki, 314a5–6); Tōh 3948 (dbu ma, ki, 272a5).

VII. Vimalamitra:

In the *Prajñāpāramitāḥādayatikā* (*Samādhīrajā*):

Sr 296.13–14 in P 5217 (mdo 'grel, sher phyin, ma, 294b4–5).

VIII. Jñānasūryāmitra:

In the *Sākārasiddhiśāstra*, as *Candraśīrāja*:


IX. Sūtrasamuccaya:

As *Candraśīrāja*:

Sr unidentified verse in P 5330 (dbu ma, a, 186b4).

Sr 32:62–65 in P 5330 (dbu ma, a, 195a7).

Sr 3.21–24 in P 5330 (dbu ma, a, 211a8).

Sr 32:5–7 in P 5330 (dbu ma, a, 241b2).
X. Subhāṣita-saṁgraha:


3.3 Classical Commentaries on the Samādhīrāja

As observed above, it is difficult to regard the Mādhyamika use of this sūtra as exegetical, that is to say, in most of the passages listed in section 3.2 the Samādhīrāja is used as a source for “proof texts,” not as the primary object of scriptural interpretation. The frequency of quotation from the text in the literature of the Mādhyamika is remarkable, but we are not in a position to determine the exact historical significance or possible ramifications of this fact. At any rate, we must wait for further research on the text before assuming a direct connection between the sūtra and the philosophical schools.

The tradition itself is sparing in exegetical clarification. Only one extant commentary is devoted exclusively to the Samādhīrāja, and it is quite late. This exegetical work is preserved in the Tibetan Tanjur (Tōh 4010; P 5511) under the title 'Phags-pachos thams-cad-kyirang-bzhinmnyam-pa-nyid rnam-par sprospa'i ting-nge-'dzin-gyirgyal-poshesbyaba theg-pachen-poi mdo'i 'grel-pagrags-pa'i phreng-bazhesbyabas, or, in Sanskrit Ārya-Sarvadharma-svabhāva-samatā-vipañcitasamādhīrāja-nāma-mahāyānasūtra-ṭikā-kīrtimālā-nāma, or Kīrtimālā, for short. This is the work of Māṇjuśrīkirti, a tantric author about whom very little is known.

The Ldan-dkar catalogue lists a rather short (600 ślokas, 2 bam po) commentary to the sūtra under the title Ting-nge-'dzin-gyirgyal-po chosnyid zab-moi 'grel-pa, but nothing is said about the author, and the work does not seem to be extant.

4. Classical Translations

4.1 Chinese Translations

According to the K’ai-yüan shih-chiao lu, the earliest translation of the Samādhīrāja into Chinese was that of An Shih-kao. Unfortunately
it is now lost.\textsuperscript{30} If the attribution of this translation to An Shih-kao is correct, it allows us to fix a \textit{terminus a quo} for the sūtra of ca. 150 C.E.

Only one complete classical translation into Chinese is extant—the \textit{Yüeh-teng san-mei ching} in 120 scrolls (chüan), translated by Narendraśaśa\textsuperscript{31}. This translation was completed in 557 C.E. in the T’ien-ping Monastery in Shang-chou. On first analysis this translation seems to be based on an original closely related to the Gilgit recension, but the textual history of Narendraśaśa’s translation is not clear. Citations in the Chinese catalogues are inconsistent, in some instances describing the translation as consisting of 11, sometimes of 10, scrolls.\textsuperscript{32} One would like to think that these variations merely reflect variations in the dimensions of the scrolls in which the sūtra was transmitted, and not recensions of varying lengths.

The translation of Hsien Kung of the Liu-Sung dynasty, also titled \textit{Yüeh-teng san-mei ching}, corresponds to the first part of scroll 6 in the ten-scroll version. Another translation by Hsien Kung, extant under the same title, was preserved only in the Kao Li edition of the Chinese Buddhist Canon, and corresponds to the latter part of scroll 5 of Narendraśaśa’s version, excluding the verse portion.\textsuperscript{33}

\section*{Synoptic Table}

All three of these texts are found in several of the Chinese Tripitaka collections now in circulation:

Taishō 639 (XV) 549a–620a = \textit{Shukusatsu Zōkyō 3:10 = Manji Zōkyō 10:3 = Tripitaka (Koreana) 181.}

Taishō 640 (XV) 620a–623b = \textit{Shukusatsu Zōkyō 3:10 = Manji Zōkyō 10:4 = Tripitaka (Koreana) 182.}

Taishō 641 (XV) 623b–629b = \textit{Shukusatsu Zōkyō 3:10 = Manji Zōkyō 10:4 = Tripitaka (Koreana) 183.}

\section*{4.2 Tibetan Translation}

Only one Tibetan translation is extant. It appears in the Mdo section of the Kanjur under the title ‘\textit{Phags-pa chos thams-cad-kyi rang-bzhin mnyam-pa-nyid rnam-par spros-pa ting-nge-’dzin-gyi rgyal-po zhes bya-ba theg-pa chen-po’i mdo} (P 795 and Tōh 127). The sūtra was translated by Śilendrabodhi and Dharmatāśila. The Ldan-dkar catalogue shows the work under the present title (no. 77), and gives its size as
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15 bam po and 4,500 ślokas—a bit shorter than the present Tibetan version, if the number of bam po is to be taken as an exact measurement. The text was likely translated into Tibetan in the eighth or early ninth century. We give the references only to the most commonly used xylographic editions of the Kanjur.

Synoptic Table


5. Modern Research on the *Samādhirāja*

5.1 Textual Materials

5.1.1 Extant Manuscripts and Modern Editions

The Sanskrit text of the *Samādhirāja* is extant in manuscripts from only two locations in the South Asian subcontinent—Gilgit, in what is now Pakistan, and the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal. From the former site only one badly damaged manuscript has been unearthed, but it clearly represents the earliest extant redaction. Various manuscripts have been recovered from Nepal and are now kept in museums and archives in Kathmandu, Calcutta, Tokyo, Paris and Cambridge. Unfortunately, no modern editor has had direct access to all the extant manuscripts.

The Gilgit manuscript presents the oldest and clearly least developed redaction. It is also very similar to the single surviving complete Chinese translation. The manuscript of the Buddhist Text Society in Calcutta represents the most expanded version, and the manuscript of Hara Prasad Shastri the one closest to the Tibetan translation. Other manuscripts in Nepalese collections remain to be investigated.

The text of the *Samādhirāja* was first published in 1896 by Rai Sarat Chandra Das and Harimohan Vidyabhusan through the Buddhist Text Society of Calcutta. This edition was based on a single very defective
manuscript from the Hodgson Collection. A major lacuna extended from the beginning of chapter XII to the middle of chapter XV. The printed edition added some mistakes of its own. Lastly, publication of this edition was interrupted halfway, in the middle of chapter XVI.

Constantin Régamey, with the intention of eventually publishing the complete text of the sūtra, edited and translated into English chapters VIII, XIX and XXII, basing his text on three manuscripts from the Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris (Fonds Sanskrit 143, 144/145 and 146), and the Cambridge manuscript (Add. 916). His manuscripts were very imperfect, but he tried to compensate for this by consulting the Tibetan translation of Mañjuśrīkūrī’s commentary Kṛtimala and comparing the Sanskrit text of the three chapters with their Tibetan translations.

Régamey’s work could not profit from the discovery of the Gilgit manuscript in 1930, as this valuable source would not be published for another decade. Nalinaksha Dutt made public the first part of his edition of the Gilgit manuscripts in 1941. His edition of the Samādhīrāja was produced by consulting not only the unique Gilgit manuscript but also the Tibetan translation, the Buddhist Text Society manuscript and a manuscript found in Nepal by Hara Prasad Shastri.

Thanks to the availability of the manuscript material in a facsimile edition published by Lokesh Chandra, Dutt’s edition can now be subjected to critical examination. For the first sixteen chapters, and for the first half of chapter XVII, the Gilgit manuscript is badly damaged. The left side of every folio is either damaged or lost, resulting, on the average, in the loss of 10 to 14 aksaras at the beginning of every line. This means that a considerable portion of the text is missing. Dutt supplied the missing portions on the basis of what are clearly later recensions—the Nepalese manuscripts and the Tibetan translation.

Accordingly, Dutt’s edition is wanting in more than one respect. It is, unfortunately, at its best a conflation of manuscripts, at its worst a reconstruction from the Tibetan. Dutt tried to fill in the gaps in the Gilgit text, apparently largely on the basis of the text of the Nepalese manuscripts. However, it is clear that the text preserved in the Gilgit manuscript represents a redaction considerably different from that found in the Nepalese manuscripts, and the redactional differences are by no means limited to the addition or omission of material. There are frequent variations in wording, construction and overall thematic development. Dutt’s edition obscures or ignores these differences. He conflates a redaction that is probably from the fifth or sixth century with the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Nepalese redaction. Because of Dutt’s frequent carelessness in using brackets, it is often impossible to distinguish between what is in the Gilgit manuscript and what is in fact
Dutt’s “reconstruction.” It appears that, with very little consistency, he uses more than one criterion to emend or to fill in lacunae. Sometimes he adopts a reading from his Nepalese manuscript, ignoring the distinct character of the Gilgit redaction, while on other occasions he follows the Tibetan. On still other occasions, he adopts a conjectural reading without due annotation.

Equally problematic is the more recent edition of P. L. Vaidya, published in 1961. While this is essentially a copy of Dutt’s edition, the editor claims in his introduction that he has made “such modifications as they [sic] seemed to be necessary in view of modern trends in textual criticism.”\(^3\)\(^5\) It is not clear what this expression means, but Vaidya has omitted all the brackets which Dutt—not always consistently—used to mark his reconstructions. Vaidya prints Dutt’s reconstructed “Gilgit” version, and places those passages from the Nepalese manuscripts which are not found in the Gilgit text in an appendix at the end of his edition. The reason offered for the latter decision is that these passages are “not supported by the unanimity of [the] manuscripts and [the] Tibetan translation.”\(^3\)\(^6\)

A more rigorous task has been accomplished by Seiren Matsunami, who has thus far published seven chapters of the text.\(^3\)\(^7\) His is an edition of the Nepalese redaction, unfortunately based on only three Nepalese manuscripts kept at the Library of the University of Tokyo (nos. 424, 425 and 426 in Matsunami’s own catalogue).\(^3\)\(^8\) Matsunami also cites the variants from the Gilgit text, carefully keeping them apart from the Nepalese materials by citing them in a separate critical apparatus.

The following bibliographic sections provide a chronological listing of the available editions, translations and studies of the sūtra.

5.1.2 Bibliography of Editions


Only the first fascicle was published. It was reprinted in Shanghai in 1940.

King of Samādhis

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Critical edition of the Sanskrit and Tibetan, and English translations of chapters VIII, XIX and XXII.


Pagination of the edition is continuous throughout the three parts.


Essentially a copy of Dutt.


Contains an edition of the Tibetan and English translation of chapter XI. Not seen; referred to in Rockwell 1980.


Chapters I–IV are contained in the first of these installments, chapters V–VII in the second.


In Russian. English summary on page 252. Includes facsimile of the fragment—a single folio corresponding to Dutt and Vaidya chapter XVII, vss. 3–16.

1980 John Rockwell, Jr. “Samādhi and Patient Acceptance: Four Chapters of the Samādhīrāja-sūtra Translated from the San-

Tibetan edition and English translation of chapters IV, VI, VII and IX, along with English translation of the Kirtimālā commentary on those chapters.

5.2 Bibliography of Translations


This was the first modern translation of the sūtra. It is a complete rendering into Japanese of Narendrayasā's Chinese version. Though still of some value, this work was carried out in the koku-yaku style of translation and cannot be regarded as a translation of interpretive significance.

1938 Constantin Régamey, ed. and trans. Three Chapters. See 5.1.2.

This was the first translation into a western language of any part of the Samādhīrāja. Contains an English translation of chapters VIII, XIX and XXII.


Contains a translation of most of chapter XXXIII.


Contains a translation of chapter XI.


Contains a translation of most of chapter XXXIV.

Japanese translation of chapter I of Sr and the Kirtimāla commentary upon it.


Japanese translation of chapter II of Sr and the Kirtimāla commentary upon it.

1975


Japanese translation of chapters II and III of Sr and the Kirtimāla commentary upon them.


This is a modern Japanese translation (gendaigo-yaku) of chapters I-XXXVII, based on the text of Dutt’s edition. Volume 1 includes chapters I-XIX, translated by Tamura, and vol. 2 chapters XX-XXXVII, translated by Tamura and Ichigō.
Introduction


Japanese translation of chapter IV of Sr and the Kirtimāla commentary upon it.


Contains an English translation of chapters IV, VI, VII and IX and the Kirtimāla commentary upon them.

5.3 Bibliography of Studies


The earliest modern study of the Sr was Hayashi’s introduction to his translation of Narendrayaśas’s Chinese version. The introduction, “Gattō-zanmai kyō Kaidai,” is on pages 1–18. This essay is, of course, primarily an analysis of the Chinese text.

1938 Constantin Régamey, ed. and trans. Three Chapters. See 5.1.2.

The only modern study of any length of the Indian text of the sūtra.

1941-Nalinaksha Dutt, ed. Gilgit Manuscripts. See 5.1.2.

In the introductions to the three volumes of his edition of the Gilgit MS, Dutt considers some of the most important issues in the study of the sūtra.


Deals with chapter XXXIV as an account of Buddhist ritual self-immolation.
1966


Analysis of various scriptural references in Pras, especially those from the Sr. The article discusses the differences between the verses cited in Pras and the variants in the MSS of the sutra.


Considers the textual history of the sūtra in terms of several interpolations or additions. Also, in nn. 7 and 8 this article gives references to most of the occurrences of Sr passages in Pras and Śiksā42.


Discusses the sūtra’s conception of the Buddha.


This article examines the lists of terms in chapters I, XVII and XXXVIII–XXXIX of the sūtra.

1967


Discusses several phonological and metrical problems in the Sanskrit text of the sūtra.

Discusses the necessity and the purpose of the sūtra quotations in Pras.


Offers a concise concordance to some of the most important technical terms in the sūtra, especially in chapters I and XXXVIII–XXXIX.


A general discussion of the relationship between chapters I, XVII and XXXVIII–XXXIX.


Discusses the concept of śīla in the Sr.

1968


A study of five types of external sandhi in the sūtra.

Further notes on the history of the composition or compilation of the sūtra. The author tries to establish the date of completion of the compilation on the basis of Chinese materials. He also identifies chapter XXXIV ("Jñānavatī-parivarta") with the Yūeh-ming p’u-sa ching translated by Chih Ch’ien, ca. C.E. 253 (T 169 [III] 411a–c).


A study of the hybrid Sanskrit of the verses of the Sr.


Discusses a universal folk motif as contained in chapter XXXIV.


Pages 189–94 discuss the references to Sukhāvati and Amitābha in the Sr; pages 202–4 summarize the discussion concerning the date of the text; pages 207–8, appendix II, describe the Gilgit MS of the Sr.


A study of the composition and dating of chapter X of the Sr based on an examination of the term indrakīla.
Translation of the King of Samādhis

CHAPTER I

The Setting

(Du 6, Ma 234, Va 1)\(^1\) Thus I heard on one occasion when the Blessed One was staying in Rājagṛha, on the Vulture Peak, together with a large community of monks, with a full hundred thousand monks, (Du 7) and with eighty million bodhisattvas.\(^2\)

And all these bodhisattvas were bound to only one more birth; they were well known for their extraordinary faculties (abhijñā), and had assembled from world spheres in all the ten directions. They had mastered the dhāraṇīs and the sūtras; (Du 8) they satisfied all beings through the gift of Dharma; they were skilled in giving expression to the knowledge of their great extraordinary faculties; they had arrived at the fullest perfection of all the perfections and were skilled in all the states of samādhi and meditative attainments (samāpatti) of the bodhisattvas. They had been praised, eulogized and celebrated by all the buddhas; they were skilled in advancing through all buddhafields. They were skilled in recognizing all of Māra’s attempts to instill fear; they were skilled in knowing all dharmas as they are, in knowing the superior or inferior faculties of all beings, and knowing what is necessary for the worship of all buddhas. They were unsoiled by any of the dharmas of the world, fully ornamented in body, speech and mind, armed with the armor of great friendliness and great compassion, and possessed of a mind which, through great vigor, is unwearied even through incalculable aeons. They had roared the great lion’s roar; they were never overcome in discussion by anyone; they were sealed with the seal of irreversibility and had received final initiation into the Dharma of all buddhas.

Such indeed were the Bodhisattva Mahāsattva named Meru, and the Bodhisattvas Mahāsattvas Sumeru, (Du 9) Mahāmeru, Meruśikharadhara, Merupradīparāja, Merukūṭa, Merudhvaja, Merurāja, Meru-
śikharasaṅghaṭtanarāja, Merusvara, Megharāja Dundubhisvara, Ratnapāpi, Ratnākara, Ratnaketu, Ratnāskhara, Ratnasambhava Ratnapra-(Ma 233)-bhāsa, Ratnyāṣṭi, Ratnamudrāhasta, Ratnavyūha, Ratnająli, Ratnaprabha, Ratnadīpā, Ratimkara, Dharmavyūha, Vyūharāja, Lakṣaṇasamalāṃkṛta, Svaravyūha, Svaraviśuddhiprabha, Ratnakūṭa, Ratnacūḍa, Daśāsatarasāmihutārcis, Jyotirāsa, Candrabhānu, Sahacittott-pādadharmacakra-pravartin, Śubhakanakaviśuddhiprabha and Sata-tamabhayanḍad. The Blessed One dwelt with these, and with all the bodhisattvas mahāsattvas of the Auspicious Kalpa with the Bodhisattva Ajita at their head, and with sixty whose thought was incomparable, headed by Maṅjuśrī. And he dwelt with the sixteen worthy men headed by Bhadrapāla, with devas belonging to the retinue of the Four Great Kings, (Du 10) headed by the Four Great Kings, and with the other devas up to those belonging to the retinue of Brahma, with Brahma at their head.

The Blessed One, honored, revered, esteemed, worshipped, saluted and venerated by these and other mighty and very exalted gods and nāgas, yakṣas and gandharvas, by asuras, garuḍas, kimnaras, mahoragas and both human and nonhuman beings. (Va 2) He was worthy of the veneration, worship, honor, reverence, esteem, salutation and respect of that fourfold assembly and the world together with its gods.

And there the Blessed One, surrounded and attended by an assembly of several thousands, taught the Dharma, which is good in the beginning, good in the middle, good in the end, (Ma 232) excellent in both meaning and expression. There he taught the complete, full, clear and entirely purified spiritual practice.3

Then, again, on that occasion there was seated in that assembled group a young man named Candraprabha,4 a young man who had offered due honor and service to former buddhas, who had planted roots of merit, was possessed of remembrance of his former births, had obtained inspired speech and set out on the Great Vehicle, and who was committed to great compassion.

Then that young man Candraprabha rose from his seat, placed his upper robe over one shoulder, placed his right knee on the ground, raised his hands, palms joined, toward the Blessed One, and said to him: “I would ask the Blessed One, the Tathāgata, Arhant and Fully Enlightened One a question, if the Blessed One would make this an occasion for explaining whatever might be asked.”

When that was said, the Blessed One said this to the young man Candraprabha: “Young man, ask the Tathāgata, Arhant and Fully Enlightened One (Du 11) whatever you like. I will satisfy your mind with an explanation of whatsoever question might be asked. I am, young
man, all-knowing, all-seeing and have achieved preeminence in the powers, the grounds of confidence and all the other qualities of a buddha (sarvadharma-bala-vaisāradya-vṛṣabhita). I possess unobstructed freedom and knowledge. In the endless and boundless world spheres, young man, there is nothing which is not known, seen, heard, understood (Ma 231) or directly realized by a tathāgata, nothing to which a tathāgata has not fully awakened. May there always be, young man, an occasion for you to ask questions of the Tathāgata! I will satisfy your mind through an explanation of whatsoever question might be asked.”

Then the young man Candraprabha, having been given this opportunity by the Blessed One, addressed him with these verses:

1. How, O Fully Enlightened One, O Protector of the World, O Light-maker, does one who practices obtain that inconceivable knowledge? O Benefactor, explain this to me!

2. Practicing in what way, O Leader of Men, O Bull of Men, O Speaker of Truth, you who are worthy of veneration by both gods and human beings, is the most excellent vehicle obtained, the incomparable and best? O Protector, you whose speech is most excellent, please answer this question. (Du 12)

3. I ask sincerely (adhyāśayena); there is no guile on my part. For me, apart from the Highest of Men, there is no authority.

4. I have made a far-reaching vow and have strong resolve. You, O Lion of the Śākyas, know my conduct. I will not be one who only thinks about what is said. (Ma 230) O Leader of Men (narendra), please explain to me at once the actual practice (pratipatti). (Va 3)

5. In the vehicle of the Buddha, which dharmas carry one forward and which are clearly the most effective? May you, O Great Hero, please explain the realization of all dharmas.

6. Explain to me, Protector, how a man who has had recourse to the beneficial dharma attains to piercing wisdom and, although free of fear and trembling and without dread, still does not abandon the elements of morality (silaskandha).

7. One who is free from intoxication, passion, hatred and delusion, whose defects have all been extinguished, he follows the practice and thinks of his body as the empty sky. Indeed, all dharmas are by nature luminous. (Du 13)
8. How does one not abandon morality? How does one not neglect meditation? In what way should one withdraw to the forest and how does one increase wisdom?

9. How does one who guards morality find delight in the excellent teaching of He Who Possesses the Ten Powers? How does one keep the elements of morality intact? And how does one assess the intrinsic nature (svabhāva) of what is conditioned (saṁskṛta)?

10. How is the wise man pure in body and speech; (Ma 229) and how, with undefiled mind, does he seek for the knowledge of a buddha?

11. How does he become pure in his bodily actions, and how does he avoid fault in his speech? How does he attain an undefiled mind? Answer my questions, O Most Excellent of Men!

When that had been said, the Blessed One said this to the young man Candraprabha: “Young man, a bodhisattva mahāsattva, when he is possessed of one single dharma, obtains those qualities, and quickly awakens fully and completely to unsurpassable, perfect and complete awakening. Young man, possessed of which single dharma does the bodhisattva mahāsattva obtain those qualities, and quickly awaken fully and completely to unsurpassable, perfect and complete awakening? It is this dharma: that his mind is the same (sama) toward all beings, (Du 14) that he has a mind disposed to benefit others, a mind of sympathy, a mind free from aversions, a mind that is never partial (avīśama).8 Possessed of this single dharma, young man, a bodhisattva mahāsattva obtains these qualities and quickly awakens fully and completely to unsurpassable, perfect and complete awakening.”

Then, on that occasion the Blessed One addressed the young man Candraprabha with these verses: (Ma 228, Va 4)

12. The bodhisattva who adopts one dharma obtains these qualities and quickly awakens to awakening.

13. There is no aversion in his mind. The bodhisattva whose mind is without aversion produces no harshness or ill will, and obtains these qualities as they have been described.

14. By maintaining an even (sama) mind, he perceives the fruits of all actions to be the same (sama). His feet tread evenly (sama) on the ground; evenness (sama) marks the range of his conduct.9

15. Having developed an even mind, a mind that is not partial, free from hatred and harshness, (Du 15) having abandoned strong
inclinations, the soles of his feet tread evenly on the ground; they are wonderfully luminous, pure and delightful to see.

16. That bodhisattva, blazing in the ten directions, (Ma 227) fills the buddhafield with splendor and light. When he obtains the stage of serenity (śāntabhūmi), he establishes many beings in the knowledge of the buddhas.

“There, young man, the bodhisattva mahāsattva, whose mind is the same toward all beings, a mind disposed to benefit others, a mind free from aversion, a mind that is never partial, attains this samādhi called ‘the manifestation of the sameness of the essential nature of all dharmas.’ And what, young man, is this samādhi called ‘the manifestation of the sameness of the essential nature of all dharmas’?

“It is restraint of one’s body, restraint of one’s speech and restraint of one’s mind.

“It is the purification of karma.

“It is going beyond all supports (ālamba).

“It is thorough knowledge of the aggregates (skandha), the sameness of the bases of consciousness (dhātu) and withdrawal from the sense fields (āyatana).

“It is abandoning thirst and entering into the direct realization of nonproduction (anutpāda). It is the illumination of all causes and the nondestruction of the fruits of karma.

“This samādhi is the seeing of dharmas (dhammadarśana), the cultivation of the path (mārgabhāvanā) and the meeting with a tathāgata.

“It is the state of possessing penetrating wisdom, knowledge concerning entrance into truth, knowledge of the Dharma, knowledge of the entrance into the special knowledges (pratisamvid), knowledge of the proper divisions into syllables and words, going beyond objects and topics (vastu) and thorough understanding of the sounds of human speech.

“It is obtaining joy (Du 16), the state of experiencing delight in Dharma, sincerity, gentleness, honesty, nondeception and lack of deviousness. It is to be unfrowning, contented, well-disposed, friendly, sweet, to have a smiling face, to be gracious and to be hospitable. It is not to be given to laziness, to be respectful to one’s teacher and to be obedient to one’s teacher.

“This samādhi is being content with one’s birth and being unsatiated by good (sukla) dharmas.

“It is knowledge of the differentiation of the stages (bhūmi) of religious development (Ma 226).
"It is the nondestruction of mindfulness. It is skillfulness in knowing the aggregates, skillfulness in knowing the bases of consciousness and skillfulness in knowing the sensefields. It is the entrance into the direct realization of the extraordinary faculties.

"It is the removal of the afflictions (kleśa) and the destruction of the continuation of habitual patterns (vāsana). It is focusing totally on knowledge, the natural outcome of cultivation (bhāvanā), skillfulness in rising above transgressions, suppressing obsessions, abandoning one's proclivities (anuśaya) (Va 5) and going beyond continuous becoming. It is the state of remembering one's former births and not hoping for the [beneficial] results of karma.

"It is the state of being totally occupied with Dharma, seeking for learning, thirsting for knowledge and the awakening of knowledge.

"It is the stage of the noble born.

"It is having a mind like a mountain, being unshakable and unmovable; it is having knowledge that is firmly established at the irreversible stage. It is the natural outcome of good (kusala) dharmas and aversion to evil (pāpa) dharmas. It is the state of not acting according to the affictions, not abandoning the rules of training, (Du 17) being firmly established in the samādhis.

"It is the knowledge of the dispositions (āśaya) of beings, the knowledge of the various kinds of rebirths and the knowledge of sameness.13

"It is the knowledge of well-constructed speech.

"It is giving up life as a householder and taking no pleasure in anything connected with the three spheres of existence.

"It is the state of not being depressed. It is not settling down (abhiniveśa) in any dharmas, taking up the Good Dharma and keeping watch over the Dharma.

"It is the firm conviction that actions must have results.

"It is skillfulness in discipline (vinaya), putting to rest contentions, freedom from disputes and freedom from arguments.

"It is the stage of patience (kṣānti-bhūmi) and the undertaking of patience.

"It is the sameness of all destinies (gati-samatā).14

"It is skillfulness in the investigation of dharmas and in the analysis of dharmas, knowledge of and skill in distinguishing the words of Dharma, knowledge of and skill in the application of words of Dharma and (Ma 225) knowledge of and skill in applying words by distinguishing what is meaningful from what is not.

"This samādhi is the knowledge of the past, the future and the present; it is knowledge of the sameness of all three periods of time.

"It is knowledge of the three spheres of purification.15
“It is knowledge of the states of the body and of the states of the mind, watching carefully one's deportment (īryāpatha), being unperturbed in one's deportment, discrimination (vikalpa) with respect to deportment and being serene in one's deportment.

“It is knowledge of and skill in what is meaningful and what is not; it is appropriate speech and knowledge of the ways of the world.

“It is unrestrained generosity and openhandedness. It is the absence of mental aloofness. It is modesty and shame. It is aversion to non-meritorious (akusāla) thoughts, not abandoning the ascetic practices and undertaking the practice of begging (caritra). It is being pleasant in behavior, rising for and giving one's seat to teachers, suppressing one's pride and restraining one's mind.

“It is the knowledge of the arising of thoughts and knowledge of the penetration into meaning. (Du 18) It is the awakening of knowledge and separation from what is not knowledge (ajñāna). It is knowledge which is penetration into thought and knowledge which is awakening to the essential nature of thought. It is knowledge and skill in bringing together and taking away. It is knowledge of all sounds and knowledge of the range of definitions, knowledge of the analysis of meaning and rejection of what is not meaningful.

“It is the seeking for worthy men (Ma 224). It is keeping company with and attending to worthy men and avoiding unworthy men.

“It is accomplishing meditative states, but not relishing them. It is the performance of marvelous feats through the extraordinary faculties. It is knowledge which enters into the intrinsic nature of names, verbal conventions and designations. It is the elimination of designations and total indifference to conditioned things.

“It is being free of desire for honors and being indifferent to abuse. It is the state of not seeking after gain and not being downcast in the absence of gain, not seeking fame and not resenting its absence. It is not succumbing to praise and not being dejected by reproach. It is non-attachment to happiness and nonaversion to suffering. It is not appropriating conditioned things. It is nonattachment to true praise and patient endurance (adhiwāsanatā) of false praise.

“It is the absence of intimacy with either householders or renunciants. It is avoidance of that which is outside of one's range (agocara) (Du 19) and moving within one's own range (gocara). It is perfection in conduct and avoiding what is not proper conduct.

“This samādhi is gentleness, not corrupting families, protecting the teaching, being of few words, talking quietly, skill in replying. It is suppressing hostility. It is holding back at the right time and avoiding the wrong time. It is not placing confidence in common men.
"It is not humiliating those who suffer, but offering material assistance to them. It is not disappointing the poor. It is compassion toward those who are immoral, possessing things for a beneficial purpose, being compassionately aware, benefitting through Dharma, renouncing the purely material and being constant in not accumulating things. (Va 6) It is the state of praising morality (Ma 223) and aversion to what is not moral, not being deceptive towards those possessed of morality, the renunciation of all one has. It is summoning one’s highest resolve (adhyāṣaya). It is the habit of acting in accordance with what one says, of being constantly occupied, of experiencing the joy of reverence.

"This samādhi is the knowledge of similes. It is skill in the knowledge of former lives. It is the habit of being primarily concerned with the roots of merit. It is having skill in means, abandoning external marks, avoiding perceptual frames and fully understanding the nature of things. It is putting the sūtras into practice. (Du 20) It is experience (kauśalya) in the vinaya. It is the determination of truth, the entrance into the direct realization of release. It is uttering comprehensive speech (ekāṁśa-vacana). It is not rejecting the knowledge and vision of things as they are. It is speaking without doubts.

"It is attending to emptiness, attending to the absence of external marks and looking into the intrinsic nature of desirelessness.

"This samādhi is attaining the four types of confidence. It is illumination through knowledge, firmness in morality, the entrance into the meditative attainments, the attainment of wisdom, delighting in solitude, knowing the self. It is satisfaction with only a little recognition. It is absence of mental confusion, the rejection of that which is produced by views. It is obtaining the dhāraṇīs, the entrance into knowledge, the knowledge of the possible, the impossible, the undertaking and the practice. It is the cause, the reason, the method, the gate, the immediate cause, the path (Ma 222), the actual practice. It is the direction, the instruction, the teaching and the practice.

"It is adaptable patience (anulomikī kṣānti), the stage of patience, the separation from impatience. It is the stage of knowledge; it is abandoning what is not knowledge (ajñāna) and being established in knowledge.

"It is the stage of the practice of yoga and the range of the bodhisattvas. It is attending to worthy men and avoiding those who are not worthy. It is the knowledge of awakening to and penetrating into the intrinsic nature of all dharmas. (Du 21)

"This samādhi is the stage (bhūmi) of a buddha which was proclaimed by the Tathāgata, in which the wise rejoice, which is rejected by the foolish, not easily understood by those who are mere disciples
(śrāvaka), unknown to hermit buddhas (pratyekabuddha). It is not a stage (abhūmi) accessible to outsiders (tīrthika). It is the stage of a buddha which is embraced by the bodhisattvas, recognized by those possessed of the ten powers, to be worshipped by the gods, honored by Brahma, accessible to Indras, venerated by nāgas, rejoiced in by yakṣas, praised by kimmaras, extolled by mahoragas, cultivated by bodhisattvas and mastered by the wise.

"This samādhi is the most excellent possession, a spiritual gift, medicine for the sick, the joy of those whose minds are at peace, a storehouse of knowledge, inexhaustible inspired speech, the method of the sūtras, the end of sorrow, the field of the courageous, the comprehension of the three realms of existence. It is a raft for those who are crossing over, a boat for those who are caught in the flood. It is glory for those seeking fame, praise of the buddhas, the renown of the tathāgatas, eulogy for those possessed of the ten powers.

"It is the virtue of bodhisattvas, the equanimity of those who are compassionate, the friendliness of those who wish to pacify anger, the joy of those who have taken up the Great Vehicle, the actual practice of those who roar the lion’s roar (Ma 221), the path to the knowledge of a buddha, the seal of all dharmas, that which brings the knowledge of the All Knowing One. It is a garden for bodhisattvas, (Du 22) a terror for the armies of Māra, a spell for those seeking security, the goal of those who have accomplished the goal, the refuge for those who find themselves among enemies, the defeat of opponents through a powerful dharma. It is a true source of the various kinds of confidence, the true search for the various powers, a first sign of the eighteen dharmas that are unique to a buddha. It is the ornament of the Body of Dharma, the natural outcome of practice, the ornament of the sons of the buddha. It is satisfaction for those seeking release. It is the joy of the Buddha’s eldest sons, the fulfillment of the knowledge of a buddha. It is not a stage (abhūmi) accessible to mere disciples (śrāvaka) and hermit buddhas.

"It is the purification of the mind, the purification of the body. It is the full development of the doors to liberation. It is the nondefilement of the knowledge of a buddha. Passion does not approach it, (Va 7) hatred departs from it, delusion finds no place in it.

"It is the arrival of knowledge (jñāna), the production of understanding (vidyā) and the abandonment of ignorance (avidyā). It is satisfaction for those whose chief concern is release, contentment for those whose chief concern is samādhi. It is the eye for those desiring to see. It is the extraordinary faculties for those who desire to perform miraculous feats, magic powers for those who wish to display them. It is
the dhāraṇīs for those who seek learning. It is not losing mindfulness. (Ma 220) It is the empowerment of the buddhas, the skill in means of the Guides.

"It is subtle, not easily understood and incomprehensible for those who are not prepared, because it is difficult to understand. It is not easily understood through the sound of articulated syllables. (Du 23) It is perceived by the wise, known by the calm, penetrated by those whose wishes are few, obtained by those who have exerted effort and maintained by those possessed of mindfulness.

"This samādhi is the exhaustion of suffering. It is the nonproduction of all dharmas; it is the use of a single method to explain all existences, destinies, rebirths and resting places.

"This, young man, is the samādhi called 'the manifestation of the sameness of the essential nature of all dharmas.'"

Then, while the Blessed One was giving this explanation of the samādhi called "the manifestation of the sameness of the essential nature of all dharmas," there occurred, for eighty million gods and men who had formerly prepared themselves, the obtainment of the patient acceptance of the fact that dharmas are not produced (anupattikēsu dharmēsu kṣānteḥ). For ninety-six million there was the obtainment of adaptable patience (anulomikāyāḥ kṣānteḥ). For ninety-three million there was the obtainment of the patient acceptance adapted to words (ghośānugāyāḥ kṣānteḥ).24 The minds of a full hundred thousand monks were, without clinging, freed from the outflows. For sixty thousand living beings—both gods and men—the spotless, clear (Ma 219) vision of dharmas was purified. The minds of eighty thousand nuns, without clinging, were freed from the outflows. Five hundred laymen attained the fruit of the nonreturning stage and six thousand laywomen attained the fruit of the once returning stage.

And this world system, which contains three thousand times many thousands of worlds, in six ways shook, shook much and shook entirely. It trembled, trembled much and trembled entirely. It swayed, swayed much and swayed entirely. It moved, moved much and moved entirely. It rattled, rattled much and rattled entirely. It rumbled, rumbled much and rumbled entirely. In the east it sank down, in the west it heaved up. In the west it sank down, in the east (Du 24) it heaved up. In the north it sank down, in the south it heaved up. In the south it sank down, in the north it heaved up. From the ends it sank down, from the middle it heaved up. From the middle it sank down, from the ends it heaved up.25 And a boundless light flooded the world and the whole world system with its gods and Māras and Brahmas, with its śrāmanas and brahmans. All living beings were suffused with that light. And the sun and the moon,
though powerful, mighty and strong, seemed not to shine at all. (Ma 218) Even the pitch-dark spaces between worlds, even they were suffused by that light, and the beings who had been reborn there suddenly became aware of each other, saying, “What! Could it be that another being has also been reborn here!” And so it was down to the great Avici Hell.

The First Chapter,
Entitled “The Setting”
CHAPTER II

A Former Life during the Time of Sālendrarāja

(Va 310, Ma 217)26 Thereupon, the Blessed One addressed the young man Candraprabha: “Young man, I remember immeasurable, incalculable tathāgatas, arhats, fully awakened buddhas who were honored by me on this very Vulture Peak for hundreds of thousands of millions of billions of aeons when I was formerly practicing the bodhisattva practice as a wheel-turning king, seeking for this samādhi and intent on quickly and fully awakening to unsurpassable, perfect and full awakening. They were honored by me, revered, esteemed, worshipped, saluted and venerated with all kinds of jewels, flowers, incense, perfumes, garlands, unguents, aromatic powders, garments, umbrellas, flags and banners, with musical instruments, cymbals and streamers, and with hundreds of thousands of millions of billions of diverse and variegated arrays of shrines (vihāra) made of manifold precious things. And in the presence of all those tathāgatas, young man, I heard in detail this samādhi called ‘the manifestation of the sameness of the essential nature of all dharmas.’ I took it up, I inquired about it, preserved and recited it; I propagated it, cultivated it by developing a sense of solitude (araṇā), repeatedly practiced and fully illuminated it in detail for others.27

“And, young man, the last of all these tathāgatas was the Tathāgata, Arhat, Fully Awakened Buddha named Sālendrarāja. And, young man, the community (saṅgha) of the Tathāgata Sālendrarāja consisted of eighty hundred thousand million disciples (śrāvaka) and bodhisattvas. His life span was seventy-six thousand billion years.28 And for eighteen thousand billion years I offered great worship and honor to that Tathāgata, Arhat, Fully Awakened Buddha Sālendrarāja. And a billion shrines were made of heavenly sandalwood and precious jewels. (Ma 216) And, young man, the life span of that Blessed One Sālendrarāja, the Tathāgata, Arhat, Fully Awakened Buddha was seventy-six thousand billion years.
"And, having gone forth (praṇavajitava) in the presence of the Blessed One Śālendrarāja, the Tathāgata, Arhat, Fully Awakened Buddha, having heard in detail the exposition of the samādhi called ‘the manifestation of the sameness of the essential nature of all dharmas’ for fourteen thousand billion years, I took it up, I inquired about it, preserved and recited it. I engaged in its practice, cultivated it by cultivating the absence of depravities, repeatedly practiced and fully illuminated it in detail for others."

Then the Blessed One once again addressed the young man Candraprabha: "Therefore, young man, while seeking for this samādhi and intent on quickly and fully awakening to unsurpassable, perfect and full awakening, you should do as I did—you should be intent on worship, honor and service to all tathāgatas. What is the reason for this? It is, young man, that since unsurpassable, perfect and full awakening is obtained without difficulty as the natural outcome of worship, honor and service to all tathāgatas, then it stands to reason that this samādhi would be even easier to obtain through the same practice! Therefore, young man, you should always be of untiring spirit in regard to worship, honor and service to all tathāgatas."

(Du 25, Va 8) Thereupon, the Blessed One on that occasion further illuminated in greater detail this account of his former life. He illuminated it for the young man Candraprabha by delivering these verses (Du 26):

1. I remember sixty billion buddhas,31 endowed with the ten powers, who dwelt in former times on the Vulture Peak. (Ma 215) While I was at that time practicing the practice of a bodhisattva, they taught this excellent, auspicious samādhi.

2. The last one of these Protectors of the World and Makers of Light was named Śālendrarāja. I questioned him about this samādhi.

3. And I was a kṣatriya, the chief of kings, a lord of the earth. I had not less than five hundred sons.

4. I had a billion shrines (vihāra) made for that Buddha, some made of the most precious sandalwood and some of jewels.

5. Beloved and dear to my people, I was a king named Bhīṣmottara. I offered the most excellent forms of worship (pūjā) to that Buddha for eighteen thousand billion years.
6. The life span of that Conqueror, the Best of Men, the Guide, the irreproachable Śālendrarāja, (Du 27) was then seventy-six thousand billion years.

7. And that Best of Men had then a community of eighty hundred million disciples (Ma 214) who possessed the three knowledges (trīvidyā) and the six extraordinary faculties, who had mastered their senses, whose outflows were exhausted and who were in their last birth. (Va 9)

8. To that Conqueror, the Best of Men, I offered many kinds of worship for the sake of the world, together with its gods, while always seeking for this samādhi.

9. Having gone forth together with my wife and children in the presence of the Conqueror Śālendrarāja, for fourteen thousand billion years I asked about this samādhi.

10. There were eighty thousand million verses and another hundred billion more. I took up in the presence of that Sugata only a single chapter from this samādhi. (Du 28)

11. My hands, my head, my wife and sons, great wealth, my food and drink—there is nothing I did not formerly give up while seeking for this excellent samādhi. (Ma 213)

12. I remember a thousand billion buddhas, more numerous than the sands of the Ganges, who, having stayed here on the Vulture Peak, taught this excellent, auspicious samādhi.

13. And they were all named the Bull of the Śākyas. And they all had sons named Rāhula and attendants named Ānanda. And they all went forth from a city named Kapilavastu.

14. Their two leading disciples were Maudgalyāyana and Śāriputra, and their holy disciples all had the same names. The world sphere was then called Saha, and all these buddhas were born in the period of the decline of Dharma. (Du 29, Va 10)

15. All these leaders of men were honored by me while I was engaged in the practice directed towards awakening. And while seeking for this samādhi I offered them every form of worship that can be offered to conquerors. (Ma 212)

16. Through actual practice (pratipatti) this samādhi is obtained, and many kinds of practice (pratipatti) have been described. For one
who is established in all these qualities this samādhi is not difficult to obtain.

17. For one who is without longing and desire for things of pleasure, who is not attached to family, not envious, who dwells in friendliness and is free from anger, this samādhi is not difficult to obtain.

18. For one who is not interested in gain and honor, who is without possessions, (Du 30) whose moral behavior is pure and who is confident, this samādhi is not difficult to obtain.

19. For one who puts forth effort, is unwearied, is committed to the forest life and is established in the ascetic practices,33 for one who is established in the patient acceptance of the absence of a self (nairatmya-kṣāntiya), this samādhi is not difficult to obtain.

20. For one whose mind is well tamed, who is not arrogant, who is established in practice and good conduct, (Ma 211) this samādhi is not difficult to obtain.

21. The major and minor marks, the eighteen dharmas unique to buddhas that were praised by the Guide, the powers, the types of self-confidence—for one who preserves this auspicious samādhi, these are not difficult to obtain. (Va 11)

22. If all the beings who are seen by the eye of the Buddha were to become buddhas at the same time, and if the life-span of each one of them were to be unthinkable thousands of billions of aeons, (Du 31)

23. and if each one of these buddhas would have as many heads as there are grains of sand in the oceans, and if in each of these heads there would be as many tongues

24. describing the blessings (Ma 210) of one who would preserve only a single verse from this samādhi, still not even a fraction of those blessings would be described. How much more difficult it would be to describe the blessings of one who would preserve this samādhi after training in it!

25. The gods, asuras, yakṣas and guhyakas, all are drawn to one who, having taken upon himself the ascetic practices,34 abides in them. And kings attend on one who preserves this auspicious samādhi which is not easily found.
26. There is no opposition for one who preserves this auspicious samādhi which is difficult to obtain, is adopted by the conquerors and is constantly attended by gods and nāgas.

27. There is endless inspiration (pratībhāṇa) for one who preserves this auspicious samādhi. He will recite endless thousands of sūtras (Du 32) without ever ceasing.

28. Those who, in the final horrifying times of this world cycle, would preserve this samādhi after hearing it will see the Buddha Amitā-bha, (Ma 209) as well as his world sphere Sukhāvatī. (Va 12)

29. After proclaiming these blessings the Teacher, the Self-Made One (svayaṁbhū), himself requested: “When I will have entered Parinirvana, in the final times of this world cycle, preserve this pure samādhi!”

30. All the buddhas from the ten directions who have passed away into the peace of nirvana, and all the present and future buddhas, all these conquerors, having trained here in this samādhi, awaken to stainless and unconditioned awakening.

The Second Chapter,
Entitled: “A Former Life during the Time of Sālendrarāja”
CHAPTER III

The True Qualities and Characteristics of a Buddha

(Du 33, Ma 208, Va 13) Then the Blessed One once again addressed the young man Candraprabha: “Moreover, young man, suppose a bodhisattva mahāsattva wants to make fully known the true buddha qualities and characteristics possessed by the Tathāgata, Arhat, Perfectly and Fully Awakened One. He wishes to make them known without exhausting the spirit or the letter, thinking ‘May all my words be upheld by the Buddha as they come forth!’ Young man, this bodhisattva mahāsattva, for the sake of all beings, should take up this samādhi, master, preserve, recite, propagate, explain and repeat it. He should develop it by cultivating a sense of solitude; he should repeatedly practice and fully illuminate it in detail for others.

“And what, young man, are the true buddha qualities possessed by the Tathāgata? With regard to this, young man, a bodhisattva mahāsattva, having gone into the forest, or to the root of a tree, or to a desolate place, or to an abandoned dwelling, there meditates as follows: ‘The Blessed One is perfectly and fully awakened, endowed with knowledge and good conduct, a sugata, knower of the world, unsurpassed, a guide for those who need to be led, a teacher of gods and men, (Du 34) a buddha, a blessed one. (Ma 207) The Tathāgata is the result of merit; he is one in whom the roots of good (kuśala-mūla) are not exhausted; he is ornamented with patience; he is the access to treasures of merit. He is adorned with the minor marks, like flowers the major marks adorn his body; he is perfectly suited to his field of action; he is pleasing to look at; he is the delight of those who are committed to faith; he is unconquerable in his wisdom, invincible in his powers. He is the teacher of all beings, the father of bodhisattvas, the king of the holy persons (ārya-pudgala), pure in speech, pleasant in voice, lovely in form, unequalled in body, unstained by desire, unsullied by forms, uninvolved with the formless realms. He is free from suffering, unfettered by the aggregates, unat-
tached to the bases of consciousness. He is restrained with respect to the sense-fields. He is cut free from the bonds, free from mental anguish, released from thirst. He has crossed over the flood; his knowledge is complete, abiding in the knowledge of past, present and future buddhas, blessed ones. But he is not in nirvana; he is established in the true goal, on the stage of those to whom all beings look up.' These, young man, are the true buddha qualities of the Tathāgata.

"Possessed of these qualities and characteristics the bodhisattva mahāsattva, (Du 35) through the power of this samādhi, makes fully known the true buddha qualities and characteristics possessed by the Tathāgata, Arhat, Perfectly and Fully Awakened One, with uninterrupted inspiration. (Ma 206) He makes them known without exhausting the spirit and the letter, and all his words are upheld by the Buddha as they come forth."

Then the Blessed One clarified further the meaning for the young man Candraprabha and illuminated it in much greater detail by uttering on that occasion this set of verses:

1. It would not be easy to pronounce the full praise of the conquerors even by speaking for many thousands of aeons (Va 14)—such are the qualities acquired by them while seeking for this excellent, auspicious samādhi.

2. Young girls with delightful, truly charming bodies and lovely ornamented limbs were formerly given away by me—without regret—while seeking this excellent, auspicious samādhi.

3. So too were wealth and provisions, and male and female slaves, (Ma 205) so too were jewels and pearls and gold and silver (Du 36) given away by me—without regret—while I was seeking for this excellent, auspicious samādhi.37

4. Garlands of pearls colored by gems and jewels, with brightly woven threads of beautiful gold, were formerly given by me to the guides while I was seeking for this excellent, auspicious samādhi.

5. For immeasurable, endless billions of aeons the most excellent, sweet smelling flowers and jasmine were given by me to the shrines (cetiya) of the conquerors after I had given rise to the most excellent, unsurpassable thought.38

6. In the same way I gave the gift of Dharma, eliciting great admiration in the assembly. Still, after giving the gift of Dharma the
thought never occurred to me that (Ma 204) this would make for me a great reputation. (Du 37)

7. Formerly I mastered the ascetic practices. I always dwelt in a quiet forest. At all times was I compassionate. My thought was always, “I must obtain the knowledge of a buddha.”

8. I never grasped at even the dearest things for my own enjoyment. (Va 15) I gave abundant meritorious gifts, and always my thought was, “I must obtain the knowledge of a buddha.”

9. Benign, gentle, accustomed to sharing, always with a smile on my face, preserving what I heard, with mild voice and gentle speech, I was loved by many. People never grew tired of seeing me. (Ma 203)

10. Not even for a moment was I envious; not for a million lives was I ever jealous. (Du 38) I was always satisfied by the food placed in my bowl, and all invitations were rejected without exception.39

11. Those who were learned and preserved what they had heard, who preserved even a single four-lined verse from this samādhi, they were always venerated by me with the most excellent unsurpassed love (prema).40

12. I gave an endless variety of gifts, and so too I guarded my moral practice for a very long time. I constantly offered worship to the guides while I was seeking for this excellent, auspicious samādhi.

13. If someone were to fill this broad, manifold and endless world system (Ma 202) with jewels and precious gems, and give it as a gift to the tathāgatas, and if someone else were to preserve a single verse from this samādhi, the merit of the latter would greatly exceed that of the former.

14. If someone, desiring merit, were to worship the Conqueror for many endless and immeasurable aeons with every kind of flower or with fragrances lovely and fine, (Du 39)

15. and if another one, desiring merit, were to worship the Conqueror for many endless and immeasurable aeons with every kind of music and many kinds of garments and food—both solid and liquid—(Va 16)

16. and if any [other] person were to give rise to the thought of awakening: “I will become a conqueror, a Self-Made One (svayambhū), a King of Dharma,” and then preserve a single verse from this
samādhi (Ma 201), the merit of the latter would greatly exceed that of the former. (Du 40)

17. If I were to proclaim its blessings (ānusāṁsā) for as many aeons as there are numerous grains of sand in the Ganges, and if its praise would not cease, still much more merit would be gained by preserving this samādhi. (Du 40)

“Therefore, young man, this samādhi is to be taken up, preserved, recited and learned by the bodhisattva mahāsattva. And when it has been taken up, preserved, recited and learned, then he should apply himself to the practice of cultivating a sense of solitude. In this way he acts for the benefit and happiness of a great many people, for the comfort of the world, for the profit, the benefit and the happiness of a vast number of gods and men.”

Then, moreover, the Blessed One on that occasion spoke these verses:

18. Therefore, upon hearing of its wonderful benefits for the buddhas, quickly proclaim this samādhi that is praised by them.

19. Seventy-three billion buddhas were venerated by me in former existences, and this sūtra was taught by all of them.

20. This sūtra was described as the entrance into great compassion. I studied it extensively and, after training in it, the qualities (dharma) of a buddha were not difficult to obtain.

21. In the final period, after the Guide of the world has entered into nirvana, there will be many uncontrolled monks who will not strive for great learning. (Du 41)

22. They will speak effusively about morality, but they will not strive for morality. They will speak effusively about meditation, but they will not strive for meditation.

23. They will speak effusively about wisdom, but they will not strive for wisdom. They will speak effusively about liberation, but they will not strive for liberation.

24. It is just as if some man were to advertise the virtues of sandalwood, saying, “Such sandalwood indeed has a lovely perfume.”

25. But then if another man were to ask him, “Do you yourself use the kind of sandalwood which you praise?” (Va 17)
26. The first man would answer saying, “O no. I praise the perfume through which I make my living, but I do not use that perfume.”

27. Just so, in the final period even those who are not engaged in its practice (Ma 199) will make a good living through praising morality, but they will not have actual morality. (Du 42)

28. Just so, in the final period even those who are not engaged in its practice will make a good living through praising meditation, but they will not have actual meditation.

29. Just so, in the final period even those who are not engaged in its practice will make a good living through praising wisdom, but they will not have actual wisdom.

30. Just so, in the final period even those who are not engaged in its practice will make a good living through praising liberation, but they will not have actual liberation.

31. Suppose there was a man, inferior and poor, who was rejected by the great majority of people, but later he obtained wealth and, having become a rich man, then indeed he would be honored by the people.

32. In the same way, as long as he has not obtained this samādhi (Ma 198), a bodhisattva is not highly regarded (Du 43) in this world by gods and men, kumbhāṇḍas and rākṣasas—as if he were a poor and insignificant person.

33. But when the wise man obtains this stage of the incalculable treasure of Dharma, men and gods are drawn to him and he gives them the finest gift.

34. Having heard the benefits of that which is highly valued and praised by the Conqueror, renouncing all reputation, possessions and comforts, proclaim this excellent, auspicious samādhi!

35. All the buddhas in the ten directions who have entered nirvana, and the future and present buddhas as well, (Ma 197) after training in this samādhi, are awakened to the incalculable, inconceivable awakening. (Va 18)

36. The young man Candraprabha was delighted and, standing before the Conqueror, spoke these words: (Du 44) “In the difficult times after the Best of Men will have entered into nirvana, I will preserve this sūtra.
37. "In those times of great fear, having renounced both life and limb and whatever comforts there are in the world, I will preserve this excellent, auspicious samādhi.

38. "Seeing that they suffer much and are without a protector, I give rise to great compassion (Ma 196) for all living beings. I extend friendliness toward them, and teach them this excellent, auspicious samādhi."

39. At that time, no less than five hundred of those who preserve this samādhi rose up, and the young man Candraprabha was the foremost among them in his enthusiastic acceptance of this excellent sûtra.

The Third Chapter,
Entitled: "The True Qualities and Characteristics of a Buddha"
(Ma 195, Va 19) Then the young man Candraprabha rose from his seat, placed his upper robe over his shoulder and knelt with his right knee on the ground. He raised his hands, palms joined, toward the Blessed One, and said to him: “I would ask the Blessed One, the Tathāgata, Arhant and Fully Awakened One a question, if the Blessed One would make this an occasion for explaining whatever might be asked.”

When that was said, the Blessed One said this to the young man Candraprabha: “Young man, ask whatever you desire of the Tathāgata, Arhant and Fully Awakened One. The Tathāgata will always grant you the opportunity, young man.”

Then the young man Candraprabha, having been granted this opportunity, (Du 45) said this to the Blessed One: “O Blessed One, the word ‘samādhi’ is often used. Exactly what thing (dharma) is designated by the word ‘samādhi’?”

When that was said, the Blessed One said this to the young man Candraprabha: “What is referred to as ‘samādhi’, young man, is the deep comprehension of mind, the absence of rebirth, the knowledge of non-continuation, the discarding of one’s burden, the knowledge of a tathāgata, the majestic power of a buddha. It is the cure for passion, the calming of enmity and the removal of delusion. It is engaging in what is appropriate and avoiding what is inappropriate. It is desire for good dharmas, the desire for release from conditioning, following through with strong determination, devotion to wakefulness and never abandoning strong effort. It is preserving pure dharmas, not depending on rebirth, not accumulating karma, (Ma 194) not paying attention to organs of sense (Du 46) and not becoming involved with objects of sense. It is not elevating oneself, not disparaging others. It is not becoming overly involved with lay households and not placing any confidence in common people. It is the natural outcome of moral behavior; it is the condition of being unassailable, the state of majestic power, self knowl-
edge. It is to be unwavering, abiding in the fulfillment of the bodily postures. It is absence of ill-will, absence of harshness, not mistreating others, taking care of friends, preserving secret mantras, absence of cruelty, not mistreating persons who maintain the precepts and speaking gently. It is not to rely on the three world realms. It is the patience of being receptive to all dharmas, in accord with emptiness. It is strong desire for the knowledge of the all-knowing ones. The word ‘samādhi’ is often used, young man, [to refer to these conditions]. The actual practice of such dharmas—no contrary practice—young man, is called ‘samādhi.’”

Thereupon, the Blessed One, revealing this samādhi called “the manifestation of the sameness of the essential nature of all dharmas,” further illuminated it in greater detail. He illuminated it for the young man Candraprabha by uttering on that occasion these verses:

1. Already I have thrown open the gateway to immortality. I have taught as it is the essential nature of dharmas. I have shown the process of rebirth as it occurs and I have revealed nirvana and its blessings. (Du 47, Ma 193)

2. You should always avoid false friends and devote yourself to true friends (kalyāṇamitra). You should live in the forest, forsake the multitude and always cultivate a benevolent mind.

3. Moreover you should always maintain pure moral behavior. You should constantly find satisfaction in strict ascetic practices and devote yourself to renunciation and wisdom. This samādhi will not be difficult to attain. (Va 20)

4. Then, after attaining this stage of peace, which is not a stage (abhumi) accessible to the common mass of mere disciples (śrāvaka), you, as true witnesses to the Sugata’s Dharma, will acquire the inconceivable virtues of a buddha.

5. If you see men who are suitable vessels and endowed with intelligence, direct them (samādapetha) towards the practice of the thought of awakening. Once established in unsurpassable knowledge, this King of Samādhis will not be difficult to attain.

6. When envy arises with respect to worldly goods, (Ma 192) if one examines [this envy] in terms of its source and its outcome here (Du 48)—from the point of view of what one seeks and what one enjoys—this samādhi will not be difficult to attain.46
7. Since indeed this King of Samādhis is the same as emptiness, it stands at the head of all pure moral practices. Dharmas are by nature always composed. The foolish, who apply their minds to what is inappropriate (ayuktayoga), do not understand this.

8. The Buddha is never absent for those who seek after this auspicious samādhi. (Du 49) They forever contemplate the Most Excellent of Men once they have had recourse to this stage of peace.

9. One who recollects the tathāgatas in all their aspects comes to be one whose mind and senses are calm. His thoughts will not be confused; he will forever be collected and he will become like an ocean, vast in learning and knowledge.

10. Moreover, after becoming established in this samādhi (Ma 191) the bodhisattva who walks the promenade (caṅkrame caṅkrami) sees thousands of millions of buddhas, more numerous even than the grains of sand in the Ganges.

11. The man who would try to grasp the measure of the qualities of a buddha would lose his mind, (Va 21) for there is no measure of the immeasurable. The Guides are inconceivable because of all their qualities.

12. There is no one anywhere in the ten directions who is the equal of a world protector—not to mention his superior! One must desire and obtain the knowledge of a buddha, endowed with all the qualities of omniscience. (Du 50)

13. With his golden body the World Protector is beautiful in every way. The bodhisattva who makes this body the object of his thought is said to be collected.

14. A wise man who understands both the conditioned and the unconditioned, becoming free from apperception of any sign, (Ma 192) abides in the signless and knows that all dharmas are empty.

15. He who is firmly established in the body of the Dharma knows all being as nonbeing. Becoming free of apperception of nonbeing, he does not perceive the Lord of the Conquerors in his body of form.

16. I proclaim and declare that as a man repeatedly reflects [on the qualities of a buddha] his mind tends towards them, moved by these acts of reflecting on them. (Du 51)
17. Thus, if a person calls to mind the King of Sages and knows him with all his unfathomable attributes, and if he cultivates such recollections constantly, his thoughts will tend and be directed toward the Buddha.

18. If, engaging [in this practice] while walking, standing or sitting, (Ma 189) he longs for the knowledge of the Best of Men, filled with longing he makes a vow to attain awakening: “I will become an unsurpassable conqueror in the world.” (Va 22)

19. He perceives the Buddha, he sees the Buddha and he examines the qualities (dharma) of buddhas. Abiding in this samādhi, he will pay homage to the overpowering inspiration (mahānubhāva) of the buddhas. (Du 52)

20. His mind is calm both in thought and deed. He perpetually speaks in praise of the buddhas and, once he has so cultivated the stream of his thoughts, he sees the World Protector both during the day and during the night.

21. Even when he is ill, diseased, or when he feels the pangs of death, his recollection of the Buddha never fades, nor is he overcome by whatever feelings and sensations he then has.

22. When he has reflected in this way he understands the emptiness of all dharmas, past and future, and, (Ma 188) firmly established in such a practice of the Dharma (dharma-naya), he does not in the least grow weary of walking the path of [the bodhisattva’s] practice (carantu carikam).

23. Therefore, now that you have heard its benefits, strive to realize incomparable awakening. (Du 53) Do not be overcome with grief about some future time, for audience with the excellent sugatas is very rare.

24. I will speak of the most excellent Dharma; you must listen and practice. A patient accepts the vile medicine, and his disease is cured so that it no longer overpowers him.

25. Thus, a person of clear vision who knows how to proceed will always strive after this samādhi. When one attends to moral behavior, learning and renunciation, this samādhi is not difficult to obtain.

The Fourth Chapter,
Entitled: “Recollection of the Buddha”
NOTES

Full citation information is provided in the list of abbreviations and bibliography found at the beginning of Part I or in the relevant bibliographic sections (3.2, 5.1.2, 5.2 and 5.3). For the latter references the reader is directed to first consult the general list, which provides a note to the location of the work in the introduction.

Notes to the Introduction

1. These nine texts are the Asṭasāhasrīkā, Daśabhūmiśvara (Daśabhūmika), Gaṇḍavyūha, Lalitavistara, Laṅkāvatāra, Samādhīrāja, Saddharmapuṇḍarīka, Suvarṇaprabhāsa, and Tathāgatagujñya (Guhyaśamāja).
2. Régamey 1938: 10–11.
6. In the present introduction, as in the translation, the title Samādhīrāja has been chosen as the title for the work, since this is the title found in the extant Sanskrit MSS. Other works with similar titles occur in the Chinese Canon, but these are not thematically or genetically related to our sutra. Further details are provided in n. 31 to this introduction.
7. The term sarvadharmasvabhāvasamatāvipaṇcita is highly problematic. In chapter XL (“Parīndana-parivarta”; see Va 303.8; also, the colophon to the same chapter) the sutra is called the “Discourse on Dharma” (dharmaparyāya) which is (or contains) “an explanation of the samādhi that is manifested as the sameness of the essential nature of all dharmas” (sarvadharmasvabhāvasamatāvipaṇcitasamādhirdeṣa, as a possessive compound). In chapter VIII, the Nepalese MSS A and B and the Tibetan translation explain this title. The stanza of explanation, however, is not found in the Gilgit MS (“Abhāvasamudgata-parivarta”; Du 87, n. 2 and Va app. I, no. 7, 312.3–10). The stanza reads as follows:

Nonexistent are all dharmas, signless, markless,
Without origination or cessation—know that all dharmas are like this. Nonexistent, inexpressible, empty, quiescent, from the beginning mere constructs
—He who knows dharmas in this manner is called a buddha.

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Therefore, one seeking the Mother of the Sugatas,  
Who manifests herself as sameness of essential nature,  
By meditating on all dharmas as nonexistent,  
Will attain to this Mother of the Conquerors.

See Régamey 1938: 65–66 for a different translation. On the authority of the Tibetan, Régamey reads nirmitaḥ in line 3, where all MSS have some variant of nirmitah. We follow the latter reading ("construct" or "magical creation"). Cf. also n. 10 to our translation.

8. It must be noted, however, that the title Candrapradipa occurs twice in the introductory stanzas (prāsasti-śloka) of the sūtra (not part of the original text). See Va 306.1 and 310.2.

9. MAV (P 73a7; D 74b4) and MAP (P 130a1; D 122b2), ed. in Ichigō 1985: 250–51.

10. Dutt reads mahākarunajētaṁ . . . sūtraṁ, but with no support in the Gilgit MS. Otāra is a normal Middle Indic form of avatāra. The reading of the Nepalese MSS is supported by the Tibetan and Chinese translations. The Tibetan reads: mdo sde 'di yi ming yang ni // snying rje chen por 'jug ces bya // (P 277.2.4–5). The Chinese reads: 亦訳如是修多羅／由此能入大悲心 (T 639 [XV] 552b14–15). The latter does not support the interpretation of the phrase as indicating a title, but see the phrase quoted in the following note. According to Ono Genmyō, the title "Juan ta-pai" 入於大悲 is known to the Chinese tradition. See Ono 2.77b5. See also sections 2.4.1 and 4.1 in the introduction and n. 10 to the translation.

11. See Va 303.25–26; T 639 (XV) 619c20: 是經名為入於大悲.


13. It is not clear whether the terms or epithets are meant as definitions or descriptions, or if they are attributes of the samādhi, its causes or its effects. Furthermore, it is not always obvious where a new epithet is intended. In many cases a phrase that appears to be a list of terms may also be construed as a listing of various aspects of one attribute. See n. 11 to the translation.


15. See section 3.2.V in this introduction.


17. On the first of these, see Régamey 1938: 25; also the introduction to Lamotte 1962: 37ff. On the Heart Sūtra, see the article by Wayman 1977.


20. The quotations are grouped and referred to according to their location in the work in which they occur. Most quotations found in the Prasannapadā, Madhyamakāvā- tāra and Śiṅgāsamuccaya have been identified by the editors of these works, Louis de La Vallée Poussin, Cecil Bendall and P. L. Vaidya. The following identifications also take into account and expand upon the listings of Du 3 (introductory note; unpaginated) and, more recently, Murakami 1966a.

21. The unlocated stanza reads:

\[
\text{tvaksṇāyumāṁśāthisamucchraye ca}
\]

\[
\text{utpādyā saṁjñām mama patnir ēṣa /}
\]

\[
\text{mūḍhā hi bālā janayanti rāgaṁ}
\]

\[
\text{stṛiyō na jānanti yathāiva māyāṁ //}
\]
22. The unlocated stanza reads:

bhāva abhāva vibhāvayi jñānaṁ
sarvī acintayi sarvī abhūtāṁ /
ye puna cittavāsānuga bālaṁ
te dukhiṁ bhavakoṭiśateṣu //

23. For the first of these unlocated stanzas, see the preceding note. The others read:

yo pi ca cintayi śūnyakadharmān
so pi kiṁ mārgapapannakū bālaṁ /
akṣarakīrtita śūnyakadharmaṁ
te ca anākṣara aksara uktaḥ //
śaṃtapaśānta ya cintayi dharmān
so pi ca cittu na jātū na bhūtaḥ /
cittavīrtakāṇa sarvī papañcāḥ
sūkṣma acintiya budhyathā dharmān //

24. The unlocated stanza reads:

parinirvṛta loki ta śūrā
yehi svabhāvata jñātimi dharmāḥ /
kāmāguṇair hi caranti asaṁgāḥ
sāṅgū viśvarjiya sattva vinentī //

25. La Vallée Poussin, in the index to his edition of the Māv, claims that Sr 32:5–7 quoted at Mav 200.11ff. is also quoted at Pras 128.13, but the two quotations are definitely not the same. Pras does not seem to contain any passage close to Sr 32:5–7. La Vallée Poussin also wonders whether the stanza in Mav 144.3–6 may be from Sr. We have not been able to locate it in the sūtra.

26. References are to page and line number in Bendall’s edition. Cp. the edition of P. L. Vaidya, where most of the passages are identified. We have added a few citations and corrected mistakes in Vaidya’s references. Dutt is of the opinion that “Sāntideva’s quotations reveal that he used an earlier copy of MS B.” See Du 3, introductory note (unpaginated).

27. Attributed by tradition to Nāgārjuna, perhaps incorrectly.

28. The verse attributed to Sr reads:

phann tshun gnod pa’i sems su gang byed pa //
de la tshul khrims thos pa skyob mi byed //
bsam gtan dang ni dgon gnas mi skyob ste //
shyin dang sange rgyas mchod pa’ang skyob mi byed //

29. The passage reads:

yathoktaṁ samādhirājasūtre / tasmāt tarhi kumāra bodhisattvena mahāsattvena
imam samādhiṁ ākāṅkṣataṁ kṣipram cānuttarāṁ samyaksaṁbodhīṁ abhisambuddhākāmera
kāyajñitānadhayavatītāna bhavitaṁ / tathā laukikāsāsid-
dhāyā ca na prārthayitavyaṁ viśeṣeṣaḥ vaiva rthitakavi cā //

30. T 2154 (LV) 480b5. See also T 2153 (LV) 399a6. The catalogues give the length of the translation as one scroll (chūan), perhaps an indication that this first translation was only a section of the complete sūtra.

31. Hence the common Japanese title, Gattō-sanmai kyō 月燈三昧経. But modern scholars in Japan prefer Sanmai-ō kyō 三昧王経, based on the Sanskrit title. Three other texts in the Chinese Canon have similar titles, derived also from the name of one of the characters in the narrative: the Candraprabha-avādaṇā (or Candraprabhabodhisattvacaryā-avādaṇā), the Candraprabhakumāra-sūtra and the
**Notes to the Introduction**

*Candraprabhabodhisattva-sūtra*. These three are each only one scroll in length. The first of these works is the *avadāna* of King Candraprabha, *Yüeh-kuang p'u-sa ching* 月光 菩薩 經, read Gakkō bosatsu kyō in Japanese. It is preserved in two translations (T 153 [5] and T 166) and corresponds to *Divyāvadāna*, no. 22. The second is the "Mahāyāna Sūtra of Candraprabha the Youth," *Yüeh-kuang t'ung-tzu ching* 月光 童子 經 in Chinese; Gakkō dōji kyō in Japanese. It is preserved in three translations (T 534, 535 and 536). The third is T 169 (*Yüeh-ming t'ung-nan ching* 月明 童男 經; that is, *Gatsumyō dōnan kyō*, also known as the *Yüeh-ming p'u-sa [sàn-meì] ching* 月明 菩薩 三昧 經 or, in Japanese, *Gatsumyō bosatsu [zanmai] kyō*). In the first of these works the character's circumstances are not the same as those of the Candraprabha of the Sr, for T 153 (5) and 166 speak of a previous existence of Śākyamuni, in which he existed as a king called Candraprabha. In the last two texts, on the other hand, the principal interlocutor is Candraprabha, the son of a rich guild master of Rājagṛha. This character is probably the same as the Candraprabha of the Sr. The topics treated in these texts, however, are different from any theme in the Sr. For further details see Ono 2.76–78; also, Buddhist Text Information, 29: 20–22 and Murakami 1968. Catalogue references are to T 2153 (LV) 399a10 and T 2149 (LV) 270c7.

32. Eleven *chüan* in T 2149 (LV) 270c7; ten or eleven in T 2154 (LV) 543c17 and T 2153 (LV) 399a10. The difference could, however, also be due to error in the catalogues.

33. Cf. T 2154 (LV) 532c2.

34. Cf. Filliozat 1941 and Bendall 1883.

35. Va vii.

36. Va x.

37. Details in section 5.1.2.


39. A manuscript of a complete French translation of the Gilgit text by the late Jean Filliozat is in the possession of his heirs. We have not been able to examine this work. A letter from Pierre Filliozat to Mr. Michael Wurbrand of Torrance, California (4 January 1985) announces plans for the publication of this translation by UNESCO.

40. This author publishes using two first names, Keinosuke and Hōshū. His last name can also be read Mippara. We follow the more common form Keinosuke Mitsuhara, but list the name under which each article was actually published.

41. This scholar sometimes uses his family name, Hirano, but his works also appear under his adopted name, Murakami. We have referred to all his publications under the latter name, for the sake of consistency, but the actual name under which the article was published is used in the full bibliographic reference, with the other name in parentheses.

42. The pagination of Japanese journals is sometimes complex. We have adopted in all cases the pagination which comes closest to being continuous throughout a given number of the journal, in this case the arabic numerals at the bottom of the page. Some items, especially those printed horizontally, may end on a page with a page number that is lower than that of the first page in the article. The reader will note this pagination; e.g., Matsunami’s 1975 edition of the sūtra (included in parentheses in the English translation).

43. In Japan the first word in the title of this journal is transliterated with the old phonetic reading “Hachinohe.” The aspiration is no longer present in modern speech or, for that matter, in the orthography of most words, and is not used in
western transliterations. However, we have respected the preferences of the publishers of this journal and retained the ancient spelling.

Notes to the Translation

1. Arabic numerals in parentheses refer to the Sanskrit text. The prefatory stanzas (praśasti-śloka), which the Nepalese MSS add at the beginning of the text, have been excluded as being of obviously late origin. They are included in the editions of Dutt and Matsunami; Vaidya places them in an appendix.

2. The opening phrase of Buddhist sūtras has been the object of debate among scholars. The discussions have focused above all on how the formula is to be punctuated, that is, whether it should be read “Thus have I heard. At one time the Blessed One was dwelling in” or “Thus have I heard at one time. The Blessed One was dwelling in.” These discussions, however, have not produced conclusive results, since it appears that neither alternative is entirely impossible and that some Buddhist authors were aware of both. See Staël-Holstein 1933: iv; Brough 1949-50; Samtanı 1964-65; and Wayman 1974: 59, n. 1. Cf. also Kajiyama 1977. In the present translation we have tried to follow the punctuation actually found in our Sanskrit manuscripts—both Nepalese and Gilgit—where if there is any punctuation it almost always comes after viharati sama (“was staying”). For a general discussion of stock phrases in the sūtra see the introduction, section 2.5.

A note is also necessary regarding abstract numbers, a difficulty met not only in the opening of the sūtra, but throughout the text wherever it is a matter of large quantities or measurements. The characteristically Buddhist numerals used to express mythical or fantastic amounts (more appropriately “abstract numbers”) are often left untranslated in English renderings, though sometimes an attempt is made to establish exact numerical equivalents. The latter effort is by necessity futile, since the sources are not in agreement as to the “true value” of these numerals, and they usually are not concrete numbers. While there is no point in trying to fix English or mathematical equivalents to these numbers, it is obvious that the Sanskrit terms would say nothing to an English reader. We have opted therefore for the use of English numerals, without attempting to establish an exact numerical equivalent. In a few instances this has meant that the translation could not contain one-to-one correspondences or consistent equivalents.

3. The Chinese text omits much of what stands between this point and the opening formula, inclusive of the description and enumeration of the attending bodhisattvas. The following is a translation of all that the Chinese version has up to this point in the text (T 639 [XV] 549a6–12):

Thus I heard. On one occasion the Bhagavan was staying in Rājagṛha, on the Grdhraštā, together with a large community of monks, with a hundred thousand of them, and with eighty million bodhisattvas who were bound to only one birth, with the Bodhisattva Mahāsattva Ajita at their head.

The Four Great Heavenly Kings, and Indra, King of Heaven, chief in the Saha World, and all other exalted gods of great merit, and very exalted and mighty asura kings, nāga kings and yakṣas, gandharvas, kinnaras, mahoragas, and both human and nonhuman beings honored, revered and esteemed the Tathāgata.

4. The Sanskrit term kumārabhātu is ambiguous. It can mean both “young man” and “prince” or “heir apparent.” There is nothing in the sūtra to indicate that the
Notes to the Translation

second possibility should be chosen here, as Candraprabha does not belong to royalty. See also n. 31 to the introduction.

5. There are, of course, technical overtones to this expression, for *adhyāsaya* is the strong or deeply rooted predisposition to follow the Buddha's teachings—a disposition that is founded on the determination and effort of many previous lives. However, the context here seems to require a less technical rendering. Cp. Sr 17:95 and Gv 42:1, 54: 91, 97.

6. This is a free rendering of the hyperbolic *vipulapraṇidhi mahyam asti chandas*. The first expression, *vipulapraṇidhi*, is paralleled by Gv 1:60 and 3:39.

7. The last hemistich of this stanza (7d: "indeed . . . luminous") appears contextually to be an interpolation. However, metrically the hemistich seems indispensable. The full line (7cd: "and thinks . . . luminous") is attested by only one MS, which has led some editors to omit the line altogether—Vaidya without acknowledging its existence and Dutt by placing it in a footnote. If the line is omitted, either stanza 6 becomes a six-line stanza (as Dutt and Vaidya print it), or number 7 becomes a two-line verse. Furthermore, the line in question (7cd) agrees metrically with 7ab better than the latter does with 6, suggesting that 7ab cannot be read as part of 6. This and other minor differences in interpretation affect the way stanzas are numbered in various editions and translations. In the present translation we follow Matsunami's numbering.

8. The pun (*sama, a-vi-sama*) is further expanded in stanzas Sr 1:14–15. Similar figures of speech with the word *sama* are found elsewhere in Buddhist literature, as pointed out in the following note. Cp. also Sr 13:9–10.

9. This stanza develops the pun initiated in the prose section (see the preceding note) and continued in stanza 15. One of the 32 bodily marks indicating a superior person who is to become either a Universal Monarch or Buddha is that his feet rest firmly and evenly on the ground (DN 3:145: *supatīṭhitapādo hoti, samam pādam bhūmiyam nikkhipati*; also DN 3:143, 146). The English translation is in *Dialogues* 3:137, 139. Cp. Lv 106, Mv 2:304 and Mvy 260–66. The attribute *aṇḍamapadāta* is included among the eighty secondary marks; see Mvy 278 and *Dharmasaṅgraha* 84(10) in Nishiwaki 1962: 26.

The spiritual interpretation of this attribute is summarized in SN 1:4. Cp. the stock description of an arhan as *ākāśa-pāṇītalasamacitta* (Āś 1.348.4 and *passim*). 

10. As the title of the text, as well as the name of the samādhi, this phrase suggests the ambiguity of the topic of the sūtra. It presents some problems of translation. Cp. the introduction, section 2.2, especially n. 7. Variations on the title also occur in the stock phrase referred to in n. 27 to this translation.

11. The following list contains over 300 Buddhist doctrines, ideals and technical terms. The exact number depends to a great extent on the way one chooses to read or count certain sets of epithets or attributes. The Japanese translators of the Sr count 327. The terms are discussed also in chapter XXXIX and in stanzas 66–129 of chapter XVII (see Murakami 1966c). But the sūtra devotes one whole chapter (XXXVIII) to only the first three terms. Murakami, on the basis of a comparison of these chapters, counts 330 terms in chapter I, 297 in chapter XVII and 293 in the combined list in chapters XXXVII and XXXXIX. However, if one assumes that each question phrase in chapter XXXIX marks one item, this chapter contains 265 items, not 290.

The Chinese text counts 316. However, many individual items in the Chinese text do not correspond to those in the Sanskrit list. The overall plan is also different, for the Chinese divides the recitation of terms into 21 separately numbered lists of ten dharmas, and a single, unnumbered series of 106 epithets of the samādhi. The first 210 items are presented as effects of the samādhi, whereas the last 106 are presented as alternate names for the samādhi.
12. Many of the terms from the fourth to the last item in the list are discussed briefly in chapter XXXIX. See the preceding note.

13. Compare this item (Va 5.5) with the item below (Va 5.7, marked by our n. 14 just below). In the latter the notion of the sameness of all forms of rebirth is mentioned as a separate item in the list.

14. See the preceding note. This item is omitted from the list in chapter XXXIX.

15. The phrase is trimanḍala-pariśuddhi-jñāna; lit. “knowledge of the purification of the three spheres” or “knowledge of purity in three spheres.” The usual definition of the “three spheres” is “giver,” “act of giving” and “receiver.” In chapter XXXIX the term is defined as “not appropriating (anupalabdhi) any dharma in the past, the present or the future” (Va 298.11–12), but this is evidently due to conflation with the definition of the previous item in the list, which is missing in the Sanskrit text of chapter XXXIX but found in the corresponding passage of the Chinese and Tibetan editions.

16. In the corresponding discussion in chapter XXXIX, the term is awikalpa; we have nevertheless preferred the reading of most MSS of chapter I, as a lectio difficilior.

17. Ajñāna is interpreted in a nontechnical sense in spite of its definition in chapter XXXIX as adhyāropa. See also n. 22 to this translation.

18. The first part of this compound, āhāranirhāra, is a highly problematic term (Tibetan: sgrub pa dang nge par sgrub pa la mkhas pa’i shes pa zas sgrub pa la mkhas pa). The translation is conjectural.

19. See n. 5 to this translation.

20. The edited text reads ekalambatmājñātā, which is both problematic and unsupported by any of Matsumani’s MSS. The latter have ekāramatā átmajñātā (P), ekāramatā átmajñātā (L), and ekāramatāpratishthāna ātmajñātā (D). The Tibetan, which reads goig bur dag’ ba dang bdag shes pa dang, also suggests a reading like ekāramatā átmajñātā. We have translated accordingly.

21. This item is missing in chapter XXXIX, but is included in chapter XVII, where it is expanded to buddha-ghoṣa-, etc. See n. 24 to this translation.

22. See nn. 17 and 23 to this translation.

23. The juxtaposition of jñāna, vidyā and avidyā creates some problems for the translator. According to chapter XXXIX, jñāna refers to knowledge in a general sense, both common (laukika) and supramundane (lokottara) cognition, whereas vidyā refers specifically to knowledge that is in agreement with reality and properly focused on the real (yoniśas). But elsewhere the same chapter seems to identify the two terms; cp. the translation of ajñāna, nn. 17 and 22 to this translation.

24. These three types of kṣanti are mentioned elsewhere in the sūtra (see, e.g., Va 118.5 and 135.23). However they do not seem to correspond exactly to the three types of patience discussed in chapter VII (see, e.g., Sr 7:22). Cf. also n. 21 to this translation.

25. The same stock phrase occurs in chapter XL (Va 303.11–17). In chapter XIX (Va app., 326.12–17) the earth’s shaking is described with eighteen verbs followed by a shorter version of the six ways (or directions) of the earth’s movement. This description is also prefaced by the word ṣadvikāram. The passage is missing in the Gilgit MS and the Chinese, but found in the Tibetan text. Cp. the earthquake on the occasion of the Buddha’s death (DN 2:156) at the time of Māra’s defeat (Lv 318–19) and on the Buddha’s enlightenment (Lv 352). Mvy 3000–31 lists thirty-one ways in which the earth shakes, including the twelve verbs denoted by the phrase above.
26. Vaidya places the introductory passage in an appendix (app. I, no. 4) because it is lacking in the Gilgit MS. The Chinese translation also omits this portion; see n. 29 to this translation.

27. This stock phrase on preserving and propagating the sūtra (see the introduction, section 2.5) occurs with very minor variations at the beginning of chapters III, XVI (Va app. I, no. 17), XX (Va app. I, no. 21), XXIII, XXIX, XXX, XXXI, XXXII, XXXVI (Va app. I, no. 36), XXXVII and XL, and, with major changes, in chapters VIII and XVIII. It is not found in the Gilgit or Chinese MSS. The expression translated here as “developing a sense of solitude” (aranā-bhāvanā) appears in some of these occurrences (e.g., chapters III and XVI). Its translation is problematic. More standard seems to be aranā-vihāra. See BHSD, s.v. aranā. Cp. also Sr 79.7 (aranābhūmiḥ / sāntabhūmiḥ / sarva-prapañcasamucchedah) and Régamey 1938: 34 (= 8§16; Va 312, from Du’s MSS A and B and Tibetan). Also MN Sutta No. 139 (Araṇāvibhāṅgasutta), Aṣṭa 3.29, Conze 1974: 35.8 and the references in Lamotte 1962: 154 n. 27. The term has been discussed by Walleser 1917: passim and Conze 1974: 97f.

28. Given the position of this phrase, one could assume that the antecedent for tasya (“his”) is saṅgha, as a collective noun for the Buddha’s disciples, since the Buddha’s own life-span is mentioned below. However, it seems more reasonable to assume a mechanical repetition than to assume that the text attributes to the Buddha’s disciples the same life-span as to the Buddha.

29. Here ends the introductory passage that is missing in the Gilgit MS.

30. The first section of this chapter—all that precedes the verses—is missing in the Chinese translation. Instead, the Chinese has the following (T 639 [XV] 551a11–13): “At that time in the midst of the world, in all of the regions within the Cakrāvāda, there was a great darkness, and all living beings looked about in awei. Each of them was startled and said, ‘How is it that suddenly there should appear here a man of this kind?’ Thereupon the World Honored One spoke these verses:”

Perhaps this section arose from a misreading of the end of chapter I, in which the inhabitants of the Avici hells look around, see each other and remark, “so there are others here.” The origins of this passage are unclear, but it does seem that an originally shorter ending to chapter I has been turned into an introduction to chapter II.

31. This is the traditional formula for beginning a pūrvayoga or account of a previous existence of a buddha. Cp., e.g., Sr 16:1.

32. The form Sahā is the more common, but we have adopted throughout the reading of the MSS, Sahā.

33. The Sanskrit has simply “purity” (dhūta), which we take as an abbreviation of dhūta-guṇa. See the following note.

34. We have assumed that with the expression dhūtān samādāya guṇām āvartate, the Sanskrit text intends the technical compound dhūta-guṇa, broken up for metrical reasons. We base our assumption on the context of this stanza, on that of stanza 19 and on the evidence collected by Edgerton (BHSD, s.v. dhūta). If our assumption is false, the two verses (19b and 25b) should be translated, respectively: “is committed to the forest life and is established in purity” and “one who, having adopted [these] pure qualities, abides in them.”

35. There is some confusion in the manuscripts regarding the title of this chapter. Some of the Nepalese versions call it “Buddhānumṛti,” reserving the title “Samādhi” for the fourth chapter.

36. The preceding verb, pratisaṃsikṣate, in this context clearly refers to the practice of buddhānumṛti, which is the subject of this paragraph (see BHSD, s.v.).
37. For this and the preceding verse see Nagarjuna's Ratnāvalī, III.59-60, in Hahn 1982: 83.

38. A reference to the bodhicitta, the thought or will of attaining enlightenment, expressed in stanzas 7 and 8.

39. This translates the Sanskrit text literally, but the expression is problematic, since it would not be proper etiquette for a monk to refuse an invitation.

40. The theme and stock phrase of the four-lined verse is repeated later in the sūtra. Cf., e.g., Sr 11:58, 24:64-67 and 32:6. See also stanza 16.

41. See the introduction, section 2.2 and nn. 10 and 11.

42. Dutt, following the Gilgit text, omits the opening passage up to our n. 43 just below, giving the text instead in a note.

43. Gilgit begins with the next words.

44. This seems to be a case of a double etymology (pra-hā/pa-dhā) lending itself to an obvious Buddhist pun. The word prahāna, according to the Mahāvyutpatti, has two seemingly opposite meanings. One is “exertion”; vyāyacchate (Mvy 962); viryam ārabhate (Mvy 963). The other is “becoming free from” or “abandoning.” In section XXXIX the Mvy cites catvāri prahānāni. Except for the second occurrence, the other three, though named prahānāni, not only do not include the term prahāna but apparently do not imply any concept of abandoning. The Mvy adds two other synonymous expressions; that is, cittam pragrhnāti (964) and samyak pradadhātī (965).

Edgerton (BHSI, s.v.) rejects the negative meaning “abandonment” as impossible, adopting “exertion” or “strenuousness.” He thinks “exertion” in the sense of Pali padhāna is implausible. However, one should consider carefully the context of this term in Buddhist practice. Becoming free is the goal of Buddhist exertion. The Pali equivalent in the noun form, padhāna (= padhāna), conveys the meaning which Edgerton wrongly rejected as implausible. The Mvy 1481 gives the fourth of the catvāri dhyānāni as sa sukhasya ca prahanād dāhkasaya ca prahanāt pāvam eva ca saumanasya-daurmanasyayor astamangād aduḥkhasukham upesṣṭaṁtipariṣuddhaṁ caturthaṁ dhyānām upasampadya viharati. This passage undoubtedly suggests the original usage of the term prahāna: “getting free from,” “abandoning” or “giving up.”

45. Lit. “patient acceptance agreeing with emptiness with respect to all dharmas” (sarvadharmesu śūnyatānulomikī kṣāntīḥ).

46. This stanza is highly problematic. We interpret yasyārthi as yasya arthe. The Chinese translation reads:

If for the sake of food one gives rise to a jealous mind,
The moment one perceives that the food is already impure,
The karmic input is immeasurable and the fruit is obtained (?),
If [then] one examines this deeply, he is able to attain the samādhi.

T 639 (XV) 653a21-22:

若為食起嫉妒心 當觀食已無有淨
用功無量乃得成 若深觀此能得定

The Tibetan translators seem to have been equally confused by this passage. They render: “Why should one give rise to karmic seeds and consequences through desire and enjoyment? If one examines this point, this samādhi is not difficult to attain.” The Tibetan text (P 795 [mdo, thu, 14b3-4]) reads:
yongs su tshol dang kun tu long spyod dang //
khāzas rgyu 'thun dag ni gang gi phyir //
phraṅ dog skyes pa de la rab tu rtogs //
ting 'dzin 'di ni rnyed par yod mi dka' //

Tamura and Ichigō’s modern Japanese translation construes the stanza as follows: “Even though an envious mind should repeatedly arise [in him] with respect to (worldly) gain, if he examines carefully the source and the outcome that this (worldly gain) produces in this world, from the point of view of (the means) by which one strives for it and the ways of enjoying it, (if [in this way] he has stopped envy for worldly gain), for such a one...” See Tamura and Ichigō 1975: 1.109.

A free, interpretive, reading of the Sanskrit would be: “If one should become envious of the worldly possessions of others, this samādhi can be easily obtained—that is, if one examines the way in which this envy will create a karmic base and a karmic consequence—observing these possessions from the point of view of what he expects from them and what he will actually get from them.” The verse is not commented upon in the Kūrtimālā.

47. “Composed” translates here samāḥita, which in vs. 13 is rendered “collected.” Etymologically related to samādhi, the word is meant to pun here with the theme of the sūtra. We have chosen to render the term “collected” when the context is that of the active practice of meditation and mental concentration and “composed” when referring to the state of calm sought in meditation and believed to correspond to the inherent peace of all things.

48. We interpret the nayu of all Nepalese MSS as na ayam. The Tibetan text suggests the translation “Those who seek after this auspicious samādhi never have thought of fear.” A corresponding Sanskrit is difficult to imagine.

49. Reading with the Gilgit text. Ma reads: yaś caṅkrame ca krami bodhisattvah /. 

50. This is the topic of chapter XXII. See especially Sr 22:35.
PART II

The Manuscript of the Vajracchedikā
Found at Gilgit

An Annotated Transcription and Translation

by Gregory Schopen

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ABBREVIATIONS AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abbreviations and Special Transcriptions Used in the Edition and Textual Notes

Chak: Chakravarti 1956.
Cz: Conze 1974.
Du: Dutt 1959.
G: Gilgit Manuscript. Raghu Vira and Lokesh Chandra, eds. Gilgit Buddhist Manuscripts (Facsimile Edition). Pt. 7. Sata-Piṭaka Series 10(7). New Delhi: International Academy of Indian Culture, 1974, folio 1380–93. I have also been able to use—thanks to Professor J. W. de Jong—a printout of a microfilm of the manuscript. This printout is sometimes much easier to read than the published facsimile.
Ku: Kumārajīva’s Chinese translation of the Vajracchedikā. Taishō 235. Chin-kang pan-jo po-lo-mi ching. Vol. 8, 748–52. The very few references I make to this text are all taken from Conze’s notes to his edition.
MM: Müller 1881.
MS: manuscript; the same as G.
Par: Pargiter 1916.
ṇ: The transcription of an akṣara which looks like the akṣara for –ṇa– with a mark above it very like the vowel marker for e. This mark is clearly intended as a kind of virāma, although the value of the nasal is not always clear. This akṣara, when it appears, always occurs as a
word final, and often seems to be used interchangeably with *anus-vāra*.

**w.** = wrongly. This implies no judgment with regard to the “correctness” or “incorrectness” of the grammatical form, etc. It refers only to the readings actually found in the MS and whether or not they have been accurately given by the editors.

· = represents a similar mark of punctuation found in the MS.

)) = represents a similar mark of punctuation found in the MS.

· )) = represents a similar mark of punctuation found in the MS.

() = indistinct or damaged akṣaras.

[ ] = lost or unreadable akṣaras.

x = lost or unreadable akṣaras within a word.

### Abbreviations and Bibliography


The Gilgit Manuscript of the Vajracchedikā


f./ff.: and following.


fo.: folio.


Abbreviations and Bibliography


INTRODUCTORY NOTE*

Since the Gilgit manuscript of the Vajracchedikā has already been edited twice, the reasons for another edition may not be altogether apparent. There are, however, several good reasons for a reedition. First of all, the manuscript of the Vajracchedikā—which contains in addition three other texts—is one of the most carefully written of the Gilgit finds. In the introduction to his edition Chakravarti, for example, notes with regard specifically to the text of the Vajracchedikā that the manuscript “is remarkably free from errors.... The few mistakes which occur are mainly orthographical or are due to oversight.” The Gilgit text of the Vajracchedikā is, in fact, a fine example of what a Prajñāpāramitā text in Sanskrit prose actually looked like in the sixth or seventh century, as opposed to how we—under the watchful eye of Pāṇini and the influence of the expectations derived from much later, mostly Nepalese, manuscript traditions—might think it should have looked. In consequence the manuscript has considerable significance for the history of the “style” of this literature, as well as for the history of the language as it was actually written. This is especially so in regard to syntax and the use of sandhi and sandhi forms.

But, if all of this is true, then it is of some importance to have as accurate an edition of the manuscript as is possible, and this brings us to a second good reason for making another edition of the text: both of the previous editions are full of mistakes and distortions. Since all of these will be signaled in my notes, there is no reason to cite them here and we might simply note the broad types of errors that occur in the editions.

In Chakravarti’s edition, for example, in less than ten pages of romanized Sanskrit there are at least twenty-nine cases in which the manuscript has, correctly, a long vowel, which Chakravarti reads or prints, incorrectly, as a short vowel. There are at least seven cases in which the opposite occurs, that is, what in the manuscript is, correctly, a short vowel is printed in Chakravarti’s edition, incorrectly, as a long

*The initial work for this text edition and translation was made possible by a grant from the Translations Program of the National Endowment for the Humanities, an independent federal agency.
vowel (virtually all of these mistakes occur at the ends of words and involve case endings, gender and number distinctions, etc.). There are at least six cases in which the manuscript has, correctly, a plural verb form, but in which Chakravarti prints, incorrectly, a singular. There are at least thirty-two cases in which Chakravarti omits an anusvāra found in the manuscript, printing an -m instead, and at least nine places where Chakravarti’s edition omits entire words which are found in the manuscript. Although I know very well from experience that some mistakes are always made in working from manuscripts, this, I think, is a little excessive.

Dutt’s edition is equally problematic and gives an equally distorted impression of the manuscript. He, for example, completely misrepresents the sandhi found in the manuscript. There are at least thirty-seven cases in which a perfectly correct sandhi in the manuscript is printed by Dutt as an unresolved hiatus (-y + a- printed as -i a- eight times; -e- printed -a i- five times; -ā- printed as -a a- ten times; -ai- printed as -a e- four times; -o- printed as -a u- seven times, etc.). His treatment of anusvāra and the nasals is equally problematic. In addition to this, there are five places where he adds words—once a whole line—which are not found in the manuscript, four places where he omits words—again, in one case a whole line—which occur in the manuscript, and in four more places he brackets words which actually occur in the manuscript.

There are yet other reasons for undertaking a new edition of the Gilgit text. Its appearance might serve to stimulate a badly needed critical investigation and revision of other editions of the text. The edition of the late Edward Conze, for instance, has become the standard one, and has recently been reprinted. Yet it is of very dubious value from a text-critical point of view. Conze’s edition, for example, is badly conflated. He mixes texts of clearly different recensions and widely different dates, and does so with a high degree of arbitrariness. He says in his introduction that the text he wants to present “is substantially that of Max Müller” which “is based on three documents, all comparatively late.” But at 14b, for example, he reads na mama bhagavan duṣkaram. Duṣkaram is not the reading in any of Müller’s three sources, the Gilgit text or the Tibetan translation. All of these sources read āścaryam (ngo mtshar). In spite of this, and without any stated justification, Conze adopts the reading found in Pargiter’s Central Asian manuscript (which is probably a thousand years earlier than the manuscripts on which Conze’s basic text is based) and the “reading” found in Kumārajīva’s translation. This, of course, is not a terribly significant example, but it is typical of one aspect of Conze’s methodology. We might look at another
case which underscores even more clearly the arbitrary nature of Conze’s editorial procedures. At the end of his 17c he omits an entire passage which is found in Müller’s edition (i.e., Conze’s basic text), because it is not found in Kumārajīva, Pargiter or the Tibetan text. It is also not found in the Gilgit text (although Conze fails to note this) and therefore we can “infer,” he says, that it “is a later addition which has crept into the text after 800 A.D.” He also adds that “it is also doctrinally suspect ... contradicting the whole of Buddhist tradition” and, he says elsewhere, “the idea is contrary to the tradition of the Prajñāpāramitā.” Obviously, if each editor were allowed to exclude passages which contradicted what he thought was “the whole of Buddhist tradition” or “the tradition of the Prajñāpāramitā,” the resulting text would be little more than a personal document. If, on the other hand, Conze excludes the passage primarily on the grounds that it does not occur in Kumārajīva, Pargiter, the Tibetan and Gilgit texts, then he must also exclude passages like evam pariyajan gangānadivālokāsāmān kalpāms tān ātmabhāvan parityajet at 13e, ‘grayānasamprasthitānāṁ sattvānāṁ arthāya śreṣṭhayānasamprasthitānāṁ arthāya at 14a or any number of other passages, each of which is omitted in all four sources.

In regard more specifically to the Gilgit text it should be noted that Conze’s notes to his edition reproduce all the errors in Chakravarti’s edition, and that there are a number of cases in which Conze’s notations in regard to the Gilgit text are wrong or misleading. For example, at 15b he notes that na-abodhisattva-pratijñāḥ sattvaḥ sakyam ayam dharmaparyāyah is missing in the Tibetan translation, but he does not note that it is also missing in the Gilgit text. Clearly, then, the text established by Professor Conze can only be used with the greatest circumspection, and a new critical edition is badly needed. The discovery of three new manuscripts of the Vajracchedikā in Nepal makes such an edition even more desirable.

Given the fact that the Gilgit manuscript of the Vajracchedikā represents both an early and a well-written text, and given the fact that one of my primary purposes is to provide a readily available example of what a Prajñāpāramitā text in the sixth or seventh century actually looked like, I have chosen to present, not an edition of the manuscript, but a transcription. I have added a series of notes—in the most economical way possible— signaling the errors and silent alterations which appear in Chakravarti’s and Dutt’s editions. I have offered virtually no emendations, conjectures or “corrections.” The text stands almost exactly as it occurs in the manuscript. This is true of the punctuation as well. I have simply reproduced the punctuation found in the manuscript, which is, I might add, usually good. I have added no grammatical or syn-
tactical notes, although there are things of interest which fall into both categories, nor have I catalogued sandhi forms. I have, in fact, done very little except try to present as accurately as possible the text as it is found in the manuscript.

In presenting the transcription I have, for the sake of economy, not used footnoting or footnote numbers. I first give the transcription of the folios line by line. The second section of the article consists of a series of notes for each line of each folio indicating the misreadings and errors concerning that line found in the published editions. The word or words in my transcription that have been wrongly read or printed by Chakravarti, Dutt, etc., are signaled in these notes by bold face type, and they are followed by statements giving the reading found in Chakravarti, Dutt, etc.

In addition to the transcription and notes, I have provided a translation. The translation is included for two basic reasons: first, to allow those who cannot read Sanskrit, but who are interested in the text, to be able to see what an early version of this text looked like and, second, because I think, rightly or wrongly, that the available English translations of this text can be usefully supplemented by another interpretation. That, in the end, is what every translation is. The first of these reasons has also very largely determined the kind of translation I have given. Apart from having paraphrased some recurring rhetorical phrases, I have tried, in the main, to stay as close to the text as possible. This procedure has, I hope, preserved some of the “style” of the original. It has, I know, resulted in what might most politely be called a “Sanskritic” English. I can here only repeat the words of an obscure scholar writing some years ago: “In reference to the translation given here, it should be noted first that it was not intended to be beautiful. In this, I am afraid, I have succeeded beyond even my greatest expectations.”

I have added to the translation a few notes, especially where there are textual uncertainties or where I thought a particular point needed further interpretation. The notes are obviously incomplete and clearly reflect my own particular interests.
TRANSCRIPTION OF THE GILGIT TEXT

Folio 5a (G 1380; Chak 182.1–183.11; Du 151.3–152.15; MM 29.6–30.11; Cz 38.6–39.20; Par 182.10–183.10; Tib 253.1.3–2.5)

1. -taḥ bhagavān āha · yā(vat) subhūt(e) tr(i)sāḥasra-mahāsāhasre lokadhāṭau prthivirajaḥ kaccit tad vahu · āha · bahu bhagavan tat prthivirajaḥ arajas tathāgatena bhāṣitas tenocyate prthivī-

2. -raja iti · yo 'py asau lokadhāṭur adhātuḥ sa tathāgatena bhāṣitas tenocyate lokadhāṭur iti · )) bhagavān āha · tat kiṃ manyase subhūte dvāṭrīṁsatā mahāpuruṣalakṣaṇānais tathāgato draṣṭavyaḥ

3. āha · no bhagavaṁs tat kasya heto tāni tāni dvātrīṁśan mahā-puruṣalakṣaṇāni tathāgatena bhāṣitāni alakṣaṇāni tenocyante dvātrīṁśan mahāpuruṣalakṣaṇānīti · bhagavān āha · yaś ca kha–

4. -lu pu(na)ḥ subhūte strī vā puruṣo vā gamgānādībālukopamān ātmabhāvān parityajed yaś ceto dharmaparyāyād antaśās ca tus-padikām api gāthām udgrhyā parebhyo desayed ayam e–

5. -va tato nidānām bahupuṇyaṁ prasavetāprimayam asamkhyeyaṁ)) atha khalv āyuṣmāṁ subhūtir dharmapraṣveṇaṁ ānī prāmumcaḥ so 'ṛūṇi prāmrjya bhagavantam etad av(o)cat ā–

6. -ścaryāṁ bhagavan paramāścaryāṁ sugata · yāvad ayaṁ dharmaparyāyas tathāgatena bhāṣito yato me bhagavām jñānam utpannam na me jātv ayaṁ dharmaparyāyaḥ śrūtapūrvaḥ paramena

7. (t)e (bhaga)van(n) āścaryena samanvāgatā bhaviṣyanti ya iha sūtre bhāṣyamāne bhūtasamīḍhām utpādayiṣyanti · ya caiṣā bhagavan bhūtasamīḍhā saivāx-rī(–x)–ā xsmāt tathāgato bhāṣate
Transcription of the Gilgit Text

Folio 5b (G 1381; Chak 183.12–184.9; Du 152.15–154.11; MM 30.12–32.1; Cz 39.20–41.19; Par 183.10–184.20; Tib 253.2.5–3.8)

1. (bh)ūxxx(bh)ūtasaṁjñeti ∙ na me bhagavann āscaryaṁ yad aham imāṁ dharmaparyāyaṁ bhāsyamānaṁ avakalpayāmy adhimucya ∙ ye te bhagavan satvā imāṁ dharmaparyāyaṁ(u(d)gra(h)īṣya(n)ti ∙ yāva(t pa)ryavāpsyā–

2. –nte ∙ te paramāscaryasamanvāgataḥ bhaviṣyanti ∙ api tu khalu punar bhagavan na teṣāṁ ātmasaṁjñā pravartsyate ∙ na satvasaṁjñā na jīvasaṁjñā na pudgalasamjñā ∙ tat kasya hetoh sarvasaṁjñā(pagatā hi)

3. buddhā bhagavantaḥ bhagavān āha ∙ evam etat subhūte paramāścaryasamanvāgataḥ te bhaviṣyanti ya imāṁ dharmaparyāyaṁ śrutvā nottrasīṣyanti ∙ na samtrasīṣyanti ∙ na sa(m)trīḥ(sam sipat-)sya–

4. –nte ∙ tat kasya hetoḥ paramapāramiteyam subhūte tathāgatena bhāṣītā ∙ yām ca tathāgataḥ paramapāramitāṁ bhāṣate ∙ tām aparimāṇa buddhā bhagavanto bhāṣante ∙ te(n)oc(yate) pa–

5. –ramapāramiteti ∙ )) api tu khalu punaḥ subhūte ya tathāgatasya kṣāntipāramitā saivāpāramitā ∙ tat kasya hetoḥ yadā subhūte kali-rājaṅgapratyaṅgamāṁsāny acchaitṣīt nāsī–

6. –n me tasmin samaye ātmasaṁjñā vā satvasaṁjñā vā jīvasaṁjñā vā pudgalasamjñā vā vā vyāpādasamjñā vāpi me tasmin samaye 'bhaviṣyad abhijānāmy aham subhūte atīte 'dhvani pāṁca jātiśā–

7. –tāni yo 'haṁ kṣāntivādi ṛṣir abhūvāms tatrāpi me nātmasaṁjñābhūn na satvasaṁjñā na jīvasaṁjñā na pudgalasamjñā ∙ tasmāt tarhi subhūte bodhisatvena mahāsatvena sarvasaṁjñā varjayītvā

Folio 7a (G 1382; Chak 184.9–185.4; Du 156.14–157.13; MM 34.2–35.2; Cz 44.6–45.11; Par 186.11–187.7; Tib 253.5.7–254.1.7)

1. –rimāṇena ∙ sarve te satvā mamāṁsena bodhim dhāraviṣyanti ∙ tat kasya hetoḥ na hi śakyam subhūte ayaṁ dharmaparyāyo hiṁ-dhimuktikaiḥ satvaiḥ śrotuṁ ∙ nātmadṛṣṭikaiḥ na satvajīvapu–

2. –dgadalṛṣṭikaiḥ śakyam śrotuṁ udgrahītum vā ∙ yāvat paryavā-ptuṁ vā nedaṁ sthānaṁ vidyate ∙ api tu khalu punaḥ subhūte yatra pṛthivīpradeṣe idaṁ sūtraṁ prakāśayiṣyati ∙ pūjanīyaḥ sa
The Gilgit Manuscript of the Vajracchedikā

3. prthvīpradeśo bhaviṣyatī · sadevamānuṣāsurasya lokasya vanda-

niyaḥ pradaśāśkaranaṇiyaś caityabhūta sa prthvīpradeśo bhavi-

ṣyatī · ye te subhūte kulapurūrñā

4. vā kuladuhitaro vā · imān evamṛūpān sūtrāntān udgrahīṣyanti

yāvat paryavāpsyanti · te paribhūtā bhaviṣyanti suparibhūtāḥ

yāṇi ca teśāṁ satvānāṁ pūrvavajānmiyāṁ aśubhāṇi ka-

5. -rmāṇy apāyasaṁvartaniyāṇi tāṇi dṛśta iva dharme paribhūtatayā
kṣapayiṣyanti buddhobodhim cānuprāṣyante · abhijānaṁ ahaṁ

subhūte aitte ‘dhvany asaṁ(khy)e(y)ai(ḥ) kalpāi(r) (a)samkhyeya–

6. -tarair ddīpaṁkarasya tathāgatasyārhatāḥ samyaksaṁbuddhasya

pareṇa caturāśṭir buddhakoṭīniyūtaśatasaḥrasaṁy abhūvan yāṇi

mayā ārāgitāni ārāgya ca na virāgitāni ·

Folio 7b (G 1383; Chak 185.4–27; Du 157.13–159.2; MM 35.2–36.3; Cz 45.11–47.5; Par 187.7–deest; Tib 254.1.7–2.6)

1. yac ca mayā subhūte te buddhā bhagavanta ārāgya na virāgitā yac

carime kāle paścimāyāṁ paṁcaśatāyāṁ varttamāṇāyāṁ imāṁ

sūtrāntān udgrahīṣyanti · yāvat paryavāpsyanti · asya subhū-

2. -te punyaskandhasyāsaṁ pūrvakaḥ punyaskandhaḥ śatatāmīṁ api

kalāṁ nopaiti · sahasratāmīṁ api · śatasaḥsraṁātāmīṁ api · sam-
khyāṁ api kalāṁ api gaṇanāṁ apy upamāṁ apy upa–

3. -niśāṁ api na kṣamate · sacet subhūte teśāṁ kulaputraṇāṁ

kuladuhiṭhriṇāṁ ca punyaskandhaṁ bhāṣeyam yāvantas te satvā

kulapurūrṇāḥ kuladuhitaras ca tasmin samaye puṇya–

4. -skandhaṁ parigrahīṣyanti · ummādāṁ satvā anuprāpaṇyuś citta-
vikṣepaṁ vā gaccheyuḥ api tu khalu punaḥ subhūte acintyo 'yāṁ
dharmaparyāyaḥ asyācintya eva vipākaḥ ))

5. āha · katham bhagavan bodhisatvāṅnasamprasthitena sthāta-
vyaṁ kathāṁ pratipattavyaṁ kathāṁ cittāṁ praghitavyaṁ ·
bhagavān āha · iha subhūte bodhisatvāṅnasamprasthitenaivāṁ
cittam utpā–

6. -dayitavyaṁ sarvasatvā mayā anupadhiśeṣe nirvāṇadhātāu
parinirvāpayitavyaḥ evaṁ ca satvān parinirvāpya na kaścit satvāḥ
parinirvāpito bhavati · tat kasya hetoḥ sace–
1. -t subhūte bodhisatvasya satvasaṃjñā pravartetā · jīvasaṃjñā
pudgalasaṃjñā vā na sa bodhisatva iti vaktavyaḥ tat kasya hetoḥ
nāsti subhūte sa dharma yo bodhisatvayānasamprasthitā nāma ·
tat kiṃ manya-

2. -se subhūte asti sa kaścid dharma yo tathāgatena dīpamkarasya
tathāgataśyāntikād anuttarāṁ samyaksambodhim abhisambud-
dhāḥ āha · nāsti sa bhagavan kaścid dharma yo tathāgatena
dīpamkara-

3. -sya tathāgataśyāntikād anuttarā samyaksambodhim abhisambud-
dhāḥ āha · tasmād aham dīpaṃkareṇa tathāgatena vyākṛto
bhaviṣyasi tvaṁ māṇavāṇāgatā 'dhvani sākyamunir nāma tathā-

4. -gato 'rhan samyaksambuddhas tat kasya hetos tathāgata iti
subhūte tathātāya etad adhvivacanaṁ yaḥ kaścit subhūte evam
vadet tathāgatenānuttarā samyaksambodhir abhisambuddhati ·

5. nāsti subhūte sa kaścid dharma yo tathāgatenānuttarā samyak-
sambodhir abhisambuddhāḥ yaḥ subhūte tathāgatena dharma
'bhisambuddhas tatra na satyaṁ na mṛṣāḥ tasmāt tathāgato
bhāṣate · sarvā-

6. -dharma buddhadharmā iti · sarvadharmā iti subhūte sarve te
adharmās tenocyante sarvadharmā iti ·)) tadyathāpi nāma
subhūte puruṣo bhaved upetakāyo mahākāyaḥ subhūtir āha · yo

Folio 8b (G 1385; 186.22–187.15; Du 160.10–162.1; MM 37.16–39.2; Cz
49.5–50.14; Par 188.10–189.9; Tib 254.4.4–255.1.1)

1. 'sau tathāgatena puruṣo bhāṣita upetakāyo mahākāyaḥ akāyaḥ sa
bhagavāṁs tathāgatena bhāṣitas tenocyate upetakāyo mahākāyaḥ
bhagavān āha · evam etat subhūte

2. yo bodhisatva evam vaded aham satvān parinirvāpayisyāmīti · na
sa bodhisatva iti vaktavyaḥ tat kasya hetoḥ asti subhūte sa kaścid
dharmo yo bodhisatvo nāma · āha · no hidam bha-

3. -gavan bhagavān āha · tasmāt tathāgato bhāṣate niḥsatvāḥ sarva-
dharmāḥ nirījvā nispudgalāḥ yaḥ subhūte bodhisatva evam vaded
aham kṣetravyūhāṁ nispādayisyāmīti · so 'pi tathāiva
4. vaktavyaḥ tat kasya hetoh kṣetravyūhah kṣetravyūhāḥ iti subhūte avyūhās te tathāgatena bhāṣītās tenocyante kṣetravyūhāḥ iti · yaḥ subhūte bodhisatvo nirātmāno dharmā nirā-

5. -tmāno dharmā ity adhimucyte sa tathāgatenārhatā samyaksaṃ- buddhena bodhisatvo bodhisatva ity ā(khyāta)s tat kiṁ manyase subhūte saṁvidyate tathāgatasya māṁsacakṣuḥ āha · evam etad bha-

6. -gavan saṁvidyate tathāgatasya māṁsacakṣuḥ )) bhagavān āha · tat kiṁ manyase subhūte saṁvidyate tathāgatasya divyam cakṣuḥ prajñā(cakṣuḥ dharmacakṣur buddhacakṣuḥ āhaivam etad bhaga-

vaṁ saṁvidyate ta-

Folio 9a (G 1386; Chak 187.14–188.7; Du 162.1–163.5; MM 39.2–40.8; Cz 50.14–52.14; Par 189.10–190.7; Tib 255.1.1–2.1)

1. -thāgatasya divyam cakṣuḥ prajñācakṣuḥ dharmacakṣur buddha-

cakṣuḥ )) bhagavān āha · tat kiṁ manyase subhūte yāvantyo gaṁgānadyāṁ bālukās tāvantya gaṁgānadyo bhaveyus tāsu yā bālukās tāvanta eva lo-

2. -kadhātavo bhaveyuh kaccid bahavas te lokadhātavo bhaveyuh bhagavān āha · yāvantaḥ subhūte teṣu lokadhātūṣu satvās teṣām ahaṁ nānābhāvāṁ cittadhārāṁ jāniyās tat kasya heto-

3. -ś cittadhārā cittadhārā iti subhūte adhārās tās tathāgatena bhāṣi-

tās tenocyante cittadhārā iti · tat kasya hetor atītam subhūte cittaṁ nopalabhyaite · anāgataṁ cittaṁ nopalabhya-

4. -te · pratyuṭpannam nopalabhyaite · tat kiṁ manyase subhūte ya imaṁ trisāhasramahāsahasram lokadhātuṁ saptarānaparipūrṇaṁ kṛtvā dānan dadyād api nu sa kulaputo vā kuladu-

5. -hitā vā tato nidānam bahu puṇyaṁ prasaveta · āha · bahu bhagavan bahu sugata · bhagavān āha · evam etat subhūte evam etad vahu sa kulaputo vā kuladuhitā vā tato nidānam

6. bahu puṇyaṁ prasaveta · sacet subhūte puṇyaśandho 'bhaviṣyan na tathāgato 'bhāṣīyat puṇyaśandhā puṇyaśandha iti · tat kiṁ manyase subhūte rūpakāyapariniśpatyā tathāgato dra-
Folio 9b (G 1387; Chak 188.8–189.21; Du 163.5–164.9; MM 40.8–41.9; Cz 52.14–54.1; Par 190.7–191.7; Tib 255.2.1–3.3)

1. -śṭavayaḥ āha · no bhagavan na rūpakāyapariniśpattī tathāgato draṣṭavayaḥ tat kasya hetoḥ rūpakāyapariniśpattī rūpakāyapariniśpattir ity apariniśpattir eṣā tathāga–

2. -teṇa bhāśītā tenocyate rūpakāyapariniśpattir iti · bhagavān āha · tat kim manyase subhūte laksanaṃsāṃpadā tathāgato draṣṭavayaḥ āha · no bhagavan na laksanaṃsāṃpadā tathāgato

3. draṣṭavayaḥ tat kasya hetoḥ yaiṣā laksanaṃsāṃpat tathāgatena bhāśītā alaksanaṃsāṃpad eṣā tathāgatena bhāśītā tenocyate laksanaṃsāṃpad iti · bhagavān āha · tat kim ma–

4. -nyase subhūte api nu tathāgatasyaivaṁ bhavati na mayā dharmaṇa desita iti · yaḥ subhūte evam vadet tathāgatena dharmaṇa desita iti · abhyācakṣīta māṁ sa subhūte asatād u–

5. -dgṛhītena · tat kasya hetor dharmadeśanā dharmadeśaneti subhūte nāsti sa kaścid dharma yo dharmaṃdēśanā nāmopalabhyaṇe · āhāstī bhagavan kecit satvā bhavisyanty anāgatena ’dhvani ya ima–

6. -n evamrūpān dharmaḥ (bhāṣyamā)nām cchriftvābhīśraddadhāsyanti · bhagavān āha · na te subhūte satvā nāsatvās tat kasya hetoḥ sarvasatvā āti subhūte asatvās te tathāgatena bhāśītās teno–

Folio 10a (G 1388; Chak 188.30–189.21; Du 164.9–165.12; MM 41.9–42.7; Cz 54.1–55.8; Par 191.7–192.3; Tib 255.3.3–4.3)

1. -cyaṃte sarvasatvā āti · tat kim manyase subhūte api tv asti sa kaścid dharmaḥ yas tathāgatenānuttaraṇaṃ samyak-sambodhiraḥ abhisambuddhāḥ āha · nāstī sa bhagavan kaścid dharmaḥ yas tathāgat–

2. -nānuttarā samyak-sambodhir abhisambuddhāḥ bhagavān āha · evam etat subhūte evam etat anūt api tatra dharmaḥ na saṃvidyate nopolabhyaṇe tenocyate ’nuttarā samyak-sambodhir Ṭi ti a–

3. -pi tu khalu punaḥ subhūte samaḥ sa dharmaḥ na tatra kimcīd viṣamas tenocyate ’nuttarā samyak-sambodhir Ṭi · nirjīvatvena niḥsatvatvena niṣpudgalatvena samā saṅuttarā samyak-saṃbo–

4. -dhiḥ sarvaḥ kuṣalair dharmair abhisambudhyate · kuṣalā dharmaḥ kuṣalā dharmaḥ Ṭi subhūte adharmās caiva te tathāgatena bhāśītās tenocyante kuṣalā dharmaḥ Ṭi · yaś ca kha–
5. -lu punaḥ subhute yāvantas trisāhasramahāsāhasre lokadhātau
sumeravaḥ parvatarājās tāvato rāśin saptānām ratnānām abhisām-
hṛtya dānaṁ dadyād yaś cetaḥ prajñāpāramitā-

6. -yā antaṣaś catuṣpadikām api gāthām udgrhyā parebhyo desayed
asya subhute puṇyaskandhasyāsau pūrvakaḥ puṇyaskandhaḥ šata-
tamīm api (ka)lān nopaiti yāvad upani-

**Folio 10b (G 1389; Chak 189.21–190.11; Du 165.12–166.14; MM 42.7-
43.7; Cz 55.8–56.20; Par 192.3–192.21; Tib 255.4.3–5.4)**

1. -śām api na kṣamate tat kiṁ manyase subhute api nu tathāgata-
syaivaṃ bhavati mayā satvā mocita iti na khalu punaḥ
subhute-r-evaṁ draṣṭavyaṁ tat kasya hetoḥ na sa kaścit sa-

2. -tvo yas tathāgatena mocitaḥ yadi punaḥ subhute kaścit satvo
'bhaviṣyad yas tathāgatena mocitaḥ sa eva tasyātmagrāho
'bhaviṣyat satvagrāho jivagrāhaḥ pudgalagrāhaḥ

3. ātmagrāha iti subhute agrāha eṣa tathāgatena bhāṣītaḥ sa ca
bālapṛthagjanair udgrhītaḥ bālapṛthagjanā iti subhute ajanā ete
tathāgatena

4. bhāṣītās tenocyaṁte bālapṛthagjanā iti tat kiṁ manyase subhute
lakṣaṇasaṃpadā tathāgato draṣṭavyaḥ āhaivam etad bhagaval
lakṣaṇasaṃpadā tathāgato draṣṭavyaḥ

5. bhagavān āha satc punaḥ subhute lakṣaṇasaṃpadā tathāgato
dra[ṣṭa]vyo 'bhaviṣyad rājāpi cakravartī tathāgato 'bhaviṣyat āha
yathāhāṁ bhagavato bhāṣītasyārtham ājā-

6. -nāmi na lakṣaṇasaṃpadā tathāgato draṣṭavyaḥ )) atha khalu
bhagavāṁs tasyāṁ velāyām imā gāthā abhāṣataḥ )) ye mām rūpeṇa
adrākṣur ye māṁ ghoṣeṇa anvayuḥ mithyā-

**Folio 11a (G 1390; Chak 190.12–191.4; Du 166.14–168.3; MM 43.7–44.6;
Cz 56.20–59.1; Par 192.21–193.13; Tib 255.5.4–256.1.4)**

1. -prahāṇaprasṛṭa na māṁ drakṣyanti te janāḥ draṣṭavyo dharmato
buddho dharmakāyas tathāgataḥ dharmatā cāpy avijñeyā na sā
śakyaṁ vijānituṁ )) tat kiṁ manyase subhute lakṣaṇasaṃpadā
tathā-
2. "gatenānuttaraṃ samyaksambodhir ābhisamabuddhāḥ na khalu punaḥ subhūte evāṃ draṣṭavyam na subhūte laksanaṃparpaṇādā tathāgatenānuttarāṃ samyaksambodhir ābhisambuddhāḥ at yat khalu pu-

3. naḥ subhūte syād evāṃ bodhisatvāṇāmaprasāthitaḥ kasyaṣid
dharmasya vināśaḥ prajñapta ucchedo vā na khalu punaḥ subhūte evāṃ draṣṭavyam na bodhisatvāṇāmprasāthitaḥ ka-

4. syaṣid dharmasya vināśaḥ prajñapta nocchedaḥ yaś ca khalu punaḥ subhūte kulaputro vā kuladuhitā vā gamgānādībūkāpamāl lokadhātūn sapratarapatipūṛṇān kṛtvā (tathā—)

5. gatebhyo 'ṛhadbhyāḥ samyaksambuddhebhyo dānamāt dadyād yaś ca bodhisatvo niśātmakeṣu dharmesu kṣāntiṃ pratilabheta ayam eva tato bahutaram puṇyaṃ prasaveta na khalu punaḥ subhūte bo[dhi]–

6. satvāṃ puṇyaskandhaḥ parigrahitavyaḥ āha puṇyaskandho bhagavan parigrahitavyaḥ bhagavaḥ āha parigrahitavyaḥ subhūte nodgrahitavyaḥ tenocyate pa(r)igra[hītavyaḥ]

Folio 11b (G 1391; Chak 191.5–26; Du 168.3–169.4; MM 44.7–45.4; Cz 54.1–60.7; Par 193.13–194.5; Tib 256.1.4–2.4)

1. api tu khalu punaḥ subhūte yaḥ kaścid evāṃ vadet tathāgato
gacchati vāgacchati vā tisṭhati vā niśidati vā śayyāṃ vā kalpayati na me sa bhāṣitasayārtham ājānāti tat ka(sya) [hetoḥ]

2. tathāgata iti subhūte na kutaścīd āgato na kvaścid gataḥ tenocyate tathāgato ’ṛhan samyaksambuddha iti yaś ca khalu punaḥ subhūte kulaputro vā kuladuhitā vā yāvantas trīṣāhasrā[maḥā–]

3. sāhasre lokadhātāu prthivīrajaṃśi tāvato lokadhātūṃ maśīṃ kuryāt tadyathāpi nāma paramāṇusāmcayās tā kim manyase subhūte bahu sa paramāṇusāmcayo bhavet āhāi–

4. vam etad bhagavan bahu sa paramāṇusāmcayo bhavet tat kasya hetoḥ saced bhagavan saṁcayo bhūṣiṣyān na bhagavaḥ avakṣyat paramāṇusāmcaya iti tat kasya hetoḥ yo ’sau paramā–

5. paṇaṃcayo bhāṣītaḥ asaṁcayaḥ sa bhagavatā bhāṣitas tenocyate paramāṇusāmcaya iti yaḥ ca tathāgato bhāṣati tṛṣāhasramahā-
sāhasro lokadhātūr iti adhātuvḥ sa tathā–
The Gilgit Manuscript of the Vajracchedikā

6. -gatena bhāṣitas tenocyate trisāhasramahāsāhasro lokadhātur iti ·
   tat kasya hetoḥ saced bhagavan dhātur abhaviṣyat sa eva bhagavan
   piṇḍagrāho 'bhaviṣyaḥ yaś caiva tathāgatena pi-
TEXTUAL NOTES

Folio 5a

1. yā(vat) subhūt(e) MM, Cz, Tib tat kim manyase subhūte yāvat, but Cz’s notation for G and Par is wrong; they both have yāvat subhūte, and both omit tat kim manyase. kaccit Chak w. kaścit, which is cited by Cz. vahu Chak, Du w. bahu. āha Cz subhūtir āha, but with no indication that G and Par omit subhūtir. bahu bhagavan tat pṛthivirajaḥ Cz’s notation for Par is wrong here; although it has more than G it too omits bahu sugata. arajas tathāgatena Du w. arajas tat tathāgatena, probably under the influence of MM and Par. bhāṣitas Du w. bhāṣitaḥ; cf. Chak n. 1 on page 182.

2. adhātuḥ Chak w. adhātum; because of his insertion of material from MM, Du’s sandhi does not correspond to that found in the MS. bhāṣitas Du w. bhāṣitaḥ. dvātrimsatā Du w. dvātrimsan; Cz cites G w. as dvātrimsatā.

3. āha Cz subhūtir āha, but with no indication that both G and Par omit subhūtir. no Cz no hīdam, and while he indicates that Par has no iti instead, he does not indicate that G both omits hīdam and has nothing corresponding to Par’s iti. bhagavaṁs Du w. bhagavan; after bhagavan Cz has na dvātrimsanmahāpuruṣa-lakṣaṇais tathāgato ’rhan samyaksambuddho draṣṭavyaḥ, which he indicates is missing in G and Tib; he fails to note that it is also missing from Par. heto tāni tāni Chak w. hetor yāni tāni; Du w. hetoḥ / yāni [hi] tāni; although the first tāni is slightly blurred, it is clearly not possible to read -r yāni. Cz has hetoḥ yāni hi tāni bhagavan; he indicates only that G omits hi, but in fact both hi and bhagavan are omitted by both G and Par as well as Tib. bhāsitāny alakṣaṇāni Du w. bhāsitāni alakṣaṇāni. tenocyaṭe Chak, Du w. -ocyate. mahāpuruṣalakṣaṇānīti Chak w. -lakṣaṇānīti; Du w. -lakṣaṇāni iti.
4. **gaṅgānadibālukopamāṇ** Chak, Du w. gaṅgānadīvalukopamāṇ. **parityajed** Chak w. parityajyed; Du w. parityajet. **catuspadikām** Chak, Du w. catuṣpadikāṃ; cf. Par. **desayed** Du has desayed because he inserts after it a piece of text from MM and is therefore “required” to alter the sandhi found in the MS. This kind of thing is very frequent in Du and will not normally be noted hereafter. MM and Cz add samprakāṣayed after desayed and, while Cz indicates that this is missing from G, he does not indicate that it was probably also missing from Par; cf. Par n. 4 on page 183.

5. **asaṃkhyaeyāṇi** Chak, Du w. –am. āyuṣmāṃ Du w. –an. **subhūtir** Du w. –ih. dharma-pravegenāśṛūṇī Chak w. –pravegenāśrūṇī; Du w. –pravegenāśrūṇī. Both here and in the following ’śṛūṇi the dental s is quite clear. Cz has –vegena- without noting G’s pra-. **prāmuṇcat** Du w. prāmuṇcat. ’śṛūṇi Chak w. ’śṛūṇi; Du w. ’śṛūṇi. **prāmṛjya** Du w. pramṛjya, but cf. his n. 4 on page 152.

6. **bhagavaṃ** Du w. bhagavan.

7. **samānvāgatā** after samānvāgatā MM, Cz have bodhisattvā; Cz indicates this is missing in Par and G, but not that it is also missing in Tib which has **bhāsyamāṇe** MM, Cz have śrutvā; Cz indicates it is missing in Par and G, but it is also missing in Tib. **saivāx-ṁ(j)-x-ā xsmāt** Chak saivaḥbhūtasamjñā tasmāt, but this is clearly too much for the space in the MS; Du has saivaḥ[bhūta]saṃjñā tasmāt, the reading of MM. Although mostly obliterated, it is virtually certain from the MS that there were only three aksaras in the space, and enough remains to indicate that the first two were probably saṃjñā; the third aksara would then have been ta-. Par has saivāsaṃjñā tasmā and Tib de nyid ’du shes ma mchis pa ... de bas na. Read: saivāsaṃjñā tasmā.

**Folio 5b**

1. **(bh)ūxxx(bh)ūtasaṃjñēti** since MM and Par have bhūtasaṃjñā bhūtasaṃjñēti (so MM; Par –saṃjñā iti), and since this would fit the gap perfectly, it is safe to assume that G too read bhūtasaṃjñā bhūtasaṃjñēti, which is also the reading of Tib. āścaryām note that Cz rejects āścaryam, the reading of G, MM and Tib, and prefers duṣkaram, the reading of Par and Ku. **bhāṣyamāṇam** Chak
w. bhasyamanam. avakalpayamy Du w. -kalpayami. adhimucya Du w. adhimucye; the reading of G could be the result of the loss or accidental omission of the vowel sign. satva in both MM and Cz the following passage occurs after satva: bhaviṣyanty anāgate 'dhvani paścime kāle paścime samaye paścimāyāṃ pañca-

satyām saddharmavipralopec vartamāne ya. Cz indicates that all of this is missing in G, but he does not indicate that Par too omits the greater part of it. Par probably had only paścimāyāṃ pañcaśatyām and no more. Tib too, though fuller than Par, omitted anāgate 'dhvani and saddharmavipralopec vartamāne, but Cz does not indicate this either. imāṃ Cz has bhagavan after imāṃ and he does not indicate that it is omitted by G, Par and Tib.

2. paramāścaryasamanvāgata Du adopts the reading of MM and Cz: paramāścaryena samanvāgata, though he cites the actual MS reading in his n. 2. Cz indicates that G reads paramāścaryasamanvāgata, but he does not indicate that Par has the same reading. api tu khalu punar Chak w. api khalu; Cz, following Chak, indicates that tu and khalu are missing in G; this, however, is not the case. Note that what I have read as tu in G could also be read as tr. pravartisyate Du w. pravartisyate. na satvasamījṇā na jivasamījṇā Du w. na jivasamījṇā na sattvasamījṇā; that is to say, Du has here inadvertently inverted the order. pudgalasamījṇā after pudgalasamījṇā Cz has pravartisyate na-api teśāṃ kācit saṁjña (read -ā) na-a-saṁjña pravartate. tat kasya hetoh. yā sa bhaga-
vann atmasamījṇā (read -ā) saiva-a-saṁjña yā sattva-saṁjña jiva-
samījṇā pudgala-saṁjña saiva-a-saṁjña. Cz’s notation here is very confused and incomplete. First, he indicates that na-api teśāṃ kācit saṁjña na-a-saṁjña pravartate is not found in Par, but he does not indicate that it is also missing in G and Tib. Secondly—and here probably the result of a printing error—since there is a marker at the end of the passage, but no marker at the beginning to indicate where the omission begins, it is not clear that G omits all the rest of this passage as well. sarvasamījṇā(pagatā) in Chak this is printed by mistake as sarvasamījṇā pagatā.

3. bhagavān āha where G has only bhagavān āha, Cz has evam ukte bhagavān āyuṣmantam subhūtim etad avocat (= Par, MM, Tib); this is not noted in Cz. ya Du w. yatra. santrasisyanti Chak w. santrāsisyanti; Du w. santrasisyanti. sa(m)trā(sam) Chak w. santrasam; Du w. santrasam.
4. paramapāramiteyam in Chak this is printed by mistake as paramapāramiteyam; Du w. paramapāramitā iyam. yāṁ ca after yāṁ ca Cz adds subhūte without a note; but subhūte is not found in G, Par or Tib. Moreover, just before yāṁ ca Du adds without brackets yadutāpāramitā, which he appears to have taken from MM. aparimāṇā after aparimāṇā Du adds without brackets or a note api; this does not occur in the MS or in Tib (Par is fragmentary). buddhā Chak w. buddha.

5. -ramapāramiteiti Du w. -pāramitā iti. ya Chak, Du w. yā. kali-rājāṅgaprathyamgamāṁsāny Chak w. -pratyanga--; Du w. kali-rājo 'ngapratyangamāṁsani. MM and Cz both read kalinga(−); cf. the former’s n. 2 on page 31 and the latter’s n. 5 on page 41.

6. tasmin Chak misprinted as ta-asmin. jivasamjīa the akṣara I have transliterated jī may in fact have a superscribed r. 'bhaviṣyad Du w. abhaviṣyat. atīte 'dhvani Chak w. printed atītedhvani; Du w. atīte adhvani. paṁca Du w. paṅca.

7. yo 'ham Du w. yadāham with the following note “MS. yemāṁ.” The yo, however, is very clear and beyond any doubt. What Du takes as māṁ I read with reservations ham; these two akṣaras can look very much alike. ksāntivādi Chak w. -vādi. abhūvaṁs Du w. abhūvaṁ. nātmasamjīnābhūn Du w. nātmasamjīnā abhūt; Cz na-ātmasamjīnā babhūva with no note citing G. varjayitvā Cz vivarjayitvā with no note citing G.

Folio 7a

1. mamāṁsena Chak, Du w. samāṁśena; MM and Cz also read samāṁśena and Cz adds a note (pages 116–17) in which he seems to want to account for the fact that the reading samāṁśena, which he thinks is correct, does not correspond to the reading of Tib. Tib has nga'i byang chub phrag pa la thogs par 'gyur ro and this, of course, corresponds exactly with the actual reading of G. Both Chak and Du must have been influenced by MM. Although the initial ma– is, in the MS, slightly smudged at the bottom, the dental s—which cannot be confused with the palatal ŋ in this script—is absolutely certain and there is virtually no possible doubt that G reads mamāṁsena. Tib then, unlike Cz, MM, Chak and Du, clearly reflects the “true” reading, and the recognition of this reading renders the remarks of Cz (page 116) superfluous. Note too that
Cz’s text has between –rimāṇena and sarve the phrase punyaskan-
dhena samanvāgatā bhavisyanti which is not found in G, although
Cz does not indicate this. The same applies to the subhūte between
te and sattvāḥ in Cz.

2. sthānaṁ Chak w. sthānāni, which Cz cites in his note. prthivi-
pradeśe Du w. –pradesa. prakāśayasyati Chak w. –iṣyate.

3. caityabhūta Du w. –bhūtaḥ.

4. satvānāṁ Chak omits satvānāṁ although it is in the MS. The
subhūte preceding satvānāṁ in Cz is not found in G. –janmikāny
Du w. –janmikāni.

5. apāyasamāṉvartanīyāni in Chak this is misprinted as apāya saṁ-
vartanīyāni. tāni Chak omits tāni although it is in the MS; it is,
however, not found in MM and Cz. 'dhvany Du w. 'dhvani.

6. ddipāṁkarasya Chak w. ddipaṇkarasya; Du w. dipaṇkarasya.
caturaśītir buddhakoṭīniyutāśatasahasrāṇy Chak w. catura-
śītibuddhakoṭi–; Du w. caturaśītibuddhakoṭīniyutāśatasahasrāṇi.
ārāgya Chak w. ārāgyā, which is cited in Cz’s notes.

Folio 7b

1. bhagavanta Du w. bhagavantah. carime Du reads carime; Chak
varime. I am not certain; va– and ca– can be virtually indistin-
guishable. pāṃcāsātyāṁ Du w. pāṅcaśātyām. varttamānāyāṁ
Du emends to vartamāna and in his n. 2 w. cites the MS as varta-
mānāyāṁ. imāṁ Du w. imān.

2. pūrvakaḥ Cz reads paurvakaḥ and, although he notes the reading
of Par, he does not cite G. śatamāṁ Chak w. śatamāṁ. kalāṁ
Du w. kalām. apy Du w. api.

3. kulaputrāṇāṁ Chak w. –pūtranāṁ. kuladuhitriṇāṁ Du w. –duhitṛṇāṁ. ca Chak omits ca although it is found in the MS; its
presence in G is not noted in Cz. bhāseyam Du w. bhāṣeya.
yāvantas te satvā Du emends to yāvat te and cites the MS in his
n. 7 where he w. gives sattvāḥ.

4. parigrahiṣyanti Chak, Du w. prati– which is also the reading of
MM and Cz. asyācintya Du w. asya acintya.
5. āha where G has only āha Cz has atha khalv āyuṣmān subhūtir bhagavantam etad avocat (MM and Tib also have this reading), but Cz has not noted G. pragṛhitavyaṁ Chak w. pragrahitavyaṁ; Du w. [pra]grahitavyam; Du's brackets are here more than usually mysterious since pra- is quite clearly in the MS. bodhisatvāyāna-saṁprasthitenaivaṁ Chak w. -(aivam); Du w. -tena evaṁ.

6. -dayitavyaṁ Chak is misprinted as -dayita vyam.

Folio 8a

1. pravartteta Chak, Du w. pravarteta.

2. dipaṅkarasya Du w. dipaṅkarasya. tathāgatasyāntikād Chak w. tathāgatasya antikād. samyaksambodhim Chak w. -sambodhim. abhisambuddhaḥ Chak w. -sambuddhaḥ. āha Cz has evam ukta āyuṣmān subhūtir bhagavantam etad avocat instead of G's āha, but the reading of G is not noted.

3. tathāgatasyāntikād Du w. -āntikāt. anuttarā Chak, Du w. anuttarām. samyaksambodhim Chak w. -sambodhim. abhisambuddhaḥ Chak w. -sambuddhaḥ. āha Cz has evam ukte bhagavān āyuṣmāntam subhūtim etad avocat instead of G's āha, but the reading of G is not noted. vyākrto Du w. vyākṛtaḥ. bhaviṣyasi Du reads bhaviṣyasi but cites the MS w. in a note as bhaviṣyāmi. mānavaṇāgata Chak w. mānavaṇāgata; Du w. mānava anāgate.

4. samyaksambuddhas Chak w. -sambuddhas; Du w. -buddhaḥ. tathāgata Chak is misprinted as tathā gata. adhivacanāṁ Du w. -vacanam. Cz notes that a passage is added in MM after -vacanaṁ which is not found in Ku, Par and Tib; it is also not found in G although Cz does not note this. tathāgatenānuttarā Du w. tathāgatena anuttarā; he also w. cites the MS reading in n. 2 as anuttarām. samyaksambodhir Chak w. -sambodhir; Du in his n. 2 w. cites the MS as -sambodhim. abhisambuddheti Chak w. -sambuddheti; Du in his n. 2 w. cites the MS as -sambuddhaḥ.

5. tathāgatenānuttarā Du w. tathāgatena anuttarām. samyaksambodhir Du w. -bodhim. abhisambuddhaḥ Chak w. -sambuddhaḥ. mṛṣāḥ Chak reads w. mṛṣāḥ and then adds a note saying “Rd. mṛṣā–,” but the MS does read mṛṣāḥ! Du w. mṛṣā. It is pos-
sfible, of course, that what I have transliterated here as 

6. –ṣarvadharma īti Chak has w. omitted sarvadharma īti and Cz, as a consequence, w. indicates that it is missing in G. tenocyante Chak w. tenocyate, which Cz cites; Du w. tena ucyante. bhaved Du w. bhavet.

Folio 8b

1. bhāṣita Du w. bhāṣitaḥ. bhāṣitas Du w. bhāṣitah. tenocyate Du w. tena ucyate. etat Du w. etate.

2. vaded Chak, Du w. vadet. parinirvāpayisyāmi īti Du w. –nirvāpayiṣyāmi īti. āha Cz has subhūtir āha, without noting that G omits subhūtir.

3. niḥsattvāḥ Cz’s notation here is potentially misleading since it seems to suggest that G reads sarvadharma niḥsattvāḥ, which is not the case. sarvadharmaḥ Du w. –dharma. vaded Du w. vadet. nispādayisyāmi īti Chak w. nispadayisyamiti; Du w. nispādayisyāmi īti.

4. kṣetraryūḥāḥ kṣetraryūḥā īti Chak w. kṣetraryūḥā īti, omitting one of the two kṣetraryūḥās found in the MS; Cz w. follows Chak. bhāṣitās Chak w. bhāṣitas. tenocyante Chak w. tenocyate, which Cz cites; Du w. tena ucyante. bodhisatvo Chak is misprinted as boodhisatvo. nīrātmānō Chak w. nirātmāno.

5. –tmāno Chak w. nirātmano. bodhisatva Cz reads bodhisattva mahāsattva and, although he notes that G has a second bodhisatva in place of mahāsattva, he does not note that Par agrees with G. ā(khyāta)s Du w. ākhyātaḥ. After ākhyātas Cz has bhagavān āha, but he does not note that this is missing in G, Par and Tib. āha Cz has subhūtir āha without noting that it is missing in G and Par.

6. caksuḥ Du w. divyacakṣuḥ. praṇā(ca)kṣur Du w. –caksuḥ. dharmacaksur Du w. –caksuḥ. āhaivam Du w. āha evam.
Folio 9a

1. **divyām caksuḥ** Du w. divyacaksuḥ. **pra(jāca)kṣur** Du w. -caksuḥ. **dharmacaksuḥ** Du w. -caksuḥ. **bhagavān āha** Du w. omits bhagavān āha. **yāvantyo** Chak w. yavantyo. **gaṅgānadyāṁ** Du w. gaṅgā--; **Cz** has gaṅgāyāṁ mahānadyāṁ without noting G. **bālukās** Chak, Du w. vālukās. **tāvantya** Du reads tāvāntya with a note w. citing the MS as yāvantyo. **gaṅgānadyo** Du w. gaṅgā-. **bhaveyus** Du w. bhaveyuḥ. **bālukās** Chak, Du w. vālukās.

2. **kaccid** Chak w. kaścid, which is cited by Cz; Du reads kaccid but then w. cites the MS as kaścit. **bhaveyuḥ** Chak w. bhaveyuḥ; Du adds after bhaveyuḥ a sentence not found in the MS: subhūtir āha / evam etat bhagavann evam etat sugata bahavas te lokadhātavaḥ; this Du presumably took from MM, which has virtually the same reading, although it adds bhaveyuḥ after lokadhātavah; Cz has the same reading as MM without noting the omission in G. **jāniyās** Chak has been misprinted as jā niyās; Du reads prajānāmi and w. cites the MS as jāniyās.

3. -Ś Du w. hetoḥ. **cittadhārā** Du w. -dhārāś. **bhāṣītās** Chak w. bhāṣītās. **tenocyante** Chak w. tenocyate. **hetor** Chak, Du w. hetoḥ. **nopalabhyate** Chak w. nopalabhyate. **anāgataṁ cittam** Du w. anāgatacittam.

4. **pratyutpannam** Chak misprinted as pratyuypannam. ya Du w. yaḥ. **dānam** Du w. dānam. **dadyād** Du w. dadyāt.

5. **puṇyaṁ** Cz has puṇyaskandham without noting that G omits -skandham. **prasaveta** both Chak and Du also read prasaveta, but the final akṣara could also be read -tā. āha Cz has subhūtir āha without noting that G omits subhūtir; Du w. omits everything from the first āha in line 5 down to prasaveta in line 6. Chak w. aha. **vahu** Chak w. bahu.

6. **puṇyaṁ** Chak w. puṇyam, which Cz cites (this citation could be misleading since Cz gives only puṇyam as the equivalent in G for his puṇyaskandham, when in fact the equivalent in G is bahu puṇyaṁ). **sacet** Du w. sa cat.
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Folio 9b

1. āha Cz has subhūtir āha without noting that both G and Par omit subhūtir. rūpakāyapariniṣpattī Du w. -pariniṣpattih. ity apariniṣpattir eśā Du has iti apariniṣpattir iti [bhagavan] apariniṣpattir eśā, etc., but his first apariniṣpattir, as well as the following iti, not only do not occur in the MS, but are not found in MM, Cz, Par or Tib. Cz does have the bhagavan but does not indicate that it is not found in G.

2. tenocyate Du reads anena ucyate, but cites the MS as reading tena. āha Cz has subhūtir āha without noting that subhūtir is not found in G. bhagavan Chak is misprinted as bhavan.

3. tenocyate Du w. tena ucyate.

4. tathāgatasyaivaṁ Chak w. –aivam. na Du w. omits na. asatād Cz has 'satodgrhitena, and both Chak and Du, though they cite the MS correctly, would emend to this. Cz does not note the reading of G.

5. –dgrhitena Chak w. udgrhitena. hetor Du w. hetoḥ. dharma-deśaneti Du w. –deśanā iti. āhāsti Du w. āha asti; Cz has āha instead of evam ukta āyuṣmān subhūtir bhagavantam etad avocata, without indicating the reading of G. bhaviṣyanty Du w. bhaviṣyantī. anāgate ‘dhvani Chak is misprinted as anāgatedhvani; after ‘dhvani Cz has pāścime kāle pāścime samaye pāścimāyāṁ pāścaśatayāṁ saddharmavipralohipa vartāmarine and, while he notes that none of this occurs in G, he does not indicate that neither could it have occurred in Par nor is it found in Tib.

6. (bhāṣyamā)ṇāṁ Chak w. bhāṣamāṇāṁ; Du w. bhāṣyaṇaṇāṇ; Cz omits bhāṣyamāṇāṁ and, while he notes that G has it (he cites the incorrect reading of Chak), he does not note that Par probably had something like it, and that Tib also has it. cchrvābbhiśradda-dhāsyanti Du w. śrutvābbhiśraddhāsyanti. nāsatvās Chak w. nāsatvāḥ; Du w. na asattvāḥ. bhāṣitās Du w. bhāṣitāḥ.

Folio 10a

1. –cyante Chak w. –cyate. tv Chak w. nv; Du w. nu. tathāgatenā-nuttarā Chak w. –anuttara; Du w. tathāgatena anuttarāṁ. samyaksambodhir Chak w. samyaksambodhir; Du w. samyaksam-
bodhim. abhisambuddhaḥ Chak w. -sambuddhaḥ. āha Cz has āyūsmān subhūtir āha, without noting that G does not have the first two words.

2. -nāuttarā Chak is misprinted as -anuttarāsamyaṃ-, etc.; Du w. tathāgatena anuttarāṃ. samyaksambodhir Chak w. -sambodhir; Du w. -sambodhīm. abhisambuddhaḥ Chak w. -sambuddhaḥ. tenocyate Du w. tena ucyate. 'nuttarā Du w. anuttarā. samyaksambodhir Chak w. -sambodhir. iti Chak w. ity.

3. tu Du w. prints tu in brackets. kīṃcid Du w. [kaścid]; both the reading and the brackets are wrong. viṃsas Du w. viṃsah. tenocyate Du w. tena ucyate. 'nuttarā Du w. anuttarā. samyaksambodhir Chak w. -sambodhir. nirjīvatvena Du w. nirjīvitvena. sānuttarā Chak w. sānuttara.

4. -dhīḥ Chak w. -sambodhiḥ. sarvaiḥ Du is misprinted as sarveḥ. kuśalair Chak, Du w. kuśalaiḥ. bhāṣitās Du w. bhāṣitāḥ. tenocyate Chak, Du w. tenocyate.

5. subhūte after subhūte Cz adds strī vā puruso vā and, although he notes that this is not found in G, he does not note that it also does not occur in Par and that Tib has for the beginning of this passage rigs kyi bu 'am / rigs kyi bu mo gang la la zhis gis, etc. trisāhasra-mahāsāhasre Chak w. -mahāsāhasre. abhisamhṛtya Chak misprinted as abhisamhṛtya. dadyād Du w. dadyāt. yaś cetaḥ Chak w. yaś caiva, which is cited by Cz.

6. catuspadikām Chak, Du catuspādikām. desayed Du w. desayet. asya Du w. etasya. (ka)lān Du w. kalām. yāvad Chak w. yavad.

Folio 10b

1. tathāgatasyaiwami Chak w. -aiwami. subhūte-r-evaṁ Chak has subhūte cevaṁ (Cz cites G as caivaṁ, but caivaṁ is only an emendation suggested by Chak in a note and not the reading found in the MS); Du has w. subhūte evaṁ. ce and re frequently can only be distinguished with difficulty—if at all—in the script. I have read r and, on the assumption that this is the correct reading, I would intrepret r here as an “inorganic” sandhi consonant or “hiatus-bridger.” But the use of such “hiatus-bridgers,” though common enough elsewhere, is certainly not characteristic of our MS. draṣṭavyāṃ Du w. draṣṭavyam.
2. "bhaviṣyad Du w. 'bhaviṣyat. pudgalagrāhaḥ Du w. pudgalagragrā[ho 'bhaviṣyat].

3. ātmagrāha Chak is misprinted as ātamgrāha. ete Chak, Du w. eva te.

4. bhāṣitās Du w. bhāṣitāḥ. tenocyamte Chak, Du w. tenocyante. lakṣaṇasampadā Chak w. -sampadā. āhaiam etad Chak w. āhai vām, omitting etad; Du w. āha / evam etad. bhagaval lakṣaṇasampadā Du w. bhagavan lakṣaṇa-; Cz cites G as evam bhagavann alakṣaṇasampadā, which is not the reading of Chak, but an emendation suggested by Chak in a note. Moreover, Cz does not indicate the reading of Par, which is essentially the same as G: āha - evam eva bhagavam lakṣaṇasampadāyās tathāgato draṣṭa-vyāḥ. What is in Cz a negative statement is in both G and Par an affirmative statement.

5. punaḥ Chak w. omits punaḥ and Cz, following Chak, w. indicates that punaḥ is not found in G. lakṣaṇasampadā Chak w. -sampadā. dra[ṣṭa]vyo neither Chak nor Du indicate that -ṣṭa- has been inadvertently omitted in the MS. "bhaviṣyad Du w. 'bhaviṣyat. "bhaviṣyat Chak bhaviṣyad. āha for G's āha Cz has āyuṣmān subhūtin bhagavantam etad avocat but, without noting G or Par, the latter having only āyuṣmān subhūtin āha. yathāham Chak w. yathāham.

6. lakṣaṇasampadā Chak w. -sampadā. bhagavāṁs Chak w. bhagavāṁs. imā gāthā Du w. ime gāthe. abhāṣataḥ )) Chak and Du both have abhāṣata and it is very possible that the : of the :)) after -ta should simply be taken as part of the mark of punctuation, :)) being a variant form of · :)). adṛāksur Du w. cādṛāksur; Cz reads ca-adṛāksur and, though he notes that G does not have ca, he does not note that it is also missing from Par. anvayuḥ Cz has ca-anvayuḥ and w. indicates that G and Par also have the ca, though it occurs in neither.

Folio 11a

1. dharmatā cāpy avijñeyā Chak w. dharmato cāsyā vijñeyā, which Cz cites; Du w. dharmatā cāpy abhijñeyā. sā Chak w. sa, which Cz cites. vijānitum Chak w. vijānitum. lakṣaṇasampadā Chak w. -sampadā.
2. samyaksaṁbodhir Chak w. –sambodhir. abhisamśuddhāḥ Chak w. abhisambuddhaḥ; Du w. abhisambuddhā. lakṣapaṇasam-padā Chak w. –sampadā. samyaksaṁbodhir Chak w. –sam-bodhir. abhisamśuddhaḥ Chak w. abhisambuddhaḥ.

3. syād Chak w. syad, which is cited by Cz. evam Chak w. evam. praṇāpta Du w. praṇāptaḥ. vā Du w. adds an iti after vā, which is not found in the MS (Du probably took it from MM or Cz). dra-śṭavyaṁ Du w. draśṭavyam.

4. yaś ca Du w. yat. gaṁgānādībālukopamaḥ Chak w. gaṁgānādī-vālukosamāḥ; Du w. gaṁgānādīvālukopamān. saptaratnapratipūrṇān Chak w. –pūrṇān.

5. samyaksaṁbuddhebhayo Chak misprinted as –sambuddhebyo. dadyād Du w. dadyāt. bahutaraṁ Chak w. –taram. puṇyaṁ Cz has puṇyaśkandham, without noting the reading of G.

6. āha Cz has āyuśmān subhūtir āha for the first āha in G, but does not note G’s lack of the first two words. pa(r)igraḥ[hitavyah] the last few syllables of the line have been obliterated, but the reconstruction given here in brackets is fairly certain.

Folio 11b

1. vāgacchati Du w. vā āgocchati. me Cz inserts subhūte after me but does not note that it occurs in neither G nor Par. [hetoḥ] the final syllables of the line have been obliterated but the reconstruction given here in brackets is fairly certain.

2. samyaksaṁbuddha Chak w. –sambuddhaḥ. subhūte Chak is misprinted as subhū te. yāvantas Du reads yāvant and cites the MS reading w. as yāvanta. trīsāhasra[mahā–] the final syllables of this line have also been obliterated, but again the bracketed reconstruction is fairly certain.

3. tāvato Chak w. tavato. lokadhātūn Chak w. lokadhātum, which is cited by Cz. paramāṇusamaṁcayās Chak w. paramāṇusamaṁcayāḥ; Du w. –saṁcayāḥ. In what follows here the MS always has saṁcaya, but in every case but one Du w. prints saṁcaya; this will not be noted hereafter. bahu Du w. bahuḥ. paramāṇusamaṁcayo Chak w. paramāṇusamsaṁśayo.
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4. –vam Du w. āha / evam; Cz has subhūtir āha: evam, without noting G or Par, neither of which has the subhūtir. bhagavan Chak w. bhagavān. bahu Du w. bahuḥ. paramāṇusacāya Chak w. paramānū–. bhagavan Chak w. bhagavān. 'bhaviṣyan Du w. 'bhaviṣyat. paramāṇusacāya Chak w. paramānū–.

5. –ṇusaṃcāya Chak w. 'sauparamānū–. asaṃcayaḥ Chak w. asaṃcaya. bhāṣitas Du w. bhāṣitaḥ. paramāṇusacāya Chak w. paramānū–. yac ca Chak, Du w. yaś ca. bhāṣati Du w. bhāṣate. tṛṣāhasramahāsāhasro Chak, Du w. tri–.

6. bhāṣitas Du w. bhāṣitaḥ. bhagavan Chak w. bhagavān for the first bhagavan in the line. abhaviṣyat Chak w. abhaviṣyat. bhagavan Cz omits the second bhagavan without noting that it is found in G. 'bhaviṣyad Du w. 'bhaviṣyat. tathāgatena in Cz tathāgatena follows rather than precedes piṇḍagrāhas, but its placement in G is not noted in Cz; Par has the same word order as G.

Folio 12a

1. –ṇḍagrāho Chak w. –graho. bhāṣitas Du w. bhāṣitaḥ. caiva- vyavahāro Cz has caiva subhūte 'vyavahāro, but the subhūte Cz places after caiva G has after 'nabhilāpyaḥ and Par after caiva- vyavahāro. None of this is noted by Cz. sa dharmāḥ Cz has na sa dharmaḥ without noting that G omits the na.

2. –thagjanair Chak is misprinted as bāla prthagjanair. vaded Du w. vadet. ātmadṛṣṭis Chak w. –drṣṭis. sa Du w. puts sa in brackets; in Cz the order of subhūte and sa is inverted without a note. samyag Du w. samyak.

3. āha Cz has subhūtir āha without noting G. no Cz w. indicates that no is omitted in G. bhagavāms Du w. bhagavan. bhagavann Du w. bhagavan.

4. adhimoktavyās Du w. adhimoktavyāḥ.

5. dharmasamjñeti Du w. dharmasamjñā iti. dharmasamjñeti Du w. dharmasamjñā iti. aprameyāsaṁkhyaeyāl Chak w. –āsam-khyeyā; Du w. –āsamkhyaeyān. lokadhātūn Chak w. –dhātūn.

6. –ripūrṇān Chak is misprinted as –pūrṇān. dānan Du w. dānam. dadyād Du w. dadyāt. prajñāpāramitāyā Chak w. prajñā–.
Textual Notes

catuṣpadikāṃ Chak, Du w. catuṣpādikāṃ. dhārayed Chak w. vācayed; Cz in his notation has been misled by Chak. deśayet Chak, Du w. deśayed. paryāṇpuyād Du w. paryāṇpuyāt.

Folio 12b

1. tato Cz inserts nidānaṁ after tato without noting that it is not found in G and Par. prasavetāprameyam Du w. prasaveta aprayeyam. asaṁkhyeyaṁ Du w. asaṁkhyeyam. saṁprakāśayet Chak w. samprakāśayet. saṁprakāśayet Chak w. samprakāśaye; Du w. samprakāśayed.

2. draṣṭavya Du w. draṣṭavyaṁ. saṁskṛtaṁ Chak w. saṁskṛtam. āttamanā Du w. āttamanāḥ. sthavira Chak is misprinted as sthavirasubhūtis, etc.; Du w. sthaviraḥ. sadevamānuṣāsu— Du w. -manuṣyā—.

3. samāptāḥ Both Chak and Du have samāptā and it is possible that here again : is a part of the final punctuation mark; i.e., :)) ·)), instead of –ḥ )) · )); cf. fo. 10b, line 6 and note.
[5a] The Blessed One said: "The number, Subhūti, of particles of dust in a world system of three thousand great-thousand worlds\textsuperscript{1}—is that great?"

He said: "It is great, Blessed One. That particle of dust is said to be not a particle by the Tathāgata. In that sense 'a particle of dust' is used. Also, that which is a world system, that is said by the Tathāgata not to be a system. In that sense 'world system' is used."

The Blessed One said: "What do you think, Subhūti? Is a Tathāgata to be seen through the thirty-two characteristic marks of a great man?"

He said: "No, Blessed One. Why is that? Each of the thirty-two characteristic marks of a great man is said to be not a characteristic mark by the Tathāgata. In that sense 'the thirty-two characteristic marks of a great man' is used."

The Blessed One said: "But again, Subhūti, if a woman or a man were to give away their person as many times as there are sands in the river Ganges, and if someone else, after taking from this discourse on Doctrine a verse of even four lines, were to teach it to others, the latter alone would on that account produce great merit, immeasurable and incalculable."

Then, indeed, the Venerable Subhūti, through the shock of the Doctrine,\textsuperscript{2} burst into tears. Wiping away his tears, he said this to the Blessed One: "It is astonishing, O Blessed One, it is truly astonishing, O Sugata, how this discourse on Doctrine\textsuperscript{3} was spoken by the Tathāgata, as a consequence of which knowledge has arisen for me! I have never heard this discourse on Doctrine before. They, Blessed One, who will produce a true conception when this sūtra is being taught here will be possessed by the greatest astonishment. And that, Blessed One, which is a true conception, that indeed is not a conception. On that account the Tathāgata says [5b] 'A true conception, a true conception'.

"Blessed One, it is not astonishing to me that I am prepared for the teaching of this discourse on Doctrine, since I have been intent upon it. Blessed One, those living beings who will take up this discourse on
Doctrine ... and master it will be possessed by the greatest astonishment. But again, Blessed One, a conception of a self will not occur to them, nor a conception of a living being, nor a conception of a personal soul, nor a conception of a person. And why is that? Because the Buddhas, the Blessed Ones, have walked away from all conceptions. 

The Blessed One said: “That is so, Subhūti. Those who, after hearing this discourse on Doctrine, will not be terrified, will not tremble, will not be overcome by dread, they will be possessed by the greatest astonishment. And why is that? This, Subhūti, has been declared by the Tathāgata to be the greatest perfection. And that which the Tathāgata declares the greatest perfection is declared as well by immeasurable Buddhas and Blessed Ones. In that sense ‘greatest perfection’ is used. “But again, Subhūti, that which is the perfection of patience of the Tathāgata, just that is not a perfection. And why is that? When, Subhūti, an evil king hacked the flesh from all my limbs, there was for me on that occasion no conception of a self, no conception of a living being, no conception of a personal soul, no conception of a person. Nor, moreover, could there have been a conception of injury for me at that time. Subhūti, I remember five hundred births in the past when I was a seer who taught patience. Then too there was for me no conception of a self, no conception of a living being, no conception of a personal soul, no conception of a person. Therefore, Subhūti, a bodhisattva, a mahāsattva, having abandoned all conception ...” [folio 6 is missing].

[“Those who will take up this discourse on Doctrine, will preserve it, will declare it, will recite it, will master it ...”]. [7a] all those living beings will carry my awakening on their shoulder. And why is that? It is not possible for this discourse on Doctrine to be heard by living beings who have but little resolve. Nor is it possible for it to be heard, taken up ... or mastered, by those who have a view of a self, nor by those who have a view of a living being or a personal soul or a person. That situation simply does not occur.

“But again, Subhūti, on whatever piece of ground one will proclaim this sūtra, that piece of ground will become an object of worship. That piece of ground will become for the world together with its devas, men and asuras a true shrine to be revered and circumambulated. Subhūti, those sons and daughters of good family who will take up sūtras such as these ... and master them, they will be ridiculed, severely ridiculed. But, through that ridicule, their demeritorious actions in former lives which should lead to rebirth in an unfortunate destiny will here and now come to be exhausted, and they will obtain the awakening of a Buddha.

“Subhūti, I remember that in the past, during incalculable and more than incalculable aeons—before the time of the Tathāgata, Arhat, Fully
and Completely Awakened One Dipaṃkara—there were eighty-four hundreds of thousands of millions of billions of Buddhas who were attended to by me and, having been attended to, were not neglected. [7b] If, Subhūti, after having attended to them, all those Buddhas were not neglected by me; and if in the Final Period, when the last five hundred years have begun, someone will take up these sūtras . . . and master them, then, Subhūti, the quantity of merit resulting from the former does not approach even a hundredth part of the quantity of merit of the latter, nor a thousandth part, nor a hundred-thousandth. That quantity of merit is not open to enumeration, nor measure, nor calculation, nor comparison, nor likening. Subhūti, those living beings, those sons and daughters of good family will acquire then such a quantity of merit that if I were to declare the quantity of merit of those sons and daughters of good family, living beings (who heard that declaration) would go mad, they would be totally disoriented. But again, Subhūti, this discourse on Doctrine is unthinkable—unthinkable indeed is its effect.”12

He said: “How, Blessed One, should one who has set out on the way of a bodhisattva stand? How should he actually practice? How should he direct his thought?”

The Blessed One said: “Here, Subhūti, one who has set out on the way of a bodhisattva should produce a thought in this manner: ‘All living beings should be led by me to final nirvana in the realm of nirvana which leaves nothing behind. But after having led living beings thus to final nirvana, there is no living being whatsoever who has been lead to final nirvana.’ And why is that? If, [8a] Subhūti, a conception of a living being were to occur to a bodhisattva, a conception of a personal soul, or a conception of a person, he is not to be called ‘a bodhisattva’. And why is that? Subhūti, that which is called ‘one who has set out on the way of a bodhisattva’, that is not a thing.13

“What do you think, Subhūti? Is that some thing which was awakened to by the Tathāgata, in the presence of the Tathāgata Dipaṃkara, as the utmost, full and perfect awakening?”

He said: “Blessed One, that which was awakened to by the Tathāgata, in the presence of the Tathāgata Dipaṃkara, as the utmost, full and perfect awakening is not some thing.”

He said: “Because of that was I assured by the Tathāgata Dipaṃkara: ‘You, young man, will be at a future time a Tathāgata, Arhat, Fully and Perfectly Awakened One named Śākyamuni.’ And why is that? Tathāgata’, Subhūti, that is a designation for thusness. Subhūti, someone might speak thus, ‘The utmost, full and perfect awakening is fully and perfectly awakened to by the Tathāgata.’ But that which is the utmost, full and perfect awakening fully and perfectly awakened to by
the Tathāgata is not some thing. Subhūti, the thing which is fully and
departed to be of the Tathāgata—in that there is neither truth
nor falsehood. On that account the Tathāgata says ‘all characteristics
are the characteristics of a Buddha.’ ‘All characteristics’, Subhūti, all
those are not characteristics. In that sense ‘all characteristics’ is used.
Suppose for example, Subhūti, there would be a man endowed with a
body, a great body.”

Subhūti said: “That which [8b] the Tathāgata has called a man
endowed with a body, a great body—he, Blessed One, is said to be with-
out a body by the Tathāgata. In that sense ‘endowed with a body, a great
body’ is used.”

The Blessed One said: “Just so, Subhūti, the bodhisattva who would
speak thus: ‘I will lead beings to final nirvana’—he is not to be called a
bodhisattva. And why is that? Is there, Subhūti, some thing which is
named ‘bodhisattva’?”

He said: “No indeed, Blessed One.”

The Blessed One said: “On that account the Tathāgata says ‘all
things are without living being, without personal soul, without person.’
Subhūti, a bodhisattva who would speak thus: ‘I will bring about wonder-
ful arrangements in [my] sphere of activity’—he too is not to be called a
bodhisattva. And why is that? ‘Wonderful arrangements in [one’s]
sphere of activity, wonderful arrangements in [one’s] sphere of activity’,
Subhūti, those have been said by the Tathāgata not to be wonderful
arrangements. In that sense ‘wonderful arrangements in [one’s] sphere of
activity’ is used. Subhūti, that bodhisattva who is intent on saying
‘without a self are things, without a self are things’—he is declared ‘a
bodhisattva, a bodhisattva’ by the Tathāgata, Arhat, Fully and Perfectly
Awakened One.

“What do you think, Subhūti? Does the physical eye of the Tathā-
gata exist?”

He said: “So it is Blessed One. The physical eye of the Tathāgata
exists.”

The Blessed One said: “What do you think, Subhūti? Does the
divine eye of the Tathāgata exist, the eye of wisdom, the eye of Dharma,
the awakened eye?”

He said: “So it is Blessed One. [9a] The divine eye of the Tathāgata,
the eye of wisdom, the eye of Dharma, the awakened eye exists.”

The Blessed One said: “What do you think, Subhūti? There could be
as many Ganges rivers as there are sands in the river Ganges, and there
could be as many world systems as there are sands in that many rivers.
Would those world systems then be many?”
The Blessed One said: "Subhūti, I could know\textsuperscript{17} the various streams of thought of living beings as numerous as those in that many world systems. And why is that? 'Stream of thought, stream of thought', Subhūti, that has been said by the Tathāgata not to be a stream. In that sense 'stream of thought' is used. And why is that? Subhūti, a past thought is not apprehended. A future thought is not apprehended. A present (thought)\textsuperscript{18} is not apprehended.

"What do you think, Subhūti? He who, after having filled this three thousand great-thousand world system with the seven precious things, would give it as a gift—surely that son or daughter of good family would, as a result, produce much merit?"

He said: "Much, Blessed One, much, Sugata."

The Blessed One said: "So it is, Subhūti, so it is much. That son or daughter of good family would, as a result, produce much merit. If, Subhūti, there would have been a quantity of merit, the Tathāgata would not have said 'quantity of merit, quantity of merit'.

"What do you think, Subhūti? Should the Tathāgata be seen through the perfect development of his physical body?" [9b]

He said: "No Blessed One. It is not through the perfect development of his physical body that the Tathāgata is to be seen. And why is that? 'A perfect development of the physical body, a perfect development of the physical body', that is said to be not a perfect development by the Tathāgata. In that sense 'perfect development of the physical body' is used."

The Blessed One said: "What do you think, Subhūti? Should the Tathāgata be seen through the possession of characteristic marks?"

He said: "No Blessed One. It is not through the possession of characteristic marks that the Tathāgata is to be seen. And why is that? That which is the possession of characteristic marks is said to be not the possession of characteristic marks by the Tathāgata. In that sense 'possession of characteristic marks' is used."

The Blessed One said: "What do you think, Subhūti? Surely it occurs to the Tathāgata: 'Not by me has a Doctrine been taught.' He, Subhūti, who would speak thus: 'By the Tathāgata a Doctrine has been taught,' he, Subhūti, would falsely accuse me by taking something up from what is not there.\textsuperscript{19} Why is that? 'A teaching of Doctrine, a teaching of Doctrine', Subhūti, that is not some thing which receives the name 'a teaching of Doctrine.'"

He said: "Blessed One, will there be any living beings at a future time who, after hearing such Doctrines being taught, will believe?"

The Blessed One said: "They, Subhūti, are neither living beings nor nonliving beings. Why is that? 'All living beings', Subhūti, they are said
to be not living beings by the Tathāgata. In that sense [10a] ‘all living beings’ is used.

“What do you think, Subhūti? Surely that which was awakened to by the Tathāgata as the utmost, full and perfect awakening is some thing?”

He said: “Blessed One, that which was awakened to by the Tathāgata as the utmost, full and perfect awakening is not some thing.”

The Blessed One said: “So it is, Subhūti, so it is. Not even the most minute thing exists or is found there. In that sense ‘utmost, full and perfect awakening’ is used. But again, Subhūti, that thing is the same; there is no difference. In that sense ‘utmost, full and perfect awakening’ is used. Through the fact of there being no personal soul, no living being, no person, that utmost, full and perfect awakening is fully and perfectly awakened to as identical with all meritorious things. ‘Meritorious things, meritorious things’, Subhūti—but just those are said by the Tathāgata not to be things. In that sense ‘meritorious things’ is used.

“But once again, Subhūti, if someone, after collecting piles of the seven precious things as large as the kings of mountains, the Sumerus, here in this three thousand great-thousand world system, were to give them as a gift; and someone else, after having taken from this Perfection of Wisdom a verse of even four lines, were to teach it to others—Subhūti, the quantity of merit from the former case does not approach a hundredth part of the quantity of merit of the latter . . . [10b] it is not open to comparison.

“What do you think, Subhūti? Surely it occurs to the Tathāgata: ‘living beings are released by me.’ Not, again, Subhūti, is it to be seen thus. Why is that? That which is released by the Tathāgata is not some living being. If again, Subhūti, there would have been some living being who was released by the Tathāgata, that indeed would have been for him the holding on to a self, the holding on to a living being, the holding on to a personal soul, the holding on to a personal entity. ‘Holding on to a self’, Subhūti, this is said by the Tathāgata to be not holding on, but it is held on to by simple ordinary people. ‘Simple ordinary people’, Subhūti, these are said by the Tathāgata not to be people. In that sense ‘simple ordinary people’ is used.

“What do you think, Subhūti, should the Tathāgata be seen through the possession of characteristic marks?”

He said: “That is so, Blessed One. The Tathāgata is to be seen through the possession of characteristic marks.”

The Blessed One said: “But if, Subhūti, the Tathāgata were to be seen through the possession of characteristic marks, a wheel-turning king would also be a Tathāgata.”
He said: “As I understand the meaning of what was said by the Blessed One, the Tathāgata is not to be seen through the possession of characteristic marks.”

Then, again, on that occasion the Blessed One spoke these verses:

Those who saw me through form,
Those who associated me with sound—[11a]
They have engaged in a misguided effort.
Those people will not see me.

The Awakened One is to be seen from the Doctrine;
The Tathāgata is the body of Doctrine;
But, indeed, the substance of the Doctrine is not to be understood;
Nor is it possible for it to be understood.

“What do you think, Subhūti? Is the utmost, full and perfect awakening fully and perfectly awakened to by the Tathāgata through the possession of characteristic marks? Again, Subhūti, it is not to be seen thus. The utmost, full and perfect awakening, Subhūti, is not fully and perfectly awakened to by the Tathāgata through the possession of characteristic marks.

“If, again, Subhūti, it should occur thus: ‘by someone set out on the way of a bodhisattva the destruction of some thing is taught, or its annihilation,’ again, Subhūti, it is not to be seen thus. The destruction of some thing, or its annihilation, is not taught by someone who has set out on the way of a bodhisattva.

“If, again, Subhūti, a son or daughter of good family, after filling world systems similar in number to the sands of the Ganges with the seven precious things, were to give them as a gift to the Tathāgata, Arhat, Fully and Perfectly Awakened One; and if a bodhisattva were to achieve composure in the midst of things that have no self—the latter would indeed produce much greater merit than the former. However, Subhūti, a quantity of merit is not to be acquired by a bodhisattva.”

He said: “A quantity of merit, Blessed One, is to be acquired, surely?”

The Blessed One said: “‘Is to be acquired’, Subhūti, not ‘is to be held on to’. In that sense ‘is to be acquired’ is used. [11b]

“But once again, Subhūti, if someone were to speak thus: ‘The Tathāgata goes, or he comes, or he stands, or he sits, or he lays down’—he does not understand the meaning of what I said. Why is that? A ‘Tathāgata’, Subhūti, has not come from anywhere, has not gone
anywhere. In that sense ‘Tathāgata, Arhat, Fully and Perfectly Awakened One’ is used.

“And if again, Subhūti, a son or daughter of good family were to grind into powder as many world systems as there are particles of dust in this three thousand great-thousand world system so that there would be just a pile of the finest atoms—what do think, Subhūti? Would that pile of atoms be huge?”

He said: “That is so, Blessed One, that would be a huge pile of atoms. And why is that? If, Blessed One, there would have been a pile, the Blessed One would not have said ‘a pile of atoms’. Why is that? That which is said to be a pile of atoms, that is said by the Blessed One not to be a pile. In that sense ‘a pile of atoms’ is used. That which the Tathāgata calls ‘three thousand great-thousand world system’, that is said by the Tathāgata not to be a system. In that sense ‘three thousand great-thousand world system’ is used. Why is that? If, Blessed One, there would have been a system, just that, Blessed One, would have been the holding on to a solid mass. And that which is said by the Tathāgata [12a] to be the holding on to a solid mass is said to be not holding on. In that sense ‘holding on to a solid mass’ is used.”

The Blessed One said: “And holding on to a solid mass is itself, Subhūti, a thing not open to verbal expression; it cannot be put into words. It, however, has been held on to by simple ordinary people. Why is that? If, Subhūti, someone were to speak thus ‘A view of a self was taught by the Tathāgata, a view of a living being, a view of a personal soul, a view of a person’—would he indeed, Subhūti, speak correctly?”

He said: “No, Blessed One. And why is that? Blessed One, that which is said by the Tathāgata to be a view of a self, that is said by the Tathāgata to be not a view. In that sense ‘a view of a self’ is used.”

The Blessed One said: “In this way, Subhūti, one who has set out on the way of a bodhisattva should know all things, should be intent on them. And he should be intent on them in such a way that even the conception of a thing would not be present. Why is that? ‘Conception of a thing, conception of a thing’, Subhūti, that is said by the Tathāgata not to be a conception. In that sense ‘conception of a thing’ is used.

“And again, Subhūti, if a bodhisattva, mahāsattva, having filled immeasurable, incalculable world systems with the seven precious things, were to give them as a gift; and if a son or daughter of good family, having taken up from this Perfection of Wisdom a verse of even four lines, were to preserve it, were to teach it, were to master it [12b]—the latter certainly would produce immeasurable, incalculable merit, much greater than the first.
“And how would he fully cause it to appear? In such a way that he would not cause it to appear. In that sense ‘fully cause it to appear’ is used.”

A shooting star, a fault of vision, a lamp;  
An illusion and dew and a bubble;  
A dream, a flash of lightning, a thunder cloud—  
In this way is the conditioned to be seen.

The Blessed One said this.  
Delighted, the Elder Subhūti, and the monks and nuns, the lay men and women, and the world with its devas, men, asuras and gandharvas rejoiced in that spoken by the Blessed One.

The Vajracchedikā Prajñāparamitā is concluded.
NOTES

For complete citation information the reader is directed to the list of abbreviations and bibliography found at the beginning of Part II.

Notes to the Introduction


Notes to the Translation

1. “Three thousand great-thousand worlds” is, of course, hardly acceptable English but, as Franklin Edgerton points out, “It is not clear what precise meaning, if any, attaches to mahāsāhasra.” He also notes that “in Mahāvyutpatti 7999 ff. and Mañjuśrīmūlakalpa 343.16 ff. mahā-compounded with other numbers means ten times the number,” and the same may or may not be intended here (see BHSD 259). For at least one description of what a world system so described would include, see La Vallée Poussin 1923–31: II.170.

2. To appreciate the significance of the expression dharmapra wyjątka, “through the shock of the Doctrine,” and of this passage as a whole, see the short but important paper by Ananda Coomaraswamy 1977 and the passages from Pāli literature he cites there. Unless I am mistaken, this is an important passage in the Vajracchedikā. Its articulation of a particular kind of “emotively” charged experience (Subhūti “bursts into tears”), a kind of shock-induced realization as a reaction to a certain form of doctrinal expression (Subhūti says “through this discourse on Doctrine knowledge has arisen for me”), may in fact be a prototype and paradigm for at least certain strands of the later Buddhist tradition. In any case, this passage is the clearest indication we have of the kind of “religious” experience with which our text seems to have been concerned.

3. Dharmaparyāya is a deceptively difficult term to translate. Edward Conze, who I follow here, translates it “discourse on dharma” (Conze 1974: 76). Charles de Harlez translates it “cours de la loi” (de Harlez 1891: 471) and Max Walleser “Lehrbuch”
4. The marks of ellipsis in this type of sentence translate the Buddhist Sanskrit idiom yavat, which stands for omitted elements of a standard list or formula. Here the whole phrase would be: “will take up this discourse on Doctrine, will preserve it, will declare it, will recite it, will master it”—editors.

5. This passage is one example of a very frequent, very important, and very little studied kind of passage found throughout the Prajñāpāramitā literature. Again and again the absence of fear, terror, dread and anxiety when confronted with the assertions made in these texts is defined as the Perfection of Wisdom, as the mark of one who actually practices the Perfection of Wisdom, or—as here—the “greatest perfection”. Typical of these passages is the following from the Ṛṣṭasūtrasrīka. Here, after the Buddha has exhorted Subhūti to teach the Perfection of Wisdom to bodhisattvas, Subhūti responds by saying: “Bodhisattva, bodhisattva”, when this is said, to what thing does that designation ‘bodhisattva’ refer? I do not see a thing called ‘bodhisattva’. Nor, moreover, do I see a thing named ‘the Perfection of Wisdom’. I, not finding then, O Blessed One, a bodhisattva nor a thing called bodhisattva, not apprehending, not seeing it, and not finding a Perfection of Wisdom, not apprehending, not seeing it—what bodhisattva in what Perfection of Wisdom will I teach and instruct?” (bodhisattva bodhisattva iti yad idam bhagavann ucayate, katamasyaitad bhagavan dharmaśyādhivacanam ādaya bodhisattva iti. nāhaṁ bhagavāṁs taṁ dharmaṁ samanupaśyāmi yad ādaya bodhisattva iti. taṁ apya ahaṁ bhagavan dharmaṁ na samanupaśyāmi yad uta prajñāpāramitā nāma. so haṁ bhagavan bodhisattvaṁ vā bodhisattvadharman vā avindan anupalabhamāno ‘samanupaśyan prajñāpāramitāṁ apya avindan anupalabhamāno ‘samanupaśyan katamaṁ bodhisattvaṁ katamasyān prajñāpāramitāyāṃ avavadiśyāmi anuśāsīsyāmi). After this passage, however, the text immediately adds: “But again, Blessed One, if when this is being said, taught and explained the mind of a bodhisattva is not depressed, not cowed, not dejected, does not fall into despair; if he is not discouraged, not crushed; if he is not terrified, frightened, does not tremble with fear—then just this bodhisattva, mahāsattva, is to be instructed in the Perfection of Wisdom. Just this is to be known as the Perfection of Wisdom of that bodhisattva. This is the instruction in the Perfection of Wisdom” (api tu khalu punar bhagavan saced evam bhāṣyamāne desāyamāne upadīṣyamāne bodhisattvasya cittaṁ nāvalīyate na saṁlīyate na viśidati na viśādām āpadyate nāya viprṣṭhībhavati mānasam na bhagapṛṣṭhībhavati notrasyati na saṁtrasyati na saṁtrāsmaṁ āpadyate, eṣa eva bodhisattvaḥ mahāsattvah prajñāpāramitāyāṁ anuśāsaniḥ, eṣāvāsya bodhisattvasya mahāsattvasya prajñāpāramitāyāṁ vedītavyā, eṣo ‘vavādaḥ prajñāpāramitāyāṁ). The text is from Vaiḍūya 1960: 3.5ff.

Similar passages, variations on this same theme, occur throughout the Āṣṭāsūtrasrīka (4.21, 5.24, 9.10, 11.2, 13.15, 15.28, etc.) but are by no means limited to this text. We find, for example, the following in the Āṣṭādāsāsūtrasrīka: “If again, Subhūti, the mind of a bodhisattva, mahāsattva, is not depressed when the fact of the isolation of all things is being talked about, is not cowed and does not tremble in fear, that bodhisattva, mahāsattva, moves in the Perfection of Wisdom” (Conze 1962: 61; see also 23.6, 60.21, etc.). In the Saptāsūriṣṭāṅka we find: “Then Mañjuśrī, the heir apparent, said to the Blessed One: ‘Blessed One, just as Buddhas are those...”

(Walleser 1914: 147). Edgerton says “lit. device, means of (teaching) the doctrine, and so, secondarily, religious discourse” (BHSD 279). In usage it seems to indicate first a talk or discussion or even “sermon” on the doctrine which draws out or elaborates on the meaning of the latter. Were it not for fear of possible misunderstandings, I would almost prefer to translate it as “development of the Doctrine”; that is, “development” in the sense of “to lay open by degrees or in detail, to disclose, reveal; to unfold more completely, to evolve the possibilities of” (as defined in Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary, s.v. develop). Secondarily, then, it comes to mean the record of that “talk” which “lays open by degrees”; that is to say, a “text” or even a “book” which contains it.
bodhisattvas, mahāsattvas, to be seen who, after hearing this explanation of the Perfection of Wisdom, will be intent, will not be terrified, will not be frightened, will not tremble with fear” (Masuda 1930: 215.5; also 209.1, 211.4, 214.6, 214.11, 216.1, 6, 13; 217.4, 10, etc.). This repeated emphasis on fear, terror or dread in connection with hearing the Perfection of Wisdom being taught or explained would seem to indicate that the authors of our texts were clearly aware of the fact that what they were presenting was above all else potentially terrifying and awful, and that a predictable reaction to it was fear. And, although these passages need to be studied further, they already give us some valuable information on the nature of the experience with which this literature is dealing.

6. Conze does not question the reading kalīṅga-rājā, “the king of Kaliṅga,” but the reading of the Gilgit text and the Khotanese (Kalārri) = Kalirājaḥ would seem to further confirm Edgerton’s suggestion that kalīṅga-rājan “is undoubtedly an error of the tradition for kali-rājan” (BHSD 172).

7. It is possible that we have here in the Gilgit text a scribal omission. Pargiter’s text (paragraph 9a) has: nāstī me tasmīṃ samayā [ātma]- (samjñāḥ vā satva-jīva-pudgalasamjñāḥ) vā na me kāci samjñāḥ nāsaṃjñāḥ babhūvā (ta)[t kasya hetoh sa] cene me subhātā tasmīṃ sa(may)ē ā(tmasamjñāḥ)bhaveśvīyat vyāpādasmāṃjñāḥ me tasmīṃ samayā ’bhavīyat(t) [ xxxxxx sa]ṃ jñā pudgalasamjñāḥbhavīyat(ī) ṣvāy)pādasmāṃjñāḥ me tasmīṃ samayā ’bhavīyat. But all of that which appears in italics does not occur in the Gilgit text. This, of course, looks very much like a homoeoteleuton in which the scribe may have written the first pudgalasamjñā, then, through an eye skip, he may have written after the first pudgalasamjñā what should have come after the second pudgalasamjñā, thereby omitting everything that should have come between. This kind of homoeoteleuton is in fact frequently found in the Gilgit manuscripts. Against this, however, is the fact that if this was purely a “mechanical” omission we would have expected the Gilgit text to have –pudgalasamjñā vā ’bhavīyat vyāpādasmāṃjñā me tasmīṃ, etc. But instead we find pudgalasamjñā vā vyāpādasmāṃjñā vāpi me tasmīṃ, etc., and the vāpi is particularly hard to explain. I see no way of deciding the case. If, however, the Gilgit text is not to be explained as the result of a scribal omission, then it must at least be noted that the way in which it has constructed the conditional sentence is rather unusual (cf. Aalto 1968).

8. The passage enclosed in brackets is translated from Pargiter’s edition.

9. The implied equation the Vajracchedikā makes here between preserving some form of the Doctrine and preserving the awakening (bodhi) of the Buddha is more explicitly stated elsewhere in the Prajñāpāramitā literature. In the Gilgit manuscript of the Aṣṭādaśasāhasrikā, for example, the Buddha is made to say: “Ananda, whatsoever son or daughter of good family will take up this deep Perfection of Wisdom, will preserve it, recite and master it, by him the awakening of the past, present and future Buddhas, Blessed Ones, will be preserved” (yo hi kaścid ānanda kulaputro vā kuladuhitā vā imāṃ gambhīrāṃ prajñāpāramitāṃ udgāhyati dhārayisayati vācāyisayati paryāyapsayati attānāgataprayutpannānāṃ buddhānām bhagavataṃ tena bodhir dhāriṭā bhaviṣyati) (Conze 1962: 75.16). And the same thing, in slightly different words, is said a little later in the same text (84.14). There remains, however, the problem of whether we have here in the Vajracchedikā a figure of speech or a reference to an actual practice. Bearing in mind that the term dharmaparyāya can mean both “a discourse on the Doctrine” and the text that contains it, is our passage saying that “he who preserves this dharmaparyāya will carry the Awakening of the Buddha” (i.e., the text of the dharmaparyāya) on his shoulder in a literal sense, in the sense that he will carry an actual book containing the “awakening” on his shoulder? Or is it saying simply that he who preserves the dharmaparyāya will honor the “Awakening of the Buddha,” the phrase “carry it on his shoulder” being used figuratively to indicate that he shows it respect? We have
in fact the same problem in a number of other passages in Mahāyāna sūtra literature.

In the Saddharma-puṇḍarīka, for example, we find the following verse (III.147):

tathāgatasaya yathā dhātu dhārayet tathaiva yo mārgati kocī tam narāḥ / evam eva yo mārgati sūtram iḍrāśam labhīta ca mūrdhāni dhārayeta (Kern and Nanjio 1908–12: 99.1–2). And, although the construction here is a little strange, the sense of this verse would seem to be: “As some man who searches for would thus preserve a relic of the Tathāgata, just so, he who searches for such a sūtra, after having obtained it, would carry it on his head.” “Would carry on his head” is, of course, the literal meaning of mūrdhāni dhārayeta. The problem is that the dictionaries give the meaning of mūrdhanā or mūrdhani, śirasā or śirasī dhārayati, as “to bear on the head” and “honor highly”; that is to say that the phrase can have either a literal or a figurative meaning.

A similar problem arises in connection with a passage in the Saptasati-ka. Here we find: avinivartantyabāhamau tvam śāradvatiputra pratiṣṭhitāḥ tām kulaputrān kuladuhitrān jānīṣva ya imaṁ prajñāpāramitānirdesāṁ śruti-vadhīmokṣyante not-trasīṣyante na santrasīṣyante na santrāsām āpatsyante mūrdhān ca pratigrahīṣyanti (Masuda 1930: 216.11), which Conze translates: “Śāradvatiputra ... you should know that those sons and daughters of good family are established on the irreversible stage, if, on hearing this exposition of perfect wisdom, they believe, do not tremble, are not frightened or terrified, and if they accept it, placing it on their heads as a mark of respect” (Conze 1973: 86). What Conze rather ingeniously translates “and if they accept it, placing it on their heads as a mark of respect” is mūrdhān ca pratigrahīṣyanti (the Tibetan here, as in the above passage from the Saddharma-puṇḍarīka, is spyi bcos len pa, and this is only a variant of the expression śirasā pratigṛhṇāti, which the dictionaries give as “to receive, accept ... with the head”; i.e., ‘humbly, obediently.” Again, the phrase is open to both a literal and a figurative interpretation. Conze, of course, gives a translation which tries to reflect both meanings and, although it is difficult, if not impossible, to decide here, there are passages where the figurative meaning seems to be more clearly excluded. One such passage is found in the Saddharma-puṇḍarīka: tatas tathāgataṁ so ‘msena pariharati ya imaṁ dharmaparyāyaṁ pustakagataṁ kṛtvāṁsena pariharati (338.4) (“Then, he carries the Tathāgata on his shoulder, who, after making this discourse on the Doctrine into a book, carries it on his shoulder.”) Here, in light of the specific mention of an actual book, it is difficult to take this passage in a figurative sense. It in fact seems to be referring to an actual practice, and we may have another reference to this practice in the much later Biography of Dharmasvāmin in which we read: “When the Guru Dharmasvāmin visited the Vajrāsana-saṅghā-vihāra carrying an Indian manuscript of the Ashtasāhasrika-Prajñāpāramitā, the keeper, a Śrāvaka, enquired, ‘What book is it?’ The Dharmasvāmin answered that it was the Prajñāpāramitā. The Śrāvaka said, ‘You seem to be a good monk, but this carrying on your back of a Mahāyāna book is not good. Throw it into the river!’” (rdo rje gdan dpe ’dun gyi gtsug lag khang shes bya bar bla ma chos rjes bgrya’ad stong pa’i rgya dpe gcig khur nas byon pas dkon gnyer nyan thos shig na re chos ci yin zer / chos rjes prajñā pa ra ma ti ho shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa yin gsung pas de na re khyod dge slong legs po cig ‘dug pa la theg pa chen po’i chos rgyab tu khur ba de ma legs de bor la chu la gyur cig zer nas) (Roecher 1959: 18–19 and 73–74). Note that in his translation after “an Indian manuscript” Roecher gives a note citing the Tibetan as rgya-dpe-rgya-gar-gyi-dpe-cha, but his edition has only rgya dpe.

The point of all this is that, although these and similar passages must be much more fully studied, our passage in the Vajrachchedikā, when read in light of these other passages, appears to be potentially much more than a simple figure of speech. It may in fact refer to the actual practice of carrying sacred books on one’s person.
10. On this passage and a number of parallel passages elsewhere see Schopen 1975. I would here like to make amends for having overlooked in my discussion some interesting remarks of the late Professor Conze in regard to this formula: "In this context the Prajñāpāramitā is then invested with a kind of magical power. It sanctifies the place where it is, makes it into a sacred, a holy place. 'This perfection of wisdom makes a spot of earth into a holy place for beings, worthy of being worshipped and revered' [translating Asta iii 57]" (see Conze 1948: esp. 119).

11. I know of no exact parallels in Mahāyāna sūtra literature to this interesting passage, but the idea expressed here—that unmeritorious karma could be eliminated as a result of being abused by others for having adopted a particular practice or position—is remarkably close to a set of ideas and practices associated with the Pāṣupatas. See Ingalls 1962 and Hara 1967–68. Professor Hara, for example, cites the following passage from the Pāṣupata-sūtra attributed to Lakulīsa: avamatak sarvabhūteṣu pariḥūyamānaḥ care, aparaha-pāpmā pāresām pariudvādā, pāpam ca tebhya dadāti sukṛtam ca tēsāṁ ādāte ("Dishonoured amongst all beings, ill-treated he should wander. [He thus becomes] freed of evil because of the slander of others. He gives his bad karma to them. And he takes their good karma" [408]). Our passage in the Vajracchedikā, of course, does not specifically mention an actual transfer between the abused and the abuser; in fact it gives no indication of the mechanism or process by which the "bad karma" of the abused is actually eliminated. In spite of this, the basic idea here appears, as I have said, to be remarkably close to the basic idea found in the Pāṣupata-sūtra. See also Hara 1970. For the history of the Pāṣupatas see the summary in the last chapter of Lorenzen 1972: 173–92. It should perhaps be noted that Jean Filliozat has called into question Professor Hara's interpretation of the "Transfer of Merit" in Pāṣupata sources (see Filliozat 1980: 111).

12. Conze in his edition cites a number of "parallels" for this passage: Dīvyāvadāna (Cowell and Neil ed.), 78, 469; Mahāvaṃsa (Geiger ed.): XVII, 56; XXXI, 125; and Karmavibhāṅgopadeśa (Lévi ed.), 153.14 and n. 4, etc. To these I would add only Waldschmidt 1967: 426–27. The interesting point here, however, is that our passage in the Vajracchedikā is not strictly speaking "parallel" with these other passages, all of which, first of all, are in verse. Typical of these verse passages is Dīvyāvadāna 79: evam hy acintiyā buddhā buddhadharmā 'py acintiyā / acintīye prassannānam vipāko 'pi acintiyā // ("Thus indeed the Buddhas are unthinkable, unthinkable too are the characteristics of a Buddha. Of those having faith in the unthinkable, surely then unthinkable is the effect.")

Seen in light of these "parallel" passages it would seem that the author of the Vajracchedikā is playing on an old formula. He gives the old formula new meaning by introducing a significant substitution, while retaining the basic statement. He substitutes dharmaparyāya, "this Discourse on the Doctrine" or the "text" that contains it, for the "Buddha" of the old formula, and thereby establishes, for the "reader" familiar with the formula, the equation of the two.

13. The reader will have observed that I have so far not left the word dharma untranslated, and have, in fact, tried to translate it throughout. Dharma is, of course, a notoriously difficult term to translate, and this fact has been taken as the justification for not translating it at all. But I do not think this gets us very far. In our text the term has at least two basic meanings, and in light of this I have used two renderings. When the term is used to refer primarily to "teachings" or something taught, as in dharmaparyāya, I have consistently translated it by "Doctrine." When it is used in a more "philosophical" sense as an element in assertions regarding "reality," I have consistently translated it by "thing," an English term of equal richness, intending thereby the sense "whatever exists, or is conceived to exist, as a separate entity; any separable or distinguishable object of thought" (Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary, 883). On this aspect of the term see most recently Warder 1971. This, of course, does not differ radically from the way in which Max Müller
handled the term in the first English translation of the Sanskrit text of the Vajracchedikā. But, for example, where he would translate “nothing,” I would prefer “no thing,” the two having quite different senses in English. There is at least one place in our text, the compound dharmacakṣu, where I do not know exactly which of the two basic meanings of dharma is supposed to be in play. As a consequence, in this case I leave the term untranslated. There is also one place in our text where the term appears to be used in a third basic sense—sarvadharmā buddhadharmā iti, etc., at 8a6—and here I have translated it by “characteristics.”

14. “Wonderful arrangements’ in [my] sphere of activity” translates kṣetrayuḥa, which presumably stands for buddhaśekṣetrayuḥa. Here the text appears to be referring to the idea that the bodhisattva—as an integral part of his long career—should work towards effecting through his accumulation of merit the appearance of a “world,” a sphere, which is ideally suited to the pursuance of the religious goal by the individuals with whom he is concerned. This idea, and the whole complex of ideas connected with the “buddhafield,” has yet to be fully studied. Cf. Rowell 1934–37, Demiéville 1937 and Lamotte 1962: 395–404.

15. The text has here only so ’pi tathaiva vaktavyah and Conze’s text has the same reading. But the various manuscript traditions show some uncertainty here and Müller reads sa vītathāṃ vade. Pargiter has read—and in part reconstructed—his Central Asian manuscript vītathāṃ evam vartavyaḥ. The Khotanese translation has si na baysuṅa vītāva hvaṅai, which Konow translates into Sanskrit as saḥ na bodhisattvam vaktavyaḥ. The Tibetan translation in the Peking Kanjur has de yang de bzhin du brjod pa bya ’o, but the blockprint Conze cites has de bzhin du brjod pa bya ’o. The uncertainty here seems to result from the fact that the referent of tathaiva is not immediately clear; this is a consequence, it would seem, of the fact that it occurs somewhat earlier. First we have evam etat subhūte yo bodhisatva evam vade ahaṁ satvān parinirvāpaṭiyameti · na sa bodhisatva iti vaktavyaḥ. This is followed by a passage giving the reason for this—a passage much longer in Conze’s and Müller’s text than it is in the Gilgit and Central Asian text. Then we have yaḥ subhūte bodhisatva evam vade ahaṁ kṣetrayūḥan nispādaṭiyameti · so ’pi tathaiva vaktavyaḥ. The two passages separated by the explanatory material are clearly parallel in structure, and seen in this light it appears that so ’pi tathaiva vaktavyaḥ = na sa bodhisatva iti vaktavyaḥ; I have translated accordingly. Conze, without noting it, has done exactly the same thing.

16. After bahavas te lokadhātavo bhaveyuh virtually all the other sources have the following passage: subhātir āha: evam etat bhagavann evam etat sugata bahavas te lokadhātavo bhaveyuh. The absence of this passage in the Gilgit text is almost certainly to be explained as a scribal omission resulting from a typical homoeoteleuton, the skip being from the first bahavas te lokadhātavo bhaveyuh to what follows the second, omitted, bahavas te lokadhātavo bhaveyuh. Note too that the mechanical nature of the omission is indicated by the fact that, unless we assume the omitted passage was originally there, the construction of the Gilgit text does not make sense. As it now stands, what is clearly a question by the “Blessed One” to Subhūti receives no answer, and the second bhagavān āha is completely unnecessary.

17. This is one of the very few places where the manuscript is clearly wrong. It has a second-person-singular verbal form with a first-person pronoun.

18. Presumably here a cittam has been inadvertently omitted by the scribe.

19. The Gilgit text here is open to at least three interpretations: asatād may be intended as an ablative singular of a stem asata, an –a extension of a weak stem in –t. Such an ablative form is not, however, recorded by Edgerton. It may also be that we should read asatā–d–udgrhitena, taking –d– as an “inorganic” sandhi consonant or “hiatus-bridger” (cf. BHSG 4.46). A third possibility is, of course, that the reading
of the Gilgit text is simply a mistake. To Conze's reference to Dīgha-Nikāya III.34, we might also add Dīgha-Nikāya III.115.

20. “Were to achieve composure” here translates kṣāntiṃ pratilabheta, and kṣānti is normally translated “patience.” Conze in fact translates the phrase “would gain the patient acquiescence in.” It is, however, possible that “patience” is not always the best translation for kṣānti, especially if “patience” is used with the implication of “to endure.” As I understand the term, it more commonly means not “to endure” or “to accept” but to remain “unaffected by,” and I think the present passage is a good example of this. Unless I am very much mistaken, the phrase nirātmakesu dharmesu kṣāntiṃ pratilabheta, which I translate as “to achieve composure in the midst of things that have no self,” is intended above all else as a positive expression of the state of mind that is much more commonly expressed in negative terms, several examples of which are cited above in n. 5. That is to say, to obtain kṣānti is the positive expression for the same state which is negatively expressed by such formulae as “he is not depressed, not cowed, not dejected ... he is not terrified, frightened and does not tremble with fear.” But the opposite of dejection, terror and fear is not patience or endurance, it is rather something more like composure. Note too that in almost every case the absence of fear and dread and the obtainment of kṣānti are to take place in regard to the same basic fact, however expressed: the absence of a self. The proper reaction to this fact, and the full realization of its implications, may be expressed either positively by saying “he obtains composure in regard to it,” or negatively by saying “he is not terrified, alarmed, frightened, etc.” In the end they are very much the same.
PART III

Śāntarakṣita’s Madhyamakālaṁkāra

Introduction, Edition and Translation by

Masamichi Ichigō

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ABBREVIATIONS AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

The following list identifies abbreviations used in the text and provides complete citation information for the works cited in the notes to this study.

**AAA:** *Abhisamayālāṃkārālokā.*


**AK:** *Abhidharma-kosa.* Edited in *Abhidharma-kosa-bhāṣya.*

**AKB:** *Abhidharma-kosa-bhāṣya.*

**BCAP:** *Bodhicaryāvatāra-panjikā.*


**C:** Cone edition. Cited by volume, folio and line number.

**cf:** confer.


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cy: commentary.

(D): Drśṭānta (example), as a member of a logical syllogism.


t: emendation.

fo.: folio.


(H): Hetu (reason), as a member of a logical syllogism.


IBK: Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū.

The Madhyamakālaṁkāra


**JNA:** Jñānaśrīmitranibandhāvalī.


**JSSN:** Jñānasārasamuccaya-nibandhana.

**K:** kārikā. In the edition, the kārikā text (text without commentary) is cited with the siglum K. Unless otherwise noted, all xylographs of the kārikā text have the given reading.


**Abbreviations and Bibliography**

**LA: Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra.**


**MA: Madhyamakālaṁkara-kārikā.**

**MĀ: Madhyamakāloka.**

Madhyamakahṛdaya-kārikā. Of Bhāvaviveka. D 3855 (Dza 1b1–40b7); P 5255 (Dza 1a1–43b7). Chapter 3 edited in Ejima 1980.

Madhyamakahṛdaya-vṛtti Tarkajvālā. Of Bhāvaviveka. D 3856 (Dza 40b7–329b4); P 5256 (Dza 43b7–380a7).

Madhyamakālaṁkāra-kārikā. Of Śāntarakṣita. Edited and translated in the present study. D 3884 (Sa 53a1–56b3); P 5284 (Sa 48b2–52b1).

Madhyamakālaṁkāra-paṇḍītā. Of Kamalaśīla. Edited in Ichigō 1985. D 3886 (Sa 84a1–133b4); P 5286 (Sa 84b7–143b2).

Madhyamakālaṁkāra-vṛtti. Of Śāntarakṣita. Edited in Ichigō 1985. D 3885 (Sa 56b4–84a1); P 5285 (Sa 52b1–84b7).

Madhyamakāloka. Of Kamalaśīla. D 3887 (Sa 133b4–244a7); P 5287 (Sa 143b2–275a4).


**MAP: Madhyamakālaṁkāra-paṇḍītā.**


——. 1986. “Kōki Chūgan Shisō no Kaimei ni mukete: Ichigo Masamichi shi Chūgan Shōgonron no Kenkyū o chūshin ni” 後期
The Madhyamakālaṃkāra


MAV: Madhyamakālaṃkāra-vṛtti.

MH: Madhyamakahṛdaya-kārikā.


MK: Mūlamadhyama-kārikā.

MRP: Madhyamakaratnapradīpa.


om.: omits.

(P): Pratijñā (thesis), as a member of a logical syllogism.


Pañ: Pañjikā. In the edition denotes the reading in MAP.

Ppra: Prajñāpradīpa Mūlamadhyamaka-vṛtti.

Ppra-ṭikā: Prajñāpradīpaṭikā.

PPU: Prajñāpāramitopadeśa.

Prajñāpāramitopadeśa. Of Ratnakaraśānti. D 4079 (Hi 133b7–162b1); P 5579 (Ku 151a4–184b6).

Prajñāpradīpa Mūlamadhyamaka-vṛtti. Of Bhāvaviveka. D 3853 (Tsha 45b4–259b3); P 5253 (Tsha 53b3–326a6).

Prajñāpradīpa-ṭikā. Of Avalokitavrata. D 3859 (Wa 1b1–Za 341a7); P 5259 (Wa 1a1–Za 405b7).


**Pras:** Prasannapadā.


**PV:** Pramāṇavārttika.

**PVin:** Pramāṇaviniścaya.


**Satyadvayāvatāra.** Of Atiśa. Edited in Lindtner 1981.

**Satyadvayavibhaṅga-kārikā.** Of Jñānagarbha. D 3881 (Sa 1b1–3b3).

**Satyadvayavibhaṅga-pañjikā.** Of Śāntarakṣita. D 3883 (Sa 15b2–52b7); P 5283 (Sa 1a1–48b7).


**SDA:** Satyadvayāvatara.

**SDV:** Satyadvayavibhaṅga-kārikā.

**SDVP:** Satyadvayavibhaṅga-pañjikā.

**SDVV:** Satyadvayavibhaṅga-vṛtti.


**Śīksa:** Śīksāsamuccaya.


**Skt.:** Sanskrit.

**SMVBh:** Sugatamatavibhaṅga-bhāṣya.
Abbreviations and Bibliography


*Tattvasaṅgraha-kārikā*. Of Śāntarakṣita. Edited with *Tattvasaṅgraha-pañjikā*.


**TBh: Tarkabhāṣā.**

**Tib.:** Tibetan.

**TJ: Madhyamakahārdaya-vṛtti Tarkajvalā.**


**TS: Tattvasaṅgraha-kārikā.**

**TSP: Tattvasaṅgraha-pañjikā.**


**V: Vṛtti.** In the edition denotes the reading in MAV.

**vs(s):** verse(s).

[ ]: Material added on the basis of the commentaries.

( ): Material added by the translator.
INTRODUCTION: THE CENTRAL TENET OF THE YOGĀCĀRA-MĀDHYAMIKA SCHOOL*

1. Introductory Note: Śāntarakṣita and the Yogācāra-Mādhyaamika School

1.1 The Division and Synthesis of the Mādhyaamika School

The Mādhyaamika school of Indian Buddhist philosophy advocates the doctrine of emptiness (śūnyatā), that is, the absence of intrinsic nature (niḥsvabhāva) in all dharma. By asserting that dharma always co-arise dependently (pratītya-samutpāna), Mādhyaamikas stress that no entity has an absolute reality. This theory leads to the avoidance of dogmatic extremes such as belief in production and nonproduction, existence and nonexistence, and eternalism and nihilism. Therefore, emptiness is called the Middle Path (madhyamā pratipad), from which the name of the school, Mādhyaamika, is derived. The teaching of emptiness, which is found here and there even in the Pali canon, was systematized by Nāgārjuna (ca. 150–250), who is considered to be the founder of the Mādhyaamika school.

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While the tenet of emptiness remained at the core of Mādhyamika thought, over time two branches developed which differed in their understanding of the methods of establishing the reality of emptiness, that is, of proving the highest truth (paramārtha-satya). Later Tibetans called these two groups the Prāsaṅgika and the Svātantrika. The names of these schools appear apparently for the first time in Tibetan literature of the eleventh century, and not at all in Indian texts.¹ The leading representatives of the Prāsaṅgika were Buddhapālīta and Candrakīrti, and of the Svātantrika, Bhāvaviveka. The Svātantrikas held that it was possible to prove emptiness by logic and independent inference (svatantrānumāna). The Prāsaṅvikas, in contrast, thought that logic and language were yet another kind of obstacle to the attainment of the experience of emptiness; their arguments point out the undesirable consequences (prasāṅga) of any view or set of views.

The divisions which arose with regard to the understanding of conventional truth (saṃvṛti-satya), on the other hand, were already established by the eighth century. The names of the schools thus distinguished are the Yogācāra-Mādhyamika and the Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika.² This division can be said to have resulted from the problem of whether or not the existence of an external object was to be affirmed from the viewpoint of conventional truth. Śāntarakṣita and the Yogācāra-Mādhyamikas held the view that conventional truth does not know an external object, while Bhāvaviveka and the Sautrāntika-Mādhyamikas held the opposite view. Both the Yogācāra-Mādhyamika and the Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika belong to the Svātantrika division of the Mādhyamika school. They are thus sometimes referred to as the Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamaka and the Sautrāntika-Svātantrika-Mādhyamaka.

The name of the Yogācāra-Mādhyamika itself, which has yet to be discovered in Indian literature, suggests to us a process of assimilation and synthesis of the Yogācāra school with the Mādhyamika. Śāntarakṣita says:

93 Therefore, those who hold the reins of logic while riding the carriage of the two systems attain the stage of a true Mahāyānist.

Kamalāśīla comments that “the two systems” refers to the Mādhyamika and the Yogācāra.³
1.2 The Essence of the Thought of the Yogācāra-Mādhyamika School

The central tenet of the Yogācāra-Mādhyamika school is explained in the following two verses of Śāntarakṣita’s MA:

91 That which is cause and effect is nothing but knowledge. It is established that knowledge is that which is self-validated.

92 Based on [the standpoint of] mind-only one must know the nonexistence of external entities. Based on this standpoint [of the lack of intrinsic nature of all dharmas] one must know that there is no self at all even in that (which is mind-only).

The purport of these two verses can be understood by reference to the following verses in the MA:

64 One should understand that conventional (truth) is in essence (1) that which is agreeable and tacitly accepted only as long as it is not investigated critically (avīcāryai-karamanīya); (2) that which is characterized by arising and decay; and (3) whatever has causal efficiency.

65 Even that which is agreeable and tacitly accepted only as long as it is not investigated critically implies the production of similar successive effects conditioned by their own successive causes.

66 Therefore, it is also correct to say that it would be impossible for conventional truth to be causeless. But if (you claim that) its substratum (upādāna) is real, you have to explain what it is.

Although all entities have in reality no intrinsic nature, that is, they are empty, they are understood to be characterized by conventional truth. The three definitions of conventional truth given in verse 64, among which the first seems characteristic of the Yogācāra-Mādhyamika school, are captured in the expression “that which is cause and effect” in verse 91. It follows that, since Śāntarakṣita explains conventional truth as that which co-arises dependently, it is clear that it has a cause. The cause, as suggested in verse 65, is the individual series (samtāna) of
moments of consciousness arising from the beginningless past. This idea is expressed in verse 91 as “nothing but knowledge,” and in verse 92 as “based on [the standpoint of] mind-only one must know the nonexistence of external entities.” These verses thus attribute conventional truth to mind-only.

Furthermore, Śāntarakṣita proposes that even mind-only is without intrinsic nature or self. One should not cling to mind-only. This idea can be found in verses 66cd and 92cd in his MA.

66cd But if (you claim that) its substratum (upādāna) is real, you have to explain what it is.

92cd Based on this standpoint [of the lack of intrinsic nature of all dhammas] one must know that there is no self at all even in that (which is mind-only).

Adopting Buddhist Sanskrit philosophical terminology, the central tenet can be described by the following equation, in which the arrows indicate both conceptual equivalence and the direction of religious progress:

\[
\text{tathya-saṁvrти-satya} \rightarrow \text{vijñaptimātra (svasaṁvedana)} \rightarrow \text{anātman.}
\]

In other words, conventional truth (saṁvṛti-satya) is nothing but mind-only (vijñaptimātra) and has no intrinsic nature (anātman). This equation reflects Śāntarakṣita’s interpretation and evaluation of the four major philosophical schools of Buddhism. Śāntarakṣita shows a gradual philosophical development from belief in the existence of external objects, maintained by the Sarvāstivāda and the Sautrāntika, through the mind-only theory of the Yogācāra, to the Mādhyamika’s emptiness, which Śāntarakṣita considers to be the ultimate stage.

The Yogācāra-Mādhyamika school evolved out of philosophies influenced by Buddhist logic (developed by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti), which refuted the theories of the Sarvāstivāda and the Sautrāntika, and it adopted the mind-only theory as a means (upāya) to attain the ultimate truth. At the same time, the school consistently maintained and recognized as its fundamental position the Mādhyamika theory that all dhammas have no intrinsic nature.
1.3 Śāntarakṣita’s Philosophical Position as Found in his Interpretation of the Concept of Nonproduction (an-utpāda)

Śāntarakṣita’s philosophical position can be summarized in his interpretation of the concept of nonproduction (an-utpāda). He turns first to the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra for the definition of nonproduction from the standpoint of the Yogācāra and the Mādhyamika, quoting the following two passages:

I maintain that nonproduction [in the theory of the Yogācāra school] means to establish mind-only [by] the exclusion [of the rest of the five kinds of] causal conditions (hetupratyaya) and [by] the denial of cause (kāraṇa).5

Entities do not exist as external realities, nor are they objects contained in the mind. The abandonment of all views is defined as nonproduction.6

As these verses demonstrate, from the point of view of the Yogācāra school, nonproduction is defined as the establishment of mind-only. In contrast, the Mādhyamika school defines it as the abandonment not only of the intrinsic nature of interior and external entities but also of all views of non-Buddhist and Buddhist schools. In this regard, we must take care to notice that the mind-only theory of the Yogācāra school is included in “all views.”

Next, by quoting two stanzas attributed to Nāgārjuna’s Yuktisāstikā, Śāntarakṣita traces his idea back to the founder of the Mādhyamika:7

Here, nothing is produced; nothing is annihilated either. Appearance and disappearance take place only in our knowledge.8

The four material elements (mahābhūta), etc., taught (by the Blessed One) are in fact reduced to consciousness. (But) since that (consciousness) is also refuted by (true) wisdom, is this (reduction) not a false conception?9

These verses tell us that what appears and disappears is nothing but knowledge and that even the great elements taught by the Blessed One cannot be supposed to be distinct from knowledge. The words “consciousness” (vijñāna) and “true wisdom” (jñāna) in the second verse can be interpreted as referring to the knowledge of the Yogācāra and the Mādhyamika, respectively. This interpretation can be supported by ref-
ference to the philosopher Ratnakarāśāntī's PPU, in which he defines "true wisdom" as knowledge completely free from error. He regards this "true wisdom" as superior to "consciousness." Although, of course, the Yogācāra school had not yet been established at that time, the second of the two verses attributed to Nāgārjuna quoted above clearly criticizes the concept of mind-only. By quoting Nāgārjuna's verses, Śāntarakṣita summarizes his position. That is, Śāntarakṣita maintains that conventional truth is nothing but mind-only but, nevertheless, that mind-only has no intrinsic nature. He affirms the Yogācāra theory from the standpoint of conventional truth, but criticizes it from that of ultimate truth.

1.4 Śāntarakṣita's Position Supported by Quotations from the LA

Śāntarakṣita supports his position in the MAV by citing three famous verses from chapter ten of the LA. There are some textual problems in the published texts of the LA, and I translate the passage according to Kamalaśīla's MAP:

256 Based on [the standpoint of] mind-only, [the yogin] must not imagine external objects. Abiding in the object having suchness [as its characteristic], he must go beyond even mind-only, [since there is no subject when there is no object].

257 Having gone beyond mind-only, he, moreover, must go beyond [the attachment to knowledge of] nonmanifestation (of the subject and the object). The yogin who abides in the stage of the nonmanifestation [of the knowledge of the previous nonmanifestation] realizes (the truth of) the Great Vehicle.

258 [At this stage the yogin, since there is no longer something to be sought], is calmed and purified by his vows [for the benefit of sentient beings]. Knowledge (in this stage) which is the best and has no self does not see [intrinsic nature anywhere, even] in [the latter stage of the knowledge of] nonmanifestation.11

The quotation of these stanzas from the LA suggests the development, as shown in verse 92 of the MA, from belief in the existence of external objects, through the mind-only theory, to the stage that even mind-only
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has no intrinsic nature. Furthermore, by analyzing the meaning of non-manifestation (nirabhāsa) into two stages, the Alikākāravāda of the Yogācāra school and the Mādhyamika, Professor Yūichi Kajiyama examined Kamalāsīla’s interpretation of these verses as presented in his Bhāvanākrama. He concluded that Kamalāsīla viewed the development leading to the highest philosophical position, that of the Mādhyamika, as divided into the following five stages: (1) the Sarvastivāda; (2) the Sautrāntika; (3) the Satyakāravāda-Yogācāra, (4) the Alikākāravāda-Yogācāra; and (5) the Mādhyamika theory of emptiness.12

1.5 Similar Ideas Shared by Jñānagarbha, Kamalaśīla and Haribhadra

Jñānagarbha is a pivotal figure in the development of the Mādhyamika school. In an important work, the SDVV, he holds that the Mādhyamika stage of nonself is to be regarded as higher than that of the Yogācāra’s mind-only:

32 [The Blessed One], whose self-nature is compassion, seeing [how people had been bound by] the fetters of imagination by means of various types of (teachings) such as mind-only, preached bondage and liberation.

The Blessed One understands action and its fruits and has compassion as the intrinsic nature of his body. He, indeed, having seen people bound by the fetters of imagination in the prison of the cycle of birth and death, became completely free from attachment to entities by means of the progressive teachings—(offered) according to the mentalities (of his listeners)—of the skandhas, dhātus and āyatanas, mind-only and the nonself in all dharmas, and preached to people about bondage and liberation.13

He goes on to add that,

In (pure) knowledge as such, the intrinsic nature of (any) entities, (be they) atoms, nonduality (or the like), does not appear. Conventions do not apply to anything which does not appear. Although there is something which appears, there is nothing which is the intrinsic nature of an entity, because neither the assemblage [of atoms] nor the two are the entity.14
Jñānagarbha’s statements regarding the order of Buddhist teachings and the nonintrinsic nature of that which appears remind us of Śāntarakṣita’s position presented above in MA 92. The following passages from Kamalaśīla’s works could be added to bolster our interpretation:

The entrance to mind-only alone is not the entrance to the truth.\(^{15}\)

Only the entrance to nondual knowledge is the entrance to the truth.\(^{16}\)

One cannot understand all at once the lack of intrinsic nature of all dharmas. First, based on [the standpoint of] mind-only, one gradually understands the lack of intrinsic nature of external objects. Therefore, it is said (in the LA X.154ab):

Both the subject and the object are rejected by those who carry out a logical investigation.

Then, gradually, having examined the intrinsic nature of mind, they understand that even that [mind] is without self, and follow the most profound path.\(^{17}\)

In the following passage we can see that Haribhadra builds his view on those of his predecessors.

Basing oneself on external objects by repudiating \(ātman\), etc.; (1) afterwards depending on the understanding that the triple realm is mind-only because of the teaching of the imagined, dependent and consummate self-natures; (2) then [investigating] the two conventional truths by distinguishing between true and untrue, conforming and not conforming (respectively) to (their) real causal efficiency, and showing that what is agreeable and tacitly accepted only as long as it is not investigated critically depends on its own successive former causes; (3) based on true conventional truth (you) must practice giving and the rest according to (worldly) appearance as (if you were) a magically created person, (4) and (you) must (mentally) cultivate (the notion of) nonproduction from the point of view of ultimate truth. You must thus gradually penetrate the Perfection of Wisdom.\(^{18}\)

This passage clearly reflects the ideas adopted by Jñānagarbha and Śāntarakṣita: “true and untrue, conforming and not conforming (respectively) to (their) real causal efficiency” corresponds to verse 12 of the
SDV and “what is agreeable and tacitly accepted only as long as it is not investigated critically depends on its own successive former causes” to verses 64 and 65 of the MA.

In Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, who are regarded as representatives of the Yogācāra-Mādhyamika school, we meet the culmination of the development of that school, after some six hundred years of evolution in Madhyamaka thought. The school grew from the pioneer Jñānagarbha, flourished in the time of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, and was inherited by Haribhadra. As the preceding discussion shows, Śāntarakṣita’s philosophy can, in fact, be traced back to that of Jñānagarbha. Jñānagarbha, therefore, should be recognized as the one who took the lead in establishing the Yogācāra-Mādhyamika school. Jñānagarbha’s position has not been well defined or properly recognized in Tibetan grub mtha’ texts, where he is variously identified as belonging to either the Yogācāra-Mādhyamika or the Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika, or sometimes even to the “Lokaprasiddhavargacārämādhyamika,” a line to which Candrakīrti is also sometimes assigned. The school in its mature and eclectic form gradually died out in India, but left a long-lasting mark on Tibetan Buddhism. Our understanding of the theory of the Yogācāra-Mādhyamika school will be explained in more detail below.

2. Conventional Truth Is Nothing but Mind-only

2.1 Śāntarakṣita’s View of Conventional Truth

Central to the synthesis achieved in Yogācāra-Mādhyamika thought are the views Śāntarakṣita proposed with regard to conventional truth. In the first sixty-two verses of MA and its auto-commentary MAV, Śāntarakṣita attempts to prove the absence of an intrinsic nature in all dharmas according to reason (yukti). The main subject is explained in syllogistic form in the first kārikā of the treatise:

1 (P) Those entities postulated as real by Buddhist and non-Buddhist schools have in reality no intrinsic nature,
(H) Because they possess neither a single nor a plural nature,
(D) Like a reflection.
Since the absence of an intrinsic nature in all dharmas tends to be understood by his opponents as nihilism, Śāntarakṣita counters this position by characterizing it as follows:

63ab Therefore, all entities are understood as being characterized only by conventional (truth).

This assertion raises the question of how conventional truth is to be understood. Śāntarakṣita summarizes it in three ways: (1) not nothingness; (2) produced by causation; and (3) having the nature of mind and mental states (citta-caitta).

Kamalaśīla further expands Śāntarakṣita’s ideas by dividing conventional truth into: (a) mere verbal usage (śabda-vyavahāra) and (b) dependent origination or causal efficiency. Dependent origination or causal efficiency is well known even to a cowherd, and is that to which the word “convention” refers in common usage (samketa).22 Kamalaśīla calls the first of these “false conventional truth” (mithyā-saṃvṛti) and the second “true conventional truth” (tathya-saṃvṛti). The two are explained as follows:

The term “true conventional truth” is used because it designates accurately what is accepted (as real by the world). “False conventional truth” refers to conceptual constructs—such as God, etc.—which have nothing to do with what is accepted (as real by the world).23

When Śāntarakṣita uses the term “conventional truth,” he is referring only to true conventional truth. He defines it in the MA and MAV:

64 One should understand that conventional (truth) is in essence (1) that which is agreeable and tacitly accepted only as long as it is not investigated critically; (2) that which is characterized by arising and decay; and (3) whatever has causal efficiency.

This (type of) conventional truth is not mere verbal usage (śabda-vyavahāra-mātrātma). True conventional truth (refers) to the entities experienced and affirmed, to that which is co-arisen dependently, and (yet) is not able to withstand any investigation.24
Śāntarakṣita then identifies this concept of conventional truth with the second clause in Nāgārjuna’s stanza defining emptiness:

That which co-arises dependently we call emptiness. That (emptiness) is a dependent designation. Precisely that is the Middle Path.²⁵

Thus, Śāntarakṣita regards true conventional truth as a synonym for “a dependent designation” (upādāya prajñāpīti). But he anticipates a possible objection. An opponent could argue that Śāntarakṣita’s interpretation contradicts the definition of the two-truth theory in the Akṣayamati-nirdeśa-sūtra, in which conventional truth is defined as that which is explained by words, language and signs. The sūtra says:

What, then, is conventional truth? It is (a) all the conventional designations of the world (loka-vyavahāra) and (b) (all) that is explained by words, language and signs. (On the other hand), what is the highest truth? It is the stage where there is no activity of mind, not to mention of words.²⁶

Śāntarakṣita connects his conception of true conventional truth with the first part of the sūtra’s definition (clause “a”), but does not discuss the second part in the MAV. He interprets the first part as follows:

The “conventional designations of the world” (loka-vyavahāra) refer to the world of sentient and inanimate beings. They are concerned with the experiencer and the experienced, and they include the successful performance of human actions.²⁷

Therefore the absence of an intrinsic nature in all dharmanas does not mean nothingness, since even this absence is characterized by true conventional truth, as defined above.

Kamalaśīla, on the other hand, considers mere verbal usage to be a form of false conventionality. This means that he would term class (b) of the sūtra’s typology of conventional truth “false conventional truth.” Why is this aspect of linguistic usage excluded from true conventional truth? Kamalaśīla explains:

(False conventional truth; mithyā-sāṁvṛti) does not agree with direct perception (pratyakṣa), etc. Thus ordinary verbal usage (śabda-vyavahāra) does not have as its domain the definition of things which co-arise dependently, since it has only the universal
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(sāmānyā) as its domain. That universal, moreover, is nonexistent because its nature is imaginary (parikalpita-svabhāva). Therefore, to affirm its existence is to deny the well-established causal efficiency of entities, because the universal cannot possess causal efficiency (arthakriyā-śakti).  

Up to this point, the Mādhyamika-Yogācāra theory of conventional truth can be understood as the logical development of Mādhyamika and Sautrāntika theories. When the question of the origin of the causal process arises, however, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalāśīla rely on Yogācāra doctrine. Since conventional truth is emphatically explained by Śāntarakṣita as that which co-arises dependently or as dependent designation, it is very clear that it has a cause. But what is the cause? If it has a cause only in the usual sense of the word, then it does not mean much to say that it has a cause. Śāntarakṣita therefore employs the Yogācāra concept of a beginningless cause or karmic substratum, as he suggests in the following stanzas from the MA:

65 Even that which is agreeable and tacitly accepted only as long as it is not investigated critically implies the production of similar successive effects conditioned by their own successive causes.

66 Therefore, it is also correct to say that it would be impossible for conventional truth to be causeless. But if (you claim that) its substratum (upādāna) is real, you have to explain what it is.

Kamalāśīla expands:

In this respect, if it were established that it (conventional truth) only has a cause in the usual sense (of the word), then it would be a case of (the fallacy of) proving what has already been proved (siddha-sādhana), for we claim that the cause of conventional reality is a beginningless (series of) successive causes.  

Thus, the school identifies cause with the individual series (saṃtāna) of moments of consciousness, existing since a beginningless past. In an ultimate sense this cause is unreal. Furthermore, Śāntarakṣita proceeds to explain that conventional truth is nothing but mind-only. In the concluding portion of his MA and MAV Śāntarakṣita states:
91 That which is cause and effect is nothing but knowledge. It is established that knowledge is that which is self-validated.

One cannot conceive of the nature of knowledge as something other than a self-established nature. Even this self-established nature is just like the form of a dream, an illusion, etc. 30

This or similar explanations may, in fact, be the basis for proposing the name Yogācāra-Mādhyamika. 31 Indeed, Śāntarakṣita explains that the bifurcation of the Mādhyamika school into the Yogācāra-Mādhyamika and the Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika was a result of differing views concerning the characteristics of conventional truth. 32 Bhāvaviveka, regarded as the founder of the Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika school, maintains that conventional truth has the nature of an external entity. He interprets that passage of scripture quoted above which asserts that the triple world is nothing but mind-only as merely a critique of the “self.” 33 Śāntarakṣita’s comments on Bhāvaviveka’s views have been aptly summarized by Professor Kajiyama as follows:

The Buddhas have taught the theory of mind-only to repudiate the existence of a soul which is conjured up by non-Buddhist philosophers as the subject of actions (kartr) and the enjoyer of their fruits (bhoktr). This opinion of [the Sautrāntika-] Mādhyamikas is tantamount to saying that external things can be as real as the mind insofar as conventional truth is concerned, although the soul must be denied. 34

Śāntarakṣita himself, on the other hand, does not admit the existence of an object external to the mind. He maintains instead that conventional truth has only the nature of mind and mental states (citta-caitta). 35 In order to understand this position more completely, it is necessary to examine Śāntarakṣita’s disagreements with Bhāvaviveka in more detail.

2.2 Bhāvaviveka’s View of “True Conventional Truth” (tathyasaṁvṛti)

Another instance of the disagreement between Śāntarakṣita and Bhāvaviveka regarding the characteristics of conventional truth is found in their respective usage of the term tathya-saṁvṛti-satya. Emptiness or the absence of intrinsic nature of all dharmas can be understood from
the point of view of ultimate truth as an awareness which goes beyond verbal usage. But, if one must verbally express emptiness in order to lead sentient beings to this awareness, one can only refer to it as “nonproduction.” Śāntarakṣita’s MA says:

69 Therefore, there is no entity that can be established in reality. Therefore, the Tathāgatas preached the nonproduction (anupāda) of all dharmas.

However, adopting the doctrine that the Blessed One had preached the absence of an intrinsic nature of all dharmas as nonproduction posed new problems to Buddhist exegesis. In other words, the attempt to explain or conceptualize the truth of emptiness, which Śāntarakṣita argues goes beyond all verbal usage, raises other questions: (1) If the statement of the Blessed One should be regarded as absolute truth, is the teaching of nonproduction itself the highest truth or not? (2) If the idea of nonproduction, which should imply the absence of an intrinsic nature in all dharmas, is understood as the negation of production, is that the highest truth or not?

Śāntarakṣita’s solution clearly shows that both nonproduction as a teaching and as a negation is only conventional truth, not the highest truth. With regard to (1) Śāntarakṣita states:

Although nonproduction, etc., is also implied in true conventional truth (tathya-samurṭi),

70 Some say that this [nonproduction] is the highest truth, since it agrees with the highest truth. (But in my view) it [the highest truth] is that which is completely free from all accumulations of fictional human ideas (pra-paṇca).

The highest truth is that which cuts off the net of all accumulations of fictional human ideas such as existence and nonexistence, production and nonproduction, emptiness and nonemptiness, etc.36

Thus, when Śāntarakṣita uses the term “highest truth” he is referring only to that which is not susceptible to explanation; language, therefore, is completely excluded. So, even the teaching of nonproduction of the Blessed One is regarded as only true conventional truth.

Śāntarakṣita’s reason for referring to this problem here in the MA seems to be that Bhāvaviveka classified the teaching of nonproduction
as the highest truth. As already shown by the studies of several scholars, Bhāvaviveka divides the highest truth into two types: pāramārthya-satya and sāṃketika-pāramārthya-satya, according to terminology used in Avalokitavrata’s Prajñāpradīpa-tīkā. In Bhāvaviveka’s Tarkajñālā, the first of these two types of highest truth is called “that which is attained without conscious effort” (mngon par ’du byed pa med par ’jug pa), and the second “that which is attained by conscious effort” (mngon par ’du byed pa dang bcas par ’jug pa). Bhāvaviveka furthermore identifies each type of highest truth with one stanza in Nāgārjuna’s MK, the former referring to the content of MK XVIII.9 and the latter to MK XVIII.10. He divides the second type of highest truth into: (1) nonconceptual knowledge; (2) the teaching of nonproduction; and (3) wisdom by learning, investigation and meditation. Bhāvaviveka considers the second type of highest truth as an excellent means to attain the first type of highest truth.

But for the ladder of true conventional truth, the learned man would not be able to mount the top of the palace of (the highest) truth.

However, as long as the second highest truth depends on the twelve bases of cognition (āyatanas), it cannot be denied that essentially it belongs to the category of conventional truth. Although Bhāvaviveka applies the term “true conventional truth” (tathya-saṃvṛti) to the second highest truth, he no doubt evaluates it highly since he considers it to be a means leading to the first type of highest truth. This implies that Bhāvaviveka considered the teaching of nonproduction, distinct from general verbal convention, to be something belonging to the highest truth. This position created the opportunity for Bhāvaviveka’s successors to attack him. In establishing the first type of highest truth beyond the second type, Bhāvaviveka seemed to think that, even having affirmed “production” as worldly verbal convention, “nonproduction” could be established on the level of the highest truth. Jñānagarbha, Śāntarakṣita and others pointed out that this position is inconsistent with Nāgārjuna’s idea that the highest truth cannot be taught without relying on verbal convention. In the SDV and its commentary the SDVV, Jñānagarbha says:

9ab Negation of production, etc., is also postulated [as the highest truth], since it agrees with reality.
The reason is that it negates that entity which is imagined as real production, etc. We postulate (this negation) as the highest truth, since the other (school, Yogācāra) understands (it) as nothing but reality. The word "also" has a cumulative (qualifying) meaning.

However, when it is investigated by reason (the negation of production is) nothing but conventional truth. If asked the reason why (we reply):

9cd Because of the nonexistence of the object to be negated, it is clear there is in reality no negation.

For negation does not take place if there is no object to be negated, and it is not reasonable to negate that which has no object.

If (someone objects that) the object to be negated is that which is imagined by (our) opponents to be real—such as the production of form and the rest—which are (merely ideas) caused by conceptualization, then:

10ab How could the negation of the imagined nature be the nonimagined (nature)?

Since the object to be negated is only the imagined (nature), the negation (of it) will also be the imagined nature, just like the negation of the darkness (of complexion) and so forth of the son of a barren woman. Even though there is no negation of real [production, etc.], there is no existence of production, etc., since nonproduction, etc., is not pervaded by the negation (of production, etc.), and there is no evidence to prove the existence of the latter (i.e., production, etc.).

10c Therefore, this is conventional (truth).

"This" refers to the absence of real production, etc.

10d (It is) not the highest truth and not real.42

Production, etc., which are the objects of the negation are not real, since they are that which is imagined. Since there is no real object to be negated, it is logically unreasonable to negate it. The negation of the imagined entity is itself nothing but imagination. Therefore, it is correct to say that the negation of production, etc., belongs to conventional
truth, not to the highest truth. This view reminds us of that discussed by Śāntarakṣita in the MA:

71 Since there is no production and the like, [in reality] there can be no nonproduction and the like. Since (production), the substantial referent (of nonproduction), has been rejected, verbal expression with reference to the latter (i.e., nonproduction) is impossible.

72 When there is no object, you cannot rightly apply any negative (to it). If [nonproduction arose] depending on an idea (vikalpa), it would be conventional, not real.

If there is no production, etc., it is impossible to apply words to explain it. Therefore, because what is objectless is negated, there can be no nonproduction, etc., since there is not even production.43

In other words, Śāntarakṣita asserts that because “production” has been repeatedly negated, there can be no “nonproduction.” Since “production” does not exist, it is not appropriate to construct a negative by applying the negation “non” to that which does not exist. If “nonproduction” arises depending on an idea (vikalpa), it is nothing but conventional truth.

Kamalaśīla comments on “nonproduction” as follows:

“Nonproduction, etc.,” means the conceptualization (vikalpa) of nonproduction, etc., or the determination of the nature of entities by conceptualization. The word “etc.” includes cessation, final peace and so on.44

As these comments suggest, for Śāntarakṣita “nonproduction” is a conceptual construct. Similarly, nonproduction originally refers to the absence of intrinsic nature; therefore one cannot try to determine its intrinsic nature. Nonproduction does not satisfy the definition of the highest truth which is free from the net of fictional human ideas (praṇaṇa). Since production and nonproduction and existence and nonexistence are nothing but fictions created by the human mind, they are relative concepts depending only on ideas. Śāntarakṣita’s observations on conventional truth seem to derive from the experience of meditation. He penetrates into the nature of our ordinary world on the basis of his profound religious insight. For Śāntarakṣita, in sum, our everyday world of conventional truth is that which is co-arisen dependently, that which
is agreeable and tacitly accepted only as long as it is not investigated critically, and that which has the nature of mind and mental states arising from the individual series of consciousnesses from the beginningless past.

2.3 Jñānagarbha’s View of Conventional Truth

Since Śāntarakṣīta’s idea of conventional truth seems very much in accordance with that of Jñānagarbha, in what follows I translate with some comments of my own the key passages concerning conventional truth from Jñānagarbha’s Satyadvaya-vibhaṅga-kārikā (SDV) and Vṛtti (SDVV).

First, Jñānagarbha defines the two truths as follows:

3 Between the two truths, conventional and ultimate, which are preached by the Sage, only that which as it appears is convention; that which is otherwise is the other.45

The commentary explains:

[The other] means the highest truth. The truth (of conventional truth) is ascertained conventionally according to the experience of (ordinary) people including a female cowherd, etc. But it is not (ascertained) in reality, because the meaning of an entity is defined (only) according to experience.46

Subsequently he explains conventional truth as follows:

If asked what so-called conventional truth is, (we reply):

15ab It is maintained that conventional truth is what covers reality or that in which it is covered.

The concealment of the truth by or in one’s mind, (and the affirmation of) what is thus generally accepted (to be real) by the world, is maintained to be conventional (truth). In a sūtra (LA X.429) it is said:

Entities arise from the point of view of conventional truth. From the point of view of ultimate reality, they have no intrinsic nature. Error with respect to the absence of an intrinsic nature is postulated as true convention.
Therefore, [from the point of view of conventional truth] all these are true. From the point of view of ultimate reality they are not true.

All these things are true from the point of view of conventional (truth). This means that they are true (only) in the sense generally accepted by the world.47

Moreover, Jñānagarbha explains:

21ab This (conventional truth) is not to be investigated critically because its nature (exists) as it appears.48

We find this developed in Śāntarakṣita’s sub-commentary on this half-verse, which states:

“Because its nature (exists) as it appears” means (it has a nature) which is agreeable and tacitly accepted only as long as it is not investigated critically. As for this conventional truth, it is not to be investigated, not to be examined.49

Further on in the SDV Jñānagarbha adds:

28 The phenomenon which appears is never rejected. It is not reasonable to reject anything which is experienced.50

As the preceding passages suggest, Śāntarakṣita owes one of his definitions of conventional truth (i.e., avicārāikaramanīya, in MA 64) to Jñānagarbha’s basic idea of conventional truth “as it appears.” This being the nature of conventional reality, should we then also regard as conventional truth the double moon that appears to those who have defective vision? Partly in response to this issue, Jñānagarbha distinguishes two types of conventional truth, namely true and false conventional truth. These correspond to the classification of Kamalāsilā discussed above. The criteria for Jñānagarbha’s classification are two: (1) whether or not it is of the nature of imagination (parikalpita-svabhāva); and (2) whether or not it has causal efficiency (arthakriyā). Thus, true conventional truth is defined as that which is not of the nature of imagination and which has causal efficiency. This definition furthermore corresponds to Śāntarakṣita’s own in MA 64.

Jñānagarbha refines his position as follows:
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Conventional truth is divided into two kinds by the fact that it is true or false.

8 A bare entity devoid of the imagined object and co-arising dependently is known as true conventional (truth). False (conventional truth) is the imagined (object).

“The imagined object” implies “production [and duration] etc.,” “the appearance of (ideas in) knowledge” and “the transformation (parinâma) of the predominant cause (pradhāna) and the gross elements (bhūta)” (which are postulated as) real (by Buddhist and non-Buddhist schools) and so forth. (True conventional truth is) that which is devoid of these. Something is a bare entity because its causal efficiency is as it appears. (An entity which) arises conditioned by causes and conditions is to be known as true conventional truth. Indeed, all entities which appear from a cause, in the knowledge of unwise men as well as (that of wise men), are understood as true conventional truth, for they are entities determined in conformity with that which appears in knowledge. (Such notions as) “production,” etc., have no counterpart in reality, but are things merely imagined, and are dependent on an established theory. Otherwise, the dispute (on the subject of production, etc.) would not occur. As for the thing which appears in the knowledge of both the opponent and the proponent, no dispute will occur. If it does occur, it is contradicted by direct perception, etc. Production, etc., postulated as real, are (known as) false conventional truth, since they are constructed by conceptualization.51

The twelfth kārikā of SDV and its commentary qualify the above:

12 Although [all knowledge is] the same as regards (the nature of) appearance, conventional (truth) is divided into true and false (conventional truth), depending on whether or not it has causal efficiency.

Although knowledge is the same in regard to having an appearance of a clear image, ordinary people understand water, etc., to be true and mirages, etc., to be false by determining whether or not their appearance misrepresents their causal efficiency. The nature of these two (conventional truths) is strictly speaking the same, in the sense that (they both) are devoid of intrinsic nature. They are distinguished by determining whether or not they are
as they appear. Whether (their appearance) misrepresents causal efficiency or not is (determined by the) way it is known (in the world), since even [causal efficiency] has no (intrinsic) nature.52

Jñānagarbha’s view of conventional truth can be summarized as follows: true conventional truth is that which is not of the nature of imagination, co-arises dependently, has causal efficiency, and appears in the knowledge of men, whether they be wise or not. On the other hand, false conventional truth has been explained as that which is of the nature of imagination and which possesses no causal efficiency. Thus, we can easily understand that Jñānagarbha’s view is reflected in the definition of conventional truth adopted by Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla.

2.4 Śāntarakṣita’s Epistemology: Self-cognition (svaśaṁvedana)

Jñānagarbha’s SDVV and Śāntarakṣita’s commentary to the same (SDVP) provide more arguments in support of Śāntarakṣita’s statement in MA 91 that conventional truth is nothing but mind-only. As discussed above, Jñānagarbha defines conventional truth as that which is exactly as it appears. Commenting on this view, Śāntarakṣita says:

The statement “conventional truth is that which is exactly as it appears” refers to direct perception (pratyakṣa).53

Now, Jñānagarbha, explaining stanza 30 of his SDV, says:

This body of color-form, etc., undefiled by the evils of conceptualization, is by nature dependent on others, and is only an appearance of knowledge. (Nevertheless) it cannot be rejected, and if one were to reject it, one would certainly undermine (the validity of) direct perception, etc.54

Śāntarakaśita comments on this passage as follows:

[Question:] And what is (“the body of color-form, etc.”)?

[Answer:] It’s “nature is to be dependent on others,” since it arises conditioned by causes and conditions.
[Question:] Why is the body not defiled by the evils of conceptualization?

[Answer:] Because “it is only an appearance of knowledge.” This means the appearance of knowledge detached from concepts. The word “only” implies that it rejects the accompanying concept. Since such things as color-form, etc., are self-cognized, (the phrase) “it cannot be rejected” is connected to “and if one were to reject it one would certainly undermine.”

[Question:] Undermine what?

[Answer:] “Direct perception, etc.” The word “etc.” implies inference, etc.

In the Madhyamakāloka of Kamalaśīla, we find the following related passage:

Among [the three natures (trisvabhāva)], the dependent nature (paratantra-svabhāva) is the one which is acceptable only as long as it is not investigated critically, the one which is exactly as it appears, and the one which co-arises dependently.

Combining the points raised in the preceding discussion, we find the following terms used as synonyms of tathya-saṁvṛti:

$tathya-saṁvṛti$ = \( ji \) ltar snang ba (yathādarśanam = yathāpratibhāsanam or yathānirbhāsanam) = $pratyakṣa$ = pratiyogita-samutpāda = paratantrasvabhāva = vijnaptimātra = svasaṁvedana = avicāraikaramaṇiya.

Therefore, these passages corroborate the Tibetan sources, which describe the Yogācāra-Mādhyamikas as those who admit only self-cognizing consciousness and reject external objects. Moreover, this list of synonyms enables one to appreciate the manner in which the Yogācāra-Mādhyamika school integrates its epistemology with the theory of the two truths.

What, then, is Śāntarakṣita’s idea of the self-cognition of knowledge? He expounds the theory of the self-cognition of knowledge in his Tattvaśāmgraha (TS) as follows:
Knowledge, whether it has an image or not, or an image different (from the external object), can never cognize any external object.59

Kamalaśīla comments on this verse as follows:

Knowledge, either with no image, or with an image, or with an image which is different from the image of the object, cannot grasp any external (object). There is not any other kind (of knowledge). Therefore, even when there is an external individual series, mind-only is established, since knowledge always cognizes only itself.60

Let us examine the characteristics of self-cognition (svasaṃvedana) in greater detail. First, the nature of svasaṃvedana is illumination (prakāśa). It is considered to be nondual because it lacks the dichotomy of the grasping and the grasped. This can be inferred from the following verses in Śāntarakṣita’s TS:

2078 (P) Therefore, that which is the subject of the dispute (svasaṃvedana) is considered to be nondual, since it is devoid of object and subject (vedyakartrtvavīyogāt),

(H) Because it is of the nature of knowledge (vijñānatva),

(D) Like a reflection.61

2081 The nature of knowledge is its capacity to illuminate, so that it does not have a place in the grasped (object). Since (knowledge endowed) with no image, etc., is not reasonable, the pervasion (vyāpti) (of knowledge by nonduality) is established.62

On the “illuminating” nature of knowledge, Kamalaśīla says the following:

By self-cognition we do not mean the nature of a subject (“the perceiver”; grāhaka). Then what is it? It has as its nature illumination by itself, intrinsically; it is just like the glow in the sky.63
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Second, since the epistemological process is only knowledge cognizing itself, knowledge is always endowed with an image. The image (ākāra) is nothing but knowledge. Image and knowledge are identical.

Third, "self-cognition" can be used to describe not only the knowledge of ordinary people, but also that of the Buddha. Thus Kamalaśīla states:

Since the self-cognition of knowledge is established even for (the cognition of) cowherds, it is not reasonable to criticize it (from any point of view). 64

With regard to the Buddha’s cognition, Śāntarakṣita says in the TS:

2046 Whether endowed with an image or not, it is not reasonable (to assume that) one cognizes anything else (but knowledge). Therefore, concerning even the Buddha's knowledge, no critical examination is applicable. 65

And, in another context, Kamalaśīla comments:

The knowledge of the Blessed One is not postulated as cognizing (the object), so no critical examination is applicable. 66.

The difference between the knowledge of ordinary people and that of the Buddha lies in whether it is false (alīka) or true (satya), and whether or not it has error (bhrānti). The nature of Buddha knowledge is explained as follows in Śāntarakṣita’s TS:

2048 The sage, just like the Kalpa-tree, is not shaken by all the winds of imagination. And yet he brings about the welfare of the world.

2049 Therefore, in spite of seeing nothing, they call him the Omniscient, the Jina among all, because he can perform all the activities of an all-knower without effort. 67

On the other hand, Kamalaśīla explains the nature of the knowledge of ordinary people as follows:
The mere mistaken knowledge, which illuminates an unreal image in spite of the absence of an object, is due to nescience.68

The knowledge of ordinary people is considered to be false. But their knowledge is not always false, since it has the potentiality of being developed through meditational practice to the point of becoming Buddha knowledge.69 Kamalaśīla terms the Buddha knowledge which the yogins aim to attain "the knowledge of nonmanifestation of even nondual knowledge" (advayajñānaniḥbhāṣajñāna).70

Śāntarakṣita seems to have advanced the idea of the self-cognition of knowledge as a refinement of Dharmakīrti's ideas. Dharmakīrti says the following:

[Excepting knowledge itself], there is nothing to be experienced by knowledge, and [likewise] it has no experience other [than self-experience]; since knowledge is deprived of cognitum and cognizer, it is illuminated by itself.71

Being based on Dharmakīrti's position, the theory of self-cognition can be established from the Sautrāntika point of view as well as from the Yogācāra standpoint. According to the Sautrāntika, knowledge cognizes in knowledge the image which has been imparted by the external object. Since the image has similarity to the external object, it can be said that knowledge cognizes the external object. But, since the image appears in knowledge, knowledge cognizes nothing but itself.

The theory of self-cognition presupposes the following conception of the nature of perception. The external object is the cause of knowledge since it imparts an image to knowledge and is the object of knowledge. On the other hand, not only is knowledge an effect but, since it is the subject of perception, its nature is also imparted to the object.72 Here, then, is the causal relation between the external object and knowledge. Now, the effect, knowledge, can be logically analyzed into the means of perception and its result. The means of perception here is nothing but the image in knowledge which is put forth by the external object. Self-cognition is established on the grounds that knowledge, which is the knower and the effect, cognizes the image which is the means of perception. However, if the object is conceived of as a cause and as an external entity producing an image which is perceived as similar to the external object, no one could deny the fact that perception is based on a dichotomy between two distinct things, namely, the internal and the external. Therefore, the theory of self-cognition could be maintained only in the context of the mind-only theory. This point is made by
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Śāntarakṣita in the following verses from the TS (repeated in the MA), in which he points out the shortcomings of the Sautrāntika theory which holds that the existence of the external objects is real.

1999 Knowledge is intrinsically opposed to insentient matter, and its immateriality is nothing but the self-cognition of knowledge.

2000 The self-cognition (of knowledge) is not to be analyzed into action and its agent, since (knowledge), being a single unity without components, cannot be divided into the (usual) three parts [i.e., the knower, the known and the act of knowing].

Why does knowledge cognize itself but not the external object? Śāntarakṣita strictly defines the nature of knowledge as sentient, and rejects the extension of the function of knowledge from itself to external objects. The similarity of the image in knowledge to the external object is also denied since knowledge and the external object are defined as qualitatively different. Knowledge, since it is immaterial, cannot grasp the insentient and material object which is distinct from knowledge.

On the basis of what relationship, then, is the self-cognition of knowledge possible? Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla examine the relation between knowledge and the image which is supposed to be imparted by the external object as follows: when knowledge cognizes the image, is the image (a) that which has not yet been put in knowledge, or is it (b) that which has already been known? If (a), the image is nonexistent, since it exists neither in knowledge nor as knowledge. That which is nonexistent cannot be the means of perception, because it is devoid of causal efficiency. But, if (b), knowledge is like a means of perception. It is an effect, because the image is being cognized, and it is absurd to think that an effect brings about an effect.

Therefore, the process of knowledge cognizing itself can never be understood by means of the relation between either the agent and its action or the knower and the known. The connection cannot be established between two things that are different in quality, despite their apparent relationship. Knowledge and its image are merely a conceptual distinction superimposed on self-cognition.

The theory of self-cognition is really not possible to maintain in terms of the Sautrāntika tenet, which holds that knowledge is endowed with an image imparted by external objects. Nor is it possible in the theory of the Vaibhāṣika, which maintains that knowledge is endowed
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with no image. It is only tenable in terms of the mind-only theory of the Yogācāra school. Śāntarakṣita concludes his presentation of the theory of self-cognition as follows:

Therefore, (knowledge) can cognize itself insofar as it has the intrinsic nature of consciousness. But how can it cognize the intrinsic nature of the object, from which it is distinct?\textsuperscript{75}

The preceding discussion of Śāntarakṣita's epistemology is summarized in the accompanying chart, which outlines his discussions in the MA with both Yogācāra schools and illustrates some of the points of disagreement between Śāntarakṣita and the Sākāravādins.

According to Tibetan tradition,\textsuperscript{76} Śāntarakṣita is classified as a scholar whose position is similar to that of the Sākāravāda of the Yogācāra school, a position which holds that images are real. We cannot, however, follow this tradition. If Śāntarakṣita is so classified because he maintains that self-cognition is always endowed with an image, whether it is the knowledge of the Buddha or of ordinary people, then this is, indeed, an accurate classification. However, if he is so classified because his position is otherwise similar to that of the Sākāravāda, it is incorrect. Śāntarakṣita criticizes the reality of the image of knowledge by the original method of applying the criticism of atoms to knowledge.\textsuperscript{77} He claims that by assuming that the image is real, the Sākāravādins cannot solve the problem of the incompatibility between unitary knowledge and plural image.

In fact, if one takes into account only his views on the nature of knowledge as illumination (prakāśa), Śāntarakṣita's position is similar to that of the Alikāravāda of the Yogācāra school. Ratnakarasānti, regarded as a later representative of that school, maintains the same idea:

[Question:] In what way do you prove the theory that all entities have the intrinsic nature of mind-only?

[Answer:] Entities are established by the fact that they are experienced according to their own appearance. This appearance is called "illuminating," "luminous" and "shining." Furthermore, this (appearance) is not material, so that it is not objective, but rather pure appearance. If it is postulated that this idea is not acceptable, one is led to the absurd implication that no entity could be established, since nothing would appear. On the other hand, if it is acceptable, all dharmas would be established
## Graphic Representation of Śāntarakṣita’s Differences with the Alikākāra-vijñānavāda and the Satyākāra-vijñānavāda Schools

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Knowledge</th>
<th>Śāntarakṣita’s Position</th>
<th>Alikākāra-vijñānavāda</th>
<th>Satyākāra-vijñānavāda</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Buddha</td>
<td>knowledge of the nonmanifestation of even nondual knowledge (advayajñāna-nirābhāsajñāna)</td>
<td>knowledge without duality (advayajñāna)</td>
<td>mind-only (citta-mātra)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paramārtha-satyā</td>
<td>true (satya), nonerror (abhrānta); images co-arise dependently</td>
<td>true and real (avicāraikaranaṁ)</td>
<td>true and real (tattvika)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ordinary people</td>
<td>false (alīka), error (bhṛānta); images co-arise dependently</td>
<td>true and real</td>
<td>true and real</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sāṃvṛti-satyā</td>
<td>production by nescience</td>
<td>production by error</td>
<td>production by error</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>endowed with an image</td>
<td>without image</td>
<td>endowed with an image</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
as having knowledge as their intrinsic nature, since that (which is appearance) is nothing but knowledge.\textsuperscript{78}

Accordingly, we can call Śāntaraksitā a Sākāravādin only in the sense that he holds that knowledge is endowed with an image which is not real. However, it would be more prudent to classify him only as a member of the Yogācāra-Mādhyamika school.

\section*{2.5 Jñānagarbha’s Position on Self-cognition}

At first reading of Jñānagarbha’s SDVV, his position on the nature of the self-cognition of knowledge seems obscure. But it is clear that he refutes the theories of both the Anākārajñānavādins and the Sākārajñānavādins with verses that are brief and to the point. First he offers his own kārikā:

Knowledge which is not endowed with an image cannot grasp the object. The other [i.e., knowledge endowed with an image] cannot (grasp the object either), since the image is neither the valid means of cognition nor (an entity that can be) reasonably (demonstrated).\textsuperscript{79}

Then he quotes from Dharmakīrti:

Otherwise, how is it possible for a single entity (i.e., knowledge) to have in reality the images which have manifold appearances? (It is impossible), since its unity would be abandoned.\textsuperscript{80}

Jñānagarbha agrees that the everyday world of conventional truth is the dependent nature and nothing but mind-only, stating that the body of color-form, etc., has the intrinsic nature of the dependent nature and is a mere appearance of knowledge. So, although we cannot find a passage to tell us precisely that mind-only is the self-cognition of knowledge, it is not unreasonable to suppose that Jñānagarbha maintained that the everyday world is nothing but mind-only.

In the SDVV, however, we come across a passage that would seem to contradict the hypothesis above:

6c (Self-cognition is impossible), because self-cognition is not reasonable.\textsuperscript{81}
The commentary SDVV states in syllogistic form:

(P) Knowledge does not cognize itself by itself,
(H) Because (it is) devoid of a representation of itself,
(D) Just like other acts of cognition.\(^{82}\)

On the evidence of passages such as this, some Tibetan works seem to argue that Jñānagarbha does not admit the theory of self-cognition. They also seem to hold that his philosophical position is linked to that of Bhāvaviveka rather than to that of Śāntarakṣita.\(^{83}\) Such interpretations, however, are based on a misunderstanding of the context of Jñānagarbha's discussion of svasaṁvedana. The passage in question is Jñānagarbha's critique of the theory that describes the process of knowing ultimate truth as an object.

Jñānagarbha states in the fifth kārikā of SDV that, strictly speaking, the "ineffable highest truth" (aparyāya-paramārtha-satya) never appears in knowledge, even in the knowledge of an Omniscient Buddha.

5 (Aparyāya-paramārtha-satya) cannot be determined as an entity corresponding to its appearance. It never appears in any form whatsoever as any object of knowledge.\(^{84}\)

Jñānagarbha then turns to the authority of scripture, quoting a sūtra passage to support his statement. This passage states that "not to see anything at all is to see the truth."\(^{85}\) Jñānagarbha's own statement that aparyāya-paramārtha-satya never appears in any knowledge seems to be in agreement with the sense of this scriptural passage. Since aparyāya-paramārtha-satya never appears, the highest truth is not seen. Therefore, the path to this truth is not to see anything at all.

Nevertheless, the opponent interprets the expression "not to see anything at all" as "not to see anything of the imagined nature (parikalpita-svabhāva)." The opponent therefore understands the passage of the sūtra to mean that not to see anything of the parikalpita-svabhāva is to see the highest truth. In other words, he comes to the conclusion that to see the truth means to see the absence of parikalpita-svabhāva, which is nonduality, the consummate nature (parinīṣpanna-svabhāva) and the highest truth.

Śāntarakṣita explains the type of knowledge that will reach this truth as "knowledge with which one cognizes by oneself the way (to salvation) (pratyātmagati-jñāna; so sor rang gis rig pa'i shes pa)."\(^{86}\) It seems that the opponent imagines that the subject of the pratyātmagati-jñāna cognizes as object the absence of the parikalpita-svabhāva. But
Jñānagarbha (and with him Śāntarakṣita) is actually proposing that knowledge itself knows the highest truth, not as an object, and not as the mere absence of *parikalpita-svabhāva*.

It is, in fact, likely that Jñānagarbha made the statement quoted above in response to his critics. The phrase “because self-cognition is not reasonable” refers only to the implications of the opponent’s notion that the *pratyātmagati-jñāna* cognizes the absence of the *parikalpita-svabhāva*. Here Jñānagarbha points out that the self-cognition of the *pratyātmagati-jñāna* cannot be established to be a process of perception such that the *pratyātmagati-jñāna* cognizes the highest truth, since they are different entities.

Jñānagarbha himself seems never to reject the theory of the self-cognition of knowledge. Rather, he argues that “self-cognition” cannot be established by the opponent’s idea of the self-cognition of the *pratyātmagati-jñāna*. He proves that *aparyāya-paramārtha-satya*, which he compares to the famous silence of Vimalakīrti, never appears in any knowledge. Otherwise, Jñānagarbha’s position would lack consistency since, on the one hand, he would affirm that the world of conventional truth is nothing but mind-only (by refuting both the theories of *anākārājñānavāda* and *sākārājñānavāda*) while, on the other hand, he would reject the self-cognition of knowledge.

### 3. That Which Is Mind-only Is Without Intrinsic Nature

As we have already shown, verses 66cd and 92cd of the MA attempt to show that the theory of mind-only should be based on the standpoint of nonself. This means that in reality mind-only possesses neither a single nor a plural intrinsic nature and that we should not cling even to mind-only. Śāntarakṣita thought highly of the mind-only theory, but primarily as a means to attain the ultimate goal, which he considered to be the Mādhyamika stage. In the process of proving emptiness, he rejected those theories which maintained the existence of external objects, including Bhāvaviveka’s theory of the Mādhyamika, while he likewise criticized the theories of the Yogācāravādins.
3.1 Śāntarakṣita’s Criticism of the Sākāravāda and the Alikāravāda of the Yogācāra School

Let us take a brief look at the criticism of the Yogācāra theories discussed in the MA and the MAV.

44 [The Yogācārin holds that] even though images appear as phantoms, produced by the ripening of latent impressions (vāsanā) which belong to the (same) individual series (saṁtāna) from the beginningless past, still, because they are the result of error, their intrinsic natures are as those of illusions.

45 Even though we appreciate this (doctrine), let us consider whether (in the theory proposed) the essence of the (images should be taken to be) real or something agreeable and tacitly accepted only as long as it is not investigated critically (avicāryaikaramanīya).

Śāntarakṣita’s criticism is directed at both the Sākāravāda and the Alikāravāda branches of the Yogācāra school. Both maintain that the image (ākāra), that is, the object of knowledge, is the result of an error produced through the ripening of latent impressions from the beginningless past. But the basic difference between the two Yogācāra theories lies in whether they consider the image to be real or whether they think it to be something agreeable and tacitly accepted only as long as it is not investigated critically. The former view is held by the Sākāravāda, the latter by the Alikāravāda. The image here refers to the image of blue, etc., as Kamalaśīla points out in his commentary MAP. ś87 Śāntarakṣita’s criticism of the theory proposed by the Sākāravādins is focused on the incompatibility of unitary knowledge with the plurality of real image. As long as the Sākāravādins hold to the reality of the image, that reality inevitably implies an extension in space (desavitānāvasthita) or non-dimensional contiguity in space (desanairantaryāvasthāna).

To counter this position, Śāntarakṣita employed a critique based on the criticism of the theory of atoms. ś88 He seems to be the only philosopher to have proposed such an approach.

49 If you admit that knowledge (consists of as many parts) as the number of (its manifold) forms, then it would be difficult (for you) to avoid the same kind of criticism which is made regarding (the reality of) atoms.
The Śākāravāda can neither solve the contradiction nor reasonably explain the process of perception, and Śāntarakṣīta attacks that philosophical position on these points.

Śāntarakṣīta then turns to the theory proposed by the Alikākāravādins:

52 (The Alikākāravāda-Yogācārin holds that knowledge) does not intrinsically possess these images, but by the force of an error they appear in knowledge, although in reality the latter is endowed with no images.

Alikākāra or nirākāra means that knowledge is not endowed with images. The Alikākāravādins maintain that knowledge without images perceives unreal images which are both produced by error and considered to be imagined nature. But it is a contradiction to hold that the image is cognized but that knowledge is not endowed with images. So, Śāntarakṣīta criticizes the idea of the Alikākāravādins that knowledge is something clearly different from the image.

54 Indeed, when there is not B (the image “blue”) in A (the knowledge “blue”), B is not perceived in A. Just as we neither (feel) pleasure when we are suffering, nor (see) white in black.

59 If it (the image) were unreal, its knowledge would [always] appear as knowledge without an image. (But) knowledge, like a pure crystal, would not perceive (any object).

3.2 Śāntarakṣīta’s Defense of His View by Reference to Scripture

Śāntarakṣīta supports his conclusion in the MAV by citing sūtras such as the Lokottaraparivarta and the Dharmasamāgīti, in addition to the Laṅkāvatāra sūtra which we quoted above. Śāntarakṣīta first quotes the Lokottaraparivarta as follows:

O, Sons of the Conqueror. Furthermore, it is understood that the triple realm is mind-only. Even the three times (past, present and future) are understood to be similar to mind. That mind also is understood to be without extremes and middle.
Introduction

He then quotes the Dharmasamītī:

Blessed One! All dharmas have as their essence the imagined nature. They are established as mind-only, without substance, like illusion, without roots.90

4. Conclusion

Śāntarakṣita’s philosophical position can be said to have aimed at the revival of Nāgārjuna’s fundamental thesis of the absence of intrinsic nature in all dharmas. He sought to prove the truth of the absence of intrinsic nature in all dharmas, or of nonself both in objects (dharma) and in the person (pudgala), by riding, to use his metaphor, the carriage pulled by the two horses of the Yogācāra and the Mādhyamika. Also greatly influenced by the logic of Dharmakīrti, Śāntarakṣita aspired to enhance Nāgārjuna’s philosophy through a synthesis of the theories of the Yogācāra and the Mādhyamika. The direction of the philosophy of the Yogācāra-Mādhyamika school, in which Śāntarakṣita played a central part, may be defined as a “Nāgārjuna Renaissance.” Śāntarakṣita explicitly recognized the eclectic nature of his philosophy when he composed the following stanza:

93 Therefore, those who hold the reins of logic while riding the carriage of the two systems [Mādhyamika and Yogācāra] attain the stage of a true Mahāyānist.
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Text and Translation

Tibetan Texts

Cone: Dbu-ma, Sa, 52b7–56b3.
Derge: Dbu-ma, Sa, 53a1–56b3 (Tūh 3884).
Narthang: Dbu-ma, Sa, 44a5–48a2.
Peking: Dbu-ma, Sa, 48b7–52b1 (P 5284; 101: 1.1.7–2.4.1).

K: Kārika = MA; K alone indicates the reading of all editions.
V: Vṛtti = MAV; V alone indicates the reading of all editions.
Pañ: Pañjikā = MAP; Pañ alone indicates the reading of all editions.

A combination of C, D, N or P with K, V or Pañ indicates the respective edition’s reading of MA, MAV or MAP, respectively. Thus, for example, PañD indicates the reading of the Pañjikā in the Derge edition.
The Madhyamakālaṃkārā: Text

Titles and Invocation

rgya gar skad du / Ma dhyā ma kā lam kā ra kā ri kā /
bod skad du / Dbu ma rgyan gyi tshig le′ur byas pa /

'Jam (C 53a) dpal gzhon nur gyur pa la phyag2 'tshal lo //
1C, D dhyā mi ka a.
2P pyag.

Text

1. bdag dang gzhan smra′i1 dngos ′di dag //
yang dag tu na gcig pa dang //
du ma′i rang bzhin bral ba′i phyir //
rang bzhin med de gzugs brnyan bzhin //
1V smras.

2. ′bras1 bu rim can (P 49a) nyer sbyor bas //
rtag rnams gcig pu′i bdag nyid min //
′bras bu re re2 tha dad na //
de dag rtag las nyams par ′gyur //
1C ′dras.
2V re′i.

3. bsgoms1 las byung ba′i shes pa yis //
shes bya ′dus ma byas smra ba′i //
lugs la′ang gcig min de dag ni //
rim can shes dang ′brel phyir ro //
1VN, VP sgom.

4. rnam shes snga mas shes1 bya ba′i //
rang bzhin rjes su ′brang2 na ni //
shes pa snga ma′ang phyi mar ′gyur //
phyi ma′ang de bzhin snga mar ′gyur //
1VN, VP zhes.
2C ′brad.
The Madhyamakālaṁkāra: Translation

Titles and Invocation

In Sanskrit: Madhyamakālaṁkāra-kārikā.
In Tibetan: Dbu ma rgyan gyi tshig le’ur byas pa.

Homage to Mañjuśrī Kumārabhūta!

Text

1. (P) Those entities postulated as real by Buddhist and non-Buddhist schools have in reality no intrinsic nature,
   (H) Because they possess neither a single nor a plural nature,
   (D) Like a reflection.

   Cited in BCAP 173.17–18; Mimaki 1982: 553:
   \[ \text{niḥsvabhāvā antī bhāvās tattvataḥ svaparoditāḥ} \quad / \]
   \[ \text{ekānekasvabhāvena viyogāt pratibimbavat} \quad // \]

2. Since effects are produced in succession, a permanent entity could not have a single intrinsic nature. If (its) effects exist at different points in time, the permanence of the [cause] is contradicted.

3. Even according to the (Vaibhāṣika) view that the unconditioned (asaṁskṛta) are the objects of wisdom acquired through meditational practice, the [unconditioned] are not single realities, since they are related to successively arising (moments of) wisdom.

4. If the intrinsic nature of the (unconditioned) object, known by a former (intuitive) cognition, continues to exist, the former cognition would still exist even when another one occurs. In that case the latter would occur at the same time as the former.
5. sngon dang phyi ma'i gnas rnams su //
   de yi¹ ngo (N 44b) bo mi 'byung na //
   'dus ma byas de² shes pa bzhin //
   skad cig 'byung bar shes par bya //
   ¹VP de'i. ²V te.

6. snga ma snga ma'i skad cig gi //
   mthu yis 'byung bar 'gyur ba¹ na //
   'dus ma byas su 'di mi 'gyur //
   sems dang sems las byung ba bzhin //
   ¹V bas.

7. skad cig pa rnams 'di dag tu //
   rang dbang 'byung bar 'dod na ni //
   gzhan la bltos¹ pa med pa'i phyir //
   rtag tu yod pa'am med par 'gyur //
   ¹C, D, VD ltos.

8. don byed nus pa ma yin la //
   de 'dod brtags pas ci zhig bya //
   ma ning gzugs bzang mi bzang zhes //
   'dod ldan rnams kyis brtags¹ ci phan //
   ¹P brtag.

9. skad cig skad cig ma yin par //
   gang zag bstan du mi rung bas //
   gcig dang du ma'i rang bzhin dang //
   bral bar gsal bar rab tu shes //

10. tha dad phyogs can¹ dang 'brel phyir² //
    khyab rnams gcig pur ga la 'gyur //
    bsgribs dang ma bsgribs³ dngos sog phyir //
    rags⁴ pa rnams khyang gcig pu min //
    ¹y om. can. ²V pas na.
    ³VN, VP bsgrib. ⁴N rigs.

11. 'byar ba dang ni bskor ba'am //
    bar med rnam par gnas kyang rung //
    dbus gnas rdul phran rdul gcig¹ la //
    bltas pa'i rang bzhin gang yin pa //
    ¹N, P cig.
5. (If it does not continue to exist), the unconditioned should be regarded as momentary, like cognition, since neither does the object itself (of the latter cognition) exist at the time of the former, (nor does) the object itself (of the former) exist at the time of the latter.

6. (P) They [the unconditioned] are not (literally) unconditioned, (H) For they occur by the force of successive (preceding) moments, (D) Like mind (citta) and mental states (caitta).

7. If those momentary entities are postulated to have taken place independently, they would permanently remain existent or non-existent, since they do not depend on others.

8. In what way is it profitable for those who seek for (causal efficiency; arthakriyā-samartha) to investigate entities having no causal efficiency? In what way is it meaningful for lustful [women] to ask whether a eunuch is handsome or not?

PV III:211. Cited in TSP 191.12–13:

arthakriyā 'samarthyasya vicāraīḥ kim t达尔thinām /

9. It is clearly understood that the person (pudgala) is possessed of neither a single nor a plural intrinsic nature, since it can be explained as neither momentary nor nonmomentary.

10. Given its relation to entities with various directional aspects, how can the all-pervading (vyāpin) [ether] be a single reality? Neither is a gross entity (a- vyāpin) a single reality, since some of its parts are visible while others are not.

11. (It is claimed that) the atom in the center is in contact with (the other atoms forming one particle), or that it is surrounded (by them with intervals remaining in between), or that it is in non-dimensional contiguity (with them, there being neither contact nor intervals between them).

TS 1989:

sanyuktam dārādevastham nairantaryayavasthitam /
ekānvabhimukham rūpaṃ yad aŋor madhyavarttinaḥ //
12. rdul phran gzhan la blta¹ ba yang //
   de nyid gal te yin brjod na //
   de lta yin na de lta bu //
   sa chu la sogs rgyas 'gyur ram² //
   ¹D, V lta.
   ²For the last two lines V reads:
   de lta yin na sa sogs //
   ji ltar rgyas 'gyur ma yin nam //

13. rdul (D 53b) phran gzhan la lta bai' ngos¹ //
   gal te gzhan du 'dod na ni //
   rab tu phra rdul ji² lta bur³ //
   gcig pu cha (C 53b) shas med par 'gyur //
   ¹C, D dos.
   ²N, P phra bai' rdul.
   ³V bu.

14. rdul phran rang bzhin med grub pa //
   de phyir mig¹ dang rdzas la sogs //
   bdag dang gzhan smras² mang po dag³ //
   rang bzhin med par mgon pa yin //
   ¹VD dmigs.
   ²P smra.
   ³P dang.

15. de yi¹ rang bzhin des brtsams dang //
   de (P 49b) yi yon tan de las bdag //
   de yi spyi dang khyad par yang² //
   de dag de dang 'du ba³ can //
   ¹VP de'i.
   ²N, P dang.
   ³VD, VP ldan pa.

16. rnam shes bems¹ po'i rang bzhin las //
   bzlog pa rab tu skye ba ste //
   bems² min rang bzhin gang yin pa //
   de 'di'i bdag nyid shes³ pa yin //
   ¹VN, VP, PañNP bem.
   ²VN, VP 'bem.
   ³VN, VP rigs.
12. (However), if, some say, (the atom in the center) entirely faces one atom in the front and also entirely faces another atom, then how can there be a gross thing such as a mountain?

TS 1990:

\[
\text{anuvatābhimukhyena tad eva yadi kalpyate} / \\
\text{pracayo bhūdhārādinām evaṁ satī na yujyate} //
\]

13. But if one maintains that the side which faces another atom is different, then how is the atom a single entity without parts?

TS 1991:

\[
\text{anuvatābhimukhyena rūpaṁ ced anyad īṣyate} / \\
\text{kathāṁ nāma bhaved ekaḥ paramāṇus tathā satī} //
\]

14. (Thus), it has been proven that atoms have no intrinsic nature. Therefore, it is (also) evident that (entities such as) the visual organ \( (cakṣurindriya) \), substance \( (dravya) \), and the like, postulated as real by many Buddhist and non-Buddhist schools, have no intrinsic nature.


15. These (entities) have [atoms] as their own being, and are composed of [atoms]. Moreover, the (atoms) are supposedly inherent in the qualities \( (gūṇa) \) of these (entities), and in the nature of their activity \( (karma) \), in their universality \( (sāmānyā) \) and in their particularity \( (viśeṣa) \). (Therefore, it is also proven that these entities have no intrinsic nature.)

16. Knowledge is intrinsically opposed to insentient matter, and its immateriality is nothing but the self-cognition of knowledge.

TS 1999. Cited in BCAP 190.11; TBh 16.15–17:

\[
\text{vijñānaṁ jaḍarūpebhyo vyāvṛttam upajāyate} / \\
\text{iyam evātmasamvittir asya yā jaḍarūpata} //
\]
17. gcig pa cha med rang bzhin la //
   gsum gyi rang bzhin mi ’thad phyir //
   de’i rang gi^2 rig^3 pa ni //
   bya dang byed pa’i dngos por min //
1^D da.
2^VN, VP gis.
3^N, P rigs.

18. de’i phyir ’di ni shes pa yi^1 //
    rang bzhin yin pas bdag shes rung (N 45a) //
    don gyi rang bzhin gzhan dag la //
    de yis ji ltar shes par ’gyur //
1^N, P yis.

19. de yi rang bzhin gzhan la med //
    gang gis de shes gzhan yang shes //
    shes dang shes par bya ba’i don //
    tha dad par ni ’dod phyir ro //

20. shes pa rnam^1 bcas phyogs la^2 ni //
    dngos su de gnyis tha dad kyang //
    de dang gzugs brnyan ’dra bas na //
    gdags^3 pa tsam gyi^4 tshor bar rung //
1^C, D rnams.
2^P las.
3^K brtags.
4^K gvis.

21. don gyi^1 rnam pas^2 bsgyur ldan pa’i //
    rnam shes su zhig mi ’dod pa //
    de la phyi rol rig pa yi //
    rnam pa ’di yang yod ma yin //
1^N, P gvis.
2^N, P par.
17. The self-cognition (of knowledge) is not to be analyzed into action and its agent, since (knowledge), being a single unity without components, cannot be divided into the (usual) three parts [the knower, the known and the knowing].

TS 2000. Cited in BCAP 190.13; TBh 16.17-18:

\[
\text{kriyākārakabhāvena na svasaṃvittir asya tu / ekasyānaṃśarūpasya trailūpyānupapattitāḥ /}
\]

For 16cd and 17ab, see the antarasloka at JNA 471.7-8:

\[
\text{iyam evātmasaṃvittir asya yājaḍarūrata / kriyākārakabhāvena na svasaṃvittir asya tu /}
\]

18. Therefore, (knowledge) can cognize itself insofar as it has the intrinsic nature of consciousness. But how can it cognize the intrinsic nature of the object, from which it is distinct?

TS 2001:

\[
\text{tad asya bodharūpatvād yuktaṁ tāvat svavedanam / parasya tv artharūpasya tena saṅvedanaṁ katham /}
\]

19. The very nature (of the knowledge) that cognizes (the object at the same) time as it cognizes itself cannot be found in either (knowledge or its object) when they are separate, yet some (the Anakārajñānadvādins) maintain that knowledge is distinct from its object.

TS 2002ab: na hi tadrūpaṁ anyasya yena tadvadane param / saṅvedyate . . .

20. On the other hand, there is an essential difference between the two (knowledge and its object, even) according to the theory that knowledge is endowed with the image of its object (sākārajñānava- vāda). Yet (this theory maintains that), although the cognition (of an external object) is merely a designation, (knowledge) is still possible, because the image (in knowledge) has the same form as its (external object).

TS 2004. Cited in Mimaki 1979: 19:

\[
\text{nirbhāsijñānāpakṣe tu tayor bhede 'pi tattvataḥ / pratibimbasya tādrūpyād bhāktāṁ syād api vedanam /}
\]

21. On the other hand, for those [the Anākārajñānadvāda] who do not hold that knowledge reflects the image of the object, neither can there be such cognitive image of an external object.

TS 2005. Cited in Mimaki 1979: 20:

\[
\text{yena tu īṣṭāṁ na viññānam arthākāroparāgavat / tasyāyam api naiśvāsti prakāro bāhyavedane /}
\]
22. shes gcig tha dad ma yin pas //
   rnam pa mang por mi 'gyur te //
   de phyir de yi mthu yis ni\(^1\) //
   don shes 'gyur bar bzhag\(^2\) pa med //
\(^1\)C, D, N na.
\(^2\)C, D gzhag.

23. rnam pa rnams dang ma bral bas //
   rnam shes gcig pur\(^1\) mi 'gyur ro //
   de lta min\(^2\) na 'di gnyis la //
   gcig ces ji skad brjod par bya //
\(^1\)V tu.
\(^2\)VD yin.

24. dkar po dag la sogs pa la //
   shes pa de ni rim 'byung ste //
   mgyogs par 'byung phyir blun po dag //
   cig\(^1\) car\(^2\) snyam du shes pa yin //
\(^1\)N, P gcig.
\(^2\)P, VP char.

25. lcug ma'i sgra la sogs pa'i blo //
   rab tu mgyogs par 'byung yin na //
   de phyir cig\(^1\) car\(^2\) 'byung ba'i\(^3\) blo //
   'dir yang ci\(^4\) phyir 'byung mi 'gyur //
\(^1\)N, P, VN, VP gcig.
\(^2\)N, P, VP char.
\(^3\)D, V ba yi.
\(^4\)K gcig.

26. yid kyi rtog pa 'ba' zhig la'ang //
   rim du shes par mi 'gyur ro //
   ring du (D 54a) gnas pa ma yin pas //
   blo rnams kun kyang mgyogs 'byung 'dra //
22. Images (in knowledge) should not be multifarious, because (the image) is not different from knowledge. In that case the (image) could not give us the cognition of an external object.

TS 2036:

\[
\text{jñānād avyatiriktataḥ nākārabahutā bhavet /} \\
\text{tataś ca tadbalenāsti nārthasaṁvedatanasthītiḥ //}
\]

23. Knowledge should not be unitary, since it is related to plural images. Otherwise how can the identity of the two be explained?

Cf. TS 2037:

\[
\text{ākāruavyatiriktatvat jñāne vā 'nekatā bhavet /} \\
\text{anyathā katham ekatvam anayoḥ parikalpyate //}
\]

24. The ordinary man takes it for granted that knowledge cognizes (such plural images as) "white" and the like instantaneously, because of the rapidity of (separate moments of) cognition, even though knowledge actually cognizes successively.

Cf. PV II:133; cited in Mimaki 1979: 28:

\[
\text{manasor yugapad vrte teh savikalpavikalpayoh /} \\
\text{vimūḍho laghuṛṛter vá tayor aikyam vyavasyati //}
\]

Cf. TS 1246:

\[
\text{krameśaivopajayante vijñānāntti cen matam /} \\
\text{sakṛd bhāvahimānas tu śīghravṛṛter alatavat //}
\]

25. But when you hear the words "lata" and ["tālaḥ" and] the like pronounced very quickly, why are they not heard instantaneously?

Cf. TS 1250:

\[
\text{latalālādibuddhinām atyarthām laghū varttanam /} \\
\text{sakṛd bhāvahimānaḥ 'taḥ kim atrāpi na vartate //}
\]

26. Taking only conceptual cognitions into consideration, (they) do not cognize [the images] successively. Since (they) do not last long, the rapidity of cognition can be said to be the same for all cognitions.

Cf. PV II:138:

\[
\text{pratibhāsāviśeṣaś ca sāntarāṇantore katham /} \\
\text{śuddhe manovikalpe ca na kramagrahaḥ bhavet //}
\]

Cf. TS 1251:

\[
\text{śuddhe ca mānase kalpe vyavasīyeta na kramah /} \\
\text{tulyā ca sarvabuddhinām āśuwṛttiś cirāsthitē //}
\]
27. de phyir yul rnams thams cad la //
   rim gyis 'dzin par mi 'gyur gyi //
   rnamp a1 dag ni tha dad ltar (C54a) //
   cig car 'dzin par snang bar 'gyur //
1PañP par.

28. mgal me la yang cig car du //
   'khor lor1 snang ba'i 'khrul ba 'byung //
   gsal bar rab tu snang ba'i phyir //
   mthong ba'i2 mtshams sbyor ma yin no //
1C, D lo.
2Editor's em.; K, V bas.

29. 'di ltar mtshams rnams1 sbyor ba ni //
   dran pas byed pa nyid yin gyi //
   mthong bas2 ma yin 'das pa yi //
   yul3 la (P 50a) 'dzin pa min phyir ro //
1Om. in VN, VP.
2P ba.
3C, D yun.

30. de yi yul tu gang 'gyur1 ba //
   de ni zhig pas2 gsal ma yin //
   de3 phyir 'khor lor snang ba 'di //
   gsal ba ma yin 'gyur ba'i rigs //
1p gyur.
2VN, VP pa.
3K de'i.

31. ri mo'i gzhi rnams1 mthong ba'i tshe //
   de la de bzhin sems mang po //
   ci2 (N 45b) ste cig3 ca'i4 tshul gyis su //
   'byung bar 'gyur bar5 'dod na go6 //
1K mo rkyang pa.
2C, D ji.
3C, P, VP gcig.
4P, VP cha'i.
5C, D ba.
6K ko.
27. Therefore, all objects are not apprehended successively, but are seen as apprehended instantaneously, just as manifold images (are instantaneously, not successively, cognized).

Cf. TS 1252:

\[
\text{ataha savatra vi\textasciitilde{\textacyrus}ye na kramagraha\texttilde{\textacyrus}na\textasciitilde{\textacyrus}m bhavet} / \\
\text{sakr\textit{d}graha\textit{na}bhasas tu bhavec chab\textasciitilde{\textacyrus}d\textasciitilde{\textacyrus}dibohavat} //
\]

See also Matsumoto 1986: 187.

28. [The opponent maintains that] even in the example of a whirled torch, the torch gives rise to an erroneous cognition of a circle of fire (produced by memory perceiving) instantaneously (discrete perceptions of the torch). (But, the circle of fire is) not created by (memory) joining together (individual) cognitions (of the torch), for (the circle) is perceived very clearly (as a complete circle).

Cf. PV II:140:

\[
\text{sighra\textit{vy}rt\textit{te} al\textit{at\textasciitilde{\textacyrus}d}er anvayaprat\textit{ig\textasciitilde{\textacyrus}hit}i\textit{n}i} / \\
\text{cakrabhr\textit{anti\textasciitilde{\textacyrus}m} d\textit{r\textasciitilde{\textacyrus}sa} dha\textit{tte} na d\textit{r\textasciitilde{\textacyrus}sa}m ga\textit{ha\textasciitilde{\textacyrus}janena sa} //}
\]

Cf. TS 1253:

\[
\text{al\textit{a} \textit{pi sakr\textit{d} bhr\textit{anti\textasciitilde{\textacyrus}s} cakrabh\textit{has\textasciitilde{\textacyrus}a} pravart\textit{ta}t} // \\
\text{na d\textit{r\textasciitilde{\textacyrus}sa}m pratisandhan\textit{a}d vispa\textit{\textasciitilde{\textacyrus}st\textit{a}m pratibh\textit{hasan\textasciitilde{\textacyrus}a}t} //}
\]

29. ("Clear perception" contradicts "joining together") because the joining together is produced by memory, not by perception, for the past object is not perceived (in the present).

TS 1254:

\[
\text{tath\textit{a} hi pratisandhan\textit{a}mAh smrtya\textit{iva} kriyate na tu /} \\
\text{dar\textit{sanena vyat\textacircumflex{\textasciitilde{\textacyrus}t\textasciitilde{\textacyrus}sa}ya vi\textasciitilde{\textacyrus}sayasy\textasciitilde{\textacyrus}anvagrah\textit{a}t} //}
\]

30. The object of memory is not seen clearly, since it has passed away. Therefore, [if] the circle [of fire] appearing [when one turns a firebrand were created by memory], it would not be seen clearly.

TS 1255:

\[
\text{ya\textasciitilde{\textacyrus} sa\textasciitilde{\textacyrus} c\textasciitilde{\textacyrus}asy\textasciitilde{\textacyrus}a vi\textasciitilde{\textacyrus}sayo n\textasciitilde{\textacyrus}sau vina\textasciitilde{\textacyrus}st\textasciitilde{\textacyrus}tv\textasciitilde{\textacyrus}t pari\textasciitilde{\textacyrus}sphu\textasciitilde{\textacyrus}t\textasciitilde{\textacyrus}h /} \\
\text{tatah pari\textasciitilde{\textacyrus}sphu\textasciitilde{\textacyrus}t\textasciitilde{\textacyrus}o n\textasciitilde{\textacyrus}yam cakrabh\textasciitilde{\textacyrus}has\textasciitilde{\textacyrus}a\textasciitilde{\textacyrus}h prasa\textasciitilde{\textacyrus}fyate} //
\]

31. If (the author) agreed (with the opponent, i.e., the Sautrântika who holds) that (many of the same kinds of perceptions) occur at the same time, then when you look at a multicolored carpet, (there would) occur at the same time as many perceptions (as there are colors in the colored carpet).
32. de lta yin na dkar la sogs //
   rnam pa sna gcig¹ shes pa yang //
   thog ma dbus mtha' tha dad pas //
   dmigs pa sna tshogs nyid du 'gyur² //
   ¹N, P cig. ²N gyur.

33. rdul phran bdag nyid dkar la sogs //
   gcig pu'i bdag nyid cha med pa //
   shes pa gang¹ la'ang snang gyur par //
   bdag gis rab tu tshor ba med //
   ¹N gnga.

34. rnam shes Inga yi khams rnams ni //
   bsags la dmigs pa'i rnam pa yin //
   sems dang sems byung dmigs pa ni //
   drug par bzhag¹ pa² byas pa yin //
   ¹C, D, VD gzhag. ²V par.

35. phyi gzhung rnams la'ang rnam shes ni //
   gcig tu snang bar mi¹ rigs² te //
   yon tan la sogs ldan pa yi³ //
   rdzas la sogs pa dmigs phyir ro //
   ¹P me. ²K 'gyur. ³P yin; V yis.

36. nor bu gzi¹ yi bdag nyid ltar //
   dngos po kun zhes² lta ba la //
   de la 'dzin pa'i sems kyang ni //
   gcig pu'i ngo bor snang mi rigs //
   ¹C, N gzi'i. ²VD shes.

37. sa la sogs pa 'dus pa la //
   yul dang dbang por kun 'jog par //
   su 'dod de yi lugs la yang //
   dngos po gcig dang mthun 'jug med //

38. snying stobs la sogs bdag sgra sogs //
   phyogs la'ang¹ don gcig² snang ba can //
   shes pa rigs pa ma yin te //
   gsum gyi bdag nyid yul snang phyir //
   ¹VN, VP om. 'ang. ²VN, VP cig.
32. If so, then even the perception (of a single cognitive image), such as white, would be a manifold cognition, since it (this perception) perceives (different) parts (of the white object) such as up, middle or edge.

Cited in SMVBh (D 59b2–3; P 347a8-b1); Shirasaki 1985: 126, n. 56.

33. (But) I have not (ever) known to appear in any cognition white, etc., which has an atomic nature and which is single and impartite.

34. It is established [by the Sautrântika themselves] that the five kinds of sense cognition have aggregates (of atoms) as their object, while the sixth [mental cognition] has cognition and mental states (cittacaitta) as its objects.

For 34ab see Hattori 1968: n. I.38: sañcitālambanāh pañca vijñānakāyāh. Hattori quotes other instances of the phrase, including Trīśikabhāṣya (Lévi): 16.20–21 and AKB 34.1–2: sañcitāśrayālambanatvat pañcānāṁ vijñānakāyānām.

35. Even according to the established theory of the other school [the Vaiśeṣika], it is not reasonable (to maintain) that knowledge appears as a unity, since (it) cognizes (objects) such as substance (dravya) having qualities (guna) and the like.

36. (If one were to accept) the view [of the Jainas and the Mīmāṁsakas] that all entities (have a self-nature) exactly like agate, then neither could the mind that grasps them appear as a single entity.

37. Even according to the theory [of the Lokāyatas], which holds that the object and the sense organs consist of the assemblage of (the four elements), earth (prthivī) and the like, [knowledge] still does not occur as a single entity.

38. Even according to the theory [of the Sāmkhya], which holds that sounds (sabda) and the like are in their essence [nothing but the three guṇas] sattva, etc., it is not reasonable (to maintain) that knowledge illuminates only a single object, for the objects appear as being in their essence the three [guṇas].
39. dngos po'i ngo bo rnam gsum la //
   de ni gal te rnam gcig¹ ste //
   (D 54b) de dang mi mthun snang na go² //
   de ni der³ 'dzin ji ltar 'dod //

1N, P cig.
2K ko; VC, VD po.
3V de.

40. phyi rol yul rnams med par yang //
   sna tshogs snang la rtag¹ pa ste //
   cig² (C 54b) ca’am³ ji ste rim 'byung ba’i //
   rnam shes rung bar⁴ shin tu⁵ dka’ //

1N, P rtags.
2K, VP gcig.
3K, VP cha’am.
4P ba’i; V ba.
5N, P, VN, VP du.

41. rnam mkha’ la sogš shes pa dag //
   ming tsam¹ du ni snang ba rnams //
   yi ge du ma snang ba’i phyir //
   sna tshogs snang bar² gsal ba yin //

1VN tsham. 2VP ba’i.

42. rnam shes sna tshogs min¹ snang ba //
   'ga’ zhig yod par gzhug² na yang //
   'on kyang yang dag gzhag³ mi rung //
   mtshan nyid bcas la gnod mthong phyir //

1N, P mi.
2VP bzhugs.
3VP bzhag.

43. de¹ phyir sna tshogs snang ba yi //
   rnam shes rnam pa kun tu (P 50b) gnas //
   de ni rnam pa tha dad ltar //
   gcig pu'i rang bzhin mi rigs so //

1V de’i.

44. ci¹ ste thog ma med rgyud kyi² //
   bag chags smin pas sprul pa (N 46a) yi //
   rnam pa dag ni snang ba yang //
   nor bas sgyu ma’i rang bzhin 'dra //

1C, D, V ji. 2K nyid.
39. How can you [the Sāṅkhya] argue that knowledge actually appre-
hends the object, since knowledge, which has a single nature, 
would appear without corresponding to its object, whose essence 
would be the three gunas?
Cf. TS 39:

\[
\text{tryākāraṁ vastuno rūpam ekākāraś ca tadośaḥ} / \\
\text{tāḥ kathaṁ tatra yujyante bhāvinyas tadvilakṣaṇaḥ} //
\]

40. [The Vedāntin argues:] Why is it so difficult to maintain [the 
unity of a] permanent consciousness, whether it occurs simul-
taneously or successively with various appearances (of the image), 
even if there are no external objects?

41. It is evident that in the cognition of “ether” (ākāśa) and the like 
(the three unconditioneds; asamskṛta), there appear various 
(images), since even a single name is made up of several letters.

42. (Some) would postulate that knowledge exists as one, appearing 
without multiplicity. However, it is impossible to establish (its 
existence) from the point of view of the highest truth, because it 
has been proved that any (entity which) has the characteristic (of 
existence, i.e., causal efficiency; arthakriyā) is refuted (from the 
point of view of the highest truth).

43. Therefore, it is established from every point of view that knowl-
edge occurs with appearances of various (images). It cannot have 
a unitary intrinsic nature, as there are various images.

44. [The Yogācārin holds that] even though images appear as phan-
toms, produced by the ripening of latent impressions (vāsanā) 
which belong to the (same) individual series (samtāna) from the 
beginningless past, still, because they are the result of error, their 
intrinsic natures are as those of illusions.
45. de dge¹ 'on kyang de dag gi² //
   dngos de yang dag³ nyid dam ci //
   'on te ma brtags gcig⁴ pu na //
   dga' bar khas len 'di bsam mo //
¹Pañ's reading; K, V dag.
²VN, VP gis.
³Pañ dbag.
⁴P cig.

46. gal te yang dag rnam par 'shes //
   du mar 'gyur ro yang na ni //
   de dag gcig 'gyur 'gal ldan pas //
   gdon mi za bar so sor 'gyur //

47. rnam pa tha dad ma yin na //
   g-yo dang mi g-yo la sogs pa¹ //
   gcig gis² thams cad g-yo la sogs //
   thal bar 'gyur te lan³ gdab dka' //
¹VP, Pañ la.
²N, P, VN, VP gi.
³VD len.

48. phyi rol don gyi tshul la yang //
   de ltar rnam par¹ ma bral na //
   gcig² gi'chos su thams cad kyang //
   'jug par 'gyur te bzlog pa med //
¹K pa.
²K cig.

49. ci¹ ste rnam pa'i grangs bzhin du //
   rnam par shes pa khas len na //
   de tshe rdul phran 'drar² 'gyur ba³ //
   dpyad pa 'di las⁴ bzlog par dka' //
¹C, D ji.
²VN, VP 'dra.
³VN, VP bar.
⁴V la.

50. gal te sna tshogs de gcig na //
   nam mkha'i gos can lugs¹ sam ci //
   sna tshogs gcig pa'i² rang bzhin min //
   rin chen sna tshogs la sogs 'dra //
¹V lus.
²Pañ pu'i.
45. Even though we appreciate this (doctrine), let us consider whether (in the theory proposed) the essence of the (images should be taken to be) real or something agreeable and tacitly accepted only as long as it is not investigated critically (avicāryai-karamanīya).

46. If (the images were) real, knowledge would be either plural or unitary. Both [knowledge and its images] would certainly be distinct things, since they have opposite [natures].

47. If the image is not manifold it is impossible to dispose of absurd (implications). For instance, with respect to [our images] of movement and rest, movement in one part (of our sphere of cognition) would cause the whole (world) to move.

48. Even in the theory of those who maintain the real existence of the external object, the same applies. If (knowledge and its image) are inseparable, one cannot escape the fact that everything would be reduced to a single dharma.

49. If you admit that knowledge (consists of as many parts) as the number of (its manifold) forms, then it would be difficult (for you) to avoid the same kind of criticism which is made regarding (the reality of) atoms.

Cited at the end of TBh, but there is a lacuna in the Skt. text. Cf. Kajiyama 1966: 150.

50. If you regard a plural (entity) as a unity,¹ is your theory any different from that of the Digambara? Plurality cannot have a single intrinsic nature, in the same way that various jewels (cannot be one single jewel).²

¹PV II:200c; JNA 420.4: citraṁ tad ekam iti ced.
²TS 1733cd: yac citraṁ na tad ekaṁ hi nānājātiyaratnavat.
Cf. PV II:201ab: naikam svabhāvam citraṁ hi manirūpaṁ yathaiva tat.
51. sna tshogs gcig pu¹rang bzhin na //
sna tshogs ngo bor snang ba dang //
bsgribs dang ma bsgribs la sogs pa //
tha dad 'di ni ji ltar 'gyur //
¹K po.

52. ci¹ste ngo bo nyid du de'i //
rnam pa 'di dag med pa ste //
yang dag tu na² rnam³ med pa'i⁴ //
rnam par shes la⁵nor bas⁶ snang //
¹C, D, VD, PañCD ji.
²Om. in K.
³C, D rnams.
⁴K pa yi.
⁵V las.
⁶VN, VP par.

53. gal te med na ji lta bur //
de dag 'di ltar (D 55a) gsal bar tshor //
de yi¹ rngos las tha dad pa'i //
shes pa de 'dra ma yin no //
¹VN, VP yis.

54. 'di ltar gang la rngos gang med //
de la de¹ shes (C 55a) yod ma yin //
bde ba min la bde sogs dang //
dkar ba² rnam la'ang mi dkar bzhin //
¹K der.
²VN, VP ba'i.

55. rnam pa 'di la shes pa'i don //
 rngos su 'thad pa ma yin te //
shes pa'i bdag dang bral ba'i phyir //
rnam mkha'i me tog la sogs bzhin //

56. med pa nus pa med pas na //
 gdags¹ pa'ang² mi rung rta ru bzhin //
bdag snang shes pa mi skyed la³ //
nus pa rung ba ma yin no //
¹N, P rtags.
²VN, VP om. 'ang.
³K med pa bdag snang shes skyed par //.
51. If plurality had a single intrinsic nature, how could it be manifested as plural and, moreover, how could there be a difference between (those parts of the object that are) visible and (those that) are not (āvrtānāvṛta)?

52. (The Alikākāravāda-Yogācārin holds that knowledge) does not intrinsically possess these images, but by the force of an error they appear in knowledge, although in reality the latter is endowed with no images.

53. If (the images) are unreal, how can they be perceived clearly like this [even by an ordinary man]? Such [nondual] knowledge is not distinct from that entity [i.e., the images].

Matsumoto 1986: 190.

54. Indeed, when there is not B (the image “blue”) in A (the knowledge “blue”), B is not perceived in A. Just as we neither (feel) pleasure when we are suffering, nor (see) white in black.

Cf. AAA 629.21-22:

\[ \text{yad yatrasānvedyāna-rūpam na tat tatra sañvedyate yathā duḥkhe sukhādi-rūpam.} \]

55. (P) The term “knowledge” is not in reality appropriate to [perception of an unreal] image,

(H) Because (such perception) is contrary to the very nature of knowledge,

(D) Like (the vision of) a flower in the sky.

56. (P) Nor can (perception) of the unreal (image) be called “knowledge” in a figurative sense,

(H) Because (the unreal image) does not have causal efficiency,

(D) Like (the vision of) the horns of a horse.

(An unreal image) cannot produce knowledge of its own appearance (bdag snang; ātmābhāsa) (in the mind), so it can have no causal efficiency.
The Madhyamakālaṃkāra: Text

57. gang phyir de yod nges tshor ba //
    shes dang 'brel ba ci zhig yod //
    bdag med de yi bdag nyid dang //
    de las byung ba ma yin no //

58. rgyu (P 51a) med na ni gang zhig (N 46b) gis //
    res 'ga' byung ba 'di rung1'gyur //
    rgyu dang ldan na2 gang3 zhig gis //
    gzhana gyi dbang las4 bzlog5 par 'gyur //
    1VN, VP ru.
    2Pān na'ang.
    3PānCD 'ga'.
    4VN, VP la.
    5C zlog.

59. de med na ni shes de yang //
    rnam pa med pa nyid kyis 'gyur //
    shel sgong dag pa 'dra ba yin1 //
    shes pa rab tu tshor ba med //
    1V yi.

60. 'di ni 'khrul bas shes she1 na //
    de ci 'khrul la rag las sam //
    de yi mthu yis byung2 na ni //
    de yang gzhana gyi dbang nyid do //
    1VP zhe.
    2VP 'byung.

61. dngos po gang gang rnam dpyad1 pa2 //
    de dang de la gcig nyid med //
    gang la gcig nyid yod min pa //
    de la du ma nyid kyang med //
    1V dang gang dpyad.
    2N, P, Pān na.

62. gcig dang du ma ma gtogs par //
    rnam pa gzhana dang ldan pa yi1 //
    dngos po mi rung 'di gnyis ni //
    phan tshun spangs te gnas phyir ro //
    1VN, VP yis.
57. Is there any relation between knowledge and (the unreal image) on account of which (the image is) definitely perceived? The unreal (image) is neither the self-nature of it (knowledge), nor what has been produced from it.

58. If (an image) has no cause, why should it occur (only) at specific times? If (it) has a cause, how is it possible to avoid the fact that it has a dependent nature (paratantra-svabhāva)?

59. If it (the image) were unreal, its knowledge would [always] appear as knowledge without an image. (But) knowledge, like a pure crystal, would not perceive (any object).

60. If you postulate that it (the image) is perceived as the result of an error (in spite of its unreality), is it any different from that which depends on an error? If (it) is produced by the force of that (error), it is, after all, of a dependent nature.

61. When any entity is scrutinized, no unity is found in it. Where there is no unity, you cannot find plurality either.

Cf. TS 1995:

\[ \text{tad evam sarvapakṣeṣu naivaikātmā sa yujyate /} \\
\text{ekāniṣpatīto nekasvabhāvo 'pi na sambhau /} \]

62. There is no entity which has a classification other than singularity or plurality, since these [classifications] are mutually exclusive.

The Madhyamakālaṃkāra: Text

63. de phyir dngos po 'di dag ni //
    kun rdzob kho na'i mtshan nyid 'dzin //
    gal te 'di dag don 'dod na //
    de la kho bos ci zhig bya //

1K pa nyid.
2Matsumoto 1986: 183 bdag, on the basis of Mi pham's commentary: Dbu ma rgyan gyi rnam bshad 'jam dbyangs bla ma dbyes pa'i zhal lung. Pañ supports dag.
3K bdag gis.

64. ma brtags gcig pu nyams dga' zhin //
    skye dang 'jig pa'i chos can pa //
    don byed pa dag nus rnam s kyi //
    rang bzhin kun rdzob pa yin rtogs //

1VD pu'i. 2K, VD kyis.

65. brtags pa ma byas nyams dga' ba'ang //
    btag rgyu snga ma snga ma la //
    brten nas phyi ma phyi ma yi //
    'bras bu de 'dra 'byung ba yin //

1K, VD, PañNP brtag. 2VP 'ga'.

66. de phyir kun rdzob rgyu med na //
    rung min zhes pa'ang legs pa yin //
    gal te 'di yi nyer len pa //
    yang dag yin na de smros shig //

1VN pa. 2V ma.

67. dngos po kun gyi rang bzhin ni //
    rigs pa'i lam gyi rjes 'brang ba //
    (D 55b) gzan dag 'dod pa sel bar byed //
    de phyir rgol ba'i gnas med do //

1V rig. 2VN, VP 'breng. 3V bar.
4N, P na; Matsumoto 1986: 203 ngan, on the basis of Mi pham's commentary.

68. yod dang med dang yod (C 55b) med ces //
    khas mi len pa gang yin pa //
    de la nan tan ldan pas kyang //
    cir yang klan ka bya mi nus //

1N, P ma.
63. Therefore, all entities are understood as being characterized only by conventional (truth). If this much is accepted [by our opponents], then why should there be any disagreement between us?

64. One should understand that conventional (truth) is in essence (1) that which is agreeable and tacitly accepted only as long as it is not investigated critically (avicāryaikaramaṇīya); (2) that which is characterized by arising and decay; and (3) whatever has causal efficiency.


65. Even that which is agreeable and tacitly accepted only as long as it is not investigated critically implies the production of similar successive effects conditioned by their own successive causes.

66. Therefore, it is also correct to say that it would be impossible for conventional truth to be causeless. But if (you claim that) its substratum (upādāna) is real, you have to explain what it is.

67. (We) reject the intrinsic nature of all entities postulated by those among our opponents who follow the way of logic. Therefore, there is nothing to be refuted (in our system).

68. Even with the greatest effort, it is not possible to criticize in any way one who admits neither existence, nor nonexistence, nor both existence and nonexistence.


sad asat sadasac ceti yasya pakṣo na vidyate /
upālambhaś cirenāpi tasya vaktum na śakyate //
69. de phyir yang dag nyid du na //
dngos po gang yang grub pa med //
de phyir de bzhin gshegs rnams kyis //
chos rnams thams cad ma skyes gsungs1 //
1N, P gsung.

70. dam pa’i don dang ’thun1 pa’i phyir //
’di ni dam pa’i don zhes2 bya //
yang dag tu na3 spros pa yi4 //
tshogs rnams kun las de grol yin //
1K, VD mthun.
2N, P, VP ces.
3N om. na.
4VN, VP yis.

71. skye ba1 la sogs med2 pa’i phyir //
skye ba med la sogs mi srid //
de yi3 ngo bo bkag4 pa’i phyir //
de yi tshig gi sgra mi srid //
1K om. ba. 2K pa me.
3Pañ de’i. 4Pañ dgag.

72. yul med (N 47a) pa la dgag pa yi //
sbyor ba legs pa yod ma yin //
rnam par rtog (P 51b) la brten1 na2 yang //
kun rdzob par ’gyur yang dag min //
1C, D, VN, VP, PañNP rten.
2C, D la.

73. ’o na1 de ni rtogs2 gyur pas //
de yi rang bzhin mngon sum phyir //
mi mkhas rnams kyang dngos rnams kyi //
dngos po ’di ’dra cis3 mi rtogs //
1N, P ’on te.
2PañCD rtog.
3N, P ci.

74. ma yin thog med rgyud1 lci bar //
dngos por sgro btags dbang byas pas //
de phyir srog chags thams cad kyis //
mngon sum rtogs2 par mi ’gyur ro //
1PañNP rgyu.
2N, P rtog.
69. Therefore, there is no entity that can be established in reality. Therefore, the Tathāgatas preached the nonproduction (anut-pāda) of all dharmas.

70. Some say that this [nonproduction] is the highest truth, since it agrees with the highest truth. (But in my view) it [the highest truth] is that which is completely free from all accumulations of fictional human ideas (prapañca).

71. Since there is no production and the like, [in reality] there can be no nonproduction and the like. Since (production), the substantial referent (of nonproduction), has been rejected, verbal expression with reference to the latter (i.e., nonproduction) is impossible.

Cited in Mimaki 1982: 228.

72. When there is no object, you cannot rightly apply any negative (to it). If [nonproduction arose] depending on an idea (vikalpa), it would be conventional, not real.

Cited in AAA 45.7–8, 838.17–18. 72ab cited in Mimaki 1982: 228. Cf. also Ruegg 1981: 92, n. 297:

na ca nirvisayah sādhu prayogo vidyate nañah /
vikalpāśrayatve vā sāmerthah syān na tāttvikaḥ //

73. Now, if the intrinsic nature of (all) entities (i.e., emptiness) can be realized intuitively by understanding it (intrinsic nature), why is it that unwise people do not understand in this way the nature of entities?

74. (In fact) they do not. They cannot realize it intuitively, because every sentient being is subject to (the habit of) imagining things as real which, from the beginningless past, grow in each burdensome individual series (saṁtāna).
75. de la sgro btags¹ gcod byed pa //  
    shes par byed pa'i gtan tshigs kyis //  
    rjes su dpog² rnams shes par³ byed //  
    rnal 'byor dbang rnams mgon⁴ sum⁵ gsal //  
    ¹V 'dogs.  
    ²VN, VP dpogs.  
    ³V pa rnam shes.  
    ⁴N, P dngos.  
    ⁵P su.

76. gzhung gis bskyed¹ pa'i bye brag gi² //  
    chos can spangs nas mkhas pa dang //  
    bud med byis pa'i bar dag la //  
    grags par gyur pa'i dngos rnams la //  
    ¹C, D, VN, VP skyed. ²K, VD gis.

77. bsgrub dang sgrub¹ pa'i dngos po 'di //  
    ma lus yang dag 'jug par 'gyur //  
    de lta min na gzhi ma grub //  
    la sogs lan² ni ji skad gdb //  
    ¹C, D bsgrub. ²D len.

78. bdag ni snang ba'i ngang can gyi¹ //  
    dngos po dgag par mi byed de //  
    de lta bas na sgrub² pa dang //  
    bsgrub bya gzhag³ pa 'khrugs pa med //  
    ¹K, VN VP gyis. ²C, D bsgrub. ³N, VP bzhag.

79. de phyir¹ thog² med srid rgyud nas //  
    dngos dang dngos med rtog³ sogṣ kyi //  
    rigs mthun sa bon yod par ni⁴ //  
    rjes su dpag par bya ba yin //  
    ¹VN, VP cir.  
    ²PaľP thogs.  
    ³C, D, VD rtogs.  
    ⁴K rigs dang mthun pa'i sa bon nyid.

80. 'di ni dngos po'i mthu stobs kyis¹ //  
    'byung ba ma yin de med phyir //  
    dngos po rnams kyi bdag nyid de //  
    rgya cher rab tu bkag pa yin (D 56a) //  
    ¹VN, VP kyi.
75. Those who infer by means of probative reason—(reason) which removes false imputations regarding that (emptiness)—can understand. Those Lords of Yogins understand it directly.

76. Everyone admits the reality of the relation of the probandum (sādhyā) and the probans (sādhana) in entities known not only to wise men but also to women and children, outside the particular locus (dharmin) proposed by their preferred theories.
   Cited in Mimaki 1982: 539.

77. Otherwise, we would be [guilty of the fallacies of] the logical mark whose locus is unreal (āśrayāsiddha) and the like, as (the opponents have) claimed.
   Cited in Mimaki 1982: 539.

78. I have not rejected entities insofar as they are of the nature of appearance. Therefore, (in our theory) there is no confusion regarding the established (relation of) the probandum and the probans.
   Cited in Mimaki 1982: 528.

79. Therefore, (having established the nonsubstantiality of all things), one must infer that people who imagine existence, nonexistence and the like have the same kinds of seeds in their individual series, which exist from the beginningless past.

80. This (idea of existence or nonexistence) does not arise by the force of [external] entities, since the latter do not exist, the self-nature of such entities having been refuted in detail.
81. rim gyis ’byung phyir glo¹ bur min //
   rtag ’byung ma yin rtag ma yin² //
   de bas goms ’dra de nyid phyir //
   dang po³ rang gi rigs las skyes //
   ¹VP blo.
   ²VD, VP pa min; VN par min.
   ³K por.

82. de phyir rtag (C 56a) chad lta ba rnams //
   gzung ’di la ni ring du gnas //
   ldog dang rjes su ’jug pa yang //
   sa bon myu gu lcug sogs bzhin //

83. chos la bdag med mkhas pa ni //
   rang bzhin med pa¹ goms byas pas //
   phyin² ci log las byung ba yi //
   nyon mongs sgrim³ pa med par spong //
   ¹VP la.
   ²P byin.
   ³C, D, VN sgrib; P bsgríb.

84. rgyu dang ’bras bu’i dngos po ni //
   kun rdzob tu ni mi¹ bzlog² pas //
   kun nas (N 47b) nyon mongs rnam byang sogs //
   rnam par gzhag³ pa ’khrugs pa med //
   ¹V ma.
   ²P bzlogs.
   ³C, D, VN sgrib; P bsgríb.

85. ’di ltar rgyu dang ’bras bu yi //
   chos ’di rnam par gzhag¹ pas na //
   tshogs rnams dri ma med pa yang //
   gzhung ’di nyid la rung ba yin //
   ¹P, VN, VP bzhag.

86. rnam par dag pa’i rgyu las ni //
   ’bras bu rnam (P 52a) par dag pa ’byung //
   yang dag ltas byung tshul khrims kyi¹ //
   yan lag la sogs rnam dag² bzhin //
   ¹V kyis.
   ²N, P rtag.
81. Because of their successive occurrence, (ideas) do not arise either without cause, or from an eternal (cause), nor are they themselves eternal. Therefore, 
(P) The (notions of production and nonproduction, which we have discussed) previously, arise from their own species, 
(H) Because they are indeed [ideas of existence and nonexistence], 
(D) As (when one gradually) becomes skilled.

82. Therefore, both eternalism and nihilism are completely rejected in our system. (The fact) that [all entities] continue to decay and to arise (successively) is like (the genetic relationship of) a seed, a sprout and a branch.

83. Those who have realized that there is no self in dharmas easily avoid affliction arising from mistaken concepts, because they have internalized (the idea of) the absence of intrinsic nature (in all dharmas).

84. Since causal relation is not denied in conventional truth, there is no confusion as to the established relationship between defilement (saṃkleśa) and purification (vyavadāna).

Cited in SMVBh (D62b1; P351a5); Shirasaki 1985: 131, n. 67.

85. Indeed, since the law of causal relation has been established, it is also possible in our system (to gather) the pure equipment (of merit and of wisdom; puṇya-jñāna-sambhāra).

86. A pure effect results from a pure cause. It is like the (eight) pure elements of moral conduct, etc., which result from right view.
87. de bzhin rnam¹ dag ma yin las //
    'bras bu rnam dag ma yin 'byung //
    log lta'i stobs las byung ba yi //
    log par g-yem² la³ sogs pa⁴ bzhin //
¹C rnames.
²VN, VP g-yems.
³VD, PañCD pa.
⁴Pañ las.

88. tshad ma'i gnod pa yod pas na //
    dngos por dmigs pa yod pa¹ ni //
    smig rgyu la sogs shes pa bzhin //
    phyin ci log par yongs su rtogs² //
¹N, P thams cad.
²K rtog.

89. de¹ phyir de mthus² byung ba yi //
    pha rol phyin pa sgrub³ pa kun //
    bdag dang bdag gir log pa las //
    byung ba⁴ bzhin du stobs chung ngo //
¹N, P de'i.
²VN, VP mthu.
³K bsgrub.
⁴P om. ba.

90. dngos por dmigs pa med pa las //
    byung ba 'bras bu chen po ste //
    rgyas pa¹i rgyu las byung ba¹i phyir //
    sa bon grung po¹i¹ myug sogs bzhin //
¹D, N, P pa¹i.

91. rgyu dang 'bras bur gyur pa yang //
    shes pa 'ba' zhig kho na ste //
    rang gis¹ grub pa gang yin pa //
    de ni shes par gnas pa yin //
¹K gi.

92. sems tsam la ni brten nas su //
    phyi rol dngos med shes par bya //
    tshul 'dir brten¹ nas de la yang //
    shin tu bdag med shes par bya //
¹N, P rten.
87. Likewise, an impure effect results from an impure (cause). It is like adultery, etc., which result from false views.

88. (P) Objectifying an entity is understood to be a mistaken concept (viparyāsa),
(H) Because it goes against the valid knowledge (that those entities possess neither a single nor a plural intrinsic nature).
(D) It is like our cognition of a mirage.
Cited in SMVBh (D65b1; P 355a5); Shirasaki 1985: 139, n. 94.

89. Therefore, if the practice of (six) pāramitās arises through the force of this (objectifying), it will be weak, just like the practice that results from the false views of “me” and “mine” (ātma-ātmiya).
Cited in SMVBh (D65b1-2; P 355a6-7); Shirasaki 1985: 139, n. 94.

90. (P) The fruit resulting from not objectifying an entity is great,
(H) Since it results from the powerful cause of [the practice of the One who has the ten powers (daśabala)].
(D) It is like the sprout (arising) from a fruitful seed.
Cited in SMVBh (D65b2; P 355a6-7); Shirasaki 1985: 139, n. 94.

91. That which is cause and effect is nothing but knowledge. It is established that knowledge is that which is self-validated.
Cited in Mimaki 1982: 166, n. 455.

92. Based on [the standpoint of] mind-only one must know the non-existence of external entities. Based on this standpoint [of the lack of intrinsic nature of all dharmas] one must know that there is no self at all even in that (which is mind-only).
Cited in Mimaki 1982: 166, n. 455.
93. tshul gnyis shing rta zhon nas su //
   rigs¹ pa'i srab skyogs 'ju² byed pa //
   de dag de phyir ji bzhin don³ //
   theg pa chen po pa nyid 'thob⁴ //
   ¹V rig.
   ²VP 'jug.
   ³V no.
   ⁴V thob.

94. khyab dang dbang la sogs ma myong //
   dpag tu med par gnas pa'i rgyu //
   'jig rten spyi bor gyur pas kyang //
   shin tu myong (D 56b) ba ma yin pa //

95. yang dag bdud¹ rtsi dag pa 'di //
   thugs rje dag pa'i rgyu can² gyi //
   de bzhin gshegs pa ma gtogs (C 56b) par //
   gzhan gyi longs spyod ma yin no //
   ¹C bdun.
   ²VD rgyu rkyen; VN, VP rgyud can.

96. de¹ phyir log par bstan pa yi //
   grub mthar 'chel ba'i blo can la //
   de lugs rjes 'jug blo can rnams //
   snying rje nyid ni rab tu skye² //
   ¹VN de'i.
   ²VN, VP bskyed.

97. blo nor ldan pas lugs gzhan la //
   ji ltar snying po med mthong ba //
   de ltar (N 48a) de dag skyob pa la //
   gus pa¹ shin tu² skye bar 'gyur //
   ¹VN, VP pas.
   ²N, P du.
93. Therefore, those who hold the reins of logic while riding the carriage of the two systems [Madhyamika and Yogacara] attain the stage of a true Mahayanist.

94. The pure and true ambrosia, the taste of which is known neither by Viṣṇu nor by Iśvara nor other [mundane deities], and which is the cause that establishes immeasurable [ordinary verbal usage (vyavahāra)],

95. and whose taste is not known even by those [i.e., śrāvakas, prāyekabuddhas, etc.] who have become leaders of the world, is not enjoyed by anyone except the Tathāgata, who is motivated by pure compassion.

96. Therefore, the compassion of the intelligent who follow the [Tathāgata’s] teaching is directed towards those who, in spite of their intelligence, give credit to established doctrines which express mistaken (views).

97. Those who possess the treasure of intelligence find no real substance (sāra) in their opponents’ theory and, instead, they pay their respects to the Protector (the Buddha).
Colophon

*Dbu ma'i rgyan gyi tshig le'ur byas¹ pa //
   slob dpon Zhi-ba-'tsho bdag dang gzhan gyi grub pa'i mtha' rgya
   mtsho'i pha rol tu son pa /² 'phags pa ngag gi dbang phyug gi zhabs kyi
   pa dma rnyog pa med pa'i ze'u "bru spyi bos len pas mdzad pa rdzogs
   so //
   rgya gar gyi mkhan po Su-re-nda³-bo-(P 52b)-dhi dang / zhu chen
   gyi lo tsā ba bande Ye-shes-sdes bsgyur cing zhus te gtan la phab pa'o //

¹N bya nyid.
²C, D om. chig shad.
³C, D ren dra.
Colophon

The Madhyamakālāmkaṇḍa-kārikās were composed by Master Śāntaraksita, who has reached the other side of the ocean of the theories established by his own and other schools and has placed on his head the pure lotus petals of the feet of the Lord of Speech (Vāgīśvara).

(These kārikās were) translated, collated, and arranged by the Indian abbot Śīlendrabodhi and the great revisor Ye shes sde.
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For complete citation information the reader is directed to the list of abbreviations and bibliography found at the beginning of Part III.

1. See Mimaki 1982: 45; but Ogawa 1976: 319 suggests the possibility that the names were used even in India.


3. MAP (D 129b6; P 138b7) in Ichigo 1985: 303.17: tshul gnyis shes bya ba ni dbu ma dang rnal 'byor spyod pa zhes bya'o //.

4. MAP (D 116b4–5; P 122b8–123a1) in Ichigō 1985: 211.8–9: kun rdzob pa'i rgyu snga ma snga ma thog ma med par 'dod pa'i phyir ro //.

5. Comments in brackets in this and the following verse are based on MAP (D 129a6-b1; P 138a6-b1) ad MAV (D 79b4–5; P 79b4–5), cy. on MA vs. 93. Edited in Ichigō 1985: 301.11–21. LA X.592:

hetupratyayavyavṛttim kāraṇasya niṣedhanam /
cittamātraṇavyavasthānam anutpādānaḥ vadhāmy aham //

6. LA X.595:

na bāhyabhāvaṁ bhāvanāḥ na ca cittaparīgraham /
sarvadṛṣṭīparīhānaṁ yat tad anutpādalakṣāṇam //

7. Editors' note: The attribution of the two verses quoted here is a matter of controversy. According to our understanding, Sāntarakṣita seems to attribute both of these verses to the LA. Preceding these verses he quotes LA X.256–58 with the words Lang kar gshegs pa las, then with the word yang he quotes LA X.592 and 595. It is at this point that, with the words 'dir yang gsungs pa, he quotes these two verses. The verses introduced by Sāntarakṣita with yang are identified in Kamalasila's MAP as follows: yang zhes bya ba ni 'phags pa lang kar gshegs pa'i mdo de nyid las so, that is, without question they are attributed to LA. The introduction 'dir yang gsungs pa is commented upon by Kamalasila as follows: 'dir yang gsungs pa zhes bya ba ni sens tsam kun rdzob tu smra ba'o // 'phags pa lang kar gshegs pa las gsungs pa'i khungs ... (the la after 'phags pa in Ichigō 1985: 303.2 is a misprint and should be deleted), thus attributing the verse to LA. The second of the two verses, however, Kamalasila attributes to Nāgārjuna: 'phags pa klu sgrub kyi zhal snga nas gsungs pa'i tshigs su bcad pa gnyis pa ... , specifically the Yuktisāstikā: 'di ni rigs pa drug cu pa las gsungs pa yin no. The first verse seems to match almost exactly LA II.138 = X.85. The verse reads:

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na hy atropadyate kiścita pratyayair na nirudhyate /
upadhyante nirudhyante pratyayā eva kalpitā //

The second verse cannot be located in LA, but matches perfectly Yuktisaśṭikā 34, as Professor Ichigō quotes below. Mimaki 1982: n. 458 contains a lengthy discussion of the problem of the correct attribution of the first verse, and also of the problems of the reading of its pada d. According to Mimaki, Ratnakarasanti (in his PPU and other texts) and Bhāvaviveka (in the MRP, therefore likely a later author of the same name) attribute the questionable verse to Nāgārjuna, not to LA. Mimaki says, however, that “la tendance à attribuer à Nāgārjuna semble être assez tardive.” The question of authorship is also taken up by Tsong kha pa in his Legs bshad snying po, in which he accepts the attribution of the first verse to LA.

However the issue is resolved, it is clear that for Śāntarakṣita quoting these two verses is a way of providing authority for his position. From this point of view, whether the verses contain the words of the Buddha from the LA or of “the second Buddha,” Nāgārjuna, from the Yuktisaśṭikā, they are verified by the sacred tradition, and are therefore authoritative.


dharma notpadyate kaścin nāpi kaścin nirudhyate /
upadhyante nirudhyante pratyayā eva kevalā //

9. Yuktisaśṭikā 34, quoted in MAV (D 79b6; P 79b6–7). See also Ichigō 1985: 302; JNA 405, 1–2; 545, 7–8:

mahābhūtādī vijnāne praktaṁ samavarudhyate /
taj jñāne viśyāmaṁ yāti nanu mithyā vikalpitam //

10. PPU (D 143a4; P 162a2–3) and Umino 1984: 15: shin tu ma ‘khrul pa’i ye shes.

11. Comments in brackets in these verses are based on MAP (D 128b2–129a6; P 137a8–138a6) ad MAV (D 79b3–4; P 79b1–4); cy. on MA vs. 92. Edited in Ichigō 1985: 297.5–301.9. LA X.256–58:

cittātāraṁ samāruhya bāhyam arthaṁ na kalpayet /
tathātalambane sthitā cittātāram atikramet //

sems tsam la ni brten nas su //
phyi rol don la mi rtog go //
yang dag dmigs par gnas nas su //
sems tsam las kyang shin tu bzla //

cittātāram atikramya nirābhāsam atikramet /

sems tsam las ni bzas nas kyang //
snang ba med las shin tu bzla //
snang med gnas pa’i rnal ’byor pa //
de yis theg pa chen por mthong //
anābhogatīḥ sāntā pranidhānair viśodhītā /

jñānam anātmakaṁ śreṣṭhaṁ nirābhāse na paṣyati //

’jug pa lhun gyis grub cing zhi //
smon lam dag gis rnam par sbyangs //
ye shes dam pa’i dag med pa //

13. SDVV 13a2-4 ad SDV 32; ed. and trans. in Eckel 1987: 183.11-21 and 97.14-24:

   thugs rje'i bdag nyid de nyid kyis //
   rtog pas bcings pa gzigs nas ni //
   sems tsam la sogs bye brag gis //
   bcings pa thar pa bstan pa mdzad //

becom ldan 'das las dang 'bras bu mkhyen pa thugs rje'i rang bzhin gyi sku can de
nyid kyis 'khor ba'i bison rar 'gro ba rtog pa'i lcags sgrog gis bcings pa la gzigs
nas / bsam pa ji lta ba bzhin du phung po dang kham dang skye mchad
dang / sems tsam dang / chos thams cad bdag med par bstan pa'i rim gyis dngos
por 'dzin pa ma lus par sel bar mdzad cing / 'gro ba la bcings pa dang thar pa
bstan pa mdzad do //

14. SDVV 13b3 ad SDV 35ab; ed. and trans. in Eckel 1987: 184.23-27 and 98.27-30:

   shes pa'i bdag nyid la ni rdul phra rab dag dang / gnyis su med pa'i dngos po'i ngo
   bo mi snang ngo // mi snang ba la ni tha snyad med do // snang ba gang yin pa
de yang dngos po'i ngo bo kho na ma yin te / 'dus pa dang gnyis kyang dngos po
ma yin pa'i phyir ro //

15. IBhK 217.8: na tu viññaptimātratāpravesā eva tattvapraśeṣā //
16. IBhK 217.13-14: adavyajñānapraśeṣā eva tattvapraśeṣā //.

17. MA (D 157a3-4; P 170b8-171a1):

   'di ltar gang zhig cig carchos ma lus pa ngo bo nyid med pa nyid du rtogs par mi
   nus pa de rezhig sems tsam la brten nas / rim gyis phy'i don ngo bo nyid med pa
   nyid la 'jug go // de nyid kyi phyir /
   rigspas rnampar lta rnam kyiyi //
   gzung dang 'dzin pa 'gag par 'gyur //
   zhessungsso // de'i 'og tu rim gyis sems kyi nga bo nyid la so sor rtog na / de
   yang bdag med pa nyid du khong du chud nas zob ma'i tshul la 'jug par 'gyur te /

The half-verse from LA X.154ab reads: yuksyā vipaśयamānānām grāhāgrāhyaṁ
nirudhyate //.

18. AAA 594.18-25:

   ātmādīnirākaranena bāhye 'rthe pratiṣṭhāpaya, paścāt kalpitaparatantarapari-
   nispannasa bhāvavakathanena traiddhātukaccattānātrāvagame niyojya, tadana
   samyagarthakrayasū yoṣgam yoṣgayaḥ tathāyathāyabhedena sanvṛtisatyada-
   vamā avīcāraikaramyamāb pūrṇapūrṇaśvaṅkārānādhiṁ nirdhiya, tathyasam-
   uṛtma sthitvā yathādarsanāṁ mayāpuruṣeṇeva dānāyā ācaritavayaṁ, para-
   mārthato' nutpaḍāś ca bhāvaśitavayaḥ ity evam kramaṇa prajñāpāramitāyāṁ
   avatārvitavyaḥ.

   (a) After -dvayam a word equivalent to Tib. rnam par dpvod do should be supplied.
   Cf. P, vol. 90, 171, 1, 1. (b) Wogihara's ed. has -ramya-pūrva-, but his MS C reads
   -ramyaṁ. Tib. has ma btags na nyams dga' ba tsam du.

The word "[investigating]" is added on the basis of the Tibetan rnam par dpvod do.

19. Cf. Mimaki 1982: 28, n. 52. The restoration into Sanskrit of 'Jig rten grags sde
   spyod pa'i dbu ma pa is that of Obermiller, but it is not certain.


21. Technical terms of Buddhist logic and their abbreviations follow those of Kajiyama
   1966.

22. MAP (D 115a1-2; P 120b8-121a1). See also Ichigō 1985: 203.2-5:
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sgra'i tha snyad kyi bdag nyid kyi kun rdzob par 'dod dam / 'on te rten cing 'brel par 'byung ba don bya ba byed pa gnag rdzi yan chad la shing tu grags pa de nyid brda'i dbang gis kun rdzob kyi sgrar brjod ces bya ba rtog pa gnyis so //

23. MAP (D 115a7–b1; P 121a8–b1); Ichigō 1985: 205.1–3:
yang dag pa'i kun rdzob ces bya ba ni ji ltar grags pa bzhiin nye bar brtags pa'i phyir ro // grags pa las 'das te rtogs pa dper na dbang phyug la sogs par rtogs pa gang yin pa de ni log pa'i kun rdzob yin no //

24. MAV (D 70b7–71a1; P 68b3–4) ad MA 64; Ichigo 1985: 204.1–3:
kun rdzob 'di ni sgra'i tha snyad tsam gyi bdag nyid ma yin gyi / mthong ba dang 'dod pa'i dngos po rten cing 'brel par 'byung ba rnams ni brtag mi bzod pa yang dag pa'i kun rdzob ste /

25. MK XXIV.18, quoted in MAV (D 71a1–2; P 68b5); Ichigō 1985: 204.7–10:
yah pratityasamutpadāḥ śunyatāṁ tāṁ pracakṣmahe / sā praṇāptaṁ upādāya pratipaṁ saiva madhyāma //

26. MAV (D 71a2–3; P 68b6–7); Ichigō 1985: 204.13–15:
de la kun rdzob kyi bden pa gang zhe na / 'jig rten gyi tha snyad ji snyed pa dang / yi ge dang skad dang brda' bstan pa dag go // don dam pa'i bden pa ni gang la sms kyi rgyu ba yang med na yi ge rnams lta ci smos /
The second half is found in Pras 374.2: paramārthasatyāṁ katamat / yatra jītānasyāpy apracārāḥ kah punar vādo 'ksaranāṁ /. The sūtra text is in P 843 (mdo, bu, 129a1–2). See also T 397 (XIII) 197b7–10.

27. MAV (D 71a3–4; P 68b7–8; Ichigō 1985: 206.1–3:

sams can dang snod kyi bdag nyid kyi 'jig rten myong bar bya ba dang myong ba'i ngo bo'i ts'hal 'dir 'jig rten gyi tha snyad du dngos pa ste / byed pa'i sgrub pa yongs su bzung ba'i phyir ro /

28. MAP (D 115a2–4; P 121a1–3); Ichigō 1985: 203.6–12:
mngon sum la sogs pas gnod pa yin te / 'di ltar sgra'i tha snyad ni spyi tsam gyi spyod yul can yin pa'i phyir rten cing 'brel par 'byung ba'i dngos po'i mishan nyid kyi yul can ma yin no // spyi de yang kun tu brtags pa'i ngo bo yin pa'i phyir dngos po med pa yin na de'i ngo bo nyid du khas len pa dngos po rnams kyi don bya ba byed pa shin tu grags pa la skur par 'gyur te / spyi ni don byed mi bzod pa'i phyir ro //

29. MAP (D 116b4–5; P 122b8–123a1); Ichigō 1985: 211.7–9:
de la gal te spyr phyu dang bcas pa tsam du sgrub par byed na ni de'i tshe grub pa bsgrub pa yin te / kun rdzob pa'i rgyu snga ma snga ma thog ma med par 'dod pa'i phyir ro /

30. MAV (D 79a1; P 78b4–5); Ichigō 1985: 292.6–8:
rang gis grub pa'i ngo bo bo nas shes pa'i ngo bo gzhan rtog pa med do // rang gis grub pa'i rang bzhin yang rmi lam dang sgyu ma la sogs pa'i gzugs bzhin no //

31. The name of the Yogācāra-Mādhyamika was used for the first time by Ye shes sde. See Mimaki 1982: 40.

32. MAV (D 78b5–6; P 78b1–3); Ichigō 1985: 290.10–13.

33. MAV (D 79b1, 78b6–7; P 79a6–7, 78b3–4); Ichigō 1985: 296.2–5, 290.15–16. See below, section 3.2.

35. MAV (D 78b6; P 78b2–3); Ichigō 1985: 290.12–13.
36. MAV (D 73a2–4; P 71a7–b1); Ichigō 1985: 230.1–232.1:

skye ba med pa la sogs pa yang yang dag pa'i kun rdzob tu gtogs pa yin du zin kyang /

dam pa'i don dang 'thun pa'i phyir //
'di ni dam pa'i don zhes bya //
yang dag tu na spros pa yi //
tshogs nnams kun las de grol yin //

don dam pa ni dngos po dang dngos po med pa dang / skye ba dang mi skye ba
dang / stong pa dang mi stong pa la sogs pa spros pa'i dra ba mtha' dag shaps pa'o //

38. TJ (D 60b4–5; P 64a7–8).
39. MH III (between 11 and 12), cited in AAA 169.19–20; MAV (D 73a4; P 71b1–2); Ichigō 1985: 232.4–7; Ejima 1980: 271:

tathyasamurthiṣopānām antarenaṇa vipaścitaḥ /
tattvapriśiśad iṣdhiḥkārāḥ / na hi yuyate //

40. MH III.9, in Ejima 1980: 270:

mahāmaitrikkṛpābhāṣyasattvasamprahāpācane /
prajñā sāṅkṛetikī jñeyā dvādaśāyatanāśrayā //

41. MK XXIV.10ab: vyavahāram anāśritaṇa paramārtho na deśyate //
42. SDVV 6a1–6a5 ad SDV 9 and 10; ed. and trans. in Eckel 1987: 161.3–28 and 76–77:

skye la sogs pa bkag pa yang //
yang dag par skye ba la sogs par rtog pa'i dngos po bkag pa'i gtan tshigs kyis /
yang dag pa dang mthun phyir 'dod //

don dam pa yin par kho bo cag 'dod do // gzhan dag ni yang dag pa kho nar 'dzin pas / yang zhes bya ba ni bsdu ba'i don to // de yang rigs pas dpyad na kun rdzob kho na ste / ci'i phyir zhe na /
dgag bya yod pa ma yin pas //
yang dag tu na bkag med gsal //

dgag bya med na bkag pa mi 'byung ba'i phyir te / yul med pa'i bkag pa mi rigs pa'i phyir ro // gal te gzugs la sogs pa la skye ba la sogs pa rnam par rtog pa'i rgyu can pha rol pos dngos po yang dag pa nyid du brtags pa gang yin pa de dgag bya nyid yin no zhe na / gal te de 'ita na /
brtags pa'i rang gi ngo bo yi //
bkag pa brtags min ji 'itar 'gyur //
dgag bya brtags pa yin du zin na / bkag pa yang brtags pa nyid du 'gyur te / mo gsham gyi bu'i sngo bsangs nyid la sogs pa bkag pa bzhi na // yang dag pa bkag pa med kyang skye ba la sogs pa yod par mi 'gyur te / bkag pas skye ba med pa la sogs pa la ma khyab pa'i phyir dang / de yod pa'i rigs pa med pa'i yang phyir ro //
de bas 'di ni kun rdzob ste //
yang dag par na skye ba med ces bya ba la sogs pa'o //
yang dag don min yang dag min //
Notes to the Introduction

The half-verse 9cd is cited in AAA 45.6: nisêdhêyabêhâvatah spasêtañ na nisêdho 'sti tattvatañ / . For 10d see Mimaki 1982: 4.

43. MAV (D 73a5–6; P 71b2–5); Ichigô 1985: 236.1–3:

\[
\text{skyê ba la sogs med na de rjod pa'i sgra'i sbyor ba mi 'thad do // de bas na yul med pa la डग pa'i phyir skyê ba yang mea pas skyê ba med pa la sogs pa mi srid do //}
\]

44. MAP (D 119b4–5; P 126b1–2) ad MA 70; Ichigô 1985: 233.1–3:

\[
\text{skyê ba med pa la sogs par rnam par rtag pa dang / rnam par rtag pas dngos po rnam kyi ngo bo rnam par bzhag pa ni skyê ba med pa la sogs pa'o // sogs pa'i sgras ni 'gog pa dang zhi ba la sogs pa bsdu'o //}
\]

45. SDVV 4a3; ed. and trans. in Eckel 1987: 156.1–5 and 70–71:

\[
kun rdzob dang ni dam pa'i don //
\]

\[
\text{bden gnyis thub pas gsungs pa la //}
\]

\[
\text{ji ltar snang ba 'di kho na //}
\]

\[
kun rdzob ghan ni cig shos yin //
\]

46. SDVV 4a3–4; ed. and trans. in Eckel 1987: 156.6–9 and 71:

\[
don dam pa'i bden pa zhes bya ba'i tha tshig go // ji ltar ba lang rdzoi mo la sogs pa yan chad kyi mthong ba de ltar kun rdzob tu bden pa rnam par gnas kyi yang dag par ni ma yin te / mthong ba dang mthun par dngos po'i don nges par 'dzin pa'i phyir ro //
\]

47. SDVV 9a2–5; ed. and trans. in Eckel 1987: 170.30–171.14 and 85:

\[
\text{ci ste kun rdzob ces bya ba 'di ci zhih yin zhe na /}
\]

\[
gang zhih gis sam gang zhih la //}

\[
\text{yang dag sgrib byed kun rdzob bzhed //}
\]

\[
blo gang zhih gis sam blo gang zhih la yod na yang dag pa sgrib par byed pa 'jig rten na grags pa de lta bi ni kun rdzob tu bzhed de / mdo las ji skad du /}

\[
dngos rnam sanye ba kun rdzob tu //
\]

\[
dam pa'i don du rang bzhin med //
\]

\[
rang bzhin med la 'khrul pa gang //
\]

\[
de ni yang dag kun rdzob 'dod //
\]

\[
ces gsungs pa lta bu'o //
\]

\[
des na 'di kun bden pa ste //}

\[
dam pa'i don du bden ma yin. //
\]

\[
kun rdzob des na 'di kun thams cad bden pa yin no // ji ltar 'jig rten na grags pa de ltar bden no zhes bya ba'i tha tshig ste /
\]

Compare 15ab with Pras 492.10: samantadh parañama saññvitthi / . The sūtra quoted is LA X.429; also cited in IBH 202.5–6:

\[
bhavatajânte saññvṛtyā paramārthane 'svabhāvakāh /
\]

\[
niḥsvabhāveṣu bhāveṣu hrāntiḥ sā saññvṛtir matā //
\]

For LA X.429, see Mimaki 1982: 184, n. 498 for different versions of the verse. For example, it is cited in LA (Vaidya) as:

\[
bhava vidyanti saññvṛtyā paramārthe na bhavakāh /
\]

\[
niḥsvabhāveṣu yā hrāntis tat satyam saññvṛtir bhauvet //
\]

48. SDVV 10a7; ed. and trans. in Eckel 1987: 175.7–8 and 89:

\[
ji ltar snang bzhin ngo bo'k'i phyir //
\]

\[
'di la dpyad pa mi 'jug go //
\]
49. SDVP (D 38b6; P 31a7):

   jì ltar snang bzhin ngo bo'i phyir / zhés bya ba ni / ma brtags na nyams dga' ba yin pa'i phyir ro // kun rdzob 'di la dpyad pa ste / brtag pa mi 'jug go //

50. SDVV 12ab; ed. and trans. in Eckel 1987: 181.7–10 and 95. Cited in AAA 93.9.10; Mimaki 1982: 200, n. 527:

   nirbhāṣate hi yad rūpam naiva tat pratiṣṭihyate / vedyamānasya no yuktam kasyacit pratiṣṭedhanam //

   snang ba'i ngo bo gang yin pa //
   de ni' gog pa ma yin nyid //
   nyams su myong ba gang yang ni //
   dag par rigs pa ma yin no //

51. SDVV 5b2–7; ed. and trans. in Eckel 1987: 160.1–28 and 75–76:

   kun rdzob de ni yang dag pa dang yang dag pa ma yin pa'i bye brag gis rnam pa gnyis te / de la

   brtags pa'i don gyis dben gyur pa //
   dngos tsam brten nas gang skyes te //
   yang dag kun rdzob shes par bya //

   brtags pa'i don ni yang dag par skye ba la sogs pa dang / rnam par shes pa snang ba dang / gtso bo dang 'byung ba'i yongs su 'gyur ba la sogs pa ste / de dag gis dben pa'o // dngos po tsam gang yin pa ni jì ltar snang ba bzhin du don byed nus pa'i phyir ro // rgyu dang rkyen rnam la brten nas skyes pa de ni yang dag pa'i kun rdzob kyi dben pa yin par shes par bya ste / 'di ltar byis pa yan chad kyi shes pa la mthun par don ji snyed rgyu las snang ba de ni yang dag pa'i kun rdzob yin par rigs te / shes pa la snang ba dang mthun par dngos po gnas pa'i phyir ro // yang dag par skye ba la sogs pa ni mi snang ste / jì lta bur yang rlung ba'am / grub pa'i mtha' la brten nas sgro btags pa 'ba' zhig tu zad do // de lta ma yin na ni rtsod pa med par thal ba kho nar 'gyur ro // rgol ba dang phyir rgol ba'i shes pa la snang ba'i cha la ni rtsod pa su yang med do // rtsod par byed na ni mngon sum la sogs pa gnod par 'gyur ro //

   yang dag min ni kun brtags yin //

   yang dag par skye ba la sogs pa gang yin pa de ni rtag pa'i bzos sbyar ba ste / de ni yang dag pa ma yin pa'i kun rdzob kyi bden pa'o //

52. SDVV 6b5–7; ed. and trans. in Eckel 1987: 163.21–164.3 and 79:

   snang du 'dra yang don byed dag //
   nus pa'i phyir dang mi nus phyir //
   yang dag yang dag ma yin pas //
   kun rdzob kyi ni dbye ba byas //

   zhés bya ba'o // shes pa gsal ba'i rnam pa snang ba can du 'dra yang / ji ltar snang ba bzhin du don byed pa la slu ba dang mi slu ba yin par nges par byas nas chu la sogs pa dang smig rgyu la sogs pa dag 'jig rten gyis yang dag pa dang yang dag pa ma yin par rtags so // dngos su na gnyis ni ngo bo nyid med pa nyid du ngo bo nyid mtshungs pa kho na' o // ji ltar snang ba bzhin du ni rnam par gnas so // don byed pa la slu ba dang mi slu ba yang ji ltar grags pa kho na bzhin te / de yang ngo bo nyid med pa'i phyir ro //

53. SDVP (D 44b4; P 38b7–8):

   kun rdzob ni ji ltar snang ba bzhin zhés bya ba ni mngon sum zhés bya ba'i tha tshig go //
Notes to the Introduction

54. SDVV 12b2–3; ed. and trans. in Eckel 1987: 181.28–31 and 96:

gzugs la sogs pa'i lus rtog pa'i nyes pas ma sbags pa gzhän gyi dbang gi bdag nyid
rnam par shes pa tsam snang ba dgag par mi nus pa 'ba' 'zhig tu ma zad kyi / byed
na byed pa lo mngon sum la sogs pas phyir gnod pa kha na byed do //

55. SDVP (D 45a7–45b2; P 39b6–40a1). Quotation marks indicate Jñanagarbha’s words:

ci lta du zhig ci na / rgyu dang rkyen la rag las te skye bas “gzhän gyi dbang gi
bdag nyid” do // ci'i phyir lus rtog pa'i nyes pas ma sbags pa can yin snyam pa
la / bshad pa / “rnam par shes pa tsam snang ba” yin te rtog pas dben pa'i shes pa
snang ba zhes bya ba'i tha tshig go // “tsam” smos pa ni rtog pa dang lhan cig pa
rnam par good par byed pa'o // gzugs la sogs pa de lta bu de ni rang rig pa'i
phyir / “dgag par bya mi nus pa 'ba' 'zhig tu ma zad kyi” / 'gog par “byed na byed
pa lo la phyir gnod pa kho na byed do” zhes bya bar sbyar ro // gang gis she
na / bshad pa / “mngon sum la sogs pas so” // “sogs pa” smos pas ni / rjes su dpag
pa la sogs pa nang du bsdu bar bya'o //

56. MĀ (D 150a4; P 162b6–7):

de la dngos po ma brtags na grags pa ji ltar snang ba sgyu ma bzhin du brten nas
byung ba gang yin pa de ni gzhän gyi dbang gi ngo bo nyid yin no //

57. The terms in bold type seem to be used as synonyms of tathyasamvrti for the first
time by Saṅtaraksita.

58. See, for example, Hopkins and Sopa 1976: 123. The text translated therein is the
“Precious Girardian of Tenets” by Dkon mchog 'jigs med dbang po, the second Jam
Dbyangs Bshad pa. The Tibetan title of the work is Grub pa'i mtha' ri rnam par bzhag
pa rin po che'i phreng ba. The text has been edited by Mimaki 1977.

59. TS 1998:

anirbhāsaṃ sanirbhāsam anyanirbhāsam eva ca /
vijñānāti na ca jñānaṃ bāhyam arthaṃ kathāñcana //

60. TSP 682.12–15:

na nirākāreṇa nāpi sākāreṇa nāpi viṣayākārād anyākāreṇa bāhyasya grahaṇaṃ
yuktam / anyās ca prākūro nāsti / tasmād ātmasaṃvedanam eva sadaiva jñānaṃ
saty api bāhye santānāntara iti siddhyati vijñāptimātratā /

61. TS 2078:

viṣādāspadam ārañdhum vijñānatavād ato mataḥ /
advayam vedyakartrivaivyogat pratibimbavat //

62. TS 2081:

vijñānatavaḥ prakāśatvaṃ tac ca grāhye nīrūspadam /
anirbhāsādyayogena vyāptis tenāya niścitā //

63. TSP 682, 21–22:

na hi grahakabhuvenātmasaṃvedanam abhipretam / kim tarhi / svayam prakṛtyā
prakāśātmatayā nabhastalavartyālokavat //

64. MAP (D 129a2–3; P 138a1–2); Ichigō 1985: 299.23–24:

rang rig pa yang gnag rdzi yan chad la grub pa'i phyir klan kar yang mi rung
ngo //
65. TS 2046:

sākāraṃ tan nirākāraṃ yuktam nānyasya vedakam /
iṭī bauddhe 'pi vijñāne na tu cintā pravarttate //

66. TSP 699, 15: na hi bhagavato jnānam tasya grāhakam isyate yenātrāpi cintā kriyeta //

67. TS 2048-49:

kalpa-pādagavat sarvasañkalpa-pavana-trīṣvīrī /
akampye 'pi karoty eva lokānām arthe-dharmān //
tenādārānaṃ apy āhuh sarve sarvam idān jinam /
anābhogena niḥśeṣasarva-viśeṣa-hṛdayam //

68. TSP 698, 22-23: kevalam avidyāvasād avidyāvam evābhātācāropadārāshaṃ jnānaṃ bhṛntam jayate //.

69. MAP (D 109a6–7; P 114a8–114b2); AAA 633.26–634.3; Ichigō 1985: 169.1–6.

70. This term is used in IBhK 211.19.

71. PVin I:38. The translation is from Kajiyama 1966: 147. See also Katsura 1969: 25; and Tosaki 1985: 10, n. 31. Cp. PV II:327. Mimaki 1979: n. 39 and Mimaki 1980a: n. 43 list many texts in which this verse is cited:

nānyo 'nubhāyvyānuddhatyāntī saṣṭhī nānubhāvo paraḥ /
grāhāya-grāhakāvaidhuryāt svayām saiva prakāśate //

72. MAV (D 60b4–7; P 56b7–57a2). See also Ichigō 1985: 72.1-10. Cf. PV III:247 – PVin I:20:

bhinnakālam kathāṃ grāhyam iti ced grāhyataṃ viduh /
hetu-vayam eva yuktijñā jñānākārāpranakṣamam //

73. These two stanzas correspond, respectively, to MA 16 and 17.

74. MAV (D 60b6–7; P 57a1–57a2); MAP (D 94b3–7; P 97b2–5); Ichigō 1985: 72.8–10–73.1–9.

75. TS 2001 = MA 18.

76. Mimaki 1982: 29, 30, 31 and 35.

77. MA 46–49. Śāntarakṣita’s theory of atoms is discussed in more detail below.

78. PPU (D 145a6–b1; P 164b1–3):

ci ste 'di dag rnam par shes pa tsam gyi rang bzhin no zhes bya ba 'di la rigs pa ci yod ce na / brjod par bya ste / 'di lachos rnambsdag nyid kiyā gsal ba'i ngo bo nyams su myong bas grub pa yin la / gsal ba de yang rab tu snang ba dang / so sor snang ba dang / gsal bzhin pa zhes bya'o // de yang bems po yang ma yin pas / lkog tu gyur ba ma yin zhing yongs su gsal ba'o // di grub pa ma yin na ni / gang yang snang bar mi 'gyur bas / thams cad ma grub par thal bar 'gyur ro // grub na ni de nyid shes pa yin pas chos thams cad shes pa'i rang bzhin du grub par 'gyur ro //

79. SDVV 7a2–3; ed. and trans. in Eckel 1987: 164.20–23 and 79:

rnam pa med pa'i shes pa ni //
yul la 'dzin par mi rigs so //
rnam pa tshad ma min phyir dang //
mi rigs phyir na cig shos min //

This is an antaraśloka, on which see Mimaki 1980b.
Notes to the Introduction

80. PV III:358; PVin I:49; SDVV 7a3; ed. and trans. in Eckel 1987: 164.24–27 and 80:

\[
gang phyir sna tshogs ngo bu ru //
\]
\[
snang ba can gyi dngos gcig la //
\]
\[
rnam pa rnam bden ji ltar 'gyur //
\]
\[
de yi gcig nyid nyams phyir ro //
\]

This antaraśloka follows that quoted in n. 79. PV III:358 reads:

\[
anyathaikasya bhāvasya nānārūpārabhāsīnaḥ //
satyām kathāṁ syur aṅkarās tad ekatvasya hānītaḥ //
\]

Pada a is quoted in JNA 446.19.

81. SDVV 4b3; ed. and trans. in Eckel 1987: 157.25 and 72: rang rig rigs pa ma yin phyir //.

82. SDVV 4b3; ed. and trans. in Eckel 1987: 157.28–29 and 73:

\[
shes pa ni bdag gis bdag shes pa ma yin te / rang snang bas stong pa'i phyir shes pa gzhon bzhin no //
\]

83. See, e.g., Gelek 1973: vol. 14, fo. 851.4. The work therein is the well known Grub mtha' chen mo (Grub mtha' rnam bshad rang gshan grub mtha' kun dang zab don mchog tu gsal ba kun bzang zhung gi nyi ma lung rigs rgya mtsho skye dgu'i re ba kun skongs). See the concordance in Mimaki 1982: 257–67.

84. SDVV 4a7; ed. and trans. Eckel 1987: 157.10–13 and 72:

\[
ji ltar snang ba'i dngos por ni //
rnam par gnas par mi rung ste //
shes pa'i dngos po thams cad la //
ji lta bur yang snang mi 'gyur //
\]

85. The same idea can be found in the Dharmasaṁgīti: adarśanaṁ bhagavan sarva-dharmānāṁ darśanaṁ samyag-darśanaṁ. Cited in MAV (D 78a7; P 78a2); Ichigō 1985: 286; Śīks 264.1–2; Mimaki 1982: 246, n. 602. Cf. T 761 (XVII) 637b21. Note the quotation in IBhK 212.2–3, quoting "a sūtra": kataman paramārtha-darśanaṁ / sarvadharmaṁ ādāraṇāma //.

86. SDVP (D 18b7–19a1; P 6b2).


88. The theory of atoms is refuted in verses 11–13 of the MA.

89. Ichigō 1985: 296.2–5; IBhK 217.9–11; MĀ 172 b3–4; trans. in Lopez 1987: 346:

\[
kye rgyal ba'i sras dag gshan yang khams gsum pa ni sems tsam du rtogs te / dus gsum yang sems dang mshungs par rtogs so // sems de yang mtha' dang dbus med par khong du chud do //
\]

Skt. quoted in IBhK 217.9–11:

\[
punar aparām bho jina-putra cittamātraṁ traidhātukam avataratā tac ca cittam anantamadhyatayāvatatā /.
\]

Cf. T 279 (X) 288c5–6.

90. Ichigō 1985: 296.10–12; trans. in Lopez 1987: 346:

\[
becom ldan 'das chos thams cad ni kun btags pa'i snying po te / sems tsam du bas pa rdzas ma mchis par sgyu ma ltar rtsa ba ma mchis pa'o //
\]

Cf. T 761 (XVII) 641c20–21.
APPENDIX

Sūtra Quotations in the MAV and MAP

The following is a list of the sūtra quotations in the commentaries to Śāntarakṣita’s MA, that is, in Śāntarakṣita’s own MAV and in Kamalāśila’s MAP. For each sūtra quotation reference is made to the quoted passage in the Chinese (Taishō edition) and Tibetan (Peking reprint edition) Canons, or to the Sanskrit, when available. The location of the quotation in MAV or MAP is given by reference to the MA verse being commented upon, followed by reference to the edition of MAV and MAP in Ichigō 1985. MAV and MAP also quote quite extensively from śāstra literature, especially from the Abhisamayālaṁkārāloka and Tattvasaṁgraha. These śāstric quotations can be located in the index to Ichigō 1985: 341–47.

References to the Taishō edition give: T + text number + (volume number) + page + column + line. References to Peking give: P + text number + (volume number: page, folio, line).

Aksayamatinirdeśa:
T 397 (XIII) 196b8–10; P 843 (34: 51, 4, 2–3) in MAV ad MA 63. Ichigō 1985: 198.
T 397 (XIII) 197b7–10; P 843 (34: 53, 5, 1–2) in MAV ad MA 64. Ichigō 1985: 204.

Udānąvarga:
XVIII.21 in MAV ad MA 75. Ichigō 1985: 250.
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Dharmasahgiti:
T 761 (XVII) 613b17–21; P 904 (36: 7, 1, 1–3) in MAV ad MA 63. Ichigö 1985: 196.
T 761 (XVII) 627a17–20; P 904 (36: 5, 2–3) in MAP ad MA 93. Ichigö 1985: 325.
T 761 (XVII) 637b21; P 904 (36: 32, 1, 2–3) in MAV ad MA 90. Ichigö 1985: 286.
T 761 (XVII) 639b9–10; P 904 (36: 34, 1, 4–5) in MAV ad MA 90. Ichigö 1985: 286.
T 761 (XVII) 641c20–21; P 904 (36: 36, 4, 1–2) in MAV ad MA 92. Ichigö 1985: 296.

Pitāputrasamāgama:
T 310–16 (XI) 391b24–c8 (T 320 [XI] 952c22–953a5); P 16 (23: 181, 1, 4–2, 3) in MAV ad MA 69. Ichigö 1985: 226.

Ratnamegha:
T 658 (XVI) 211b13–14; 659 (XVI) 243c3–4; P 897 (35: 175, 5, 8–176, 1, 1) in MAV ad MA 69. Ichigö 1985: 226.
T 658 (XVI) 216b6–12; 659 (XVI) 249b23–28; P 897 (35: 182, 5, 4–6) in MAV ad MA 82. Ichigö 1985: 270.
T 658 (XVI) 235c9–12; P 897 (35: 214, 1, 5–6) in MAV ad MA 63. Ichigö 1985: 198.

Ratnākāra:

Laṅkāvatāra:
II.137 = X.133 in MAV ad MA 45; partially quoted in MAP. Ichigö 1985: 126–27.
II.173 (cf. X.167) in MAV ad MA 61; partially quoted in MAP. Ichigö 1985: 174–75.
II.196 (cf. X.374) in MAV ad MA 61; partially quoted in MAP. Ichigō 1985: 174-75.


III.48 = X.91 in MAV ad MA 61; partially quoted in MAP. Ichigō 1985: 176-77.

III.53 in MAV ad MA 61; partially quoted in MAP. Ichigō 1985: 176-77.


VI.2 (cf. X.708) in MAV ad MA 45; partially quoted in MAP. Ichigō 1985: 124-25.


X.489ab in MAV ad MA 91. Ichigō 1985: 292.


**Lokottara-parivarta:**

P 761 (26: 74, 1, 8-2, 1); T 279 (X) 288c5-6 (cf. Mimaki 1982: 95, n. 291; 237, n. 591) in MAV ad MA 92. Ichigō 1985: 296.

**Vajracchedikā:**


**Samyutta-Nikāya:**

i.V.10.6 in MAV ad MA 64. Ichigō 1985: 210.

**Samādhirāja:**

VII.6 in MAP ad MA 96. Ichigō 1985: 331.

IX.22a in MAV ad MA 75. 22bcd in MAP. Ichigō 1985: 250.

IX (Vaidya 44.11-13) in MAV ad MA 83. Ichigō 1985: 272.

IX.47a in MAV ad MA 93. 47bcd in MAP. Ichigō 1985: 322-23.


Appendix

Sāgaramatiparipṛčchā:
T 400 (XIII) 494a16–17; P 819 (33: 65, 1, 1) in MAV ad MA 69. Ichigō 1985: 222.
T 400 (XIII) 494b12–13; P 819 (33: 65, 2, 3) in MAV ad MA 72. Ichigō 1985: 240.
P 820 (33: 124, 2, 2–3) in MAV ad MA 72. Ichigō 1985: 244.

Hastikakṣaya:
T 814 (XVII) 784c5–10; P 873 (34: 297, 5, 8–298, 1, 2), in MAV ad MA 63. Ichigō 1985: 200.
T 813 (XVII) 779b21–22 (T 814 [XVII] 785b8–9); P 873 (34: 298, 5, 2) in MAV ad MA 69. Ichigō 1985: 222.
Studies in the Literature of the Great Vehicle: Three Mahāyāna Buddhist Texts

Edited by Luis O. Gómez & Jonathan A. Silk

The King of Samādhis Sūtra: Chapters I-IV
The Gilgit Manuscript of the Vajracchedikā Sūtra
Śāntarakṣita’s Madhyamakālaṃkāra

Indian Buddhist literature falls roughly into two classes: the religious or scriptural (sūtra) and the philosophical (śāstra). The three parts of this volume contain studies and translations of two sūtras and one śāstra. Taken together, they permit the reader to confront the vast breadth and depth of Indian Mahāyāna Buddhist literature.

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Through the texts included here and the different methods used in their study, this volume seeks to present an overview of modern research on Indian Mahāyāna Buddhist literature. It is the first volume in the series Michigan Studies in Buddhist Literature.

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