Preface to the 2018 Open Access Edition

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Immediately upon the publication of the printed version of this book, I became aware, thanks to the very great kindness of two colleagues from Budapest, Ferenc Ruzsa and Mónika Szegedi, of the existence of a very important Dunhuang manuscript, Pelliot tibétique 797. Its readings are on the whole better than those preserved in the Tanjurs I used for the present edition. Had I known of this manuscript, I would certainly have printed many of its readings. I have not revised the edition, however, since I subsequently published Pelliot tibétique 797 as “Materials Toward the Study of Vasubandhu’s Viśīkā (II): An edition of the Dunhuang Manuscript Pelliot tibétique 797”, Revue d’Études Tibétaines, 39, April 2017, pp. 342–360. Interested readers are directed to this (also Open Access) publication, which is presently located at http://himalaya.socanth.cam.ac.uk/collections/journals/ret/pdf/ret_39_07.pdf. Although I have not incorporated the new data of Pelliot tibétique 797 in the present edition, in the course of preparing that material, aside from noticing different (and usually better) readings, I detected several errors in the printed edition. Those errors, noted both in an errata sheet distributed with the edition and in the article cited above, are in the present edition corrected tacitly. For the rest, however, the Tibetan edition remains the same.

The main differences between the present edition and Pelliot tibétique 797 (below PT) are as follows:

3d: klung la rnag la sogs mthong bzhin || PT 797: klung la rnag la sogs mthong phyir ||
4d: de dag gis ni gnod phyir ro || PT 797: de dagis kyang gnod phyir ro ||
IV J: dngos po la sms can dmyal ba’i srungs ma || PT 797: sms can dmyal ba’i srungs ma = Skt.
IV K: de bzhin du gzhann yang || PT 797: de bzhin du gzhann du yang
IV P: ji lta bur || PT 797: de lta bur = Skt.
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Introduction

In 1912 Louis de La Vallée Poussin published an edition of the Tibetan translation of Vasubandhu's Viṃśikā and its autocommentary (on the title, see below), accompanied by an annotated French translation, deeply informed by his profound learning. In 1925, thanks to a discovery in Nepal, Sylvain Lévi was able to publish the Sanskrit of the same text (1925a), which he followed with a French translation (1932). Lévi, however, was constrained to work primarily with a hand-copy, and a number of textual problems remained. In the decades since, although all based on Lévi's edition, a number of editions and translations have been published, representing efforts to come to grips with what seems at first glance like a small and simple text. But as many scholars have discovered, while small, it is anything but simple. A great aid toward the further study of the text was made in 1989 by the publication by Mimaki, Tachikawa and Yuyama of (black and white) photographs of the unique palm leaf manuscripts, preserving both the verses and the author's autocommentary. When I first took up work on these manuscripts, I was not aware of any published studies. In the intervening years, however, at least two have appeared, Balcerowicz and Nowackowska (1999) and Tola and Dragonetti (2004). Unfortunately, neither of these efforts is fully satisfactory (neither, moreover, took any serious account of the Tibetan translations). Although I prepared an edition and translation years ago, I hesitated to publish it, due to my conviction that without a thorough study not only of the Chinese translations, but also, crucially, of the commentaries, the text in its traditional understanding would remain plagued with problems.

Having reached the conclusion, however, that I was unlikely to be able in the foreseeable future to assemble the team of specialists necessary to adequately engage, most importantly, with the commentaries, preserved only in Tibetan and Chinese, I decided to concentrate on Vasubandhu's texts, to produce critical editions of the Tibetan versions
of the verses and autocommentary and to present them alongside my
edition of the Sanskrit text. I have renounced for the present my idea to
accompany these with editions of the Chinese translations, since the
problems presented even by the translation of Xuanzang (see below)
would have both swelled the work beyond a reasonable size, and
delayed its presentation indefinitely. (The other two Chinese transla-
tions confront us with even greater challenges.) Of the accuracy of the
Sanskrit and Tibetan editions presented below I am more or less confi-
dent—meaning that even if I have not understood and emended the
texts correctly, at least I have reported their readings accurately. Of the
accompanying English translation, I remain in some spots in doubt. It
illustrates my understanding, to be sure, but that understanding is any-
thing but firm in more than one place—despite the kind and generous
help I have received from a number of friends and colleagues who have
been willing, over the years, to offer suggestions on these materials.

   It is a genuine pleasure, now precisely 90 years after the publica-
tion of Lévi’s editio princeps, to offer a reedition of this fundamental
text. I have read it with students, and presented it at a Leiden Linguis-
tics Summer School, and I thank all who participated. One draft was
read by Jowita Kramer, whom I thank for her good suggestions.
Lambert Schmithausen, with his characteristic charity and humility,
shared “some haphazardly noted stray remarks.” These many com-
ments—surely needless to say—vastly improved the presentation. In
the very few instances when I have still, stubbornly, disagreed with
Prof. Schmithausen, I have given my reasons in the notes. Finally, with
his well-known generosity my old friend Harunaga Isaacson, joined by
Mattia Salvini, carved out some time to go over the Sanskrit edition
with me, and this had—again, needless to say—very positive results. It
need hardly be emphasized that none of those who have so generously
offered advice is in any way responsible for the errors that remain, but
these friends and colleagues are severally and collectively certainly to
be credited with any merits the present work may have. In conclusion,
I thank Prof. Michael Witzel for doing me the honor of including this
volume in the Harvard Oriental Series.

* * *
In the materials presented here, my editions of the kārikās alone, and of the integral text with its commentary, are based for the Sanskrit respectively on manuscripts A (3a4-4a5) and B (in its entirety) published by Mimaki, Tachikawa and Yuyama (1989). I am grateful for the advice on decipherment and other matters given by Diwakar Acharya during the above-mentioned course in which I taught the text in Leiden in 2007. For the Tibetan, I have utilized the following editions of the Tanjur:

For the Viṃśikā-kārikā (nyi shu pa’i tshig le’ur byas pa):

- Cone: sms tsam, shi 3a4-4a2.
- Derge 4056: sms tsam, shi 3a4-4a2.
- Ganden 3556: sms tsam, si 4a3-5a5.
- Narthang 4325: sms tsam, si 4a5-5a5.
- Peking 5557: sms tsam, si 3b1-4b1.

For the Viṃśikā-ṛṣṭṭī (nyi shu pa’i ‘grel pa):

- Cone: 3557, sms tsam, si 4a2-10a3.
- Derge 4057: sms-tsam, shi 4a3-10a2.
- Ganden 3557: sms tsam, si 5a5-13a5.
- Narthang 4326: sms tsam, si 5a5-10b7.
- Peking 5558: sms tsam, si 4b1-11a1.

As one would expect, Cone and Derge almost always agree against Ganden, Narthang and Peking. However, this does not mean that the readings of the former are always to be preferred, although they often are. In at least three places, it is clear that all editions have perpetuated an error (XV [B], XIX [G], XIV [I]).

Alongside the ‘canonical’ Tibetan translation of the verses, we are also lucky to have what plainly represents an earlier form of the translation, preserved in a single manuscript found at Dunhuang, now kept in Paris as Pelliot tibétain 125 (below, PT 125). This was recorded by Lalou (1939: 43) as follows:
I will have nothing further to say here about the Trimśikā, but the entire manuscript was earlier transcribed by Ueyama (1987). On the basis of color photographs available on the Artstor website, I have read the former portion of the manuscript, containing the verses of the Vīṃśīka, and been able to correct a few of Ueyama’s readings. I agree with the following important conclusions offered by Ueyama: copyist errors prove that this manuscript is not an original or fair-copy coming from the translator’s pen, but a copy of another manuscript. The similarity of the text to that eventually established in the Tanjurs shows that this version does not represent a different text or translation altogether, but is an earlier form of the later revised translation. There is no chance that it was translated from Chinese. (Ueyama is more cautious, saying that it is not made at least from any of the presently known Chinese versions, but as I show below, errors in understanding of the Sanskrit prove that its direct source must have been in Sanskrit.)

Although I have remarked on some points of interest in the notes to the edition, here I wish to point out some of the peculiarities of this version, in light of both the Sanskrit text and the ‘canonical’ translation. The first is that unlike the Vṛtti, but like the independent translation of the verses in the Tanjurs and Manuscript A of the Sanskrit, PT 125 contains the first verse. This verse also reveals the oddity that PT 125, which elsewhere translates vijñapti with rnam shes, here renders it rnam rig. When vijñāna appears in verse 6, PT 125 renders this too with rnam par shes pa, the (later?) standard translation equivalent. Further evidence for the copying of PT 125 is found in 1d, which is unmetrical. We might presume that skra zla la stsogs pa myed mthong bas so should be understood skra zla lastsogs pa myed mthong baso, which would provide (graphically at least) seven syllables. Finally, I do not under-

3 f. (7.4 x 28.2) non pag.; 6.1, règl. estampées, petites marges noires, trou à gauche non cerclé; ponct. inters. avec deux points. Papier pelucheux.
stand shes bya ba, normally iti, in 1a; was what is now evedam in Sanskrit somehow written in a way that led the Tibetan translators to understand an iti there? Verse 2 illustrates the fact that PT 125 follows the Sanskrit word order slavishly; this is particularly clear in d where vijñaptir yadi nārthataḥ appears as rnam shes +on te don myed na+o. (I do not understand what it means that this verse is followed not by a double shad, as is normal, but by something resembling [HI]). A number of other examples of literal rendition of Sanskrit word order are to be found throughout

Verse 15, besides proving that it is based on a Sanskrit (rather than Chinese) original, provides an extreme illustration of the fact that the text in PT 125 required revision. The first line alone contains nothing but errors: the Sanskrit text has ekatve na kramenaḥ, ‘If [the sense object] were singular, there would be no gradual motion,’ which PT 125 renders gcigis dang nī rims zhes pa. Here gcigis [gcig gis] = *ekatvena in place of ekatve na, and rims zhes pa = *kramena iti, understanding iti as the quotative particle rather than as a verb (the second member of the compound is perhaps more commonly spelt eti than iti; for the grammar see Verhagen [1996: 28; 40n96], and my note to this passage). This word evidently motivated some possible misunderstanding in India as well, since the manuscript of the Vṛtti includes what I understand as a gloss in XV (C), gamanam ity arthaḥ, which would not be necessary unless the word iti/eti was liable to misunderstanding. While a detailed study of PT 125 must await another occasion, it is certain that the text recorded in PT 125 (although to be sure not this precise manuscript version) stood behind the revision later enshrined in the Tanjurs. Moreover, that this older version was in some way available at least to the translators of the Vṛtti in its unrevised form is shown by 20d, in which the Vṛtti preserves the reading of PT 125 against that in the Tanjur version of the kārikās.

The present work is nothing more than one step toward a more satisfactory and wholistic philological treatment of the Viṃśikā (to say nothing of a contextualized philosophical study). What has not been taken into account in this treatment of the text are its Chinese transla-
tions (with only a few exceptions in the notes), and its commentaries, which comprise the following sources:

Weishi lun 唯識論, T. 1588, translated by Prajñāruci 頗頴般若流支.
Dasheng weishi lun 大乘唯識論, T. 1589, translated by Paramārtha.
Weishi ershi lun 唯識二十論, T. 1590, translated by Xuanzang. (On these three, with the Tibetan translation, see inter alia Sasaki 1924 and Akashi 1926)
Dharmapāla’s Cheng weishi baosheng lun 成唯識寶生論, T. 1591, translated by Yijing 義淨 (see Liebenthal 1935).
Vinātadeva’s Prakaraṇaviṃśaṭīkā, Rab tu byed pa nyi shu pa'i 'grel bshad, Derge 4065, sems tsam, shi 171b7-195b5 (see Yamaguchi and Nozawa 1953: 1-131, and Hillis 1993).
Vairocanarakṣita’s subcommentary on Vinātadeva, Viṃśikāṭīkā-vivrāti, edited in Kano 2008.

Concerning the proper title of the work, it has long been referred to in modern scholarship as the Viṃśatikā, a mistake found in the Sanskrit manuscript of the Vṛttī which has at last been corrected by Kano (2008: 350. Note however that Lévi (1925b: 17) does already call the text “Viṃśatikā ou Viṃśikā”). Aside from the detailed Pāṇinian analysis provided by Vairocanarakṣita, as Kano points out there has long been abundant evidence for the correct title Viṃśikā. This includes a Chinese transcription in [Kui]Ji’s commentary, and Tibetan transcriptions. In this regard, we should note that pace Kano, the Tanjurs do not read viṃśika (or even biṃśika) but rather clearly they have only a single vowel in almost all cases, therefore yielding at best viṃśaka, perhaps not coincidentally the reading of the colophon in MS (A), viṃśakā-vijñaptiprakaraṇaṁ, and that contained at least in the Derge edition’s title of Vinātadeva’s commentary, Prakaraṇaviṃśaṭīkā. It is interesting to note that in PT 125, although Lalou read bing, a comparison with other examples of vowels on the same folio shows that it is only possible to understand here beng. We should also note that the Tanjurs have the Tibetan title of the verses as nyi shu pa'i tshig le'ur byas pa, while PT
125 has instead nyī shu pa dgos par byed pa+o. Here dgos par byed pa seems to be an attempt to etymologically render kārikā, connecting it with the root √kṛ. I have not found this elsewhere.

I have imposed the sentence numbering on the text in an effort to make comparison between versions, and reference to the translation, more transparent. The identification of objections in the translation owes much to the commentaries, but I hasten to emphasize that I have not made a proper study of these, and this aspect of the work (as so much else) must remain highly provisional. I have retained in so far as practical the punctuation of the Sanskrit manuscript, although it must be admitted that the result often seems somewhat inconsistent.

The Viṁśikā has been translated into modern languages a number of times. Among the best efforts may be that of Frauwallner (1994: 366-383; 2010: 392-411), and I have profited much from consulting it. A step toward further improved understanding of the text will involve close study of both the Chinese translations, and the commentaries, listed above.

The text has been often studied by modern scholars, but I make no pretence here to contribute to the doctrinal, philosophical or historical study of the text (see recently the very interesting Kellner and Taber 2014). I am, moreover, aware that Vasubandhu’s text probably had significant influence on later works (such as Dharmakīrti’s Santanāntarāsiddhi; see Yamabe 1998). My notes attempt to do no more than provide clues focused, in the first place, on philologically relevant aspects of the establishment of the Sanskrit text, rather than engagement with the text’s contents per se. It would thus be otiose here to attempt a (perforce very partial) listing of relevant studies on the doctrine of the Viṁśikā.
I adopt the following conventions:

Tibetan:
I do not distinguish between pa/ba, or nga/da, selecting in all cases the ‘correct’ form.
I ignore for the most part Narthang’s frequent abbreviated spellings, such as semn for sems can, rnaṁr for rnam par and so on.
I mostly do not note minor orthographic oddities which may be due to breaks on the printing blocks (missing vowels, for instance).
In PT 125, I may have been ungenerous to the scribe; he writes pa/pha almost identically, and unless I am sure he intended pha, I transcribe this letter as pa.
i transcribes the reversed gi-gu (gi gu log).
+ transcribes the ’a-rtɛn with a flag on its right shoulder ☞.

Sanskrit:
(Italics) within parenthesis in the Sanskrit text indicate a reconstruction based on Tibetan and context. These usually but not always agree with the suggestions of Lévi.
[ ] Brackets in the Sanskrit indicate a partially legible character.
⟨ ⟩ Angle brackets indicate a supplement to the text.
+ A + indicates a missing letter, the number determined by the available space in the manuscript.
. One dot indicates either a consonant or a vowel missing.
* An asterisk after a letter indicates that the manuscript has a special form of the letter which does not include a vowel, or a virāma (typically with t and sometimes m).
**Bold** characters indicate the first akṣara on a line of the manuscript.
Folio numbers are supplied in small notation to indicate folio and side.
When I have altered the text more than to make a trivial correction, I make a note on the same page. All changes, even trivial, are noted in the apparatus.
Punctuation marks are as in the manuscript, unless otherwise noted. The *daṇḍa* is indicated with |, half *daṇḍa* (rare) with †, a mark more or less like ɻ with ;, and one more or less like ɺ with ,.

When *avagraha* is not written in the manuscript, as needed I add it between ⟨ ⟩; in other cases, I transcribe it as written in the manuscript.
Literature


Frauwallner, Erich. 2010. The Philosophy of Buddhism. Trans. Gelong Lodrö Sangpo with the assistance of Jigme Sheldrön, under the supervision of Professor Ernst Steinkellner (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass).

Funahashi Naoya 舟橋尚哉. 1986. “Nepāru shahon taishō ni yoru Yuishiki Sanjūju no gentenkō narabi ni Yuishiki Nijūron dāichige dainige no genpon ni tsuite” ネパール写本対照による『唯識三十頌』の原典考並びに『唯識二十論』第一偈第二偈の原本について [Textual notes on the Trīṃśikāvijñānapīṭhāśāyam based on the Comparison of Nepalese


Lalou, Marcellle. 1939. *Inventaire des Manuscrits tibétains de Touen-houang conservés à la Bibliothèque Nationale,* (Fonds Pelliot tibétain) no. 1–849. (Paris: Maisonneuve; Bibliothèque Nationale).

Chinese texts are cited according to the Taishô edition.

Pāli texts are referred to in the Pali Text Society editions, with the standard sigla.

Tibetan sigla:
C: Cone Tanjur
D: Derge Tanjur
G: Golden (Ganden) Tanjur
N: Narthang Tanjur
P: Peking Tanjur
Sanskrit Manuscript A
Tibetan Tanjur Critical Edition
and
Pelliot tibétain 125
of the
Vīmśikā-kārikā

With an English Translation
### Viṃśikā-Kārikā

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sanskrit Text</th>
<th>Tanjur</th>
<th>PT 125</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| In principle, manuscript A | C: Cone  
D: Derge  
G: Ganden (Golden)  
N: Narthang  
P: Peking | | |

| 0  | namah sarvajñaya ||  | rgya gar skad du | bingsha ka kā ri ka | bod skad du | nyi shu pa'i tshig le'ur byas pa | | 'jam dpal gzhon nur gyur pa la phyag 'tshal lo || | \(\text{\textsuperscript{3}}\) rgya gar kyï skad du beng shï ka | ka ri ka || || bod skad du nyï shu pa dgos par byed pa+o || |

| a:  | Written བིང་ཞེས་ in all versions  
kā ri ka | C: kā ri kā  
byas pa || CDN: byas pa |
| 1 | viñaptimātram evedam asadarthāva-bhāsanāt*  |
|   | yadvat taimirakasyāsatkeśoṇḍūkādi-darśanam* ||

|   | 'di dag rnam par rig tsam nyid ||
|   | yod pa ma yin don snang phyir ||
|   | dper na rab rib can dag gis ||
|   | skra zla la sogs med mthong bzhin ||

|   | ~∞ : || rnam rig tsam ste shes bya ba ||
|   | myed pa+i don snang ba+i phyiro ||
|   | ji ltar rab rib can gyisu ||
|   | skra zla la stsogs pa myed mthong bas so ||

|   | c:  |
|   | can | MS cin with i vowel cancelled |

|   | Not in the Vṛtti. |

|   | shes bya ba = ? |

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This [world] is just Manifestation-Only, because of the appearance of non-existent external objects, as in the case of the seeing of nonexistent hair-nets and the like by one with an eye disease.
| 2 | na deśakāliyamaḥ santāniṇiyamo na [ca] | gal te rnam rig don min na || yul dang dus la Chad pa myed || rgyud kyang ma Chad ma Yin zhing || bya ba byed pa yang rigs pa myed || rnam shes +on te don myed na+o$^\text{§§}$ |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | na ca kṛtyakriyā yuktā vijñaptir yadi nārthatah || | yul dang dus la Chad pa myed || rgyud kyang ma Chad ma Yin zhing || bya ba byed pa yang rigs pa myed || rnam shes +on te don myed na+o$^\text{§§}$ |
| | | | | | | | b: rgyud ] MS rgyud |
| | | | | | | rgyud = santāna (sems) |
| | | | | | | chad = niyama (nges) |
| | | | | | | rnam shes = vijñapti (but in 1a rnam rig; below = vijñāna) |
| | | | | | | +on te = yadi, following Sanskrit word order |
| | | | | | | don myed na = nārtha (don min na) |

If manifestation does not [arise] from an external object, it is not reasonable that there be restriction as to time and place, nor nonrestriction as to personal continuum, nor causal efficacy.
Restriction as to place and so on is proved, as with dreams. Moreover, nonrestriction to personal continuum [is proved] as with hungry ghosts, in their all seeing the river of pus and so on.
Causal efficacy [is proved] as in ejaculation in a dream.
And again as with hell all [four aspects are proved],
in the seeing of the hell guardians and so on,
and in being tortured by them.
| 5 | tiraścāṁ sambhavaḥ svargge yathā na narake tathā | ji ltar dud 'gro mtho ris su || 'byung ba de ltar dmyal ba min || yī dags min te 'di lta bur || de yod sduṅ bsngal des mi myong || byol songs mtho ris +byung ba dag || jī bzhin sems dmyal myed de bzhīn || myī +dre gang las der skyes gyi || sduṅ bsngal myī myong de de dago || |
|---|---|---|---|
| b: | yathā na ] MS (A) erroneously yathā ca | c: | b: |
| d: | duḥkhan | yi dags ] G yi dwags | dmyal | MS dmyal |
| | duḥkhan | min te | C: min ta |

Animals are not born in hell as they are in heaven, nor are hungry ghosts, since they do not experience the suffering produced there.
If you accept that gross material elements arise there in this fashion through the karmic deeds of those [beings], and [you accept their] transformation, why do you not accept [the transformation] of cognition?
| 7 | karmmaṇo vāsanānyatra phalam anyatra kalpyate | gzhan na las kyi bag chags la || 'bras bu dag ni gzhan du rtog || gang na bag chags yod pa der || ci yi phyir na 'dod mi bya || las kyi bag chags gzhan du la || +bras bu dag ni gzhan du rtog || gang na ba der myi 'dod na || bag chags ji+i phyir zhig du || |
| 8 | tatraiva neṣyate yatra vāsanā kin nu kāraṇaṁ || |

Vṛtti in d: ci'i for ci yi

The perfuming of the karmic deed
you imagine to be elsewhere than the result;
What is the reason you do not accept [that the result is] in precisely the same location where the perfuming [takes place]?
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sanskrit</th>
<th>Pali</th>
<th>Commentary</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>rūpādyāyatanāstītvan tadvineyajanam prati</td>
<td>abhiprāyavaśād uktam upapādukasatvavat*</td>
<td>gzugs sogs skye mchēd yod par ni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>dgongs pa'i dbang gis gsungs pa ste</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b: 'dul ba yi  G: 'dul ba ni

| +du mchēd = āyatana (skye mchēd; homonym 'du byed normally = samskāra) |
| +gro ba = jana (yi skye); dag suggests plural? |

The existence of the sense-fields of material form and the rest were spoken of [by the Blessed One] with a special intention directed toward the individual to be guided by that [teaching], as [in the case of the mention of] beings born by spontaneous generation.
| 9 | yataḥ svabījād vijñaptīr yadābhasā pravarttate || | | | rang gi sa bon gang las su || | | | rnam rig snang ba gang 'byung ba || | | | de dag de yi skye mched ni || | | | rnam pa gnyis su thub pas gsungs || | | gang bdag sa bon las rnam shes || | | | gang snang rab du +jug pa nī || | | | +du mched rnam pa gnyis pasna || | | | de dag de+ir thub pas gsungs || |

| d | tasyā ] MS (A) ac tasyā plus an extra (unnecessary, hence erased) vertical line for long vowel |

|  | Vṛtti in b: 'byung for byung |

|  | rab du +jug pa = pravartate ('byung ba) |

A manifestation arises from its own proper seed, having an appearance corresponding to that [external object]. The Sage spoke of the two [seed and appearance] as the dual sense field of that [manifestation].
For in this way there is understanding of the selflessness of persons.
Moreover, teaching in another way
leads to the understanding of the selflessness
of the elemental factors of existence in terms of an imagined self.
That [sense-field of form and the rest] is not a unitary
nor atomically plural sense object,
neither are those [atoms] compounded,
since the atom [itself] is not proved.
Because [either] in the simultaneous conjunction with a group of six [other atoms],
the atom [would have to] have six parts.
[Or] because, the six being in a common location,
the cluster would be the extent of a [single] atom.
Given that there is no conjunction of atoms, what is [conjoining] when those [atoms] are compounded? But it is also not due to their partlessness that the conjunction of those [atoms] is not proved.
| 14 | digbhāgabheda yasyāsti tasyaikatvarīḥ na yujyate | gang la phyogs cha tha dad yod ||
|     | chāyāṛṭi kathāṁ vānyo na pīṇḍaś cen na tasya te ||
|     | de ni gcig tu mi rung ngo ||
|     | grib dang sgrīb par ji ltar 'gyur ||
|     | gong bu gzhan min de de'i min ||
|     | pyogs cha tha dad gang yod pa ||
|     | de+i gcig du myi rung ngo ||
|     | drib dang sgrīb kyang ji ltar | +gyur ||
|     | pung myin gal te de de myin ||

| c | chāyāṛṭi | MS (A) | MS (A) nna added below the line |
| c | vānyo na | MS vā anyonya; MS (A) syātāṁ na |
| d | cen na | MS (A) |

> MS (A): In the margin below tāṁ na pi in another (more modern) hand is written mi li tā. Harunaga Isaacson suggests that this (as mūlāḥ) may be a gloss on pīṇḍa: ‘[the atoms] connected/combined’.

| b: | de ni | N: da ni |

| pung (phung) = pīṇḍa (gong bu) |

It is not reasonable that something with spatial differentiation be singular.
Or how is there shadow and obstruction?
If the cluster is not other [than the atoms],
the two [shadow and obstruction] would not be [properties] of that [cluster].
| 15 | ekatve na krameṇetir yugapan na grahāgrahau | gcig na rim gyis 'gro ba med || zin dang ma zin cig car med || ris chad du mar gnas pa dang || mig gis mi gsod phra ba’ang med || gchigis dang nī rims zhes pa || gchig char bzung dang ma bzung myed || bar chad du ma +jug pa dang || phra dang myi mthong myed par +gyurd ||
| a | krameṇetir ] MS (A) krameṇeti | a: gcig na ] CD: gcig ni
| d | sūkṣmā° | Both MSS sūkṣmā°
| b: | zin cig ] CD: zan cig
| d: | mi gsod ] CD: mi sod

mar gnas pa = ?
*Vṛtti* in d: *mi sod* (N *mi bsod*).
mig gis mi gsod: in the *Vinayasūtra-vyākhyāna* of Prajñākara (Derge Tanjur 4121, *dul ba, ru* 122b1) we find: *mthong ba’o zhes pa yin te mig gis gsod pa’i srog chags yod na gdod nyes par ’gyur ba’o.*
gchigis = ekatvena! (* ekatve na)
rims zhes pa = krameṇa iti! (* krameṇetīḥ)

bzung dang ma bzung = grahāgraha (zin dang ma zin)
bar chad du = vicchinna (ris chad du)
ma +jug pa = ?
myi mthong = anikṣa (* mig gis mi gsod; what is gsod?*)
If [the sense object] were singular,
there would be no gradual motion,
no simultaneous apprehension and non-apprehension,
nor divided multiple existence, nor the invisible microscopic.
The idea that there is direct perception [of the external object takes place] as in a dream and so on. Additionally, that external object is not seen [at the moment] when one has [the idea that there is direct perception of an external object]; [so] how can you consider that [the external object] is directly perceived?
As I discussed, manifestation has the appearance of that [external object].
Recollection [comes] from that.
One who is not awake does not understand
the non-existence of a sense-object seen in a dream.
Mutual shaping of manifestation is due to their influence on each other. When one dreams, the mind is overpowered by sloth; thus the result is not the same.
| maraṇaṁ paravijñaptiviśeṣād vikriyā yathā | 'chi ba gzhan gyi rnam rig gis || bye brag las te dper bya na || 'dre la sogs pa'i yid dbang gis || gzhan gyi dran nyams 'gyur sogs bzhin || gsod pa gzhan gyi rnam shes gyi || bye bragis pye ji lta bar || gzhan gyī dran ba nyams par gyurd || sha za la stsogs pa'i dbang gis || |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>a maraṇaṁ</th>
<th>MS (A) maraṇa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a:</td>
<td>rig gis ] P: rigs gis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b:</td>
<td>dper bya na ] N: dpang byin?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d:</td>
<td>nyams ] N: nyis?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>yid dbang = manovaśa (PT 125 omits an equivalent for manas)</th>
<th>gsod pa = maraṇa ('chi ba)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>sha za= piśāca ('dre)</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Death is a transformation due to a particular manifestation of another, just as the transformation of memory loss and the like of others is due to the mental force of demons and so on.
| 20  | katham vā daṇḍakārṇyaśūnyatvam ṛṣikopataḥ | drang srong khros pas dan ta ka'ī ||
|     | manodaṇḍo mahāvadyāḥ katham vā tena | dbyig pa+i dgon pa ji ltar na ||
|     | сидhyaṭi || | drang srong khros pas stong pa bar ||
|     |                              | yid nyes kha na ma tho cher ||
|     |                              | de yis ji ltar 'grub par 'gyur ||
|     |                              | ji ltar de+is grub pa yin ||

| a:  | kḥros ] N: bros  |
|     | dan ta ] GNP: dante  |
| b:  | stong s par 'gyur ] GNP: stong par gyur  |
|     | de yis ] CD: de mis  |

| d:  | grub ] MS ḍ grub  |

Vṛtti in d: ji ltar de yis 'grub par 'gyur  
NB: this reading = PT 125!

dbyig pa = daṇḍa  
nyes pa sdig tshe ba = mahāvadyāḥ  
(kha na ma tho cher)

Otherwise, how did the Daṇḍaka forest become emptied by the sages' anger?  
Or how does that prove mental violence is a great violation?
How is the knowledge of those who know other minds inconsistent with reality? 
[Reply:] It is as with knowledge of one's own mind. 
Because one does not know [other minds or even one's own] 
in the way that [such knowing of minds] is the scope of a Buddha.
| 22 | vijñaptimātratāsiddhiḥ svaśaktisadṛśi mayā | kṛtayāṁ sarvavathā sā tu na cintyā buddha-gocaraḥ || | rnam rig tsam du grub pa 'di || bdag gis bdag gi mthu 'dra bar || byas kyi de yi rnam pa kun || bsam yas sangs rgyas spyod yul lo || | rnam shes tsam du +grub paru || bdagīs bdagī mthu +dra bas +dī bgyis rnam pa thams chad de+o || sangs rgyas spyod yul bsam du med || || c kṛtayāṁ ] MS (A) kṛteyaṁ |

| | | | rnam pa thams chad = sarvavtha (rnam pa kun) bsam du med = na cintya (bsam yas) |

---

I have composed this proof of [the World as] Manifestation-Only according to my ability, but that [fact that the World is nothing but Manifestation-Only] is not conceivable in its entirety. It is the scope of the buddhas.
| C | viṃśakāvījñaptiprakaraṇāṃ samāptam* || | nyi shu pa'i tshig le'ur byas pa slob dpon dbyig gnyen gyis mdzad pa rdzogs so || | nyi shu pa rdzogso || |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| śloka 20 | || rgya gar gyi mkhan po dži na mi tra dang | shī len dra bo dhi dang dā na shī la dang | zhu chen gyi lo tsā ba ban de ye shes sdes bsgyur cing zhus te gtan la phab pa'o || |
| 20] MS (A) written as 2 with m above | The following namaḥ sarvavide || no doubt belongs with the following Trimiṃśikā-kārikā. | shī | N: shi len dra ] GN: lendra; P: landra bo dhi dang ] CD: bo dhi dang | tsā | N: tsa ban de ] GNP: bande |

The Twenty Verses written by the Venerable Vasubandhu. Translated by the Indian masters Jinamitra, Śīlendrabodhi and Dānaśīla, and the great translator Ye shes sde, it has been corrected.

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Sanskrit Manuscript B

and

Tibetan Tanjur Critical Edition

of the

Viṃśikā-ṛtti

With an English Translation
rgya gar skad du | bingshi ka brītti ||
bod skad du | nyi shu pa'i 'grel pa |
'jam dpal gzhon nur gyur pa la phyag 'tshal lo ||

A) theg pa chen po la kham s gsum pa rnam par rig pa tsam du rnam par gzhag ste | mdo las | kye rgyal ba'i sras dag 'di lta ste | kham gsum pa 'di ni sems tsam mo zhes 'byung ba'i phyir ro || sems dang yid dang | rnam par shes pa dang | rnam par rig pa zhes bya ba ni rnam grangs su gtogs pa'o ||
B) mdo las | kye rgyal ba'i sras dag 'di lta ste | kham gsum pa 'di ni sems tsam mo zhes 'byung ba'i phyir ro || sems dang yid dang | rnam par shes pa dang | rnam par rig pa zhes bya ba ni rnam grangs su gtogs pa'o ||
C) sems de yang 'dir mtshungs pa lta pa dang bcas par dgongs pa'o ||
D) tsam zhes bya ba smos pa ni don dag pa'i phyir ro ||
E) rnam par shes pa 'di nyid don du snang ba 'byung ste ||
F) dper na rab rib can rnam s kyis skra zla la sogs pa med par mthong ba bzhin te ||
G) don gang yang med do ||
[Vasubandhu]

A) The Great Vehicle teaches that what belongs to the triple world is established as Manifestation-Only, because it is stated in scripture: B) “O Sons of the Conqueror, what belongs to the triple world is mind-only.” C) Mind, thought, cognition and manifestation are synonyms. D) And here this ‘mind’ intends the inclusion of the concomitants [of mind]. E) “Only” is stated in order to rule out external objects. F) This cognition itself arises having the appearance of an external object. G) For example, it is like those with an eye disease seeing non-existent hair, a [double] moon and so on, but H) there is no [real] object at all.
II

A) 'dir 'di skad ces brgal te |

gal te rnam rig don min na ||
yul dang dus la nges med cing ||
sems kyang nges med ma yin la ||
bya ba byed pa'ang mi rigs 'gyur || [2]

B) ji skad du bstan par 'gyur zhe na | C) gal te gzugs la sogs pa'i don med
par gzugs la sogs pa'i rnam par rig pa 'byung ste gzugs la sogs pa'i don
las ma yin na | D) ci'i phyir yul la lar 'byung la thams cad na ma yin | E) yul
de nyid na yang res 'ga' 'byung la thams cad du ma yin | F) yul dang dus
de na 'khod pa thams cad kyi sems la nges pa med pa 'byung la 'ga' tsam
la ma yin | G) ji ltar rab rib can nyid kyi sems la skra la sogs pa snang gi |
gzhan dag la ni ma yin ||
II

---

na deśakālaniyamaḥ santānāniyamo na [ca] |
na ca kṛtyakriyā yuktā vijñaptir yadi nārthataḥ || 2 ||

[Objection:]  
A) To this it is objected:  

If manifestation does not [arise] from an external object, it is not reasonable that there be restriction as to time and place, nor nonrestriction as to personal continuum, nor causal efficacy. [2]

B) What is being stated here? C) If there is the arisel of manifestation of material form and so on without any external object of material form and so on, and [consequently the manifestation] does not [arise] from a [real] external object of material form and so on, D) why does [such a manifestation] arise in a particular place, and not everywhere; E) why does it arise only in that place at some time, not always; and F) why does it arise without restriction in the minds of all those present there in that place at that time, and not in [the minds] of just a few? G) For instance, while a hair and so on may appear in the mind of one with eye disease, it does not [appear] to others [free of that disease].
II
ci'i phyir gang rab rib can gys mthong ba'i skra dang | sbrang bu la sog s pas skra la sog s pa'i bya ba mi byed la | de ma yin pa gzh an dag gis ni byed | rmi lam na mthong ba'i bza' ba dang btung ba dang bgo ba dang dug dang mthon la sog s pas zas dang skom la sog s pa'i bya ba mi byed la | de ma yin pa gzh an dag gis ni byed | dri za'i grong khyer yod pa ma yin pas grong khyer gyi bya ba mi byed la | de ma yin pa gzh an dag gis ni byed | dri dag don med par med du 'dra na yul dang dus nges pa dang | sems nges pa med pa dang | bya ba byed pa 'di dag kyang mi rung ngo zhe na |
II

\(\text{k)}\) niyamah santananiyamah kṛtyakriyā ca na yujyate,

\(\text{h)}\) Why is it that the hair, bee and so on which appear to one with eye disease have no causal efficacy of a hair and so on, while for those others without [eye disease, those hairs, bees and so forth which appear to them] do have [causal efficacy]? \(\text{i)}\) The food, drink, clothing, poison, weapons and so on seen in a dream do not have causal efficacy [to address] hunger, thirst and the like, but those others not [in a dream] do have such [causal efficacy]. \(\text{j)}\) A mirage city, being non-existent, does not have the causal efficacy of a city, but other [cities] not [unreal like] that do. \(\text{k)}\) If these [things like dream food] resemble the non-existent in lacking any [real external] object, restriction as to time and place, nonrestriction as to personal continuum, and causal efficacy are not reasonable.

1: Here begins the Sanskrit manuscript; the translation hereafter is from the Sanskrit.
A) mi rung ba ma yin te | 'di ltar |

    yul la sogs pa nges 'grub ste ||
    rmi 'dra'o || [3ab]

B) rmi lam du rmis pa dang mtshungs pas na rmi 'dra'o || c) ji lta zhe na |
C) rmi lam na yang don med par yul la la na grong dang | kun dga' ra ba
dang | skyes pa dang bud med la sogs pa ji dag snang la thams cad na
ma yin yul de nyid na yang res 'ga' snang la dus thams cad du ma yin
pas e) don med par yang yul la sogs pa nges par 'grub po ||

D) thams cad na ma yin yul de nyid na yang res 'ga' snang la ] GNP: ø
III

A) na khalu na yujyate, yasmāt* ||

desādiniyamaḥ siddhas svapnavat*

B) svapna iva svapnavat* ⟨ ⟩ C) kathāṃ D) tāvat svapne vināpy arthena kvacid eva deśe kīñcid grāmārāmastripuruṣādikaṁ drśyate na sarvatra tatraiva ca deśe kadācid drśyate na sarvakālam E) iti siddho vināpy arthena desakālaniyamaḥ ||

[Vasubandhu]

A) They are certainly not unreasonable, since:

Restriction as to place and so on is proved, as with dreams.

[3ab]

E) “As with dreams” means as in a dream. (C) Well, how, first of all, [do you explain that] even without an external object, some village, grove, man, woman or the like is seen in a dream at a particular place, rather than everywhere, and at that particular place at some specific time, rather than always? (E) For this reason, restriction as to time and place is established, even in the absence of an external object.

D) grāmārāmastripuruṣādikaṁ | MS: bhramarā°
sems kyang nges pa med |
yi dags bzhin te | [3bc]

\textit{g}_{7} \text{grub ces bya bar bsnyegs so } || \textit{g}_{6} \text{yi dags } \text{nams kyi dang mtshungs pas}
na yi dags bzhin no || \textit{g}_{4} \text{ji ltar 'grub}

thams cad kyis |
klung la rnag la sogs mthong bzhin || [3cd]
Moreover, nonrestriction to personal continuum [is proved] as with hungry ghosts. [3bc]

“Is proved” is carried over [from the previous foot]. "As with hungry ghosts" means as in the case of hungry ghosts. [3c] How is this proved? [3d] Collectively

In their all seeing the river of pus and so on. [3cd]
III

jr r nag gis gang ba'i klung ni r nag gi klung ste | ky mar gyi bum pa bzhin no || sj las kyi rnam par smin pa mtshungs pa la gnas pa'i yi dags rnams ni kun gyis kyang mtshungs par klung r nag gis gang bar mthong ste | gcig 'gas ni ma yin no || mjr r nag gis gang ba ji lta ba bzhin du gcin dang | ngan skyugs dang | me ma mur dang | mchil ma dang | snabs kyis gang ba dang | dbyig pa dang | ral gri thogs pa'i mi dag gis srung ba yang de bzhin te | sogs pa zhes bya bar bsdu'o || ky de ltar na don med par yang rnam par rig pa rnams kyi sems nges pa med par 'grub bo ||
III

\[ j \) pūyapūrṇā nadi pūyanadī | k) gṛṭaghaṭavat* | l) tulyakarmmavipākāvasthā hi pretāḥ sarve (')pi samaṁ pūyapūrṇān nādīm paśyanti naika eva | m) yathā pūyapūrṇām evaṁ mūtrapuriṣādipūrṇāṁ daṇḍāsidharaiś ca puruṣair adhiṣṭhitāṁ ity ādigrāhaṇena | n) evaṁ santānāniyamo vijñāptināṁ asaty apy arthe siddhāḥ ||

\[ j \) “The river of pus” means a river filled with pus, k) as [one says] a pot of ghee [when one means a pot filled with ghee]. l) For hungry ghosts in a state of equally experiencing fruition of their actions collectively all see the river filled with pus, not just one of them alone.

m) The word “and so on” is mentioned to indicate that as [they see the river] filled with pus, they [also see it] filled with urine, feces and the like, and guarded by persons holding staffs and swords. n) Thus the nonrestriction of manifestations to [a specific] personal continuum is proved even without the existence of an external object.
bya byed rmi lam gnod pa 'dra || [4a]

A) grub ces bya bar rig par bya'o || B) dper na rmi lam na gnyis kyis gnyis phrad pa med par yang khu ba 'byung ba'i mtshan nyid ni rmi lam gyi gnod pa'o || C) de ltar re zhig dpe gzhan dang gzhan dag gis yul dang dus nges pa la sogs pa bzhi 'grub bo ||
IV

svapnopaghātavat kṛtyakriyā |

A) siddheti veditavyam* | B) yathā svapne dvayasamāpattim antareṇa śukravisarggalakṣanaḥ svapnopaghātaḥ | C) evan tāvad anyānyair drṣṭāntair deśakālaniyamādicituṣṭayaṁ siddham* |

Causal efficacy [is proved] as in ejaculation in a dream. [4ab]

A) “Is proved” is to be understood. B) [Causal efficacy is established] as with ejaculation in a dream [that is, a wet dream], which is characterized by the emission of semen in a dream in the absence of [actual] sexual union. C) In this way at the outset is proved, through these various examples, the four-fold [characterization, namely] the restriction to time and place and the rest.

C) anyānyair | MS: anyānair
IV

thams cad sems can dmyal ba bzhin || [4b]

d grub ces bya bar rig par bya'o || e, sems can dmyal ba dag na yod pa
dang mtshungs pas sems can dmyal ba bzhin no || n, ji ltar 'grub ce na |
IV

narakavat punaḥ

sarvaṁ*

D) siddham iti veditavyaṁ | E) narakṣy iva narakavat* ( | ) F)
kathāṁ siddhaṁ |

And again as with hell all [four aspects are proved]. [4bc]

D) “Are proved” is to be understood. E) “As with hell” means like in the hells. F) How are they proved?
dmyal ba'i srung ma sogs mthong dang ||
de dag gis ni gnod phyir ro || [4cd]

dper na sems can dmyal ba dag na sems can dmyal ba'i sems can
rnams kyis sems can dmyal ba'i srung ma la sogs pa mthong ste | yul
dang dus nges par 'grub bo || kh yi dang bya rog dang lcags ky i ri la
sogs pa 'ong ba dang 'gro bar yang mthong ba ni so gs pa zhes bya bar
bsdu ste | thams cad kyis mthong gi | gcig 'gas ni ma yin no || de dag
gis de dag la gnod pa yang 'grub ste | dngos po la sems can dmyal ba'i
srung ma la so gs pa med par yang rang gi las ky i rnam par smin pa
mtshungs pa'i dbang gi phyir ro || de bzhin du gzh an yang yul dang
dus nges pa la so gs pa bzh i po 'di dag thams cad grub par rig par bya'o ||
IV

narakapālādidasrāne tais ca bādhane \[4\]

\[6\] yathā hi narakēṣu nārakāṇāṁ narakapālādidasrānam deśa-kālaniyamena siddham \( \langle \mid \rangle \) śvāvāyasāyasaparvatādyāgamanagamanada \( \text{ca} \) brāhmaṇaṁ cety ādigrahaṇena \( \langle \mid \rangle \) sarveṣāṁ ca naikasyaiwa \( \langle \mid \rangle \) tais ca tadbādhanaṁ siddham asatsv api narakapālādisu samānasvā-karmmavipādhipatyat* \( \langle \rangle \) tathānyatraṁ svaram etad deśakālaniyamādīcatuṣṭayaṁ siddham iti veditavyam* |

In the seeing of the hell guardians and so on, and in being tortured by them. [4cd]

\[6\] Just as it is proved that in the hells hell beings see the hell guardians and so on with restriction as to time and place \( \langle \rangle \) —“and so on” means that they see the dogs, crows, the iron mountains and so on coming and going— \( \langle \rangle \) and all [hell beings see these], not merely one, \( \langle \rangle \) and [just as it is] proved that they are tortured by them, even though the hell guardians and so on do not exist, because of the domination of the generalized common fruition of their individual karmic deeds— \( \langle \rangle \) Just so it should be understood that the entirety of this four-fold characterization, namely] the restriction to time and place and the rest, is proved elsewhere too [and not only in the separate examples].
1. ci'i phyir sms can dmyal ba'i srung ma dang bya rog dang khyi la sogs pa de dag sms can du mi 'dod ce na |

2. mi rigs pa'i phyir ro || x. de dag ni sms can dmyal bar mi rigs te | de bzhin du sdug bsngal des mi myong ba'i phyir ro || o. gcig la gcig gnod pa byed na ni 'di dag ni sms can dmyal ba pa dag go || 'di dag ni sms can dmyal ba'i srung ma dag go zhes rnam par gzhag pa med par 'gyur ro || p. byad gzugs dang bong tshod dang stobs mtshungs pa dag ni gcig la gcig gnod pa byed kyang ji lta bur 'jigs par mi 'gyur ro || o. lcags rab tu 'bar ba'i sa gzhi la tsha ba'i sdug bsngal yang mi bzod na ni ji ltar de na gzhans la gnod pa byed par 'gyur | o. sms can dmyal ba pa ma yin pa dag sms can dmyal bar 'byung bar ga la 'gyur |
IV

For what reason, then, do you not accept the hell guardians, and dogs and crows, as really existent beings?

Because it is not reasonable for those [guardians and so on] to be hell beings, since they do not experience the sufferings of that [place] in precisely that same way. If they were torturing each other, there would be no differentiation that ‘these are the hell beings; these the hell guardians.’ And if those of equal form, size and strength were torturing each other, they would not be so very afraid. And how could [those guardians], unable to tolerate the suffering of burning on a flaming iron ground, torture others there? On the other hand, how could non-hell beings be born in hell [in the first place]?
\[
\text{o na dud 'gro dag kyang ji ltar mtho ris su 'byung ste | de bzhin du sems can dmyal bar yang dud 'gro dang yi dags kyi bye brag sems can dmyal ba'i srung ma la sogs pa 'byung bar 'gyur ro zhe na |}
\]
V

A) kathan tāvat tiraścāṁ svarge sambhavaḥ | B) evaṁ naraṅeṣu
tiryakpretaśeṣāṇāṁ narakapālādinaṁ sambhavaḥ syāt* ||

[Objection]
A) [Well,] to begin, how [—as you admit as well—] could animals be born in heaven? B) In the same way, animals and certain hungry ghosts might be born in the hells as hell guardians and others.
ji ltar dud 'gro mtho ris su ||
'byung ba de ltar dmyal ba min ||
yi dags min te de lta bur ||
de yod sdug bsngal des mi myong || [5]

cj dud 'gro gang dag mtho ris su 'byung ba de dag ni snod kyi 'jig rten na
de'i bde ba myong bar 'gyur ba'i las kyis der 'byung ba dag ste | de na
yod pa'i bde ba so sor myong ngo || d) thems can dmyal ba'i srung ma la
sogs pa dag ni de bzhin du thems can dmyal ba'i sdug bsngal mi myong
ngo || e) de'i phyir dud 'gro dag der 'byung bar mi rigs so || f) yi dags kyi
bye brag dag kyang ma yin no ||
V

tīrāscāṁ sambhavaḥ svarge yathā na nareke tathā |
na pretānāṁ yatas tajjaṁ duḥkhan nānubhavanti te || [5 ]||

c) ye hi tīryaṅcaḥ svarge sambhavanti te tadbhājanalokasukha-
saṁvarttanīyena karmmaṇā tatra sambhūtās tajjaṁ sukham pratyanu-
bhavanti | nā caiva narakapālādayo nārakāṁ duḥkhaṁ pratyanu-
bhavanti | tasmān na tīrāscāṁ sambhavo yukto r, nāpi pretānāṁ* ( | )

[Vasubandhu]

Animals are not born in hell as they are in heaven,
Nor are hungry ghosts, since they do not experience the
suffering produced there. [5]

c) For, those who are born in heaven as animals, being born
there through their karmic deeds conducive to happiness [performed]
in the Receptacle World, experience the happiness produced there [in
heaven], b) but the hell guardians and so on do not experience hellish
suffering in a similar fashion. e) Therefore, it is not reasonable that
animals are born [in hell], r) nor is it so for hungry ghosts.
A) sems can dmyal ba de dag gi las rnams kyis der 'byung ba'i bye brag dag 'di lta bur 'byung ste | mdog dang byad gzugs dang bong tshod dang stobs kyi bye brag gang gis sems can dmyal ba'i srung ma la sogs pa'i ming thob pa'o || b) gang lag pa brkyang pa la sogs pa bya ba sna tshogs byed par snang ba de lta bur yang 'gyur ste | de dag 'jigs pa bskyed pa'i phyir ro || dper na lug lta bu'i ri dags 'ong ba dang | 'gro ba dang | lcags kyi shal ma li'i nags tshal tsher ma kha thur du lta ba dang gyen du lta bar 'gyur ba lta bu ste | c) de dag ni med pa yang ma yin no zhe na |

B) 'gyur | CD: 'grub
VI

A) teṣān tarhi nārakāṇāṁ karmamabhīs tatra bhūtaviśeṣāḥ sambhavanti varṇāṇāṁ kṛtipramāṇalavāśिśतā ye naraka. pālādi-saṁjñaṁ pratilabhante | B) tathā ca pariṇamanti yad vividhāṁ hasta-vikṣepāṇabhiṣyati kurvanto dṛṣyante bhayaotpādanārtham yathā meṣa-kṛtayaḥ parvatā āgacchanto gacchantaḥ āyāh (āyāhśāblalī) vane ca kaṇṭakā adhomukhibhavanta ūrdhamukhibhavantaś ceti | C) na te na sambhavanty eva ||

[Objection]  
A) Then, particular types of gross material elements arise there through the karmic deeds of those hell beings, which, particularized as to color, form, size and strength, obtain the designations 'hell guardian' and so on. B) And they transform in such a manner that they appear performing activities like waving their hands and so on, in order to instill fear, as mountains in the shape of rams coming and going and thorns in the forest of iron thorn trees turning themselves down and turning themselves up [likewise appear in hell instilling fear]. C) Therefore, it is not that those [hell guardians and so on] are not born at all.

B) āgacchanto | MS: āganto
gal te de'i las kyis der
'byung ba dag ni 'byung ba dang |
de bzhin 'gyur bar 'dug na go |
rnam par shes par cis mi 'dod || [6]
VI

yadi tatkarmmabhis tatra bhūtānāṁ sambhavas tathā |
isyate pariṇāmaś ca kim vijñānasya neṣyate || 6 ||

d) (vi)jñānasyaiva tatkarmmabhis tathāpariṇāmaḥ kasmān
nesyate ⟨ ⟩ e) kim punar bhūtāni kalpyante || f) api ca ||

[Vasubandhu]

If you accept that gross material elements arise there in
this fashion through the karmic deeds of those [beings],
And [you accept their] transformation, why do you not

d) Why do you not accept that the transformation thus brought
about by the karmic deeds of those [beings] is [a transformation] of
 cognition itself? e) Why, moreover, are gross material elements
imagined [to play any role at all]? f) What is more:
VII

gzhan na las kyi bag chags la ||
'bras bu dag ni gzhan du rtog ||
gang na bag chags yod pa der ||
c'i phyir na 'dod mi bya || [7]

A) sems can dmyal ba pa rnams kyi las gang gis der 'byung ba dag de lta bur 'byung ba dang | 'gyur bar yang rtog pa'i las de'i bag chags de dag nyid kyi rnam par shes pa'i rgyud la gnas te | gzhan ma yin na a) bag chags de gang na yod pa de dag nyid la de'i 'bras bu rnam par shes par gyur pa de 'dra bar c'i phyir mi 'dod la | c) gang na bag chags med pa der de'i 'bras bu rtog ba 'di la gtan tshigs ci yod |
karmmaṇo vāsanānyatra phalam anyatra kalpyate |
tatraiva neṣyate yatra vāsanā kin nu kāraṇāṁ || 7 ||

A) yena hi karmmaṇā nārakāṇāṁ tatra tāḍr̥śo bhūtānāṁ sambhavaḥ kalpyate pariṇāmaś ca tasya karmmaṇo vāsanā teṣāṁ vi[jñā]na(saṁtāṇa)sanniviṣṭā nāṇyatra , b) yatraiva ca vāsanā tatraiva tasyāḥ phalaṁ tāḍr̥śo vijñānapariṇāmaḥ kin neṣyate ⟨ | ⟩ c) yatra vāsanā nāsti tatra tasyāḥ phalaṁ kalpyata iti kim a(t)ra kāraṇāṁ |

The perfuming of the karmic deed you imagine to be elsewhere than the result;
What is the reason you do not accept [that the result is] in precisely the same location where the perfuming [takes place]? [7]

A) You imagine such an arising and transformation of gross material elements of hell beings there [in hell] as due to their karmic deeds, while the perfuming of those karmic deeds is lodged in their individual continua of cognition, not elsewhere. b) So why do you not accept that such a transformation of cognition as the result of those [karmic deeds] is precisely where the perfuming itself is? c) For what reason, in this case, do you imagine that the result of those [karmic deeds] is somewhere where the perfuming is not?
Ⅶ

Ⅳ  šmras pa | lung gi gtan tshigs yod de | Ⅴ  gal te rnam par shes pa nyid
gzugs la so gs par snang gi | gzugs la so gs pa’i don ni med na gzugs la
so gs pa’i skye mchod yod par ni bcom ldan ’das kyis gsung bar mi ’gyur
ro zhe na |
VII

D) āgamaḥ kāraṇam | E) yadi vijñānam eva rūpādipratibhāsām
syān na rūpādiko ⟨")rthas tadā rūpādyāyatanaśtitvaṁ bhagavatā
noktam syāt* |

[Objection]

D) The reason is scripture. E) If there were nothing but cognition
with the appearance of material form and the rest, and no external
objects characterized as material form and the rest, then the Blessed
One would not have spoken of the existence of the sense-fields of
material form and the rest.
A) 'di ni gtan tshigs ma yin te | 'di ltar |

gzugs sogs skye mched yod par ni ||
des 'dul ba yi skye bo la ||
dgongs pa'i dbang gis gsungs pa ste ||
rdzus te byung ba'i sems can bzhin || [8]

B) dper na bcom ldan 'das kyis rdzus te byung ba'i sems can bzhin yod do || zhes gsungs pa yang phyi ma la sems kyi rgyud rgyun mi 'chad pa
la dgongs nas dgongs pa'i dbang gis gsungs pa ste |
VIII

A) \( \text{akāraṇam etat* yasmāt*}, \)

\[ \text{rūpādyāyatanaśtitvaṁ tadvineyajanam prati |} \]
\[ \text{abhiprāyavaśād uktam upapādakasatvavat* || [8 ||]} \]

B) \( \text{yathāsti satva upapāduka ity uktāṁ bhagavatā 'bhiprāyavaśāc cittasantatyānucchedam āc,atyāṁ abhipretya |} \)

[Vasubandhu]

A) This is not a reason, since:

The existence of the sense-fields of material form and the rest were spoken of [by the Blessed One] with a special intention directed toward the individual to be guided by that [teaching], as [in the case of the mention of] beings born by spontaneous generation. [8]

B) By way of example, the Blessed One with a special intention said “There are beings of spontaneous birth,” intending [allusion to] the nonannihilation of the continuum of mind in the future. D) [We know this] because of the [scriptural] statement:
VIII

\[c\] 'di na bdag gam sems can med ||
chos 'di rgyu dang bcas las byung ||

\[d\] zhes gsungs pa'i phyir ro ||
de bzhin du bcom ldan 'das kyis gzugs la
sogs pa'i skye mched yod par gsungs pa yang de bstan pas 'dul ba'i skye
bo'i ched du ste | bka' de ni dgongs pa can no ||
VIII

c) nāstiha satva ātmā vā dharmmās tv ete sahetukāḥ ( || )

d) iti vacanāt* e) evaṁ rūpādyāyatanāstitvam apy uktam bhaga-
vatā taddeśanāvineyajananam adhikṛtyety ābhiprāyikaṁ tad vacanaṁ |

c) Here [in our teaching] there is no being or self,
but [only] these elemental factors of existence along with their
causes.

e) Thus, although the Blessed One did speak of the existence of
the sense-fields of form and the rest, that [scriptural] statement is of
special intention since it is directed toward the individual who is to be
guided by that teaching.
dir ci las dgongs she na |
rang gi sa bon gang las su ||
rnam rig snang ba gang byung ba ||
deg dag de yi skye mched ni ||
rnam pa gnyis su thub pas gsungs || [9]
A) ko (')trābhīpṛāyaḥ |

yataḥ svabijād vijñaptir yadābhāsā pravarttate |
dvidhāyatanatvena te tasyā munir abravīt* || [9 ||]

A) In this regard, what is the special intention?

A manifestation arises from its own proper seed, having an appearance corresponding to that [external object]. The Sage spoke of the two [seed and appearance] as the dual sense field of that [manifestation]. [9]
B) 'di skad du bstan 'gyur zhe na | gzugs su snang ba'i rnam par rig pa rang gi sa bon 'gyur ba'i bye brag tu gyur pa gang las byung ba'i sa bon de dang | snang ba gang yin pa | de dang de dag ni de'i mig dang | gzugs kyi skye mched du bcom ldan 'das kyis go rims bzhin du gsungs so ||

C) de bzhin du reg byar snang ba'i rnam par rig pa'i bar du rang rang gi sa bon 'gyur ba'i bye brag tu gyur pa'i sa bon gang las byung ba'i sa bon de dang | snang ba gang yin pa | de dang de dag ni bcom ldan 'das kyis de'i lus dang reg bya'i skye mched du go rims bzhin du gsungs te |

D) 'di ni 'dir dgongs pa'o ||
IX

\[B)\] kim uktam bhavati \(\mid\) \(c)\) rūpapratabhāsā vijñaptī yataḥ svabijāt pariṇāmaviśeṣapraptād utpadyate tac ca bijam yatpakhēsā ca \(d)\) sā te tasyā vijñaptēs caksūrūpāyatanatvena yathākramam bhagavān abravīt* \(\mid e)\) evaṃ yāvat spraṣṭavyapratibhāsā vijñaptī yataḥ svabijāt pariṇāma-viśeṣapraptād utpadyate, tac ca bijam yatpakhēsā ca \(f)\) sā te tasyāḥ kāyaspraṣṭavyāyatanatvena yathākramam bhagavān abravid \(g)\) ity aya[m] \((abhi)prāyāḥ\) |
a) de ltar dgongs pa'i dbang gis bstan pa la yon tan ci yod ce na |

de ltar gang zag la bdag med par
'jug par 'gyur ro || [10ab]

b) de ltar bshad na gang zag la bdag med par 'jug par 'gyur te | c) drug po
gnyis las rnam par shes pa drug 'byung gi | lta ba po gcig pu nas reg pa
po'i bar du gang yang med par rig nas gang dag gang zag la bdag med
par bstan pas 'dul ba de dag gang zag la bdag med par 'jug go|
A) evaṁ punar abhiprāyavaśena deśayitvā ko guṇaḥ ||

tathā pudgalanairātmya-praveśo hi ||

B) tathā hi deśyamāne pudgalanairātmyaṁ praviśanti | c)
dva(ya)ṣ[a](tkābhyaṁ vijnā)naṣatkarāṃ pravarttate na tu kaścid eko draṣṭāsti na yāvan mantety evaṁ vidītvā ye pudgalanairātmyadeśanā-vineyās te pudgalanairātmyaṁ praviśanti ||

[Objection]

A) And what is the advantage of having explained things in this way by recourse to special intention?

[Vasubandhu]

For in this way there is understanding of the selflessness of persons. [10ab]

B) For when it is being taught in this way [those individuals to be guided] understand the idea of the selflessness of persons. c) The six cognitions come about from the two sets of six [= the twelve sense-fields], but when they understand that there is no distinct seer at all—[and all members of the stock list] up to—no distinct thinker, those who are to be guided by the teaching of the selflessness of persons understand the idea of the selflessness of persons.
gzhan du yang |
bs tan pa'i chos la bdag med par
'jug 'gyur || [bcd]

gzhan du yang zhes bya ba ni rnam par rig pa tsam du bstan pa'o || ji ltar chos la bdag med par 'jug ce na | rnam par rig pa tsam 'di nyid gzugs la sogs pa'i chos su snang bar 'byung ste | gzugs la sogs pa'i mtshan nyid kyi chos gang yang med par rig nas 'jug go ||
Moreover, teaching in another way leads to the understanding of the selflessness of elemental factors of existence. [10bcd]

D) “In another way” refers to the teaching of Manifestation-Only.

E) How does this lead to understanding the selflessness of elemental factors of existence?  

F) [One understands this by] knowing that this Manifestation-Only arises with the semblance of elemental factors of existence such as material form and the rest, but actually there is no existing elemental factor of existence having as its characteristic mark material form and the rest.
gal te chos rnam pa thams cad du med na rnam par rig pa tsam zhes bya ba de yang med pas de ji ltar rnam par gzhag ce na |
X

\textit{H) yadi tarhi sarvathā dharmmo nāsti tad api vijñaptimātraṁ nāstīti ( | ) katham tarhi vyavasthāpyate |}

[Objection]

\textit{H) If, then, no elemental factor of existence exists in any fashion, Manifestation-Only does not exist either. How, then, could [your position] be established?}
chos ni rnam pa thams cad du med pa ma yin pas de ltar chos la bdag med par 'jug par 'gyur te |

brtags pa'i bdag nyid kyis | [10d]
It is not the case that one comes to understand the selflessness of elemental factors of existence by thinking that the elemental factors of existence do not exist in any fashion at all. But rather [such understanding comes in thinking that elemental factors of existence exist only]:

*In terms of an imagined self.*
gang byis pa rnams kyischos rnams kyi rang bzhin kun brtags pa'i bdag nyid des de dag bdag med kyi, sams rgyas kyi yul gang yin pa brjod du med pa'i bdag nyid kyis ni med pa ma yin no | m de ltar rnams par rig pa tsam yang rnams par rig pa gzhan gyis kun brtags pa'i bdag nyid kyis bdag med par rtogs pa'i phyir rnams par rig pa tsam du rnams par gzhag paschos thams cad la chos la bdag med par 'jug pa yin gyi | yod pa de la yang rnams pa thams cad du skur pas ni ma yin no | n gzhan du na ni rnams par rig pa gzhan yang rnams par rig pa gzhan gyi don du 'gyur bas rnams par rig pa tsam nyid du mi 'grub ste | rnams par rig pa rnams don dang ldan pa'i phyir ro ||
X

\( \text{k)} \) yo bālair dharmaṇāṁ svabhāvo grāhya-grāhakādīḥ parikalpitas tena kalpitenātmanā teṣāṁ nairātmyam āj na tv anabhiṇeyatmanā yo buddhanām viśaya iti \( \text{m)} \) evam vijñā[pti] (mātrasyā)pi vijñaptantaratparikalpitenātmanā nairātmyapraśād vijñaptimātravyavasthāpanayā sarvadharmmaṇāṁ nairātmyapraśeśo bhavati na tu sarvathā tada(s)t(i)tvāpavād(ā)ṭ* \( \text{n)} \) itarathā hi vijñapta vijñapta vijñapta vijñaptaṃ arthaḥ syād iti vijñaptimātratvan na siddhyārthavatītvād vijñaptināṁ |

\( \text{k)} \) The reference is to the selflessness of those elemental factors of existence the intrinsic nature of which—characterized by subject and object and so on—fools fantasize in terms of an imagined self. \( \text{l)} \) [The reference] is not to [the selflessness of elemental factors of existence] in terms of the inexpressible self, which is the domain of the Buddhas. \( \text{m)} \) In this way, Manifestation-Only also leads to an understanding of the selflessness of all elemental factors of existence through the establishment of the fact of Manifestation-Only because of an understanding of selflessness in terms of a self fantasized by another manifestation, not because of a denial of the existence of those [elemental factors of existence] in each and every respect. \( \text{n)} \) For otherwise one manifestation would have another manifestation as its external object, and therefore the fact of Manifestation-Only could not be proved, because manifestations would possess external objects.

\( \text{M)} \) nairātmyapraśād ] MS: nairātmyapraśā
bcom ldan 'das kyis dgongs pa 'dis gzugs la sogs pa'i skye mched yod par gsungs kyi | gzugs la sogs pa gang dag yod bzhin du de dag rnam par rig pa so so'i yul du mi 'gyur ro zhes bya ba de ji ltar rtogs par bya zhe na |
XI

A) kathaṁ punar idam pratyetavyam anenaḥbhiprāyaṇaḥ bhaga-
vataḥ rūpādyāyanāstanāstitvan uktam na punah santhya eva tāni yaṁi
rūpādivijñaptīṁ pratyekan viṣayībhavantīṅ |

[Objection]

A) How, then, should one understand this, namely, that while
the Blessed One spoke of the existence of the sense-fields of visible
form and the rest with this special intention, those things which come
to be the corresponding sense objects of the manifestations of visible
form and the rest do not actually exist at all?
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XI

8) 'di ltar |

de ni gcig na'ang yul min la ||
phra rab rdul du du ma'ang min ||
de dag 'dus pa 'ang ma yin te ||
'di ltar rdul phran mi 'grub phyir || [11]
XI

B) yasmān

na tad ekaṁ na cānekaṁ viśayaḥ paramāṇuśaḥ |
na ca te samāhataḥ yasmāt paramāṇuḥ ur na sidhyati || [11 || ]

[Vasubandhu]

B) Since:

That [sense-field of form and the rest] is not a unitary nor atomically plural sense object, neither are those [atoms] compounded, since the atom [itself] is not proved. [11]
c) ji skad du bstan par 'gyur zhe na | d) gang gzugs la sogs pa'i skye mched gzugs la sogs pa rnam par rig pa so so'i yul yin du zin na de ni gcig pu zhig yin te | ji ltar bye brag pa rnam s kyis cha shas can gyi ngo bor brtag pa'i lta bu 'am | rdul phra rab du ma 'am rdul phra rab de dag nyid 'dus pa zhig tu 'gyur grang na | e) gcig pu de ni yul ma yin te | cha shas rnam s las gzhan pa cha shas can gyi ngo bo gang la'ang mi 'dzin pa'i phyir ro || f) du ma'ang yul ma yin te | rdul phra rab so so la mi 'dzin pa'i phyir ro || g) de dag 'dus pa yang yul ma yin te | 'di ltar rdul phra rab rdzas gcig tu mi 'grub pa'i phyir ro ||
What is stated here? Whatever sense-field, consisting of visible form and the rest, would be the corresponding sense object of the manifestations of visible form and the rest, would be either unitary—as the Vaiśeśikas imagine material form as a part-possessing whole—or it would be atomically plural, or it would be compounded of those very atoms themselves. First of all, the sense object is not unitary, because there is no apprehension anywhere at all of a material form as a part-possessing whole separate from its parts. Nor is it plural, because there is no apprehension of atoms individually. Nor would those [atoms], compounded, come to be the sense object, since the atom is not proved to be a singular substance.
A) ji ltar mi 'grub ce na |
B) 'di ltar ||

drug gis cig car sbyar bas na ||
phra rab rdul cha drug tu 'gyur || [12ab]

c) phyogs drug nas rdul phra rab drug gis cig car du sbyar na ni rdul phra
rab cha drug tu 'gyur te | gcig gi go gang yin pa der gzhan mi 'byung ba'i
phyir ro ||
A) kathāṁ na sidhyati |

B) yasmāt* |

ṣaṭkena yugapadyogāt paramāṇoḥ ṣaḍaṁśatā ||

c) ṣadbhyo digbhyaḥ ṣaḍbhiḥ paramāṇubhir yugapadyoge sati paramāṇoḥ ṣaḍāṁśatā prāpnoti ād ekasya yo deṣas tatrānyasyāsambhavat* |

[Objection]

A) How is [the atom as a singular substance] not proved?

[Vasubandhu]

B) Since:

Because [either] in the simultaneous conjunction with a group of six [other atoms], the atom [would have to] have six parts, [12ab]

c) If there were simultaneous conjunction with six atoms from the six directions [of possible orientation], this would result in the atom having six parts, because where there is one thing another cannot arise.
drug po dag kyang go gcig na ||
gong bu rdul phran tsam du 'gyur || [12cd]

v) ji ste rdul phra rab gcig gi go gang yin pa de nyid du drug po rnams kyi
go yang yin na ni v) des na thams cad go gcig pa'i phyir gong bu thams
cad rdul phra rab tsam du 'gyur te | phan tshun tha dad pa med pa'i
phyir v) gong bu gang yang snang bar mi 'gyur ro || v) kha che'i bye brag
tu smra ba rnams nyes pa 'di 'byung du 'ong ngo zhes te | rdul phra rab
rnams ni cha shas med pa'i phyir sbyor ba ma yin gyi | 'dus pa dag ni
phan tshun sbyor ro zhes zer ba v) de dag la 'di skad du | v) rdul phra rab
rnams 'dus pa gang yin pa de de dag las don gzhan rnams ma yin no
zhes brjod par bya'o ||
Or, the place in which there are six atoms would be precisely the same as the place of the single atom. For this reason, because all of them would be in a common location, the entire cluster would be the extent of a single atom, because they would not exclude one another. Thus no cluster would be visible at all. The Kashmiri Vaibhāṣikas say: “Atoms do not at all conjoin, because of being partless—absolutely not! But compounded things do conjoin one with another.” They should be questioned as follows: Since a compound of atoms is not something separate from those atoms,
XIII

rdul phran sbyor ba med na ni ||
de ’ dus yod pa de gang gis || [13ab]

A) sbyor ba zhes bya bar bsnyegs so ||

cha shas yod ba ma yin pas ||
de sbyor mi ’grub ma zer cig | [13cd]

B) ji ste ’ dus pa dag kyang phan tshun mi sbyor ro zhe na | rdul phra rab rnams ni cha shas med pa'i phyir sbyor ba mi ’grub bo zhes ma zer cig |
’dus pa cha shas dang bcas pa yang sbyor bar khas mi len pa'i phyir ro ||
c) de bas rdul phra rab rdzas gcig pu mi ’grub bo || b) rdul phra rab sbyor bar ’dod kyang rung mi ’dod kyang rung ste |
XIII

paramāṇor asaṁyogē tatsaṁghāte (')sti kasya saḥ ||

A) saṁyoga iti varttate |

na cānavaṃyavatvāna tattsāṁyogē na sidhyati || [13 || ]

B) atha saṁghātā apy anyonyaṁ na saṁyuṣyante na tarhi para-

māṇuṇāṁ niravayavatvāt saṁyogo na sidhyatitī vaktavyaṁ* | sāvyava-

syāpi hi saṁghātasya saṁyogāṅabhyupa(gamāt | c) atah pa)raṁānur

ekaṁ dravyaṁ na sidhyati | d) yadi ca paramāṇoḥ saṁyoga iṣyate yadi

vā nesyaṁ |

Given that there is no conjunction of atoms, what is [con-

joining] when those [atoms] are compounded? [13ab]

A) “Conjoining” is carried over [from the previous].

But it is also not due to their partlessness that the con-

junction of those [atoms] is not proved. [13cd]

B) If you now were to claim that even compounds do not

conjoin with one another, then you [Kashmiri Vaibhāṣikas] should not

say that the conjunction of atoms is not proved because of their part-

lessness, for a conjunction of the compounded, even with parts, is not

admitted. c) Therefore, the atom is not proved as a singular substance. d)

And whether a conjunction of atoms is accepted or not:

B) niravayavatvāt ] MS: niravayatvāt
gang la phyogs cha tha dad yod ||
de ni gcig tu mi rung ngo || [14ab]

\( \lambda \) rdul phra rab kyi shar phyogs kyi cha yang gzhan pa nas 'og gi cha'i bar du yang gzhan te | phyogs kyi cha tha dad na de'i bdag nyid kyi rdul phra rab gcig pur ji ltar rung |

grib dang sgrib par ji ltar 'gyur || [14c]
XIV

digbhāgabheda yasyāsti tasyaikatvan na yujyate |

A) anyo hi paramāṇoḥ [p]ū[rvadīg][bh][āgo] <5a2> yāvad adho-
digbhāga iti digbhāgabhede sati kathaṁ tadātmakasya paramāṇor eka-
tvaṁ yokṣyate |

chāyāvṛtī kathaṁ vā |

It is not reasonable that something with spatial differentia-
tion be singular. [14ab]

A) If there were spatial differentiation of an atom—namely, the
front part is different [and so are all the other sides] including the
bottom part—how would the singularity of an atom with that
[multiple] nature be reasonable?

Or how is there shadow and obstruction? [14c]
 XIV

8) gal te rdul phra rab re re la phyogs kyi cha tha dad pa med na ni nyi ma shar ba'i tshe ngos gzhan na ni grib ma 'bab par ji ltar 'gyur te | C) de la ni gang du nyi ma 'bab pa'i phyogs gzhan med do || 8) gal te phyogs kyi cha tha dad par mi 'dod na rdul phra rab la rdul phra rab gzhan gyis sgrīb par yang ji ltar 'gyur | 8) rdul phra rab gan la yang cha shas gzhan med na gang du 'ong ba'i phyogs la gcig la gcig thogs par 'gyur | 8) thogs pa med na ni thams cad go gcig tu gyur pas 'dus pa thams cad rdul phra rab tsam du 'gyur te | de ni bshad zin to ||
If no single atom were to have spatial differentiation, how is it that when the sun rises in one place, there is shadow in one place, sunshine in another? For that [atom] does not have another portion on which there would be no sunshine. And how is an atom obstructed by another atom if spatial differentiation is not accepted? For [an atom] has no other separate part whatsoever, from contact with which one [atom] would be resisted by another. And if there were no resistance, then because all of them would share a common location, the entire compound would be the extent of a [single] atom, as has already been discussed [in verse 12cd, above].
6) grib ma dang sgrib pa rdul phra rab kyi ma yin yang | ci gong bu'i yin pa de ltar yang mi 'dod dam |

10) rdul phra rab rnams las gong bu gzhan zhig yin par 'dod dam ci na de dag de'i yin |

1) smras pa | ma yin no ||

1) ma yin no | All editions: yin no
[Objection]

Do you not accept in this way that the two, shadow and obstruction, belong to the cluster, not to the atom?

[Vasubandhu]

Do you, for your part, accept that the cluster which would possess those two [shadow and obstruction] is something other than the atoms?

[Opponent]

We say: no.
XIV

gong bu gzhan min de de'i min || [14d]

j) gal te rdul phra rab rnams las gong bu gzhan ma yin na de dag de'i ma yin par grub pa yin no ||

k) yongs su rtags pa 'di ni gnas pa'i khyad par te | gzugs la sogs pa'i mtshan nyid ni ma bkag na rdul phra rab ce 'am | 'dus ba zhes bsam pa 'dis ci zhig bya zhe na |
XIV

anyo na piṇḍaś cen na tasya te (|| 14 ||)

b) yadi nā)nyah paramāṇubhyaḥ piṇḍa iṣyate na te tasyeti siddham bhavati |
k) sanniveśaparicalpa eṣaḥ ( | ) paramāṇuḥ saṃghāta iti vā kim anayā cintayā ( | ) laksanān tu rūpā(duṇā) na pratiṣidhyate |

[Vasubandhu]

If the cluster is not other [than the atoms], the two [shadow and obstruction] would not be [properties] of that [cluster]. [14cd]

b) If you do not accept the cluster as something other than the atoms, then it is proved that the two [shadow and obstruction] are not [properties] of that [cluster].

[Objection]

k) This is mere imaginative speculation about construction. Why do you have this worry about whether it is an atom or a compound? In any case, the characteristic of visible form and the rest is not negated.
XIV

1) de dag gi mtshan nyid gang yin |

   M) mig la sogs pa'i yul nyid dang || sngon po la sogs pa nyid do ||

   N) gang mig la sogs pa'i yul sngon po dang | ser po la sogs ba 'dod pa de ci rdzas gcig pu zhig gam | 'on te du ma zhig ces de dpyad par bya'o ||
XIV

1) kim punas teṣāṁ lakṣaṇaṁ

śaṁ
cakṣurādiśayatvaṁ nilāditvaṁ ca

N) tad evedaṁ sampradāḥyate ( | ) yat tac cakṣurādināṁ viṣayo nilapitādikam iṣyate kin tad ekaṁ dravyam (atha vā ta)d anekam iti |

[Vasubandhu]
1) Then what is their characteristic?

[Objection]
M) Being a sense-field of visual perception and the rest, and blueness and the like [are the characteristic of visible form].

[Vasubandhu]
N) This is precisely what is being determined: is the sense-field of visual perception and the rest you accept as blue, yellow and so on a single substance, or rather multiple?
XV

A) 'dis ci zhig bya zhe na |
B) du ma'i nyes pa ni bshad zin to ||

gcig na rim gyis 'gro ba med ||
zin dang ma zin cig car med ||
ris chad du mar gnas pa dang ||
mig gis mi sod phra ba 'ang med || [15]

B)
nyes pa ] All editions: nges pa
A) kiṇ cātaḥ |

B) anekatve doṣa uktah ||

ekatve na krameṇetir yugapan na grahāgrahau |
vicchinnānekaṃavṛttiś ca sūkṣmāṇikṣā ca no bhavet* || [15 || ]

[Objection]
A) And what [follows] from this?

[Vasubandhu]
B) The fault if it is [judged to be] multiple has already been discussed.

If [the sense object] were singular, there would be no gradual motion, no simultaneous apprehension and non-apprehension, nor divided multiple existence, nor the invisible microscopic. [15]
c) gal te mig gi yul sngon po dang ser po la sogs pa gang yin pa de ris su ma chad de rdzas gcig par rtogs na sa la rim gyis 'gro bar mi 'gyur te | gom pa gcig bor bas thams cad du son pa'i phyir ro || d) tshu rol gyi cha zin la pha rol gyi cha ma zin pa cig car du mi 'gyur te | de'i tshe zin pa dang ma zin pa de mi rigs so ||
c) yadi yāvad avicchinnāṁ n[ī](lādi)cāhaṁ kaṁ caṅkuṣo viṣayas tad ekaṁ dravyaṁ kalpyate pṛthivyāṁ krameṇetir na syāt ( | ) gamanam ity arthāḥ | sakṛtpāda(k)[š]epena sarvasya gatavāt* | d) a(r)vā[g]-bhā[g]asya ca grahaṇaṁ parabhāgasya cāgra(haṇaṁ) yugapan na syāt ( | ) na hi tasayaiva tadāniṁ grahaṇaṁ cāgrahaṇaṁ ca yuktam* |

c) If one imagines the visual sense-object, blue and the rest, as long as it is undivided, to be a single substance, there would not be gradual motion on the ground—going, that is to say—because everything would be traversed with a single foot-step. d) And the apprehension of a facing portion and the non-apprehension of the non-facing portion would not be simultaneous, because the apprehension and non-apprehension of the very same thing at that [same] time is not reasonable.
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glang po che dang rta la sogs pa'i ris su chad pa du ma gcig na 'dug par mi 'gyur te | gcig gang na 'dug pa de nyid na gzman yang 'dug na de dag ris su chad par ji ltar rung | gnyis kyis gang non pa dang ma non pa de dag gcig tu ji ltar rung ste | bar na de dag gis stong pa gzung du yod pa'i phyir ro || gal te mtshan nyid tha dad pa nyid kyis rdzas gzman kho nar rtog gi gzman du ma yin na go | chu'i skye bo phra mo nams kyang chen po dag dang gzungs mtshungs pas mig gis mi sod par mi 'gyur ro ||
And there would be no existence of divided and multiple elephants, horses and so on in a single place; because one thing would be just precisely where another is, how could a division between them be reasonable? Or on the other hand, how is it reasonable that a place is single which is occupied by those two [elephant and horse] and not occupied, since one apprehends that the gap between them is empty of the two? And, if you were to imagine [the two] to have a difference in substance purely because of a distinction in characteristic feature, not otherwise, microscopic aquatic creatures, having forms like macroscopic [creatures], would not be invisible.
XV

1) de'i phyir nges par rdul phra rab tha dad par brtag par bya ste 2) de
dag gcig tu mi 'grub bo 3) de ma grub pas gzugs la sogs pa yang mig la
sogs pa'i yul nyid du mi 'grub ste 4) rnam par rig pa tsam du grub pa yin
no
Therefore [since this is not the case], one must certainly imagine a
distinction atomically. 
And that [atom] is not proved to be singular. Since [the singular atom] is not proven, the fact that visible form—and
the rest—are sense-fields of the visual—and the rest—is unproven; therefore Manifestation-Only comes to be proved.

I) tasmād avaśyaṁ paramāṇuśo bhedaḥ kalpayitavyaḥ ( | ) j) sa caiko na sidhyati | k) tasyāsiddhau rūpādinām caks(u)rādiviṣayatva(m asiddham  
L) i)ti siddham* vijñaptimātram bhavatīti |
A) tshad ma'i dbang gis na yod dam med pa dmigs kyis dbye bar 'gyur la |
tshad ma thams cad kyi nang na mgon sum gyi tshad ma ni mchog
yin no || B) don de med na 'di ni bdag gi mgon sum mo snyam pa blo 'di
ji ltar 'byung zhe na |
XVI

A) pramāṇavaśād astitvaṁ nāstitvaṁ vā nirddhāryate ( | ) sarveṣān ca pramāṇānāṁ pratyakṣam pramāṇaṁ gariṣṭham b) ity asaty arthe ka(tham) iyaṁ buddhir bha(vatī me) pratyakṣam iti ||

[Objection]

A) Existence or non-existence is settled on the strength of the valid means of cognition, and of all valid means of cognition, direct perception is the most important valid means of cognition. b) Therefore, if an external object does not exist, how does this awareness come about, namely ‘this is before my eyes’?

A) pramāṇānāṁ | MS: pranānāṁ
XVI

mngon sum blo ni rmi sog s bzhin || [16a]

c, don med par yang zhes sngar bstan pa nyid do ||

d, de yang gang tshe de yi tshe ||
khyod kyi don de mi snang na ||
de ni mngon sum ji ltar ’dod || [16bcd]
The idea that there is direct perception [of the external object takes place] as in a dream and so on. [16ab]

c) I already earlier made the point that “Even without an external object” [is understood].

Additionally, that external object is not seen [at the moment] when one has [the idea that there is direct perception of an external object]; [so] how can you consider that [the external object] is directly perceived? [16bcd]
d) gang gi tshe yul 'di nyid ni bdag gi mngon sum mo snyam du mngon sum gyi blo de byung ba de'i tshe khyod kyi don de mi snang ste | yid kyi rnam par shes pas yongs su bcad pa dang | mig gi rnam par shes pa yang de'i tshe 'gags pa'i phyir ro || xf) lhag par yang skad cig mar smra bas de mngon sum du ji ltar 'dod || de ltar na de'i tshe gzugs dang rol sogs pa de dag ni 'gags zin to ||
XVI

\[\text{D)}\ yad(ā) \text{ ca sā pratyakṣa(}buddhir \text{ bhava)}\text{tidaṁ me pratyakṣam iti tadā na so }{'}rtho \text{ drṣyate manovijñānenaīva paricchedāc cakṣurviṣṭaṇānasya ca tādā niruddhatvād} \text{ E)} \text{ iti kathām tasya pratyakṣatvam iṣṭām }{'} \text{ vi[ś]e[ś]e[ṇa tu kṣaṇika(}vādino) \text{ }<\text{Gan> yasya tadaṇīṁ niruddham eva tad rūpaṁ rasādikāṁ vā}}\]

\[\text{D)}\ \text{And [at the moment] when that idea [that there is] direct perception [of the external object] comes about with the thought }{'}\text{This is my direct perception,} \text{ that external object is not seen [at that same moment], because the discerning takes place only by means of mental cognition, and because at that time the visual cognition [which precedes the mental cognition] has ceased.} \text{ E)} \text{Given this, how can you accept that that [object] is directly perceived? F)} \text{What is more, [this holds] especially for one who advocates the momentariness [of all things], for whom [the respective] visible form, or flavor and the rest, has [already] entirely ceased at that time.} \]
A) myong ba med par yid kyi rnam par shes pa dran par mi ’gyur bas
B) don gdon mi za bar myong bar ’gyur te | de ni de mthong ba yin no ||
C) de ltar de'i yul gzugs la sogs pa mngon sum du ’dod do zhe na |
XVII

A) nānanubhūtam manovijñānena smaryate ( | ) B) ity avaśyam arthānubhavena bhavitavyam tac ca darśanam ity C) evam tadviṣayasya rūpāde(h) p(r)atyakṣatvaṁ mataṁ |

[Objection]

A) What was not [previously] experienced cannot be recollected by mental cognition. B) Therefore, there must be experience of an external object, and that is spoken of as ‘seeing’. C) In this way I consider it to be a case of an direct perception of that sense-object, [namely] material form and the rest.
D) myong ba ni don dran pa yin no || zhes de ma grub ste | 'di ltar |

   dper na der snang rnam rig bzhin ||
   bshad zin | [17ab]

E) dper na don med par don du snang ba mig gi rnam par shes pa la sogs
   pa'i rnam par rig pa 'byung ba de bzhin te bshad zin to ||

   de las dran par zad | [17b]
XVII

D) asiddham idam anubhūtasyārthasya smaraṇam bhavatīti |
yasmāt* |

uktāṁ yathā tadbhāsā vijñaptih ||

E) vināpy arthena yathārthābhāsā cakṣurviṣṇāṇādikā vijñaptir
utpa(dya)te tathoktaṁ ||

smaraṇaṁ tataḥ |

[Vasubandhu]

D) This [argument about] recollection [being] of an experienced
    external object is unproved, since:

    As I discussed, manifestation has the appearance of that
    [external object]. [17ab]

E) I have discussed how, even in the absence of an external
    object, a manifestation consisting of visual cognition and so forth
    arises with the appearance of an external object.

    Recollection [comes] from that. [17b]
XVII

v) rnam par rig pa de las dran pa dang mtshungs par ldan pa der snang ba nyid gzugs la sogs pa la rnam par rtog pa yid kyi rnam par rig pa 'byung ste | w) dran pa byung ba las don myong bar mi 'grub bo ||

x) dper na rmi lam gyi rnam par rig pa'i yul yod pa ma yin pa de bzhin du | gal te gnyid kyis ma log pa'i tshe na yang | de ltar yin na ni de kho na bzhin du de med par 'jig rten rang rang gis khong du chud pa'i rigs na | y) de ltar yin te | z) de'i phyir rmi lam bzhin du don dmigs pa thams cad don med pa ma yin no zhe na |
For from that manifestation arises a mental manifestation associated with memory, which has precisely the appearance of that [material form] and conceptually fantasizes itself [to refer to] material form and so on; thus the arisal of a memory does not prove the experience of an external object.

[Objection]

If a manifestation were to have as its sense-object an unreal external object also for one awake, just as is the case in a dream, in precisely that way everyone would understand by themselves the non-existence of that [external object]. But that is not how it is. Therefore, it is not so that all referential objectifications of external objects are, as is the case in a dream, [actually] devoid of external objects.
XVII

1) de ni gtan tshigs su mi rung ste | 'di ltar |

rmi lam mthong ba yul med par ||
ma sad bar du rtogs ma yin || [i7cd]

M) de ltar log par rnam par rtog pa la goms pa'i bag chags kyi gnyid kyis
log pa'i 'jig rten ni rmi lam bzhin du yang dag pa ma yin pa'i don
mthong te | N) ma sad kyi bar du de med par ji lta ba bzhin du rtogs pa
ma yin gyi | O) gang gi tshe de'i gnyen po 'jig rten las 'das pa rnam par mi
rtog pa'i ye shes thob nas sad par gyur pa de'i tshe de'i rjes las thob pa
dag pa 'jig rten pa'i ye shes de mngon du gyur nas yul med par ji lta ba
bzhin du khong du chud de de ni mtshungs so ||
XVII

1. idam ajñāpakām* | yasmāt* |

svapnadṛgviṣayābhāvāṁ nāprabuddho 'vagacchati || 17 ||

M) evaṁ vitathavikalpābhāvyāśavāsanānānīdrayā prasupto lokaḥ svapna īvābhūtam artham paśyann aprabuddhas tadabhāvāṁ yathāvan nāvagacchati; o) yadā tu tatpratipakṣalokottarānirvikalpa-jnānalabhāt prabuddho bhavati tadā tatprṣṭhalabdhasuddhalaukika-jnānaśammukhiḥbhāvād viṣayābhāvāṁ yathāvad avagacchatiḥ samāṇam etat* |

[Vasubandhu]

1. You cannot draw a conclusion from this, since:

One who is not awake does not understand the non-existence of a sense-object seen in a dream. [17cd]

M) Just so everyone, asleep with the sleep of repeated perfuming of erroneous conceptual fantasy, sees unreal external objects, as in a dream; n) being unawakened, they do not properly understand the non-existence of the [external object]. o) But when they are awakened through the acquisition of supramundane non-discriminative insight which is the antidote to that [erroneous imagination], then they properly understand the non-existence of the sense-object because the subsequently obtained pure worldly insight becomes present. This [situation] is the same.
A) gal te rang gi rgyud gyur pa'i khyad par nyid las sms can rnam kyi don du snang ba'i rnam par rig pa 'byung gi | don gyi khyad par las ma yin na | b) brten pa de dang bshad pa de med pas sdig pa'i grogs po dang | dge ba'i bshes gnyen la brten pa dang | dam pa dang dam pa ma yin pa'i chos mnyan pa las sms can rnam kyis rnam par rig pa nges pa ji ltar 'grub par 'gyur |
XVIII

A) yadi svasantānapariṇāmaviśeṣād eva satvānāṁ arthaprati-
bhāsā vijñaptaya utpadyante nārthaviśeṣ.ū.śāt* | B) tadā ya eṣa pāpa-
kalyāṇamitrāsāmparkāḥ sadasaddharmmaśravanāc ca vijñaptiniyamaḥ
satvānāṁ sa katham [si]dhyāti, asati sadasatsamparke taddeśānāyāṁ
cia |

[Objection]

A) If manifestations with the appearance of external objects
were to arise for beings only through particular transformations of
their own mental continua, not through particular external objects, B)
then how is it proved that association with bad or good spiritual
guides, and hearing true and false teachings, shape the manifestations
of beings, if that association with the good and the bad and that
teaching do not [actually] exist?
gcig la gcig gi dbang gis na ||
rnam par rig pa phan tshun nges || [18ab]

c) sems can thams cad kyi rnam par rig pa phan tshun gyi dbang gis phan tshun du rnam par rig pa rnam snges par 'gyur te | ci rigs su sbyar ro || d) gcig la gcig ces bya ba ni phan tshun no || e) de'i phyir rgyud gzhan gyi rnam par rig pa'i khyad par las rgyud gzhan la rnam par rig pa'i khyad par 'byung gi don gyi khyad par las ni ma yin no ||
Mutual shaping of manifestation is due to their influence on each other. [18ab]

Because all beings exert an influence on each others’ manifestations, there comes to be mutual shaping of manifestation, according to the circumstances. "Mutually" means “reciprocally.” Therefore, a distinct manifestation arises within one mental continuum because of a distinct manifestation within another mental continuum, not because of a distinct external object.
XVIII

rj dper na rmi lam gyi rnam par rig pa'i don med ba bzhin du gal te gnyid kyis ma log pa'i yang de lta na gnyid kyis log pa dang ma log pa na dge ba dang mi dge ba'i las kun tu spyod pa'i 'bras bu phyi ma la 'dod pa dang mi 'dod pa 'dra bar ci'i phyir mi 'gyur |

sems ni gnyid kyis non pas na ||
de phyir rmi dang 'bras mi mtshungs || [18cd]

h de ni 'dir rgyu yin gyi don yod pa ni ma yin no ||
XVIII

\[\text{F) } \text{yadi yathā svapne nirarthikā vijñaptir evaṁ jāgrato (')pi syāt kasmāt kuśalākuśalasamudācāre suntāsuptayos tulyāṁ phalam iṣṭāniṣṭam āyatāṁ na bhavati ( | )}\]

\[\text{G) yasmāt* |}\]

middhenopahataṁ cittāṁ svapne tenāsamaṁ phalam

\[\text{[|18||]}\]

\[\text{H) idam atra kāraṇaṁ na tv arthasadbhāvaḥ |}\]

[Objection]

\[\text{F) If [as you claim] a manifestation were devoid of an external object likewise also for one awake, as is the case in a dream, why do those asleep and those not asleep not come in the future to have the same [karmic] result, desired and undesired [respectively], of [their] wholesome and unwholesome behavior?}\]

[Vasubandhu]

\[\text{G) Since:}\]

\[\text{When one dreams, the mind is overpowered by sloth; thus the result is not the same. [18cd]}\]

\[\text{H) This is the cause in this case, and not [some alleged] real existence of an external object.}\]
XIX

\[ A \]
gal te 'di dag rnam par rig pa tsam du zad na gang la yang lus dang
ngag kyang med pas shan pa la sogs pas gsod pa na lug la sogs pa 'chi
bar ji ltar 'gyur | \[ B \] 'chi ba de des ma byas na ni shan pa la sogs pa srog
gcod pa'i kha na ma tho ba dang ldan par ji ltar 'gyur zhe na |
XIX

A) yadi vijñāptimātram evedāṁ na kasyacit kāyo (')sti na vāk* katham upakramamāṇānāṁ aurabhrikādhīhir urabhādīnināṁ maraṇam bhavati, B) atatkrte vā tanmarane katham aurabhrikādināṁ prāṇātipātāvadyena yogo bhavati ||

[Objection]

A) If this [world] is nothing but Manifestation-Only, and no one has a body or voice, how does the death of rams and others being attacked by butchers come about? B) Or if their death is not due to those [butchers], how does there come to be a connection between the butchers and the crime of taking life?

A) upakramya° MS: anukramya°
'chi ba gzhan gyi rnam rig gi ||
bye brag las de dper bya na ||
'dre la sogs pa'i yid dbang gis ||
gzhan gyi dran nyams 'gyur sogs bzhin || [19]

c
\( \text{dper na 'dre la sogs pa'i yid kyi dbang gis gzhan dag gi dran pa nyams pa dang | rmi ltas su mthong ba dang | 'byung po'i gdon phab par 'gyur ba dang | rdzu 'phrul dang ldan pa'i yid kyi dbang gis te | dper na 'phags pa kā tyā'i bu chen po'i byin gyi brlabs kyis sa ra ṇas rmi ltas su mthong ba dang | drang srong dgon pa pa'i yid 'khrugs pas thags zangs ris bzhin du gzhan gyi rnam par rig pa'i bye brag gis sems can gzhan gyi srog gi dbang po dang mi mthun pa'i 'gyur ba 'ga' 'byung ste | des skal ba 'dra ba'i rgyud kyi rgyun chad pa zhes bya ba 'chi bar rig par bya'o ||} \)

G) skal ba | All editions: bskal pa
Death is a transformation due to a particular manifestation of another, just as the transformation of memory loss and the like of others is due to the mental force of demons and so on. [19]

C) Just as, due to the mental force of demons and so on others come to experience dislocations [including] memory loss, dream visions and possession by ghouls of illness, D) and [this also takes place] due to the mental force of those possessed of superpowers—E) For example, Sāraṇa had a dream vision due to the controlling power of Ārya-Mahākātyāyana, F) and the conquest of Vemacitrin was due to the hostility of the forest ascetics—G) Just so, it is due to the influence of a particular manifestation of another that there arises some transformation of others obstructing the life force, by which there comes to be death, designated as the cutting off of related [mental] continuities. This is how it should be understood.
drang srong khros pas dan ta ka'i ||
dgon pa ji ltar stongs par 'gyur || [20ab]

A) gal te gzhan gyi rnam par rig pa'i bye brag gis sems can dag 'chi bar mi 'dod na | b) yid kyi nyes pa kha na ma tho ba chen po dang bcas pa nyid du bsgrub pa na | bcom ldan 'das kyis khyim bdag nye ba 'khor la bka' stsal pa | c) khyim bdag khyod kyis dan ta ka'i dgon pa dang | ka ling ka'i dgon pa dang ma tang ka'i dgon pa de dag ci zhig gis stongs pa dang | gtsang mar gyur pa ci thos zhes smras pa dang | d) des gau ta ma drang srong rnams khros pas de ltar gyur ces thos so zhes gsol to ||
XX

kathāṁ vā daṇḍakāraṇyaśūnyatvam ṛṣikopataḥ |

A) yadi paravijñaptiśeṣādhipatyāt satvānāṁ maraṇāṁ neṣyate |
B) manodaṇḍasya hi mahāśāvadyatvāṁ sādhayatā bhagavatopālir 
grhapatih pṛṣṭāḥ c) kaccit te grhapate śrutaṁ kena tāni daṇḍakāraṇyāni mātaṅgāraṇyāni kalingāraṇyāni śūnyāni medhyābhūtāni ⟨ | ⟩ Dtenok-
taṁ śrutaṁ me bho gautama ṛṣīṇāṁ manahpradoṣeṇeti ||

Otherwise, how did the Daṇḍaka forest become emptied by 
the sages' anger? [20ab]

A) If you do not accept that beings die because of the influence of a particular manifestation of another [how do you account for what happened in the Daṇḍaka forests?]. B) For the Blessed One, in proving that mental violence is highly objectionable, asked the householder Upāli: C) “Have you heard anything, householder? By whom were the Daṇḍaka forests, the Mātaṅga forests, and the Kalinga forests emptied and made ritually pure?” D) He said: “I have heard, O Gautama, it was through the mental hostility of the sages.”
yid nyes kha na ma tho cher ||
ji ltar de yis 'grub par 'gyur || [20cd]

gal te 'di ltar rtog ste || de la dga' ba ni ma yin pa de dag gis de na gnas
pa'i sems can rnam kha btag gi | drang srong rnam kyi yid 'khrugs
pas dogs pa ni ma yin no zhe na |  3  de ltar na las des lus dang ngag gi
nyes pa rnam pas yid kyi nyes pa ches kha na ma tho ba chen po dang
bcas par 'grub par ji ltar 'gyur te |  6  de'i yid 'khrugs pa tsam gyis sems
can de snyed 'chi bar 'grub bo ||
manodanḍo mahāvadyah kathāṁ vā tena sidhyati || 20 ||

E) yady evaṁ kalpyate, tadabhirasannair amānuṣais tadvāsi-
naḥ satvā utsādītā na tv ṛṣināṁ* manahpradoṣāṁ mṛṭā ity evaṁ sati
kathāṁ tena karmmaṇā manodanḍah kāyavāgdaṇḍābhyām mahā-
vadyatamaḥ siddho bhavati ( | ) o) tan manahpradoṣamātreṇa tāvatāṁ
satvānāṁ* maraṇāt sidhyati |

Or how does that prove mental violence is a great violation?

[20cd]

E) If you were to imagine as follows: beings dwelling there were
annihilated by non-humans favorable to those [sages], rather than
dying due to the mental hostility of the sages— E) if such were the case,
how does that action prove mental violence to be a much greater
violation than physical or verbal violence? o) That is proved by the
death of so many beings solely on account of mental hostility.
XXI

\[ \lambda \text{gal te } \text{di dag rnam par rig pa tsam du zad na gzhan gyi sems rig pas ci gzhan gyi sems shes sam 'on te mi shes she na} | \ \beta \text{'dis ci zhig bya} | \ \gamma \text{gal te mi shes na ni gzhan gyi sems rig pa zhes kyang ci skad du bya} | \ \delta \text{ji ste shes na yang} \]
XXI

A) yadi vijñaptimātram evedaṁ paracittavidaḥ kiṁ paracittam jānantya, atha na, B) kiṁ cātaḥ 1 C) yadi na jānanti kathāṁ paracittavido bhavanti | D) atha jānanti |

[Objection]

A) If this [world] is nothing but Manifestation-Only, do then “those who know other minds” [really] know other minds, or not? B) And what [follows] from this? C) If they do not know, how do they become those who [are spoken of as ones who] know others minds? D) Or they do know [which is only possible if external objects do really exist, in which case]:

1
gzhan sems rig pas shes pa ni ||
don bzhin ma yin ji ltar dper ||
rang sems shes pa | [21abc]

deyang ji ltar don ji lta ba bzhin du ma yin zhe na |
sangs rgyas kyi
spyod yul ji bzhin ma shes phyir | [21cd]

ji ltar de brjod du med pa'i bdag nyid du sangs rgyas kyi spyod yul du
gyur pa de ltar des ma shes pa'i phyir de gnyi ga yang don ji lta ba bzhin
ma yin te | c) log par snang ba'i phyir ro || h) gzung ba dang 'dzin pa'i
rnam par rtog pa ma spangs pa'i phyir ro ||
paracittavidāṁ jñānam ayathārtham* kathāṁ* yathā , 
svacittajñānam* 

E) tad api katham ayathārtham* | 
ajñānād yathā buddhasya gocaraḥ || [21 || ] 

F) yathā tan nirabhilāpyenātmanā b(u)ḥ, ddhānāṁ gocaraḥ | 
tathā tadajñānāt ( ) tad ubhayaṁ na yathārtham g) vitathapratibhāsata- 
tayā m) grāhyagrāhakavikalpasyāprahīṇatvāt* |

How is the knowledge of those who know other minds 
inconsistent with reality?  
[Reply:] It is as with knowledge of one's own mind. [21abc]  

E) How is that [knowledge of one's own mind] also inconsistent 
with reality? 

Because one does not know [other minds or even one's 
own] in the way that [such knowing of minds] is the 
scope of a Buddha. [21cd]  

F) Because we do not know that in the way that that [know- 
ledge] is the scope of the buddhas, with respect to its nature as inexpressible. Both [knowledges, of one's own mind and of those of 
others,] are inconsistent with reality, g) because [all that non-buddhas 
are able to know is an] erroneous appearance. h) This is because they 
fail to reject the conceptual fantasy of subject and object.
A) rnam par rig pa tsam gyis rab tu dbye ba rnam par nges pa mtha’ yas
la gting mi dpogs shing zab pa'i |

rnam rig tsam du grub pa 'di ||
bdag gis bdag gi mthu 'dra bar ||
byas kyi de yi rnam pa kun ||
bsam yas | [22abcd]
XXII

A) anantaviniścayaprabhedāgādhagāṁbhīryāṁ vijñaptimātra-
tāyāṁ ⟨ | ⟩

vijñaptimātratāsiddhiḥ svaśaktisadṛśī mayā |
kṛteyāṁ sarvathā sā tu na cintyā,

A) Because [the idea of] Manifestation-Only has unfathomable depth, its explanations and divisions endless,

I have composed this proof of [the World as] Manifestation-Only according to my ability, but that [fact that the World is nothing but Manifestation-Only] is not conceivable in its entirety. [22abcd]
XXII

b) bdag 'dra bas rnam pa thams cad ni bsam par mi nus te | rtog ge'i spyod yul ma yin pa'i phyir ro || c) 'o na de rnam pa thams cad du su'i spyod yul snyam pa la |

sangs rgyas spyod yul lo [22d]

zhes bya ba smos te | d) de ni sangs rgyas bcom ldan 'das rnams kyi spyod yul te | shes bya thams cad kyi rnam pa thams cad la mkhyen pa thogs pa mi mnga' ba'i phyir ro ||
XXII

B) sarvaprakārā tu sā madṛśaiś cintayitum na śakyā tarkāviṣayatvat* | c) kasya punaḥ sā sarvathā gocara ity āha |

buddhagocaraḥ , [|| 22 || ]

D) buddhānāṁ hi sā bhagavatāṁ sarvaprakāraṁ gocaraḥ sarvākārasarvājñeyajñānāvighātād iti ||

B) However, that [idea of Manifestation-Only] cannot be conceived in all its aspects by those like me, because it is beyond the domain of logical reasoning, c) For whom, then, is this [idea] in all respects the [proper] scope? We reply:

**It is the scope of the buddhas.** [22d]

D) For it is the scope of the buddhas, the Blessed Ones, in all aspects, because their knowledge of all objects of knowledge in all ways is unobstructed.
Colophon

slob dpon dbyig gnyen gyis mdzad pa nyi shu ba'i 'grel pa rdzogs so ||

|| rgya gar gyi mkhan po dzi na mi tra dang | shi len dra bo dhi dang |
zhu chen gyi lo tsä ba ban de ye shes sdes zhus te gtan la phab pa ||
Colophon

viṃśikā vijñaptimātratāsiddhiḥ
kṛtir iyam ācāryavasubandhoḥ ||

This is the Proof of [the World as] Manifestation-Only in Twenty Verses
A composition of the Master Vasubandhu.

viṃśikā ] MS: viṃśatikā
Notes and Commentary

I/II
In his edition, Sylvain Lévi (1925: 3) ‘restored’ the missing first leaf of the Viṃśikā and its autocommentary. Later, Nasu Jisshū (1953: 114) offered a revised version. For these, see below. While most of the reconstructions remain unverifiable, according to the subcommentary of Vairocanaraksita (Kano 2008: 353), phrase 1 (H) should read nārthah kaścid asti. I therefore print this in the Sanskrit text.

Since both of these reconstructions are, with the exception noted above and that discussed below under (B), nothing but speculation, I translate the Tibetan text, distinguishing this translation from that of the extant Sanskrit by use of a smaller type size.

Lévi’s proposal, which has been adopted (uncritically, it seems to me) by almost all scholars, runs as follows, with the insertion of the first verse from his verse manuscript (in roman typeface):

I
A) mahāyāne traidhātukāṁ vijñaptimātraṁ vyavasthāpyate | B) cittamātram bho jinaputrā yad uta traidhātukam iti sūtrāt | C) cittam mano vijñānam vijñaptiś ceti paryāyāḥ | D) cittam atra sasamprayogam abhi-pretāṁ | E) mātram ity arthapratiṣedhārtham |

vijñaptimātram evaitad asadarthāvabhasanāt|
yathā taimirikasyāsatkeśacandrādīdarśanam||

II
A) atra codyate |

yadi vijñaptir anarthā niyamo na deśakālayoḥ|
santānānasyāniyamaś ca yuktā kṛtyakriyā yuktā na ca || 2 ||
Nasu Jishšú (1953: 114) suggested some modifications on this reconstruction, with somewhat more attention to the Tibetan translation:

I

A) mahāyāne traidhātukam vijñaptimātram vyavasthāpyate | B) cittamātram idam bho jinaputrā yad uta traidhātukam iti sūtre vacanat | C) cittam mano vijñānam vijñaptir iti paryāyāḥ | D) tac ca cittam iha sasam-prayogam abhiprāyaḥ | E) mātragrahaṇam arthapraṭiṣedhārtham | F) vijñānam evedam arthapratibhāsam upathyate | G) yathā taimirikānām asatkeśacandrādidarśanam | H) na tu kaścid artho ’sti

II

A) atraitac codyate |

na deśakālanīyamaḥ santānāniyamo na ca |
na ca kṛtyakriyā yukta vijñaptir yadi nārthataḥ || 2 ||

B) kim uktam bhavati | C) yadi vinā rūpādyarthena rūpādvijñaptir upṭadyate na rūpādyarthāt | D) kasmāt kva cid eva deśa upṭadyate na sarvatra | E) tatraiva ca deśe kadācid upṭadyate na sarvadā | F) tatra deśakāle pratiṣṭhitānām sarveśāṁ santānaniyama upṭadyate na kasya cid eva | G) yathā taimirikasyaiva saṃtānasya keśādayaḥ drṣyante nānyeṣāṁ | H) kasmād yaḥ taimirikayair drṣyate keśabhrāmarādiko na
There is little question that the first word of the treatise is indeed *Mahāyāne*. For this reason I translate as I do, a bit unnaturally in English. Better would be “according to the Great Vehicle,” but in order to preserve the priority of the fundamental term *mahāyāna*, I make this choice in English.

This scripture citation has been much discussed. As La Vallée Poussin (1912: 67n3) and Lévi (1932: 43n1) point out, it should undoubtedly be traced to the *Daśabhūmika-sūtra* (Kondō 1936: 98.8–9), which contains the sentence *cittamātram idam yad idam traiddhātukam*. Various forms of the same are found cited in a range of sources. The inclusion of *bho jinaputrā*, and whether, with Tibetan *dag*, it should be taken as a plural, seems to me to have unnecessarily occupied the attentions of Harada 2000 who, however, does not pay attention to some of the citations offered by Lévi in the above mentioned note (he confessed in 1999: 101n2 that he did not “yet” have access to this book). See also for useful references Harada 2003.

Lévi (1932: 43n2) points to *Abhidharmakośa* II 34ab (Pradhan 1975: 22) *cittam mano 'tha vijñānam ekārtham*, which of course does not take account of *vijñāpti*.

While the Tibetan (and Chinese) translations present these two sentences as prose, the separate Sanskrit manuscript of the verses of the *Vimśatikā* preserves instead a verse:

```
vijñāptimātram evedam asadarthāvabhāsanāt |
yadvat taimirakasyāsatkeśoṇḍūkādidarśanām ||```
This [world] is just Manifestation-Only, because of the appearance of non-existent external objects, as in the case of the seeing of nonexistent hair-nets and so on by one with an eye disease.

There is some discussion concerning the reading of the word keśondūka. In particular, how to read the shape under ṇḍ has been questioned. Dictionaries tell us to expect -u-, but a reading with the manuscript of u is superior from a metrical point of view. On the first two verses see Funahashi 1986 (perhaps one of the first, if not the very first, to have made direct use of the Nepalese manuscripts); not much seems to have been added by Hanneder 2007.

As already noted by La Vallée Poussin (1912: 67n7, and see Lévi 1932: 44m1), the same verse is quoted in the Lokatattvanirṇayā of the Jaina scholar Haribhadrasūri, where it appears in the following form (verse I.74; Suali 1905: 283.16–284.1): vijñaptimātram evaitad asamarthāvabhāsanāt | yathā taimarakasyeha kośakaṭādidarśanam ||, in which at the very least kośa must be read keśa. [Ui 1917:2–3 cites the verse, crediting La Vallée Poussin for its discovery and identification, although most Japanese scholars appear to overlook the clear attribution offered by Ui, as well as La Vallée Poussin's earlier article itself.]

For a partial translation and some observations on Dharmapāla's commentary on timūra, see Chu 2004: 120ff.

III

As La Vallée Poussin (1912: 70n1, followed by Lévi 1932: 46n1) points out, we find a parallel in the Nyāyavārttika (he refers to 528.12 in an edition not available to me; in the edition of Tarkatirtha 1944: 1085.9–13): asaty arthe vijñānabheda drṣṭa iti cet | atha manyase yathā tulyakarmavipākotpannāḥ pretāḥ pūyapūrṇām naḍīṁ paśyanti | na tatra nady asti na pūyam | na hy ekaṁ vastv anekākāraṁ bhavitum arhati | drṣṭaṁ ca vaijñānabhedaḥ | kecit tāṁ eva jalapūrṇāṁ paśyanti kecid rudhira-pūrṇāṁ ity ato ‘vasīyaṁ yathā ‘dhyāte nimitte paśyante iti. This is translated by Jha (1919: 261) as follows: “But even in the absence of real objects we find diversi-
ty in the cognitions.’ You mean by this as follows: —‘From among persons born under the influence of similar destinies, while some (on death) have sight of a river full of pus—though in reality neither the river nor the pus are there; and though one and the same thing cannot have several forms, yet in regard to the same river we find diversity in the cognitions: Some other persons see that same river as full of water, others again as full of blood, and so forth; from all [of] which it follows that in each case the Cognition appears in that particular form in accordance with the inner consciousness of each person, and it has no external basis in the shape of an object.’” The passage continues (Tarkatirtha 1944: 1085.16–1086.4; Jha 1919: 262): deśādinīyamaś ca prāpnoti | ekasmin dese nadiṁ pūyapūrṇāṁ paśyanti no desāntaresu | asaty arthe niyamahetur vaktavyah | yasya punar vidyamānaṁ kenacid ākāreṇa vyavasthitāṁ tasya śeṣo mithyāpratyaya iti yuktam | mithyāpratyayaś ca bhavanto na pradhānaṁ bādhanta iti pūyādipratyayānāṁ pradhānaṁ vaktavyam iti | yathā pūyādipratyayānāṁ evaṁ māyāgandharvanagaramr̥gatṛṣṇāsālīlānāṁ iti. “Further (under the Opponent’s doctrine) there can be no restriction as to place &c.; that is, when no object exists, what would be the reason for the fact that persons see the river of pus in one place, and not another? He for whom there is something really existing in a definite form,—for him it is quite possible that all cognition in any other form should be wrong; and wrong cognitions, if they appear, never completely discard (do away with) their (real) counterpart; so that it behoves the Opponent to explain what is the counterpart of the cognitions of ‘pus’ and the rest; and just as in the case of the cognition of ‘pus’ so also in the case of the cognitions of magical phenomena, imaginary cities, miragic water and so forth (it would be necessary to point to real counterparts).” CD

Tib. takes katham as a separate question, thus for the sake of indicating the correspondence between the versions I add (D) to the Sanskrit text, although in fact there is no boundary here.
DE)
Note that *vināpy arthena* is translated both *don med par* and *don med par yang* in (D) and (E) respectfully. Moreover, the same phrase is translated with the latter in XVI (C), and with the former in XVII (E).
E)
Tib. has no equivalent for *kāla*, instead reading *yul la sog pa*, ‘place etc’.
I)
Tib. has no equivalent for *samaṁ*, which I also do not see in Vinitadeva (176b6–7).
M)
For the Skt. text’s *mūtrapurīṣāḥ*, Tib. has *gcin dang* | *ngan skyugs dang* | *me ma mur dang* | *mchil ma dang* | *snabs*, namely *mūtrapuriṣa*, with the addition of hot ashes (*kukkula*), phlegm/saliva (*kheṭa*), and snot/mucus (*singhāṇaka*). The last two are a set combination, as are the first two, but the inclusion of ashes I have not noticed elsewhere in such a context. The commentary of Vinitadeva and the translations of Paramārtha and Xuanzang agree almost completely with the Skt. text, but Prajñāruci (T. 1588 [XXXI] 65b8–9) lists pus, blood, urine, feces, liquid iron, and flowing water.

IV
I)
In brackets “see” is added on the basis of Tibetan *mthong*.
J)
Chu (2011: 36): “The word *ādhipatya* is a special term in the Yocācāra system: it refers to the mutual influence between different living beings.”
L)
Tib. reverses the order of “dogs and crows” (and adds “et cetera”) both with respect to the Skt. and its own mention in (H) above.
V
A) Tib. has *kyang (*api) after its equivalent of *tirāscām.
B) Tib. has *yang (*api) after its equivalent of *narakēsu.
F) Tib. *yi dags *kyi bye brag dag suggests *pretaviśeṣānām in place of the text's pretañām.

VI
B) The *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (Pradhan 1975: 164.2–4) speaks of: “The forest of iron thorn trees, the sharp thorns of which are 16 fingers long. The thorns turn themselves downwards on beings who climb them, tearing their bodies, and turn themselves upwards on those who descend,” *āyaḥśālmālīvanāṃ tikṣṇaśodāśaṅgulakāntakam | teṣāṃ sat-tvānām abhirohatāṃ kaṇṭakā avāṅmukhiḥ havantaḥ kāyaṃ bhindanti avataratāṃ cordhīḥ havantaḥ.
6c
On the function of go in the Tib. see Silk 2016. I do not understand the reading in the *Vṛtti with ’dug in place of ’dod, found in the verse-only translation.
D) Two cases of *der (*tatra) in the Tib. trans. do not have any correspondent in Skt.

VII
7ab: La Vallée Poussin (1912: 73n4) points out that the half-verse is found in the *Nyāyāvārttika 529.7 (in the edition of Tarkatirtha 1944: 1086.4; Jha 1919: 262).
D) Tib. *smras pa often renders āha (as it does in XIV [I], below)
VIII
B) An important passage for trying to understand the text here is no doubt that in the *Abhidharmaśabdhāśya* chapter 9 (Pradhan 1975: 468.10–15; Lee 2005: 90.1–8; cf. La Vallée Poussin 1923–1931, v.258):

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ASTY EVA PUDGALO YASMĀD UKTAM NĀSTI SATTVA UPAPĀDUKA ITI MITHYĀDRŚTIH | KAŚ CAIVAM ĀHA NĀSTI SATTVA UPAPĀDUKA ITI | SATTVAS TU TATHĀSTI YATHĀ VIBHAKTAKA BHAGAVATETI BRŪNAH* | TASMĀD YĀH PARATROPAPĀDUKASATTVĀ-

KHYASKANDHASANITĀNĀPAVĀDĀNAM KAROTI TASYAIŚĀ MITHYĀDRŚTIR NĀSTI SATTVA

UPAPĀDUKA ITI | SKANDHĀNĀM UPAPĀDUKATVĀT | ATHAIŚĀ MITHYĀDRŚTIH PUDGALĀPAVĀDIKĀ SATĪ KINPRĀHAṬTAVYĀ ṢHAVET | NA HY EŚĀ SATYADARŚAN-

BHĀVANĀPAHĀṬTAVYĀ YUYJYATE | PUDGALASYA SATYEŚV ANANTARbhāvāt |. A very tentative translation of this passage might run: "[The Pudgalavādins assert that] the person really exists because the expression "There does not exist a spontaneously born being" was called a mistaken view. But who [claimed] in this way that "There does not exist a spontaneously born being"? We rather assert that a being does exist, [however] in just the fashion analyzed by the Blessed One. Therefore, this mistaken view that "There does not exist a spontaneously born being" belongs to whomever denies that a continuum of aggregates denominated 'being' may be spontaneously born in another [realm], because it is a fact that the aggregates are spontaneously born. Now, if [you hold that] this denial of the person is a mistaken view, [you must state] how it could be abandoned. For it is not reasonable that it could be abandoned by [the four noble] truths, by vision or by mental cultivation, because the person is not included in the [four noble] truths." *:
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The MS adds *mānusyakasūtre*, but this seems to be an error. See Lee 2005: 90n340, Honjō 2014: 905, §9024. The expression *na 'tthi sattā opapātikā* does occur, however, in MN (117) iii.71,30, *Mahācattārī-

Sakasutta*. More investigation is required to understand the relation between Vasubandhu's positions in the present passage and in the *Abhidharmaśabdhāśya*. Note also that the statement denying the existence of the spontaneously arisen being (*nāsti sattvā upapādukāḥ*)
is found cited in several sources, such as the *Saṅghabhedavastu* of the Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya (Gnoli 1978: 220.28), and the *Prasannapadā* (La Vallée Poussin 1903–1913: 356.7, at which point La Vallée Poussin's n6 refers to DN i.55.18, which contains the same sequence). See also the following.

C) This half verse is frequently cited, for instance in the *Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya* chapter 9 (Pradhan 1975: 466.9; Lee 2005: 74.12), *Prasannapadā* (La Vallée Poussin 1903–1913: 355.4) and in the *Paramārtha-gāthā* 4cd (Wayman 1961: 168).

IX

F) Should we follow the expression in (D) and restore tasyāḥ (*vijñaptes*)?
Note that Tib. has the term neither in (F) nor above in (D).

G) The expression *ity aya[m] (abhi)*prāyaḥ is rendered in Tib. ‘di ni ‘dir *dgongs pa’o,* which might suggest that we restore instead (*atrābhi*)-prāyaḥ, but there does not appear to be enough room in the missing portion of the manuscript leaf to allow this.

X

A) The expression *ko guṇah* appears to be idiomatic. Edgerton (1953 s.v. guṇa) suggests that the meaning ‘advantage,’ for which he refers to the *Mahāvastu,* “is not recorded in this use” in Skt. or Pāli. For another example in a work of Vasubandhu, see the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (Pradhan 1975: 439,6). I have the impression that it occurs in non-Buddhist works as well.

C) The reconstruction of Tibetan *drug po gnyis* presents problems. What is visible in the MS is *dva,* and *va* is certain. We must reconstruct *vijñāna,* of course. The expression in question means ‘two sets of six’ or
'two times six,' namely twelve, the twelve ayatanas (Vinițadeva 183a6–183b1). The, or a, normal Sanskrit way to say this, however, is *dvīṣaṣṭa, but there is no vowel above dva. Paramārtha has here (T. 1589 [XXXI] 71c29) 從唯六雙但六識生, and Xuanzang (T. 1590 [XXXI] 75b28) 論若了知從六二法有六識轉. I follow the suggestion of Harunaga Isaacson that we reconstruct dva(ya)ṣ[a]ṭ(kābhyaṁ vijñā)naṣṭakaṁ, without—as Isaacson emphasizes—insisting that this was indeed the original reading. But it certainly fits the context.

For the Skt. mantā, Tib. has reg pa po = *spraṣṭā. Paramārtha has this same reading (見者乃至無著者), as does Vinițadeva (183b1), while Xuanzang has 見者乃至知者 and Prajñāruci (T. 1588 [XXX] 67a1) 覺者, agreeing with mantā. Akashi (1926: 160n2) wonders whether we should emend the Tibetan to rig pa po (which Sasaki 1924: 48 prints), but seems unconvinced by his own suggestion. reg pa po corresponds to the fifth, but not the sixth, item in the relevant list. The confusion, wherever it lies, seems to come from the (apparent?) contradiction of the presentation in IX (C-E), which limits itself to the visible through the tangible, but X (C) then states the listing to contain 2 × 6 = 12 members, not 10. One version of a listing is found in the Mañjuśrīvikrīḍitā: mthong pa po, nyan pa po, snom pa po, za ba po, reg pa po, rnam par shes pa po = draṣṭā, śrotā, ghrātā, bhoktā, spraṣṭā, vijñātā (draft ed. J. Braarvig at https://www2.hf.uio.no). The (non-Buddhist) list in the Mahābhārata is slightly different (14.20.21): ghrātā bhakṣayītā draṣṭā spraṣṭā śrotā ca paṇcamaḥ | mantā boddhā ca saptaite bhavanti paramartvijāḥ ||. The matter should be carefully considered, paying attention also to Vinițadeva’s commentary.

The Tibetan translation of the verses has bstan pas for what in the Vṛtti is read bstan pa’i (D: bstan pa).

H) Tib. adds yang after its equivalent of vijñaptimātram iti, with rnam par rig pa tsam zhes bya ba de yang med pas representing something like *vijñaptimātram iti tad api nāst(ī)ti, instead of tad api vijñaptimātram
nāstīti, although it seems that itī is made to do double duty here as the quotative zhes bya ba and as the reason represented by pas.

J) api tu is not represented in Tib.

K) Skt. grāhyagrāhakādiḥ parikalpitas is omitted in Tib.

L) Tib. has its equivalent for na tv anabhilāpyenātmanā yo buddhānāṃ viśaya iti as sangs rgyas kyi yul gang yin pa brjod du med pa'i bdag nyid kyi ni med pa ma yin no, which La Vallée Poussin (1912: 76) rendered: “mais elles [= les choses, dharmāḥ] ne sont pas sans exister de l’indicible manière d’être qui est du domaine des Bouddhas.” Paramārtha has (T. 1589 [XXXI] 72a9–10) न धर्माणांत्यप्रवेशो तिब्बत, *dharma- nairātmya-pravesaḥ, as we see in (I).

M) For nairātmya-pravesaḥ Tib. has chos la bdag med par ’jug pa, *dharma- nairātmya-pravesaḥ, as we see in (I).

XII 12:

La Vallée Poussin (1912: 78n1, with additions by Lévi 1932: 52m1) notes a number of citations of this verse, including Prajñākaramati’s Bodhicaryāvatāra-paṇjikā ad IX.87 (La Vallée Poussin 1901–1914: 503.7, with the expression yad uktam ācāryapādaḥ) and Nyāyavarttika (Tarka- tirtha 1944: 1068.20–21; Jha 1919: 243), and see La Vallée Poussin’s detailed note to his translation of the Sarvadarśanasamgraha (1901–1902: 179n77), as well as the citation in the Sarvasiddhāntasamgraha III.12 (edited in La Vallée Poussin 1901–1902: 403).

12b Here and below, Tib. renders Skt. mātra with tsam but (as here) when it means ‘extent’ not ‘only,’ perhaps Tib. tshod would be better.
In the manuscript we find the reading niravayatvā, for what we would expect as niravayavatvā, and the same in XIII (B). The form niravayava is well attested, for instance in Brahmasūtra 2.1.26: kṛtsnaprasaktir niravayavatvāsabdakoṇp vā. However, there are also a number of instances in which the form without final -va also appears. It is not possible at this moment to be absolutely sure that they are erroneous. In the Ekādaśamukhahṛdayam (Dutt 1939: 35–40; input and corrected by Somadeva Vasudeva at http://gretil.sub.uni-goettingen.de/gretil/1_sanskr/4_rellit/buddh/ekmuhr_u.htm, based on the published manuscript [see von Hinüber 2014: 104, item 33a]), corresponding to Dutt’s 38.5–8 we find evaṁ mahārthiko yaṁ mama bhagavat hṛ[dayam] ekavelāṁ prakāśītvā catvāro mūlāpattayah kṣa[yaṁ] gacchanti | pañcāntaryāṇi karmāṇi niravaya<va>m tanvikarisya<n>ti | kah punar vādo athābhāṣītam pratipatsyanti |. Here Vasudeva has restored the form niravayava, although the manuscript writes only niravaya. In the edition of the Mīmāṁsāslokavārttika with the commentary Kāśikā of Sucaritamiśra we find (sub 5.4.103) a sentence printed yadā kaścit sautrāntikam pratyevam sādhyati | ātmā nityaḥ niravayatvāḥ vyomavad iti tadā dharmadharmidvayasya bādhanaṁ bhavati. However, Kei Kataoka writes to me as follows (email 11 IX 2014): “I checked the Adyar manuscript of the Kāśikā. It has anavayavatvā on p. 1863.6. (neither niravayavatvā nor niravayyatvā) [manuscript preserved in the Adyar Library, Chennai, No. 63358, TR 66–4]. I noticed another instance of niravayatve in the Nyāyamaṇjarī, Mysore edition Vol. II 420.6. But the manuscript reads niravayavatve [manuscript preserved in Government Oriental Manuscript Library, Madras (Chennai), R 3583. Malayalam]. So the mistake niravayatva > niravayatva does happen.” Somdev Vasudeva points out to me several other instances in which at least the electronically available versions of the Nyāyamaṇjarī, Jayatīrtha’s Nyāyasudha and several other texts also have the latter form, without -va-.
Skt. arthaṭṭaram is pluralized in Tib. don gzhan rnams. There are several other places in this text where the Tibetan appears to be plural corresponding to singular forms in Sanskrit. In this sentence, I follow the advice of Prof. Schmithausen and connect it with the following verse, but note that this is not the understanding of the Tib. translation, or of Frauwallner, who understands things quite a bit differently here (for convenience I cite the English [2010: 402], but the German is the same [1994: 375]): “(Opponent:) The Individual atoms do not combine with one another because they are partless. Thus, this mistake need not result. When aggregated, they do, however, combine with one another; so say the Vaibhāṣikas of Kaśmir. (Answer:) But the amassment of atoms is nothing other than they themselves.” The Chinese of Parmārtha renders the passage (T. 1589 [XXXI] 72b3–7): 若汝言：「隣虚不得聚集，無方分故。此過失不得故起。是隣虚聚更互相應」。罽賓國毘婆沙師作如此説。則應問之：如汝所説：「隣虚聚物，此聚不異隣虚」，while Xuanzang has (T. 1590 [XXXI] 76a3–5): 加濕彌羅國毘婆沙師言：非諸極微有相合義，無方分故。離如前失。但諸聚色有相合理有方分故。此亦不然. All of these versions, it seems to me, understand the thought to be completed here, rather than continuing into the following verse. Despite this, it is very clear that the Skt. expects a question (te idaṁ praṣṭavyāḥ), and the question does not come until 13ab.

XIV

14ab:

La Vallée Poussin (1912: 79n1) notes the citation in Prajñākaramati’s Bodhicaryāvatārapaṇiṣikā ad IX.87 (La Vallée Poussin 1901–1914: 50210–11), and in Nyāyavārttika 522.10 (Tarkatirtha 1944: 1070.4; Jha 1919: 245), where it is read as digdeśabheda yasyāsti tasyaṅkatvaran na yuyate.

B)

The MS has pā and another illegible character. Tib. ngos suggests the restitution pā(rśv)e (see already La Vallée Poussin 1912: 80).
is that we need *chāyā (Tib. grib ma ’bab par), while the text has only āṭapa (‘sunshine’). Moreover, the syntax with anyatra pārśve bhavaty anyatrātapaḥ suggests, if it does not make quite certain, that something has dropped out between pārśve and bhavaty, which I here conjecturally restore as chāyā. Under this understanding, Skt. anyatrātapaḥ is missing from Tib. However, we find in Vinitadeva (187a7) the following: gal te rdul phra rab cha shas med pa’i phyir phyogs kyi cha tha dad pa med na de’i dus na nyi ma shar ba’i tshe ngos gcig la grib ma ’bab pa gcig tu nyi ma shar bar ji ltar ’gyur, indicating that the text available to Vinitadeva must have had something very close to what I conjecture. See Yamaguchi’s note in Sasaki 1924: 17 (n3 to §14). We find the following in the Nyāyavarttika (Tarkatirtha 1944: 1071.5–10; Jha 1919: 245–246): chāyāvṛtī tarhi na prāpnutaḥ paramāṇor adeśatvād iti | na deśavattvāc chāyāvṛtī | kim tarhi | mūrtimatsparśavattvāt mūrtimat sparśaviśiṣṭam dravyāṁ dravyāntaram āvṛṇoti | kim idam āvṛṇoti | svasaṃbandhitavene-tarasya sambandhaṁ pratiśedhatiḥ | chāyā tu tejāḥparamāṇor āvṛṇat mūrtimataḥ paramāṇanā tejāḥparamāṇur āvṛṇyate yan na chāyetī virala-tejāḥsambandhitī dravyaṃgaṇakarmāṇī chāyety abhidhīyate sarvato vyāvyattejāḥsambandhīni tu tānī tamaḥsaṁjñakānī | tad evaṁ chāyā- vṛtyor anyathāsiddhatvād ahetuḥ |. “In that case, as there would be no points of space in the Atom, there should be no shadow, nor screening.’ But shadow and screening are due, not to presence of space-points, but to corporeality and tangibility; it is only a corporeal and tangible object that screens another object. ‘What is the meaning of this screening?’ What it means is that the Object being itself connected (with something) prevents the connection (with that same thing) of another object. Shadow also is due to the screening of the atoms of light; i.e., the corporeal Atom screens the atom of Light; and there is ‘Shadow’ where this screening takes place. In fact ‘Shadow’ is the name applied to such substances, qualities and actions as are connected with the smaller amount of Light (than the adjacent things); and when those same substances have all light completely turned away from them, they come to be called ‘Darkness.’ Thus, as the phenomena of ‘shadow’ and
'screening' are capable of being otherwise explained, they cannot serve as valid reasons (in support of the proposition that Atoms are made up of parts)."

F) The MS reads sarvaṁ saṁhātaḥ, which I emend to sarvāḥ saṁghātaḥ. Tib. 'dus pa thams cad. The whole sentence is found as follows in Paramārtha (T. 1589 [XXXI] 72b24–25): ज्ञान तत्त्व संपत्तिः,一切六方隣虛同一處故, 則一切聚同隣虚量. These translations demonstrate that sarva must govern saṁghāta. Note, however, that in Xuanzang (T. 1590 [XXXI] 76a21–23): 既不相礙, 應諸極微展轉處同, 則諸色聚同一極微量, this relation is not made clear (as usual, Prajñāruci will require some sorting out).

I) The reading of all Tanjurs, yin no, must be emended in light of the Skt. to *ma yin no. Vinitadeva's commentary (187b6) has mdo sde pas smras pa ma yin no zhes bya ba smos so. See Yamaguchi's note in Sasaki 1924: 17 (n5 to §14).

14cd

vānyo na ] MS (B): vā anyonya; MS (A): vā syātāṁ na. Part of the confusion of the reading may have come about by the commentary's dissolution of the feet of the verse. Tib. has lines cd as grib dang sgrīb pa riltar 'gyur gong bu gzhān min de de'i min, (PT 125: drint dang sgrīb khyang jiltar 'gyur phung myin gal te de de myin). For cd Paramārtha has (T. 1589 [XXXI] 74b1): 影障復云何 若同則無二, while Xuanzang has (T. 1590 [XXXI] 76a16): 無應影障無 聚不異無二. These versions variously suggest the presence in cd of anya—gzhān, khyang, 同 = anya na, more literally 不異. At the same time, however, the 'gyur might suggest itself as an equivalent for syātāṁ, although in the prose of (H) where precisely this verb is found in Skt. it is translated with yin.

M) Tib. appears to have taken this as a verse. However, none of the Chinese versions do so, and the Skt. as we have it is not metrical.
Lévi (1932: 54n1) quotes (and translates) the *Sphuṭārthā Abhidharma* of Yasomitra (Wogihara 1936: 26.11–16) as follows: *Vaibhāṣikāṇāṃ ayam abhiprāyaḥ. nilādigrahaṇaṃ atapāloka-grahaṇaṃ vā samsthānanirapekṣaṃ pravartate. kāvyājñaptīgrahaṇaṃ tu varṇā- nirapekṣaṃ. pariśṭārapāyatanagrahaṇaṃ tu varnasamsthānāpekṣaṃ pravartata iti. Sautrāntikapāksikas tu ayam ācāryo nainam arthaṁ prayacchati. na hi cākṣuṣam etat samsthānagrahaṇaṁ. mānasāṁ tv etat parikalpitam.*

** XV **

B) The emendation to *nyes pa* is supported by the sense, the Skt. and Viṇītadeva (188a7): *gcig bu'i nyes pa 'lang bshad pa nyid de.* See also Yamaguchi’s note in Sasaki 1924: 18 (n8 to §14).

C) Tib. *sngon po dang ser po la sogs pa gang yin pa* suggests *nīlapitādika.* Schmithausen suggests the reading and restoration *n(lādī)kaṇ,* writing that the “ākṣara nā in the ms. may well be a mutilated nī.” This is certainly an attractive solution; immediately earlier in the line in the word sūkṣmānīkṣa (MS: sūkṣmānīkṣā) we see the ākṣara ni, the shape of which is compatible with what is left here at the end of the line (without color photos it is difficult to tell more), and there is likely enough space for two additional ākṣaras, as Schmithausen suggests. The Chinese versions have: Prajñāruci (T. 1588 [XXXI] 68b2–4): 若純一 青物不雜黃等，若人分別眼境界者，行於地中不得說言有次第行； Paramārtha (T. 1589 [XXXI] 72c8–9): 若一切青黃等無有隔別，是眼境界 執為一物，於地則無次第行； Xuanzang (T. 1590 [XXXI] 76b4–5): 若無隔 別所有青等，眼所行境執為一物，應無漸次行大真理. Paramārtha’s version agrees with Tib. in listing blue and yellow, while the others have only blue, supporting the suggested restoration of Skt.

Skt. *gamanam ity arthaḥ* looks like a gloss to clarify *krameṇetiḥ,* it is omitted in Tib., but it is possible that in Prajñāruci’s translation cited immediately above, 不得說言有次第行, “we cannot say that there is
gradual motion," is meant to stand for na syād gamanam ity arthaḥ. Verhagen (1996: 39n95–40n96) points to similar expressions in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (Pradhan 1975: 138.2), eti gaty-arthaḥ, and in the Prasannapada (La Vallée Poussin 1903–1913: 5.1), etir gaty-arthaḥ.

E) The Skt. MS’s anekatra (MS hastyaśvādikasyānekaṭra) is understood in Tib. (gcig na) and elsewhere as *ekatra. Viniṇṭadeva (188b7): de’i tshe gnas gcig gi steng na ’dug pa’i glang po che dang rta la sogs pa du ma ris su chad par ’dug par mi ’gyur ro; Prajñāruci (T. 1588 [XXXI] 68b13) 一處, and Xuanzang (T. 1590 [XXX] 76b7) 一方處 (Paramārtha [T. 1589 (XXXI) 72c11] is unclear). There is no easily imaginable graphic way to account for the manuscript reading as a writing error.

F) I restore the lacuna in the MS vicche(do yujya)te in light of Tib. rung. That is, de dag ris su chad par ji ltar rung = kathāṁ tayor vicche(do yujya)te.

G) The MS has tadaikaṁ, for which I read tad ekam. However, Tib. de dag gcig tu might suggest *te ekam(?).

I add ‘reasonable’ on the basis of Tib. rung. See (F) above.

H) On the grammatical function of go in the Tib. see Silk 2016.

J) Tib. de dag seems to correspond to Skt. sa.

XVI
16c
I do not understand Tib. khyod kyi don as equivalent of so ’artha.

D) Tib. yul ’di nyid apparently corresponds to idam. Here the expression yad(ā) ca sā pratyakṣa(buddhir bhava)tīdāṁ me pratyakṣam iti is rendered gang gi tse yul ’di nyid ni bdag gi mgon sum mo snyam du mgon sum gyi blo de byung ba, but above in (B) ity asaty arthe ka(tham) iyaṁ
buddhir bha(vatīdaṁ me) prayakṣam iti is rendered don de med na 'di ni bdag gi mngon sum mo snyam pa blo 'di ji ltar 'byung zhe na.

Skt. na so (ṛtho dṛṣyate) appears in Tib. as khyod kyi don de mi snang ste.

In manovijñānenaiva, Tib. has no equivalent for eva.

EF) The Skt. expressions iti kathāṁ tasya prayakṣatvam iṣṭaṁ | viṣeṣ(e)ṇa tu kṣaṇika(++)yasya tadānīṁ niruddham eva tad rūpaṁ rasāḍikaṁ vā | correspond to Tib. lhag par yang skad cīg mar smra bas de mngon sum du ji ltar 'dod || de ltar na de'i tse gzugs dang rol sogs pa de dag ni 'gags zin to || This suggests something like *kathāṁ kṣaṇikavādinā tasya prayakṣatvam iṣṭam | evaṁ tu tadānīṁ niruddham tadrūpaṁ rasāḍi-kaṁ vā, perhaps: ‘How do the advocates of the doctrine of momentariness accept direct perception of that [object], given that at that time visible form, flavor and the rest have entirely ceased in that fashion?’ Lévi suggested restoring (sya viṣa), but I see no trace of *viṣaya in Tib. I follow Schmithausen (following Tib. and Frauwallner) in offering kṣaṇika(vādino). Paramārtha (T. 1589 [XXXI] 73a2–4) has: 是塵云何可證, 若人說剎那滅。此人是時執色乃至觸已謝, while Xuanzang translates (T. 1590 [XXXI] 76b24–25): 剎那論者有此覺時, 色等現境亦皆已滅。如何此時許有現量. While the first two support the restitution of vādin, Xuanzang’s version seems close to that in Tib.

XVII

H) Tib. yod pa ma yin pa as a translation of abhūta, which below is yang dag pa ma yin pa.

L) Tib. gtan tshigs, here equivalent to jñāpakā, elsewhere renders kāraṇa. I wonder if this could be due to a confusion, in light of, for example, Mahāvyutpatti §4460 jñāpakahetu = shes par byed pa’i gtan tshigs.
M)
The Nyāyabhāṣya (Tarkatirtha 1944: 1077.4–1078.5; Jha 1919: 255) argues as follows: svapnānte cāsanto viṣayā upalabhyaṁ ity atrāpi hetyavhaḥ | pratibodhe 'nupalambhād iti cet | pratibodhaviṣayopalambhād apratisedhāḥ | yadi pratibodhe 'nupalambhāt svapne viṣayā na santīti tarhi ya ime pratibuddhena viṣayā upalabhyaṁ upalambhāt santīti | viparyaye hi hetusāmarthyaṁ | upalambhāt sadbhāve saty anupalambhād abhāvaḥ siddhyati ubhayathā tv abhāve nānupalambhasya sāmarthyaṁ asti. “In fact there is no reason to show that what are cognised during dreams are non-existent things. 'Inasmuch as things dreamt of are not perceived when the man wakes up, (they must be regarded as non-existent).' [According to this reasoning of yours] inasmuch as we do apprehend the things cognised during the waking state, the existence of these cannot be denied; if, from the fact of our not apprehending, on waking, the things cognised in dreams, you infer that these things are not existent,—then it follows that the things that we do apprehend when awake are existent, because they are apprehended; so that the reason you put forward (in proof of the unreality of things dreamt of) is found to have the power of proving a conclusion contrary to your tenets. It is only when the existence of things can be inferred from their apprehension, that you can infer their non-existence from their non-apprehension. And if under both circumstances (of dream as well as of waking) things were equally non-existent, then non-apprehension could have no power at all (of proving anything).”

N)
Tib. ma sad kyi bar du for aprabuddha understands it as ‘while they are not awake.’

XVIII
B)
In sadasatsamparke, Tib. omits sadasat.
18a
On adhipatya see the note above to IV(J).
C) The expression *yathāyogam*, ‘according to the circumstances,’ is explained by Vinītadeva (192a3–4) as referring to the ways in which one manifests good and bad physical forms in response to interactions with good and evil companions, and the same with good and bad teachings producing mental forms, although there are no externally existing actions at all.

18cd Chu (2011: 36) refers to Dharmakīrti’s *Santānāntarasiddhi* and its commentary (so far available only in fragments), which a propos *anyā-dhipatya* (see the verse here, 18a) reads: *vijñānavādino middhābhi-bhavavibhramad eva pumiso nyasya jñānasyādhipatyam sahakāritvam | tena śunyasya jñānasya vṛttir bhavisyati |*. “For the Vijñāvādin, precisely for the reason of being overpowered by torpor, of illusion, the influence of another person’s cognition is [only] a co-operative causal factor (sahakāritva), the cognition empty of that [influence] would take place.”

H) In *arthasadbhāvah*, Tib. omits *sad*.

XIX

A) Skt. *idam* is rendered ‘*di dag*, and precisely the same in XXI (A), where again we get the expression *yadi vijñāptimātram evedam* rendered *gal te *di dag* *rnam par rig pa tsam*.

Ui (1953: 21 from back) emends the MS’s *anukramyamānānām* to *upakramyamānānām*, and I accept this, although it is hard to explain how the error might have come about. Kano (2008: 356) cites the suggestion of Schmithausen to read *anupakramyamānānām* (Prof. Schmithausen suggests to me that this arose through the simple omission of -pa- in the MS). A meaning of *upa√kram*, however, is ‘attack, do violence to,’ and thus its usage here seems to me fitting. All Chinese versions support this as well. Tib. *gsod pa* is also used by Vinītadeva
Prof. Schmithausen, however, writes to me: “Actually, a negation is found here in Paramārtha's rendering of the passage .... In this case, we may translate: “If everywhere there is only vijñapti, then there is no body and no speech. Why should cows, sheep and other animals, without being injured by the butchers, die? If their death is not effectuated by the butchers, why are the butchers guilty of killing living beings?” Paramārtha's version reads (T. 1589 [XXXI] 73b8–10): 問: 若一切唯有識, 則無身及言。云何牛、羊等畜生非屠兒所害而死。若彼死非屠兒所作, 屠兒云何得殺生罪。The passage in Xuanzang's translation reads (T. 1590 [XXXI] 76c27–28): 若唯有識無身語等, 羊等云何為他所殺。若羊等死不由他害, 屠者云何得殺生罪: “If there is only consciousness, without body or speech, how are rams and the like killed by others? If rams and the like die without being violently treated by others, how does a butcher produce the sin of killing?” Prajñāruci’s translation (T. 1588 [XXXI] 69b4–8) has: 問曰: 若彼三界唯是內心, 無有身口外境界者。以何義故。屠獵師等殺害猪羊等者, 若彼非是屠獵師等殺害猪羊牛馬等者, 以何義故。屠獵師等得殺生罪。是故, 應有外色香等身口境界。At the very least the translation of Xuanzang seems to me to support my suggested reading, with the single negation corresponding to atatkrte và tanmarane. Schmithausen suggests that the first negation (“without being injured by the butchers”) supports the retention of the negation in *an-upakramyamāṇām.

F) Skt. parājayah omitted in Tib. (noted already by Lévi 1925b: 18).


G) Skt. paresāṁ corresponds to Tib. sems can gzhan gyi.
I accept the GNP reading 'byung ste | des under the assumption that des is meant to render Skt. yayā.

The term sabhāgasantati refers to the continuity of moments of mentality, one like moment following the next. Cp. for instance the expression from the Pitṛputrasamāgama quoted in the Śikṣāsamuccaya (Bendall 1897–1902: 253.5): anantarābhāgā cittasaṁtati.

XX

Lévi (1925b: 26–35) discusses the Upāli sūtra in detail, and as he says (1925b: 27) “Par une rencontre singulière, j’ai découvert à la Bibliothèque du Durbar, à Katmandou, un feuillet où se retrouve la citation incorporée par Vasubandhu dans son commentaire.” This folio has been edited anew in Chung and Fukita (2011: 329–337), alongside its Chinese parallel.

C-E)

The quotation in Vasubandhu’s text — kaccit te gṛhapate śrutaṁ kena tāni daṇḍakāraṇyāni mātaṅgāraṇyāni kaliṅgāraṇyāni sūnyāni medhya-bhūtāni tenoktaṁ śrutaṁ me bho gautama ṭsiṇāṁ manahpradoseneti — is parallel to that found in the Upāli-sūtra edited by Chung and Fukita (2011: 335. §17–19): (k)iñcit t(e) gṛhapate śrutaṁ santi daṇḍakāraṇyāni kaliṅgāraṇyāni mātaṅgāraṇyāni sūnyāni medhyāṇy aranyabhūtānītī | śrutaṁ me bho gautama | kiñcit te gṛhapate śrutaṁ kena tāni daṇḍa-kāraṇyāni kaliṅgāraṇyāni mātaṅgāraṇyāni sūnyāni medhyāṇy aranyab-hūtānīty | ... (§25) śrutaṁ me bho gautama riṣīnāṁ manahprakopenti.

XXI

A) See note to XIX (A) above.

B) This expression, which is found in Tib. and Xuanzang but not the other two Chinese versions, may be meant to be Vasubandhu’s words, but might be a rhetorical device of the opponent.
D)
I take the liberty of quoting in full, with his permission, what Prof. Schmithausen wrote to me:

D looks defective. We have an objection in the form: If this world is only manifestation, then what about the *paracittavidah?* Do they know others' mind or not (*atha na? kīṁ cātaḥ?*) ... What regularly follows in such cases is pointing out difficulties in the case of both alternatives: If (*yadi*) X, then difficulty X; if however (*atha, *very often used in the sense of “if however”, “if on the other hand”*) y, then difficulty Y. What is missing here is Y, which might have run thus: “then how can you maintain that there is only *vijñapti* but no external object [because in this case the object, viz., the mind of others, does exist outside the cognition of the *paracittavid*]” (thus Paramārtha and, similarly, Prajñāruci), or: “then *vijñaptimātratā* would not be proved [in this case]” (Xuanzang). I think there is good reason to assume that a piece of text has dropped out here in part of the manuscript tradition, including ms. B and also the manuscript used by the Tibetan translators.

The Chinese of Paramārtha referred to here reads (T. 1589 [XXXI] 73c2–3): 若不知, 云何得他心通。若知, 云何言識無境. Prajñāruci has (T. 1588 [XXXI] 69c29–70a1): 若不知者, 云何說言知於他心。若實知者, 云何說言無外境界, while Xuanzang (T. 1590 [XXXI] 77a19–21) has: 若不能知, 何謂他心智。若能知者, 唯識應不成。雖知他心, 然不如實. With the exception of what may be a gloss added by Xuanzang (not mentioned by Schmithausen), “although they know other minds, [their knowledge] is not in accord with reality,” these three translations agree quite closely with one another.

G)
In accord with the Tib. translation, I attach this to the preceeding. I believe this is also the understanding of Paramārtha (T. 1589 [XXXI] 73c7–8): 此二境界不如是, 此顯現故。能取所取分別未滅故, and Xuanzang (T. 1590 [XXXI] 77a27–28): 此二於境不如實知, 由似外境虛妄顯現故。所取能取分別未斷故.
Skt. *sarvaprakāram* is omitted in Tib.

**Colophon**

As noted in the Introduction, the title is given wrongly by the manuscript: for the manuscript reading *Viṁśatikā* we must read, with all other sources, *Viṁśikā* or *Viṁśaka*. It is probably needless to point out that the text contains not twenty verses but either (with MS [A]) twenty two, or (with MS [B]) (most probably) twenty one.
Sanskrit Variant Readings

The two first verses are found only in the independent verse MS (A); the commentary MS (B) is missing the first folio. It begins with *niyamaḥ* on folio 2. Only in the case of verses is an indication of source necessary, since only MS (B) contains the prose commentary.

\[\text{ac} = \text{before correction}\]
\[\text{pc} = \text{after correction}\]

**II**

J) santānāniyamaḥ | MS: wrongly santānāniiyamaḥ, as if santānān niyamaḥ.

**III**

D) tāvat svapne | MS: tāvan svapne
gramārāmastrīpuṣadikāṁ | MS: reads bhramāṁ. The correction is supported by Tib. and all Chinese versions.

L) pūyapūrṇān | MS: ac pūyaṁ pūrṇan

**IV**

C) anyānyaṁ | MS: anyānair; reading anyonyair would also be possible, but when this Skt. term appears below in XVIII (C) it is translated in Tib. with the very common *phan tshun*, while here we have *gzhan dang gzhan dag gis*.

**V**

B) tiryak° | I read a virāma under the ka.
5b yathā na | MS (A): erroneously yathā ca
5d duḥkhan | MS (A): written duṣkhan or duḥkhan

C° sarīvarttaniyena | MS: nī added in lower margin in the same script with caret to indicate insertion.
VI
A) narakapālādisāṃjñāṁ [MS: ac nana° with second na erased.
B) āgacchanto [MS: āganto
gacchantah [MS: ĥ is not legible or even not present
ayahśāmalī°] Parts of two letters visible but undecipherable; malī??
6d vijñānasya neṣyate ] MS (B): vijñāna(sya) neṣ(ya)t(ε)

VII
7c neṣyate ] MS (B): n(e)ṣy(ate), at the very best (mostly illegible)

VIII
8c uktam ] MS (B): ac uktaṁm, possible but not clear.
C) sahetukāḥ ⟨ || ⟩ ] MS: sahetukā

IX
9c dvividhāyatatanatvena ] MS (A): dvividhāyatatvena
9d tasyā ] MS (A): ac tasyā plus an extra (unnecessary, hence erased) vertical line
   for long vowel
C) rūpapratibhāsa [MS (A): ac rūpā°.
uptyadate tac ca] MS: uptyadate | tac ca
E) pariṇāmaviśeṣapraśtād ] MS: pariṇāmaviśeṣad
spaṣṭavya° ] MS: spaṣṭavya°
F) kāyaspaṣṭavyāyatatanatvena ] MS: kāyaspaṣṭavyāyatatanatvena

X
C) dva(ya)ṣ[a](kābhyaṁ vijñā)naṣṭkaṁ ] MS: dva(+).ṣ.(++ vijñā)naṣṭkaṁ
10b punar ] MS (A): punah
10cd
dēsaṇā ḍharmmanirātmayapraveśaḥ ] MS (B): de[śa]nā dha(r)[m](manai)r-ātmayapraveśaḥ; MS (A): ḍharmmyanirātmayapraveśaḥ

10d
kalpitatmanā ] ] MS (B): ///tātmanā
M)
nairātmayapraveśād ] MS: nairātmayapraveśā

XI
11d
paramāṇur na ] MS (A): erroneously adds ca in margin by na
D)
vaīśeṣikaiḥ anekāṁ ] MS: vaīśeṣikaiḥ | anekāṁ

XII
12a
yugapadyogāṭ ] MS (A): yugpadayogāṭ
C)
śaḍaṇṇatā ] MS: śaḍaṇṇatāṁ
D)
parasparāvyatirekād ] The MS has a small mark resembling a cursive roman letter v between ra and vya, used to indicate that the vowel is to be extended.
G)
niravayavatvāt ] MS (B): niravayatvāt. See in the notes above.

sārīṇghatās ] MS (B): sārīṇhātās
kāśmiravaibhāṣikāḥ ( | | ) ] MS (B): kāśmiravaibhāṣikās
I)
sārīṅghāto ] MS (B): sārīṅhāto

XIII
13b	tatsaṅghāte ] MS (B): tattsāṅhāte
B)
saṅghātā ] MS (B): sāṅghātā

niravayavatvāt ] MS (B): niravayatvāt (see above XII (G)).
sāvayavasyāpi hi ] MS (B): pc sāvayavasyāpi hi with syāpi hi rewritten
saṅghātasya ] MS (B): sāṅghātasya
13c
na ] MS (A): ac nā
13d
tatsamyogo na sidhyati ] MS (B): ta(tsa)myogo na (s)idhyati; MS (A): ac
repeats tatsamyogo na sidhyati.

XIV
A) [p]ū(ṛvadīg)[bh](āgo) ] There seems to have been space for 2 more aksaras to
be restored after go.
iti digbhāgabhede ] MS (B): iti digbha added above line with caret.
14c
chāyārūṭi ] MS (A): ोरुट्टी
B)
pā(ṛśv)[e] ⟨chāyā⟩ bhavaty ] MS (B): pā. [e] bhavaty, to which I add the
conjectured chāyā (see notes above).
F)
sarvah sanighataḥ ] MS (B): sarvaṁ sanīhataḥ
14cd
anyo na ] MS (B): anyonya; MS (A): syātāṁ na. See the note above.
cen na ] MA (A) nna added below line; MS (A): In the margin below tāṁ na pi
in another (more modern) hand is written mi li tā. Harunaga Isaacson
suggests that this (as miliḥ) may be a gloss on piṇḍa: ‘[the atoms]
connected/combined'.
K)
sanighata ] MS (B): sanīhata

XV
15a
krameṇetir ] MS (A): krameṇeti
15d
sūkṣmā° ] Both MSS: sūkṣma°
C)
syāt ( | ) gamanam ] MS (B): syād gamanam
D)
syāt ( | ) na hi ] MS (B): syān na hi
E)
hastyaśvādikasyaikatra ] MS (B): hastyaśvādikasyān ekatra. See the discussion
above.
na syāt ( | ) f] yatraiva ] MS (B): nna syād f] yatraiva
G)
tad ekaṁ ] MS (B): tadaikaṁ

176
I) avaśyaṁ ] MS (B): avavaśyaṁ

XVI
A) pramāṇānāṁ ] MS (B): praṇānāṁ
16a pratyakṣabuddhiḥ ] MS (A): ābuddhi
16b tadā ] MS (A): ac tādā

XVII
17b vijñaptiḥ ] MS (A): vijñapti
17d nāprabuddho ] MA (A) nāprāmbuddho

XVIII
18b mithaḥ ] MS (A): mitha, with tha overwritten.

XIX
A) upakramya° ] MS (B): anukramya° (Ui 1953: 21 from back).
maraṇam ] MS (B): ac maraṇam
B) tanmaraṇe ] MS (B): tat°
19a maraṇaṁ ] MS (A): maraṇa
G) jīvitendriyavirodhinī ] MS (B): jītendriyavirodhinī

XX
20b ṛṣikopataḥ ] MS (B): ṛṣi° inserted in top margin
C) kaccit ] MS (B): kacci
F) karmmaṇā ] MS (B): karmmanā
A) ṛtha, na ] MS (B): ṛtha, na

21b

ayathārthaṁ ] MS (A): ṛtha overwritten, no ṛ visible

21c

ajñānād ] MS (A): adds ṅā in top margin with ˇ

G

grāhakavikalpasyā] MS (B): pc kalpasyā rewritten in cramped space

XXII

22c

kṛteyāṁ ] MS (A): kṛteyāṁ

22d

Colophon

viṁśatikā ] MS (B): ac viṁśitikā

ācāryavasubandhoḥ || ] The scribe adds: grantha<pra>māṇam asya bhāsyasya

160. MS (A): has the colophon viṁśakāvijñaptiprakaraṇam samāptam ||
### Tibetan Variant Readings of the Vṛtti

#### O

*bìng shì kā bṛṭṭi || Č: bìng shì kā brittī || D: bìngshì kā bṛdhi ||*

#### I

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<tr>
<td>A)</td>
<td>gzhag ste</td>
<td>NP: bzhag ste</td>
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<tr>
<td>B)</td>
<td>mdo las</td>
<td>CD: mdo las</td>
<td>phyir ro</td>
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<tr>
<td>C)</td>
<td>rnam par rig pa</td>
<td>N: rnam rig pa</td>
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<td>E)</td>
<td>don dgag pa’i phyir ro</td>
<td>P: don dgag gi phyir ro</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>G)</td>
<td></td>
<td>skra zla</td>
<td>Č: ska zla; N: sgra zla</td>
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#### II

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<td>2a)</td>
<td>don min na</td>
<td>D: don man na</td>
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<tr>
<td>B)</td>
<td>zhe na</td>
<td>C: zhe na</td>
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<tr>
<td>D)</td>
<td>’byung la</td>
<td>N: ’byung ba ma yin</td>
<td>N: ma yin</td>
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<tr>
<td>E)</td>
<td>res ’ga’</td>
<td>D: ras ’ga’ ’byung la</td>
<td>GN(?)P: ’byung ba ma yin</td>
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<tr>
<td>F)</td>
<td>ma yin</td>
<td>G: ma yin</td>
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<tr>
<td>G)</td>
<td>snang gi</td>
<td>C: snang gi ma yin</td>
<td>P: ma yin</td>
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<td>H)</td>
<td>sbrang bu</td>
<td>D: sgrang bu byed la</td>
<td>CG: byed la</td>
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<tr>
<td>I)</td>
<td>mi byed la</td>
<td>CG: mi byed la</td>
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III

3a
'grub ste || C: 'grub sta ||; G: 'grub ste ||
NP: 'gyur te |
C)
ji ltar | NP: ji ltar
zhe na | | N: zhe na
D)
thams cad na ma yin yul de nyid na
yang res 'ga' snang la | GNP: ø
3b
nges pa med | | G: nges pa med ||
3c
yi dags | G: yi dwags (consistently below, not further noted)

G)
rnams kyi dang | N: rnams kyis
H)
ji ltar 'grub | | G: ji ltar 'grub ||
J)
rnag gi | N: rnagi
L)
klung rnag gis | GNP: klung rnag gi
M)
rnag gis gang ba | GNP: rnag gi gang ba
me ma mur | GNP: me mar mur
dbyig pa dang | | GP: dbyig pa dang
srung ba | GNP: bsrungs pa

IV

4a
gnod pa 'dra || | C: gnod pa 'dra |
A)
grub ces | GNP: 'grub ces
rig par bya'o || | DN rig par bya'o |
C)
bzhi 'grub bo | CDG: bzhin 'grub bo
D)
grub ces | GNP: 'grub ces
E)
pas sens can | N: pas serin
(occasionally used, without
discernable pattern; not noted further)
4c
dmyal ba'i | N: dmyal ba'i |
mtong dang || | GNP: mtong dang |
G)
sems can rnams kyis | NP: sens can
rnams kyi
I)
thams cad kyis mtong gi | | GNP:
thams cad kyis mtong gis
gcig 'gas ni | GNP: gcig 'gas na
yin no | N: yino (occasionally below;
not further noted)

O)
sems can dmyal ba pa dag go || | CG:
sems can dmyal ba pa dag go |
rnam par gzhag pa | N: rnam par bzhag
pa
med par 'gyur ro || | D: med par 'gyur ro
|; N: med par 'gyuro | (such
abbreviations not further noted)
P)
gcig gnod pa byed kyang ji ltar | C: gcig
gnod pa byed kyang ji ltar |
ji ltar bur | C: ji ltar | bur
'jigs par | GNP: 'jig par
Q)
sa gzhin | N: sa bzhi
gnod pa byed par 'gyur | | GNP: gnod pa
byed par 'gyur
R)
'byung bar ga la 'gyur | | GN: 'byung bar
gla 'gyur ||
V

A) 'byung ste ] P: 'byung ste || (end of folio)
5c de ltar ] verse version has 'di ltar

VI

A) de dag gi ] GNP: de dag gis
las mams kyis ] GNP: las rnams kyi
B) de lta bur yang 'gyur ste ] CD: de lta
bur yang 'grub ste |
dags 'ong ba dang | ] N: dags 'ong ba
dang ||
shal ma li'i ] GNP: shal ma la'i
nags tshal ] N: nag tshal
'gyur ba lta bu ste ] GNP: 'gyur ba de lta
bu ste
6a de'i las kyis ] GNP: de'i las kyi

VII

7b rtog || ] D: rtog |; GNP: rtogs ||
7d mi bya || ] N: mi bya |
A) bag chags de dag ] GNP: bag chags dag
B) rnam par shes par gyur pa ] GNP: rnam
par shes par 'gyur pa
de 'dra bar ] C: de 'da bar

VIII

A) ma yin te ] ] D: ma yin te ||
8b 'dul ba yi ] GNP: 'dul ba'i
8d rdzus te ] CD: brdzus te (P: ba may have
been removed)

B) rdzus te ] CD: brdzus te
bzhin yod do || ] GNP: yod do
zhes ] C: zhis
sems kyi rgyud ] GNP: sems kyi
C) las byung || ] GN: las byung |
IX

A) she na | P: she na ||
9c de yi ] GNP: de'i
B) zhe na | N: zhe na ||
C) de dang | snang ba ] CD: de dang snang ba
D) bcom ldan 'das kyis ] GNP: bcom ldan 'das kyi
go rims | G: go rim
E) bye brag tu | G: bye brag tu pa'i bye brag tu
F) bcom ldan 'das kyis ] G: bcom ldan 'das

X

C) shes pa drug ] P: shes pa
gcig pu ] GNP: gcig po
'jug go | ] D: 'jug go ||
1oc bstan pa'i ] D: bstan pa
1od 'jug 'gyur || ] GNP: 'jug 'gyur |
D) rig pa tsam du ] GNP: rig pa tsam nyid du
F) nyid gzugs la ] N: nyid gzugs (end of line)
G) mtshan nyid kyi ] N: mtshan nyid kyis
'jug go || C: 'jug go ]; GNP: 'jug |
L) sangs rgyas kyi yul | NP: sangs rgyas kyi spyod yul
M) rtogs pa'i phyir | GNP: rtog pa'i phyir
nm par gzhag pas | GNP: nm par bzhag pas
N) don du 'gyur bas | N: don du 'gyur bas
followed by 20 spaces filled with tsegs

XI

A) dgongs pa 'dis ] D: dgongs pa 'das
skye mched yod par ] D: skye mched yang par
gzugs la sog s pa | GNP: gzugs la sog s pa'
rnam par rig pa | N: rnam par rig par
ji ltar rtogs par | GNP: ji ltar rtogs par
B) 'di ltar | ] CD: 'di ltar
C) zhe na | ] C: zhe na ||
D) ngo bor brtags pa'i ] GNP: ngo bor brtags pa'i
rab du ma 'am ] GNP: rab du ma 'am |
XII
A) ce na | CD: ce na
'di ltar || GNP: 'di ltar
12a
drug gis | GNP: drug gis |
C)
12c
gcig gi go | NP: gcig gis go
ji ste | N: ji snyed
na ni | N: nad (see next)

E) des na | N: ni na
G) ma yin gyi | G: ma yin gyis || NP: ma
yin gyis |
I) yin pa de de dag | GNP: yin pa de dag
gzhan rnams | GNP: gzhan nam gzhan

XIII
13d
de | GNP: de'i
B)
rdul phra rab | GNP: rdul phra rab gyi
rnams | N: rnam
shas med | G: shes med
zer cig | D: zer cig
yang sbyor bar | GNP: yang sbyor bas

C) de bas | N: de bas na
D) phra rab rdzas | N: phra rab brdzas
E)

XIV
A)
rdul phra rab kyi | GNP: rdul phra rab gyi
14c
grib dang sgrib | CD: sgrib dang sgrib
B)
re re la phyogs | GNP: re re la yang phyogs
phrazy bab par | GNP: grib mi 'bab par
C)
de la ni | N: de lta ni
D)
phogy_pass| CD: phogy_pass
ji ltar 'gyur | N: ji ltar 'gyur |
E)
gzhan med na | GNP: gzhan med na|
thogs par 'gyur | GNP: thog par 'gyur |
P: thog par 'gyur |
F)
'gyur te | G: 'gyur to
rnams las | CD: rnam las (either form
seems grammatical)
dei yin | GNP: dei yin
I) sdmras pa | GNP: sdmras pa
14d
gong bu | N: gang bu
K) yongs su rtons pa | GNP: yongs su rtag pa
L) yin | CP: yin || N: yino ||
M) dang || GN: dang |
sngon po | N: sngon pa
XV

B) nyes pa | All editions: nges pa
15d mi sod | N: mi bsod
C) gom pa gcig bor | GNP: goms pa gcig bor
D) cha ma zin pa | GNP: cha ma zin pa
H) yin na go | D: yin na go
15d mi 'gyur ro | N: 'gyuro
J) dag gcig | G: dagsig; P dag cig

XVI

A) thams cad kyi | N: thams cad kyis
16b nang na | CD: nang na yang
tshe de yi | GP: che de'i; N: tshe de'i
16c khyod kyi | GNP: khyod kyis
de mi | CD: de min
D) bdag gi | GNP: bdag gis
khyod kyi | GNP: khyod kyis
E) ji ltar 'dod | ] DP: ji ltar 'dod
F) zin to | ] DP: zin to

XVII

B) de ni de | CD: de ni da ma
17a yin no | GNP: yin no
'Di ltar | CGNP: 'di ltar
17c rig bzhin | GNP: rig bzhin
17b bshad zin | GNP: bshad zin nas
E) bzhin te | D: bzhin ta; GNP: bzhin de
G) 'grub bo | D: 'grub bo
I) rigs na | GNP: rig na
J) de ltar | GNP: de lta
L) 'di ltar | GNP: 'di ltar
17d rtogs ma | GNP: rtog ma
M) mthong te | GNP: mthong ste
XVIII

A) las sems can | C: las sems can followed by 25 spaces filled with tsegs 'byung gi | ] GNP: byung gi
B) brten pa ] GNP: rten pa
de dang ] N: de dang followed by 7 spaces filled with tsegs bshes gnyen la brten pa ] N: bshes gnyen la rten pa
sems can rnams kyis ] GNP: sems can rnams kyi
ji ltar 'grub ] GNP: ji ltar grub 'gyur | ] N: 'gyur ||
C) dbang gis ] N: dbang gi

E) rgyud gzhan gyi ] GNP: rgyud gzhan gyis
'byung gi don ] GNP: 'byung gi don
F) ma log pa na ] P: ma log pa ni
kun tu spyod ] GNP: kun tu spyad 'dod pa 'dra bar ] GNP: 'dod par 'dra bar mi 'gyur | ] N: mi 'gyur
H) rgyu yin gyi ] N: rgyu yin gyis

XIX

A) ji ltar 'gyur | ] GN: ji ltar 'gyur ||
19a rnam rig gi || ] C: rnam rig gi |; GN: rnam rig gi; P: rnam par rig gi
19b bya na || ] GP: bya na |
C) yid kyi dbang gis | GN: yid kyi dbang gi; P: yid kyi dbang gis
gzhan dag gi ] GNP: gzhan dag gis
D) rdzu 'phrul dang ] C: rdzu 'phrul dang |

E) kā tyā'i ] GNP: ka ta'i
byin gi ] GNP: byin gyis
brlabs kyis | N: brlab ma gyis
F) thags zangs ris | GNP: thag bzangs rigs
[ this is the form found in dictionaries ]
G) 'byung ste | des } CD: 'byung ste de skal ba ] All editions: bskal pa
rgyud kyi rgyun chad pa ] GNP: rgyud kyi rgyun 'chad pa
zhes bya ba ] C: zhas bya ba
XX

20a
khros pas ] GNP: khros pa'i
dan ta ] GNP: danta
stongs par ] NP: stong par
A)rnam par rig pa'i ] GNP: rnam par rig
bye brag gis ] G: bye brag gi [folio flip]
gi; NP: bye brag gi
mi 'dod na ] ] GNP: mi 'dod na
B)kha na ma ] GP: kha na
chen po dang ] G: chen po dang |
bsgrub pa na ] ] GNP: sgrub pa na |
bdag nye ba ] GNP: bdag nye bar

21a
dan ta ] GNP: danta
ling ka'i ] NP: lingga'i
dgon pa dang ] GNP: dgon pa dang |
tang ka'i ] GNP: tangga'i
stongs pa ] ] GNP: stong pa

D)zhes smras pa ] GNP: zhes rmas pa (this
is a rarer verb, but smras agrees with
ukta; the Buddha's question itself is
translated with bka' stsal pa)
F)rtog ste || ] NP: rtog ste |
drang srong rnam s kyis ] GNP: drang
srong rnam s kyi

XXI

A)sems rig pas ] GNP: sems rigs pas

XXII

A)rig pa tsam gyis ] GNP: rig pa tsam gyi
rnam par nges pa ] C: rnam par [folio
flip] par nges pa
mi dpogs shing ] GNP: mi dpog shing

21a
shes pa ni || ] N: shes pa ni |

XXII

A)spyon yul snyam ] GNP: spyod yul snyam |
spyon yul te ] GNP: spyod yul snyam

D)spyod yul te ] GNP: spyod yul snyam

Colophon
dbyig gnyen gyis mdzad pa ] GNP: dbyig
gnyen gyi mdzad pa'i

len dra ] GNP: lendra
ban de ] GNP: bande
Sanskrit Reading Text

of the

Vimśikā-vaṛtta
I

... nārthaḥ kaścid asti |

II

......

na deśakālaniyamah santānāniyamah na ca |
na ca kṛtyakriyā yuktā vijñaptir yadi nārthah || 2 ||

......-niyamah santānāniyamah kṛtyakriyā ca na yujyate ,

III

A) na khalu na yujyate , yasmāt ||

deśādiniyamah siddhas svapnavat

B) svapna iva svapnavat | C) kathaṁ | D) tāvat svapne vināpy arthena kvacid eva deśe kiṃcid grāmārāmastriparuṣādikāṁ dṛṣyate na sarvatra tatraiva ca deśe kādācid dṛṣyate na sarvakālam | E) iti siddho vināpy arthena deśakālaniyamah ||

pretavat punah

santānāniyamah ||

F) siddha iti varṭate ; G) pretānām iva pretavat | H) kathaṁ siddhaḥ |

| J) samaṁ

sarvaiḥ pūyanadādīdarśane || 3 ||

K) pūyāpūrṇā nadi pūyanadi | L) gṛṣṭhaṅgatavat | M) tulyakarma-

vipākāvasthā hi pretāḥ sarve 'pi samaṁ pūyapūrṇān naṁ paśyanti naika eva | N) yathā pūyapūrṇāṁ evaṁ mūtrapuriṣādipūrṇāṁ daṇḍā-
sidharaiś ca puṣair adhiṣṭhitām ity ādigranaṇena | N) evaṁ santānāniyamo vijñaptināṁ asaty apy arthe siddhaḥ ||

IV

svapnopaghātavat kṛtyakriyā |
A) siddheta veditavyaṁ || b) yathā svapne dvayamāpattim antareṇa sukravisargalakṣaṇaḥ svapnopaghātaḥ || c) evam tāvad anyāyaṁ drṣṭāntair deśakālaniyamādicatuṣṭayaināṁ siddhāṁ ||

narakavat punaḥ sarvaṁ
d) siddham iti veditavyaṁ || e) narakṣeva iva narakavat || f) kathāṁ siddham ||
narakapālādīdarśane taś ca bādhane ||
yathā hi narakṣeva nāraṅāṁ narakapālādīdarśanaṁ deśakālaniyamena siddhām || h) śvavāyasāyasparvātadyāgaṃanagamanadarsaṇaḥ cety ādigrhaṇena || i) sarveṣaṁ ca naikasyaiva || j) tāś ca tadbādhanaṁ siddham asatsv api narakapālādiṣu samānasvakarma-vipākādhīpātyaṁ || k) tathānyatrápi sarvam etad deśakālaniyamādicatuṣṭayaiṁ siddham iti veditavyaṁ ||

l) kim punaḥ kāraṇaṁ narakapālās te ca śvāna vāyasāś ca satvā nesyaṁte ||

m) ayogāṁ || n) na hi te nāraṅa yujyante tathāva tadduḥkhaḥpratि�samvedanāṁ || o) parasparaṁ yātayatāṁ ime nāraṅa ime narakapālā iti vyavasthā na syāt || p) tulyākṛtipramāṇabalāṁ ca parasparaṁ yātayatāṁ na tathā bhayaṁ syāt || q) dāhauḍṭhaṁ ca pradīptāyāṁ ayomayaṁ bhūmāv asahamanāṁ kathaṁ tatra parāṁ yātayeyuḥ || r) anāraṅāṁ vā naraṅa kutaḥ sambhavaḥ ||

V

A) kathāṁ tāvat tiraścāṁ svarge sambhavaḥ || b) evaṁ narakṣeva tiryakpretvāsiṣṭaṁ narakapālādināṁ sambhavaḥ syāt ||
tiraścāṁ sambhavaḥ svarge yathā na naraṅe tathā ||
na pretāṁyāṁ yatas tajjaṁ duḥkhaṁ nānubhavanti te ||
yathā ||

C) ye hi tiryāṅcaḥ svarge sambhavaṁ te tadbhājanalokasukha-saṁvartanīyaṁ karmanā tatra sambhūtaṁ tajjaṁ sukhaṁ pratyanubhavanti || d) na caiva narakapālādayo nāraṅaṁ duḥkhaṁ pratyanubhavanti || e) tasmān na tiraścāṁ sambhavo yukto || nāpi pretāṁ ||
VI

A) teṣāṁ tarhi nārakāṇāṁ karmabhis tatra bhūtaviśeṣāḥ sambhavanti varṇākṛtipramāṇabalaviśiṣṭā ye narakapālādīsāṁ jñāṁ pratilabhante | B) tathā ca pariṇāmaṁ yad vividham hastavikṣepādi-kriyāṁ kurvanto dṛṣyante bhayotpādanārtheḥ yathā meśāṅtvayaḥ parvata āgaṃchato gacchante ayahśĀlmalivane ca kaṇṭakā adho-mukhibhavanta ūṛddhamukhibhavantaś ceti | C) na te na sambhavanty eva ||

yadi tatkarmabhis tatra bhūtānāṁ sambhavas tathā | īṣyate pariṇāmaṁ ca kiṁ vijñānasya neṣyate || 6 ||

D) vijñānasayaiva tatkarmabhis tathā pariṇāmaḥ kasmāṁ neṣyate | E) kim punar bhūtāni kalpyante || 7 ||

VII

karmaṇo vāsanānyatra phalam anyatra kalpyate | tatraiva neṣyate yatra vāsanā kin nu kāraṇaṁ || 7 ||

A) yena hi karmaṇā nārakāṇāṁ tatra tāḍṛśo bhūtānāṁ sambhavaḥ kalpyate pariṇāmaṁ ca tasya karnaṇo vāsanā teṣāṁ vijñānasamāntanasannivṛṣṭā nānyatra , B) yattraiva ca vāsanā tatraiva tasyāḥ phalaṁ tāḍṛśo vijñānapariṇāmaḥ kin neṣyate | C) yatra vāsanā nāsti tatra tasyāḥ phalaṁ kalpyata iti kim atra kāraṇaṁ |

D) āgamaḥ kāraṇaṁ | E) yadi vijñānam eva rūpādipratibhāsaṁ syān na rūpādiko ‘rthas tadā rūpādyāyatanāstītvair bhagavatā noktaṁ syāt |

VIII

A) akāraṇam etat yasmāt ,

rūpādyāyatanāstītvair tadvineyajanam prati | abhiprāyavaśād uktam upapādūkasatvatvai || 8 ||

B) yathāśi satva upapāduka ity uktaiṁ bhagavatā ‘bhiprāyavaśāc cittasantarātyanucchedam āyatyāṁ abhipreyai |
C) nāstīha satva ātmā vā dharmmās tv ete sahetukāḥ ||

D) iti vacanāt | D evaṁ rūpādyāyanāstītvam apy utkāṁ bhaga-

vātā taddeśanāvīneyajanam adhikṛtyety ābhiprāyikāṁ tad vacanāṁ |

IX

A) ko 'trābhprāyaḥ |

yataḥ svabijād vijñaptir yadābhāsā pravarttate |

dvividhāyatanatvena te tasyā munir abravīt || 9 ||

B) kim uktam bhavati | C) rūpapratibhāsā vijñaptir yataḥ svabijāt

parināmaviśeṣapraṇaptād utpadyate tac ca bijāṁ yatpratibhāsā ca | D) sā te
tasyā vijñaptaś caksūrūpāyatanatvena yathākramaṁ bhagavān abravīt |

E) evaṁ yāvat spraṣṭavyapratibhāsa vijñaptir yataḥ svabijāt parināma-

viśeṣapraṇaptād utpadyate, tac ca bijāṁ yatpratibhāsā ca | F) sā te tasyāḥ
kāyaspraṣṭavyāyatanatvena yathākramaṁ bhagavān abravīd G) ity ayam

abhprāyaḥ |

X

A) evaṁ punar abhiprāyavaśena deśayitvā ko guṇāḥ ||

tathā pudgalanairātmyapraveśo hi ||

B) tathā hi deśyamāne pudgalanairātmyam praviśanti | C) dvayaśaṭka-bhyāṁ vijñānaṣṭakampravartate na tu kaścid eko draṣṭāsti

na yāvan mantety evaṁ viditvā ye pudgalanairātmyadeśanāvīneyāṁ te

pudgalanairātmyam praviśanti ||

anyathā punar

deśanā dharmanairātmyapraveśāḥ ||

D) anyatheti vijñāpitimātrađeśanā | E) kathāṁ dharmanairātmya-

praveśāḥ | F) vijñāpitimātram idaṁ rūpādiharmapratibhāsām utpa-

dyate G) na tu rūpādilkaśano dharmaḥ kaścid astīti viditvā |

H) yadi tarhi sarvathā dharmaṁ nāsti tad api vijñāpitimātraṁ

nāstīti kathāṁ tarhi vyavasthāpyate |
I) na khalu sarvathā dharmo nāstīty evaṁ dharmanairātmaya-praveśo bhavati | J) api tu |
kalpitātmanā , | 10 ||

K) yo bālair dharmanāṁ svabhāvo grāhyagrāhakādiḥ parikalpitas tena kalpitātmanā teṣāṁ nairātmyaṁ | I) na tv anabhilāpyenātmanā yo buddhānāṁ viṣāya iti | M) evam vijñaptimātra-syāpi vijñaptyantaraparikalpitenātmanā nairātmyapraveśād vijñaptimātravyasyavasthāpanaṁ sarvadharmanāṁ nairātmyapraveśo bhavati na tu sarvathā tadastitvāpavādāt | N) itarathā hi vijñapter api vijñapty-antaram arthaḥ syād iti vijñaptimātratvan na sidhyetārthavatītvād vijñaptināṁ |

XI

A) kathāṁ punar idaṁ pratyetavyam anenābhipréyaṇa bhagavatā rūpādyāyatanaṁstitvam uktaṁ na punaḥ saṁty eva tāṁ yāṁ rūpaṁvijñaptināṁ pratyekaṁ viṣayibhavantītī |

B) yasmān
na tād ekaṁ na cānekaṁ viṣayaḥ paramānuśaḥ |
na ca te saṁhatā yasmāt paramāṇur na sidhyati || 11 ||

C) iti | kim uktaṁ bhavati | D) yat tad rūpādikam āyatanaṁ rūpaṁvijñaptināṁ pratyekaṁ viṣayaḥ syāt tad ekaṁ vā syād yathā 'vayavirūpaṁ kalpyate vaiśeṣikāḥ anekaṁ vā paramānuśaḥ saṁhatā vā ta eva paramāṇavāḥ | E) na tāvad ekaṁ viṣaya bhavaty avayavebhyaśvāyavirūpaṁ kavicīd apy agrahanāt | F) nāpy anekaṁ paramā-नūṁāṁ pratyekam agrahanāt | G) nāpi te saṁhatā viṣayibhavanti | yasmāt paramaṇur ekaṁ dravyaṁ na sidhyati |

XII

A) kathāṁ na sidhyati |

B) yasmāt |

śaṭkena yugapadyogāt paramāṇoḥ śaḍaṇśatā ||
C) शादभ्यो दिग्भ्याः शादभिः परमाणुभिः युगपद्योगे सति परमाणोऽ शाद्विस्ताः प्राप्नोति | एकस्य यो देशस तत्रान्यायासाम-भवाः |

शान्ताः समानादेशात्वतः पिन्डाः सयद्य अनुमात्रकाः || 12 ||

D) अथा या एवाकस्या परमाणोऽ देशाः सा एवा शान्ताः | E) तेना सर्वेषां समानादेशात्वतः सर्वाः पिन्दाः परमाणुमात्राः सयद् परस्पराभ्यातिरेकाः F) इति ना कास्तिपिन्दो द्रष्याः सयद् G) नावा हि परमानावसं शाम्युञ्ज्यांते निरवायात्वतः | मां भुदे एशा दोषप्रसादाः H) सार्धात्सदुपरस्पराः सार्ढुञ्ज्यांताः इति कास्मिनराविभागिसं || H) ते इति प्राध्यायाः I) या परमाणुनांम सार्घाटो ना सा ते ब्रह्यो 'र्थान्तांत इति ||

XIII

परमाणोऽ शाम्योगे ततसार्घाते 'स्ति कास्या सा ||

A) सार्म्योगा इति वार्त्तते |

na cāनवायात्वत्वेना तत्सार्म्योगो ना सिद्धयति || 13 ||

B) अथा सार्धात्सद् अपि नावा शाम्युञ्ज्यांते ना तर्हि परमाणुनांम निरवायात्वताः सार्म्योगो ना सिद्धायतिः वाकत्वायाः | सावायासयाः हि सार्धात्सदाः सार्म्योगानाभ्युपागमतः || C) अतह परमाणुर तकाः द्रवायाः ना सिद्धयति || D) यदि का परमाणोऽ सार्म्योगा इस्याते यदि वा नेश्याते |

XIV

dिग्भागाभ्धेदो यस्यांस्ति तस्यात्कात्वना युज्याते |

A) अन्यो हि परमाणोऽ वृवपदिग्भागो यावद अधोदिग्भागा इति दिग्भागाभ्धेदे सति काथां तदात्मकाया परमाणोऽ एकत्वाः योक्ष्याते |

c) चायावर्तति काथां वा |

B) यद्य एवाकस्या परमाणोऽ दिग्भागाभ्धेदो ना सयद्य एदितयो-दये काथां अन्यत्रा पार्वेण चायाः भवत्य अन्यातातापः || E) ना हि तस्यायनां प्रदेशो 'स्ति यत्रातापो ना सयात् || D) एवाराणाः का काथां भवति
paramāṇoḥ paramāṇvantareṇa yadi digbhāgabheda nesyaḥ | e) na hi kaścid anyāḥ parabhāgo 'sti yatragamaṇād anyenānyasya pratīghātaḥ syāt | f) asati ca pratīghāte sarveṣāṁ samānadeśavat sarvāḥ sarīghātaḥ paramāṇumātraḥ syād ity uktam |

g) kim evaṁ nesyaṁ piṇḍasya te chāyāvṛti na paramāṇor iti |

h) kim khalu paramāṇubhyo 'nyaḥ piṇḍa iṣyate yasya te syātāṁ |

i) nety āha |

anyo na piṇḍaś cen na tasya te || 14 ||

j) yadi nānyāḥ paramāṇubhyaḥ piṇḍa iṣyate na te tasyeti siddham bhavati |

k) sanniveṣaparikalpa eşaḥ | paramāṇuḥ saṁghāta iti vā kim anayā cintayā | lakṣaṇan tu rūpādīnaṁ na pratiṣidhyate |

l) kim punas teṣāṁ lakṣaṇaṁ |

m) caṅṣurādiviṣayatvaṁ nilāditvañ ca |

n) tad evedaṁ sampradhāryate | yat tac caṅṣurādināṁ viṣayo nilaṅtādikam iṣyate kin tad ekaṁ dravyam atha vā tad anekam iti |

XV

A) kiṁ cātaḥ |

B) anekatve doṣa uktah ||

ekatve na kramaṇeṣṭir yugapaṁ grahaṁกราห anāgataḥ 

vīcchinnānekaṅvṛttiś ca sūkṣmāṇikṣā ca no bhavet || 15 ||

c) yadi yāvad avicchinnāṁ nilādikaṅ caṅṣuṣo viṣayas tad ekaṁ dravyaṁ kalpyaṁ prthivyāṁ kramaṇeṣṭir na syāt | gamanam ity arthaḥ | sakṛṭpādaṅkeṣeṇa sarvaṁya gaṅgaṁ vartvāḥ | d) arvāṅghāgaṁya ca grahaṇaṁ parabhāgaṁya ca grahaṇaṁ ca yuktam |
E) vicchinnasya cānekasya hastyaśvādikasyaikatrasṛṣṭir na syāt
f) yatraśit hy ekan tatraśivam iti kathan tayor vicchedo yujyate
g) katham vā tad ekaṁ yat prāptaṁ ca tābhyaṁ na ca prāptam antarāle
tacchūnyagrahaḥnāt
h) sūkṣmāṇāṁ codakajantūnāṁ sthūlaḥ samāna-
rūpāṇāṁ anikṣaṇāṁ na syāt
d) yadi lakṣaṇabhedaḥ eva dravyāntarvatvam kalpyate,
nānyathā, tasmād avaśyaṁ paramānuśo bhedāḥ kalpayitavayāḥ
j) sa caiko na sidhyati
k) tasyāsiddhau rūpādinaṁ ca kṣurā-
diviṣayatvam asiddham iti siddham vijñaptimātratram bhavatīti

XVI

A) pramāṇavaśād astitvaṁ nāstitvaṁ vā nirddhāryate
b) sarveśāṁ ca pramāṇāṇāṁ pratyakṣam pramāṇam gariṣṭham
      ity asaty arthe
     katham iyaṁ buddhir bhavatītame pratyakṣam iti
     pratyakṣabuddhiḥ svapnādau yathā
   c) vināpy artheneti pūrvam eva jñāpitaṁ
     sā ca yadā tadā
   na so 'rtho dṛśyate tasya pratyakṣatvaṁ kathāṁ mataṁ
      16
   d) yadā ca sā pratyakṣabuddhir bhavatītame pratyakṣam iti
      tadā na so 'rtho dṛśyate manovijñānenaiva paricchedācakṣurviṣayānasa-
      yca tadā niruddhatvād ekyāthi tamaṁ pratyakṣatvaṁ iṣṭāṁ
   viṣeṣena tu kṣaṇikavādino yasya tadānāṁ niruddham eva tad rūpāṁ
      rasādikām vā

XVII

A) nānanubhūtam manovijñānena smaryate
b) ity avaśyam arthānubhavena bhavatavyaṁ tac ca darśanam ity c) evaṁ tadviṣayasya
      rūpādeḥ pratyakṣatvaṁ mataṁ
   d) asiddham idam anubhūtasyārthasya smaraṇam bhavati
      yasmāt
      uktāṁ yathā tadābhāsā vijñaptītīt
vināpy arthena yathārthābhāsā caśūrviṃjāṇāṅādikā viṃjāṇapīt utpadyate tathoktaṁ ||

smaraṇaṁ tataḥ |

tato hi viṃjāṇapīt saṃpratibhāsaiva rūpādi-vikalpikā manoviṃjāṇapīt utpadyata g) iti na smṛtyutpādārthānu-bhavaḥ sidhyati |

yathā yathā svapne viṃjāṇapīt abhūtarthaviṃṣayā tathā jágrato 'pi syāt p) tathaiva tadabhāvam lokāḥ svayam avagaccheta j) na caivam bhavati k) tasmān na svapna ivārthopalabdhiḥ sarvā nirarthikā |

idam ajñāpakaṁ | yasmāt |

svapnadṛṣṭo viṃṣayābhāvam nāprabuddho 'vagacchati || 17 ||

evaṁ vitathavikalpābhāṣyāsavāsanāṅidrayā prasupto lokāḥ svapna ivābhūtam artham paśyann l) aprabuddhas tadabhāvam yathāvam nāvagacchati , m) yādā tu tatpratipakṣalokottaranirvikalpa-jñānalābhāt prabuddho bhavati tadā tatprṛṣṭhalabdhaśuddhalaukīka-jñānasammukhibhāvād viṃṣayābhāvam yathāvad avagacchati tī tam etat |

A) yadi svasantānaparṇāṃvīṃṣiṣād eva satvānām arthapratibhāsā viṃjāṇaptaya utpadyante nārthaviṃṣiṣāt ||

anyonyādhipatitvena viṃjāṇaptiṇyamo mithaḥ ||

c) sarveśāṁ hi satvānām anyonyavijñāṇapādyādhipatyena mitho viṃjāṇapīt niyamo bhavati yathāyogaṁ m) mithā iti parasarparataḥ n) atāḥ santānāntaraviṃjāṇapādvīṃṣiṣāt santānāntare viṃjāṇapādvīṃṣiṣa utpadyate nārthaviṃṣiṣāt |

yadi yathā svapne nīrarthikā viṃjāṇapīt evaṁ jágrato 'pi syāt kasmāt kuśālākuśalasamudācāre suptāsuptayos tulyāṁ phalām īṣṭānīṣṭaṁ ayatāṇa na bhavati |
G) yasmāt |
middhenopahataṁ cittāṁ svapne tenāsamaṁ phalaṁ || 18 ||

H) idam atra kāraṇāṁ na tv arthasadbhāvaḥ |

XIX

A) yadi vijñaptimātram evedaṁ na kasyacit kāyo 'sti na vāk katham upakramamāṇāṁ aurabhrikādibhir urabhrādināṁ maraṇam bhavati , B) ataktye vā tanmarāṇe katham aurabhrikādināṁ prāṇātipātāvadyena yogo bhavati ||

maraṇāṁ paravijñaptiviśeṣād vikriyā yathā |
smṛtilopādikāṇyeśāṁ piśācādīmanovaśāt || 19 ||

g) yathā hi piśācādīmanovaśād anyeśāṁ smṛtilopasvapna- 

darśanabhūtagrahāveśavikārā bhavanti | d) rddhivanmanovaśāc ca | e) 
yathā sāraṇasyāryamahākātyāyanādhiṣṭānāt svapnadarśanāṁ | f) 
āranyakarṣimanahpradoṣāc ca vemacitrināḥ parājayaḥ | g) tathā para-

vijñaptiviśeṣādhipatyāt pareśāṁ jivitendriyavirodhī kācid vikriyotpadyate yaya ṣabhāgasantaticchedākyam maraṇam bhavatiiti veditavyāṁ |

XX

kathāṁ vā daṇḍakāraṇyaśūnyatvam ṛṣikopataḥ |

A) yadi paravijñaptiviśeṣādhipatyāt satvānāṁ maraṇāṁ nesya-te |
B) manodandaśasya hi mahāsāvadyatvamāṁ sādhayātā bhagavatopālir 
grhapatīḥ prṣṭāḥ c) kaccit te grhapat śrutas kena tāni daṇḍakāraṇyāni 
mātaṅgāraṇyāni kaliṅgāraṇyāni śūnyāni medhyibhūtāni | d) tenoktaṁ 
śrutaṁ me bho gautama ṛṣīnāṁ manahpradosēṇetī ||

manodandaṁ mahāvadyaḥ kathāṁ vā tena sidhyati || 20 ||

E) yady evam kalpyate , tadabhiprasannair amānuṣais tad-

vāsinaḥ satvā utsādita na tv ṛṣīnāṁ manahpradosāṁ mṛtā ity E) evam 
sati kathāṁ tena karmanā manodaṇḍaḥ kāyavāgdaṇḍābhyāṁ mahā-
vadyatamaḥ siddho bhavati | G) tan manahpradosamātreṇa tāvataṁ 
satvānāṁ maraṇatāt sidhyati |
XXI

A) yadi viñaptimātram evedam paracittavidah kim paracittaṁ jānanyat, atha na, B) kim cātah I C) yadi na jānanti kathāṁ paracittavido bhavanti || D) atha jānanti |

paracittavidāṁ jñānam ayathārtham kathāṁ yathā, svacittajñānam

E) tad api katham ayathārtham |

ajñānād yathā buddhasya gocaraḥ || 21 ||

F) yathā tan nirabhilāpyenatmanā buddhānāṁ gocaraḥ | tathā tadajñānāt | tad ubhayām na yathārtham gocaraḥ C) vitathapratibhāsatayā H) grāhyagrāhakavikalpasāyaprahāṇatvāt |

XXII

A) anantaviniścayaprabhedādghāḥagāmbhirāyaṁ viñaptimātratyāṁ |

viñaptimātratāsidhiḥ svaśaktisadṛṣṭi mayā | kṛteyam sarvathā sā tu na cintyā ,

B) sarvaprakārā tu sā mādrśaṁ cintayitum na śakyā tarkkāviṣayatvāt | C) kasya punah sā sarvathā gocara ity āha |

buddhagocaraḥ , || 22 ||

D) buddhānāṁ hi sā bhagavatāṁ sarvaprakāraṁ gocaraḥ sarvākārasarvajñeya jñānāvighatād iti ||

viṁśikā viñaptimātratāsidhiḥ 
krīḍir iyam ācāryavasubandhoḥ ||
English Reading Text
of the
Vimśikā-ṛṛtti
I

[Vasubandhu]

A) The Great Vehicle teaches that what belongs to the triple world is established as Manifestation-Only, because it is stated in scripture: B) “O Sons of the Conqueror, what belongs to the triple world is mind-only.” C) Mind, thought, cognition and manifestation are synonyms. D) And here this ‘mind’ intends the inclusion of the concomitants [of mind]. E) “Only” is stated in order to rule out external objects. F) This cognition itself arises having the appearance of an external object. G) For example, it is like those with an eye disease seeing non-existent hair, a [double] moon and so on, but there is no [real] object at all.

II

[Objection:]

A) To this it is objected:

If manifestation does not [arise] from an external object, it is not reasonable that there be restriction as to time and place, nor nonrestriction as to personal continuum, nor causal efficacy. [2]

B) What is being stated here? C) If there is the arisal of manifestation of material form and so on without any external object of material form and so on, and [consequently the manifestation] does not [arise] from a [real] external object of material form and so on, D) why does [such a manifestation] arise in a particular place, and not everywhere; E) why does it arise only in that place at some time, not always; and F) why does it arise without restriction in the minds of all those present there in that place at that time, and not in [the minds] of just a few? G) For instance, while a hair and so on may appear in the mind of one with eye disease, it does not [appear] to others [free of that disease].
H) Why is it that the hair, bee and so on which appear to one with eye disease have no causal efficacy of a hair and so on, while for those others without [eye disease, those hairs, bees and so forth which appear to them] do have [causal efficacy]? \( \text{i) The food, drink, clothing, poison, weapons and so on seen in a dream do not have causal efficacy [to address] hunger, thirst and the like, but those others not [in a dream] do have such [causal efficacy].} \( j) \) A mirage city, being non-existent, does not have the causal efficacy of a city, but other [cities] not [unreal like] that do. \( k) \) If these [things like dream food] resemble the non-existent in lacking any [real external] object, restriction as to time and place, nonrestriction as to personal continuum, and causal efficacy are not reasonable.

III

[ Vasubandhu ]

A) They are certainly not unreasonable, since:

Restriction as to place and so on is proved, as with dreams.

\([3ab]\)

B) “As with dreams” means as in a dream. \( \text{c} ) \) Well, how, first of all, [do you explain that] even without an external object, some village, grove, man, woman or the like is seen in a dream at a particular place, rather than everywhere, and at that particular place at some specific time, rather than always? \( e) \) For this reason, restriction as to time and place is established, even in the absence of an external object.

Moreover, nonrestriction to personal continuum [is proved] as with hungry ghosts. \( [3bc]\)

F) “Is proved” is carried over [from the previous foot]. \( \text{g} ) \) “As with hungry ghosts” means as in the case of hungry ghosts. \( h) \) How is this proved? \( i) \) Collectively
In their all seeing the river of pus and so on. [3cd]

“The river of pus” means a river filled with pus, as one says a pot of ghee [when one means a pot filled with ghee]. For hungry ghosts in a state of equally experiencing fruition of their actions collectively all see the river filled with pus, not just one of them alone. The word “and so on” is mentioned to indicate that as they see the river filled with pus, they also see it filled with urine, feces and the like, and guarded by persons holding staffs and swords. Thus the non-restriction of manifestations to a specific personal continuum is proved even without the existence of an external object.

IV

Causal efficacy [is proved] as in ejaculation in a dream. [4ab]

“Is proved” is to be understood. [Causal efficacy is established] as with ejaculation in a dream [that is, a wet dream], which is characterized by the emission of semen in a dream in the absence of [actual] sexual union. In this way at the outset is proved, through these various examples, the four-fold [characterization, namely] the restriction to time and place and the rest.

And again as with hell all [four aspects are proved]. [4bc]

“Are proved” is to be understood. “As with hell” means like in the hells. How are they proved?

In the seeing of the hell guardians and so on, and in being tortured by them. [4cd]

Just as it is proved that in the hells hell beings see the hell guardians and so on with restriction as to time and place — “and so
on" means that they see the dogs, crows, the iron mountains and so on coming and going—\(i\) and all [hell beings see these], not merely one, \(j\) and [just as it is] proved that they are tortured by them, even though the hell guardians and so on do not exist, because of the domination of the generalized common fruition of their individual karmic deeds—\(k\). Just so it should be understood that the entirety of this four-fold [characterization, namely] the restriction to time and place and the rest, is proved elsewhere too [and not only in the separate examples].

[Objection]

\(l\) For what reason, then, do you not accept the hell guardians, and dogs and crows, as really existent beings?

[Vasubandhu]

\(m\) Because it is not reasonable. \(n\) For it is not reasonable for those [guardians and so on] to be hell beings, since they do not experience the sufferings of that [place] in precisely that same way. \(o\) If they were torturing each other, there would be no differentiation that ‘these are the hell beings; these the hell guardians.’ \(p\) And if those of equal form, size and strength were torturing each other, they would not be so very afraid. \(q\) And how could [those guardians], unable to tolerate the suffering of burning on a flaming iron ground, torture others there? \(r\) On the other hand, how could non-hell beings be born in hell [in the first place]?

V

[Objection]

\(a\) [Well,] to begin, how [—as you admit as well—] could animals be born in heaven? \(b\) In the same way, animals and certain hungry ghosts might be born in the hells as hell guardians and others.
Animals are not born in hell as they are in heaven,
Nor are hungry ghosts, since they do not experience the suffering produced there. [5]

For, those who are born in heaven as animals, being born there through their karmic deeds conducive to happiness [performed] in the Receptacle World, experience the happiness produced there [in heaven], but the hell guardians and so on do not experience hellish suffering in a similar fashion. Therefore, it is not reasonable that animals are born [in hell], nor is it so for hungry ghosts.

VI

[Objection]

A) Then, particular types of gross material elements arise there through the karmic deeds of those hell beings, which, particularized as to color, form, size and strength, obtain the designations ‘hell guardian’ and so on. And they transform in such a manner that they appear performing activities like waving their hands and so on, in order to instill fear, as mountains in the shape of rams coming and going and thorns in the forest of iron thorn trees turning themselves down and turning themselves up [likewise appear in hell instilling fear]. Therefore, it is not that those [hell guardians and so on] are not born at all.

[Vasubandhu]

If you accept that gross material elements arise there in this fashion through the karmic deeds of those [beings], And [you accept their] transformation, why do you not accept [the transformation] of cognition? [6]
D) Why do you not accept that the transformation thus brought about by the karmic deeds of those [beings] is [a transformation] of cognition itself? E) Why, moreover, are gross material elements imagined [to play any role at all]? F) What is more:

VII

The perfuming of the karmic deed you imagine to be elsewhere than the result;
What is the reason you do not accept [that the result is] in precisely the same location where the perfuming [takes place]? [7]

A) You imagine such an arising and transformation of gross material elements of hell beings there [in hell] as due to their karmic deeds, while the perfuming of those karmic deeds is lodged in their individual continua of cognition, not elsewhere. E) So why do you not accept that such a transformation of cognition as the result of those [karmic deeds] is precisely where the perfuming itself is? C) For what reason, in this case, do you imagine that the result of those [karmic deeds] is somewhere where the perfuming is not?

[Objection]
D) The reason is scripture. E) If there were nothing but cognition with the appearance of material form and the rest, and no external objects characterized as material form and the rest, then the Blessed One would not have spoken of the existence of the sense-fields of material form and the rest.

VIII

[Vasubandhu]
A) This is not a reason, since:
The existence of the sense-fields of material form and the rest were spoken of [by the Blessed One] with a special intention directed toward the individual to be guided by that [teaching], as [in the case of the mention of] beings born by spontaneous generation. [8]

B) By way of example, the Blessed One with a special intention said “There are beings of spontaneous birth,” intending [allusion to] the nonannihilation of the continuum of mind in the future. D) [We know this] because of the [scriptural] statement:

C) Here [in our teaching] there is no being or self, but [only] these elemental factors of existence along with their causes.

E) Thus, although the Blessed One did speak of the existence of the sense-fields of form and the rest, that [scriptural] statement is of special intention since it is directed toward the individual who is to be guided by that teaching.

IX

A) In this regard, what is the special intention?

A manifestation arises from its own proper seed, having an appearance corresponding to that [external object]. The Sage spoke of the two [seed and appearance] as the dual sense field of that [manifestation]. [9]

B) What is being stated? C) The proper seed from which—when it has attained a particular transformation—arises a manifestation having the appearance of visible form, and that as which this [cognition] appears: D) the Blessed One spoke of these two as, respectively, the
sense field of visual perception ["seeing eye" = seed] and the sense field of visible form [= the object] related to that manifestation. E) The same [applies to all items in the stock list] up to: The Blessed One spoke of the proper seed from which—when it has attained a particular transformation—arises a manifestation having the appearance of the tangible, and that as which this [manifestation] appears: v) [the Blessed One spoke] of these two as, respectively, the sense field of tangible perception ["body" = seed] and the sense field of the tangible [= the object] related to that [manifestation]. c) This is the special intention.

X

[Objection]

A) And what is the advantage of having explained things in this way by recourse to special intention?

[Vasubandhu]

For in this way there is understanding of the selflessness of persons. [10ab]

E) For when it is being taught in this way [those individuals to be guided] understand the idea of the selflessness of persons. c) The six cognitions come about from the two sets of six [= the twelve sense-fields], but when they understand that there is no distinct seer at all— [and all members of the stock list] up to—no distinct thinker, those who are to be guided by the teaching of the selflessness of persons understand the idea of the selflessness of persons.

Moreover, teaching in another way leads to the understanding of the selflessness of elemental factors of existence. [10bcd]
“In another way” refers to the teaching of Manifestation-Only. How does this lead to understanding the selflessness of elemental factors of existence? [One understands this by] knowing that this Manifestation-Only arises with the semblance of elemental factors of existence such as material form and the rest, but actually there is no existing elemental factor of existence having as its characteristic mark material form and the rest.

[Objection]

If, then, no elemental factor of existence exists in any fashion, Manifestation-Only does not exist either. How, then, could [your position] be established?

[Vasubandhu]

It is not the case that one comes to understand the selflessness of elemental factors of existence by thinking that the elemental factors of existence do not exist in any fashion at all. But rather [such understanding comes in thinking that elemental factors of existence exist only]:

In terms of an imagined self. [10d]

The reference is to the selflessness of those elemental factors of existence the intrinsic nature of which—characterized by subject and object and so on—fools fantasize in terms of an imagined self. [The reference] is not to [the selflessness of elemental factors of existence] in terms of the inexpressible self, which is the domain of the Buddhas. In this way, Manifestation-Only also leads to an understanding of the selflessness of all elemental factors of existence through the establishment of the fact of Manifestation-Only because of an understanding of selflessness in terms of a self fantasized by another manifestation, not because of a denial of the existence of those [elemental factors of existence] in each and every respect. For
otherwise one manifestation would have another manifestation as its external object, and therefore the fact of Manifestation-Only could not be proved, because manifestations would possess external objects.

XI

[Objection]
A) How, then, should one understand this, namely, that while the Blessed One spoke of the existence of the sense-fields of visible form and the rest with this special intention, those things which come to be the corresponding sense objects of the manifestations of visible form and the rest do not actually exist at all?

[Vasubandhu]
B) Since:

That [sense-field of form and the rest] is not a unitary nor atomically plural sense object, neither are those [atoms] compounded, since the atom [itself] is not proved. [11]

C) What is stated here? D) Whatever sense-field, consisting of visible form and the rest, would be the corresponding sense object of the manifestations of visible form and the rest, would be either unitary—as the Vaiśeṣikas imagine material form as a part-possessing whole—or it would be atomically plural, or it would be compounded of those very atoms themselves. E) First of all, the sense object is not unitary, because there is no apprehension anywhere at all of a material form as a part-possessing whole separate from its parts. F) Nor is it plural, because there is no apprehension of atoms individually. G) Nor would those [atoms], compounded, come to be the sense object, since the atom is not proved to be a singular substance.
[Objection]
A) How is [the atom as a singular substance] not proved?

[Vasubandhu]
B) Since:

Because [either] in the simultaneous conjunction with a group of six [other atoms], the atom [would have to] have six parts, [12ab]

C) If there were simultaneous conjunction with six atoms from the six directions [of possible orientation], this would result in the atom having six parts, because where there is one thing another cannot arise.

[Or] because, the six being in a common location, the cluster would be the extent of a [single] atom. [12cd]

D) Or, the place in which there are six atoms would be precisely the same as the place of the single atom. E) For this [reason], because all of them would be in a common location, the entire cluster would be the extent of a [single] atom, because they would not exclude one another. F) Thus no cluster would be visible at all. G) The Kashmiri Vaibhāṣikas say: “Atoms do not at all conjoin, because of being partless—absolutely not! But compounded things do conjoin one with another.” H) They should be questioned as follows: I) Since a compound of atoms is not something separate from those [atoms],
Given that there is no conjunction of atoms, what is [conjoining] when those [atoms] are compounded? [13ab]

A) “Conjoining” is carried over [from the previous].

But it is also not due to their partlessness that the conjunction of those [atoms] is not proved. [13cd]

B) If you now were to claim that even compounds do not conjoin with one another, then you [Kashmiri Vaibhāṣikas] should not say that the conjunction of atoms is not proved because of their partlessness, for a conjunction of the compounded, even with parts, is not admitted. C) Therefore, the atom is not proved as a singular substance. D) And whether a conjunction of atoms is accepted or not:

It is not reasonable that something with spatial differentiation be singular. [14ab]

A) If there were spatial differentiation of an atom—namely, the front part is different [and so are all the other sides] including the bottom part—how would the singularity of an atom with that [multiple] nature be reasonable?

Or how is there shadow and obstruction? [14c]

B) If no single atom were to have spatial differentiation, how is it that when the sun rises in one place, there is shadow in one place, sunshine in another? C) For that [atom] does not have another portion on which there would be no sunshine. D) And how is an atom
obstructed by another atom if spatial differentiation is not accepted? \(E\)
For [an atom] has no other separate part whatsoever, from contact with which one [atom] would be resisted by another. \(F\) And if there were no resistance, then because all of them would share a common location, the entire compound would be the extent of a [single] atom, as has [already] been discussed [in verse 12cd, above].

[Objection]
\(G\) Do you not accept in this way that the two, shadow and obstruction, belong to the cluster, not to the atom?

[Vasubandhu]
\(H\) Do you, for your part, accept that the cluster which would possess those two [shadow and obstruction] is something other than the atoms?

[Opponent]
\(I\) We say: no.

[Vasubandhu]
\(J\) If the cluster is not other [than the atoms], the two [shadow and obstruction] would not be [properties] of that [cluster]. \([14cd]\)

\(J\) If you do not accept the cluster as something other than the atoms, then it is proved that the two [shadow and obstruction] are not [properties] of that [cluster].

[Objection]
\(K\) This is mere imaginative speculation about construction. Why do you have this worry about whether it is an atom or a compound? In any case, the characteristic of visible form and the rest is not negated.
Then what is their characteristic?

Being a sense-field of visual perception and the rest, and blueness and the like [are the characteristic of visible form].

This is precisely what is being determined: is the sense-field of visual perception and the rest you accept as blue, yellow and so on a single substance, or rather multiple?

And what follows from this?

The fault if it is [judged to be] multiple has already been discussed.

If the sense object were singular, there would be no gradual motion, no simultaneous apprehension and non-apprehension, nor divided multiple existence, nor the invisible microscopic. [15]

If one imagines the visual sense-object, blue and the rest, as long as it is undivided, to be a single substance, there would not be gradual motion on the ground—going, that is to say—because everything would be traversed with a single foot-step. And the apprehension of a facing portion and the non-apprehension of the non-facing portion would not be simultaneous, because the apprehension and non-apprehension of the very same thing at that [same] time is not reasonable.
E) And there would be no existence of divided and multiple elephants, horses and so on in a single place; F) because one thing would be just precisely where another is, how could a division between them be reasonable? G) Or on the other hand, how is [it reasonable that] that [place] is single which is [both] occupied by those two [elephant and horse] and not occupied, since one apprehends that the gap between them is empty of the two? H) And, if you were to imagine [the two] to have a difference in substance purely because of a distinction in characteristic feature, not otherwise, microscopic aquatic creatures, having forms like macroscopic [creatures], would not be invisible.

I) Therefore [since this is not the case], one must certainly imagine a distinction atomically. J) And that [atom] is not proved to be singular. K) Since [the singular atom] is not proven, the fact that visible form—and the rest—are sense-fields of the visual—and the rest—is unproven; L) therefore Manifestation-Only comes to be proved.

XVI

[Objection]

A) Existence or non-existence is settled on the strength of the valid means of cognition, and of all valid means of cognition, direct perception is the most important valid means of cognition. B) Therefore, if an external object does not exist, how does this awareness come about, namely ‘this is before my eyes’?

[Vasubandhu]

The idea that there is direct perception [of the external object takes place] as in a dream and so on. [16ab]

C) I already earlier made the point that “Even without an external object” [is understood].
Additionally, that external object is not seen [at the moment] when one has [the idea that there is direct perception of an external object]; [so] how can you consider that [the external object] is directly perceived? [16bcd]

D) And [at the moment] when that idea [that there is] direct perception [of the external object] comes about with the thought “This is my direct perception,” that external object is not seen [at that same moment], because the discerning takes place only by means of mental cognition, and because at that time the visual cognition [which precedes the mental cognition] has ceased. E) Given this, how can you accept that that [object] is directly perceived? F) What is more, [this holds] especially for one who advocates the momentariness [of all things], for whom [the respective] visible form, or flavor and the rest, has [already] entirely ceased at that time.

XVII

[Objection]

A) What was not [previously] experienced cannot be recollected by mental cognition. B) Therefore, there must be experience of an external object, and that is spoken of as ‘seeing’. C) In this way I consider it to be a case of an direct perception of that sense-object, [namely] material form and the rest.

[Vasubandhu]

D) This [argument about] recollection [being] of an experienced external object is unproved, since:

As I discussed, manifestation has the appearance of that [external object]. [17ab]
I have discussed how, even in the absence of an external object, a manifestation consisting of visual cognition and so forth arises with the appearance of an external object.

Recollection [comes] from that. [17b]

For from that manifestation arises a mental manifestation associated with memory, which has precisely the appearance of that [material form] and conceptually fantasizes itself [to refer to] material form and so on; thus the arisal of a memory does not prove the experience of an external object.

[Objection]

If a manifestation were to have as its sense-object an unreal external object also for one awake, just as is the case in a dream, in precisely that way everyone would understand by themselves the non-existence of that [external object]. But that is not how it is. Therefore, it is not so that all referential objectifications of external objects are, as is the case in a dream, [actually] devoid of external objects.

[Vasubandhu]

You cannot draw a conclusion from this, since:

One who is not awake does not understand the non-existence of a sense-object seen in a dream. [17cd]

But when they are awakened through the acquisition of supramundane non-discriminative insight which is the antidote to that [erroneous imagination], then they prop-
erly understand the non-existence of the sense-object because the subsequently obtained pure worldly insight becomes present. This [situation] is the same.

XVIII

[Objection]

A) If manifestations with the appearance of external objects were to arise for beings only through particular transformations of their own mental continua, not through particular external objects, then how is it proved that association with bad or good spiritual guides, and hearing true and false teachings, shape the manifestations of beings, if that association with the good and the bad and that teaching do not [actually] exist?

Mutual shaping of manifestation is due to their influence on each other. [8ab]

C) Because all beings exert an influence on each others’ manifestations, there comes to be mutual shaping of manifestation, according to the circumstances. “Mutually” means “reciprocally.” Therefore, a distinct manifestation arises within one mental continuum because of a distinct manifestation within another mental continuum, not because of a distinct external object.

[Objection]

F) If [as you claim] a manifestation were devoid of an external object likewise also for one awake, as is the case in a dream, why do those asleep and those not asleep not come in the future to have the same [karmic] result, desired and undesired [respectively], of [their] wholesome and unwholesome behavior?
Since:

When one dreams, the mind is overpowered by sloth; thus the result is not the same. [18cd]

This is the cause in this case, and not [some alleged] real existence of an external object.

XIX

[Objection]

If this [world] is nothing but Manifestation-Only, and no one has a body or voice, how does the death of rams and others being attacked by butchers come about? Or if their death is not due to those [butchers], how does there come to be a connection between the butchers and the crime of taking life?

Death is a transformation due to a particular manifestation of another, just as the transformation of memory loss and the like of others is due to the mental force of demons and so on. [19]

Just as, due to the mental force of demons and so on others come to experience dislocations [including] memory loss, dream visions and possession by ghouls of illness, and [this also takes place] due to the mental force of those possessed of superpowers— For example, Sāraṇa had a dream vision due to the controlling power of Ārya-Mahākātyāyana, and the conquest of Vemacitrin was due to the hostility of the forest ascetics. Just so, it is due to the influence of a particular manifestation of another that there arises some transformation of others obstructing the life force, by which there comes to be death, designated as the cutting off of related [mental] continuities. This is how it should be understood.
Otherwise, how did the Daṇḍaka forest become emptied by the sages’ anger? [20ab]

A) If you do not accept that beings die because of the influence of a particular manifestation of another [how do you account for what happened in the Daṇḍaka forests?]. B) For the Blessed One, in proving that mental violence is highly objectionable, asked the householder Upāli: C) “Have you heard anything, householder? By whom were the Daṇḍaka forests, the Mātaṅga forests, and the Kaliṅga forests emptied and made ritually pure?” E) He said: “I have heard, O Gautama, it was through the mental hostility of the sages.”

XX

Or how does that prove mental violence is a great violation? [20cd]

E) If you were to imagine as follows: beings dwelling there were annihilated by non-humans favorable to those [sages], rather than dying due to the mental hostility of the sages— if such were the case, how does that action prove mental violence to be a much greater violation than physical or verbal violence? G) That is proved by the death of so many beings solely on account of mental hostility.

XXI

[Objection]

A) If this [world] is nothing but Manifestation-Only, do then “those who know other minds” [really] know other minds, or not? B) And what [follows] from this? C) If they do not know, how do they become those who [are spoken of as ones who] know others minds? D) Or they do know [which is only possible if external objects do really exist, in which case]:
How is the knowledge of those who know other minds inconsistent with reality?

[Reply:] It is as with knowledge of one's own mind. [21abc]

F) How is that [knowledge of one's own mind] also inconsistent with reality?

Because one does not know [other minds or even one's own] in the way that [such knowing of minds] is the scope of a Buddha. [21cd]

F) Because we do not know that in the way that that [knowledge] is the scope of the buddhas, with respect to its nature as inexpressible. Both [knowledges, of one's own mind and of those of others,] are inconsistent with reality, F) because [all that non-buddhas are able to know is an] erroneous appearance. H) This is because they fail to reject the conceptual fantasy of subject and object.

XXII

A) Because [the idea of] Manifestation-Only has unfathomable depth, its explanations and divisions endless,

I have composed this proof of [the World as] Manifestation-Only according to my ability, but that [fact that the World is nothing but Manifestation-Only] is not conceivable in its entirety. [22abcd]

B) However, that [idea of Manifestation-Only] cannot be conceived in all its aspects by those like me, because it is beyond the domain of logical reasoning. C) For whom, then, is this [idea] in all respects the [proper] scope? We reply:
It is the scope of the buddhas. [22d]

For it is the scope of the buddhas, the Blessed Ones, in all aspects, because their knowledge of all objects of knowledge in all ways is unobstructed.

Colophon:

This is the Proof of [the World as] Manifestation-Only in Twenty Verses
A composition of the Master Vasubandhu.