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MATERIALS TOWARD THE STUDY OF
VASUBANDHU'S VIMŚIKĀ (I)

Sanskrit and Tibetan Critical Editions
of the Verses and Autocommentary,
An English Translation and Annotations

by
JONATHAN A. SILK

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Preface to the 2018 Open Access Edition

This Open Access edition is provided in accordance with an agreement between myself and Prof. dr. Michael Witzel, editor of the Harvard Oriental Series. It is provided subject to a CC-BY-SA license, which allows anyone to *Share* this document: copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format; and to *Adapt* it in part or in whole: to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially. You must give appropriate credit, provide a link to the license, and indicate if changes were made. You may do so in any reasonable manner, but not in any way that suggests the licensor endorses you or your use. Under this “ShareAlike” license, if you remix, transform, or build upon the material, you must distribute your contributions under the same license as the original.

Immediately upon the publication of the printed version of this book, I became aware, thanks to the very great kindness of two colleagues from Budapest, Ferenc Ruzsa and Mónika Szegedi, of the existence of a very important Dunhuang manuscript, Pelliot tibétain 797. Its readings are on the whole better than those preserved in the Tanjurs I used for the present edition. Had I known of this manuscript, I would certainly have printed many of its readings. I have not revised the edition, however, since I subsequently published Pelliot tibétain 797 as “Materials Toward the Study of Vasubandhu’s *Vimśikā* (II): An edition of the Dunhuang Manuscript Pelliot tibétain 797”, *Revue d’Etudes Tibétaines*, 39, April 2017, pp. 342–360. Interested readers are directed to this (also Open Access) publication, which is presently located at http://himalaya.socanth.cam.ac.uk/collections/journals/ret/pdf/ret_39_07.pdf. Although I have not incorporated the new data of Pelliot tibétain 797 in the present edition, in the course of preparing that material, aside from noticing different (and usually better) readings, I detected several errors in the printed edition. Those errors, noted both in an errata sheet distributed with the edition and in the article cited above, are in the present edition corrected tacitly. For the rest, however, the Tibetan edition remains the same.

The main differences between the present edition and Pelliot tibétain 797 (below PT) are as follows:

3d: klung la rnag la sogs mthong bzhin ||] PT 797: klung la rnag la sogs mthong phyir ||

4d: de dag gis ni gnod phyir ro ||] PT 797: de dagis kyang gnod phyir ro ||

IV J: dngos po la sems can dmyal ba’i srung ma] PT 797: sems can dmyal ba’i srungs ma = Skt.

IV K: de bzhin du gzhan yang] PT 797: de bzhin du gzhan du yang

IV P: ji lta bur] PT 797: de lta bur = Skt.

6c: de bzhin 'gyur bar 'dug na go |] PT 797: de bzhin 'gyur ba 'ang 'dod na go || = Skt.
 VI D: de'i las rnams kyis der] PT 797: de'i las rnams kyis = Skt.
 VI F: *no equivalent in Tanjurs*] PT 797: yang || = Skt. api ca.
 VII A: gzhan ma yin na] PT 797: gzhan na ma yin na = Skt. nānyatra
 VIII B: sems can bzhin yod do ||] PT 797: sems can yod do = Skt.
 IX E: bye brag tu gyur pa'i sa bon gang las byung] PT 797: bye brag tu gyur pa gang las 'byung
 = Skt.
 10a: de ltar gang zag la bdag med par] PT 797: de ltar gang zag bdag myed par; Tanjur text is
 unmetrical!
 10c: bstan pa'i chos la bdag med par] PT 797: bstan pas chos la bdag myed par
 X D: rig pa tsam] PT 797: rīg pa tsam nyid
 X L: sangs rgyas kyī yul] PT 797: sangs rgyas rnams kyī yul = Skt. buddhānām
 X M: chos thams cad la chos la bdag med par] PT 797: chos thams cad la bdag myed par (la
 chos *erased*) = Skt.
 XI D: rnam par rig pa] PT 797: rnam par rīg pa rnams = Skt.
 XI D: ji ltar] PT 797: dper na
 12c: drug po dag kyang go gcig na ||] PT 797: drug po dag gī go gcig na || = Skt.
 XII I: don gzhan rnams ma yin] PT 797: don gzhan ma yin = Skt.
 13b: de 'dus yod pa de gang gis ||] PT 797: de 'dus yod pa de gang gī || = Skt.
 13d: de sbyor mi 'grub ma zer cig |] PT 797: de'i sbyor myi 'grub ma zer chīg | = Skt.
 XIII C: de bas] PT 797: de lta bas na
 14c: grib dang sgrib par ji ltar 'gyur ||] PT 797: grīb dang sgrīb pa ji ltar 'gyur || = Skt.
 XIV E: gang du 'ong ba'i phyogs la] PT 797: gang du 'ong ba'i phyir = Skt.
 XIV G: ci gong bu'i yin pa de ltar yang] PT 797: gong bu'i yin pa de ltar
 XIV I: *text as emended*: smras pa | ma yin no ||] PT 797: smras pa ma yin no || = Skt.
 XV B: *text as emended*: du ma'i nyes pa] PT 797: du ma'i nyes pa = Skt.
 XV J: de dag gcig tu] PT 797: de gcīg tu = Skt.
 XVI B: snyam pa blo] PT 797: snyam ba'i blo; better than Tanjur version
 XVI D: gang gi tshe yul 'di nyid ni] PT 797: gang gī tshe 'dī ni
 XVII A: rnam par shes pa] PT 797: rnam par shes pas = Skt.
 XVII D: myong ba ni] PT 797: myong ba'i = Skt.
 XVII H: ma log pa'i tshe na yang] PT 797: ma log pa na yang
 XVIII B: dge ba'i bshes gnyen la brten pa] PT 797: dge ba'i bshes gnyen la bsnyen pa
 XVIII B: sems can rnams kyis] PT 797: sems can rnams kyī = Skt.
 XVIII H: don yod pa ni ma yin no] PT 797: don yod pa nī rgyu ma yin no
 XIX C: 'byung po'i gdon phab par] PT 797: 'byung po'i gdon phab pas; better reading
 XIX G: sems can gzhan gyi srog] PT 797: gzhan gyī srog = Skt. pareṣāṇ
 XIX G: *text as emended*: des skal ba] PT 797: des skal ba = Skt.
 XX B: bka' stsal pa] PT 797: rmas pa = Skt.
 XX C: zhes smras pa] PT 797: shes rmas pa
 XX E: drang srong rnams kyis] PT 797: drang srong rnams kyī = Skt. ṛṣiṇāṁ
 XXII A: rnam par rig pa tsam gyis] PT 797: rnam par rīg pa tsam gyī; better reading
 XXII B: rtog ge'i spyod yul] PT 797: rtog ge' yul

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Introduction

In 1912 Louis de La Vallée Poussin published an edition of the Tibetan translation of Vasubandhu's *Viṃśikā* and its autocommentary (on the title, see below), accompanied by an annotated French translation, deeply informed by his profound learning. In 1925, thanks to a discovery in Nepal, Sylvain Lévi was able to publish the Sanskrit of the same text (1925a), which he followed with a French translation (1932). Lévi, however, was constrained to work primarily with a hand-copy, and a number of textual problems remained. In the decades since, although all based on Lévi's edition, a number of editions and translations have been published, representing efforts to come to grips with what seems at first glance like a small and simple text. But as many scholars have discovered, while small, it is anything but simple. A great aid toward the further study of the text was made in 1989 by the publication by Mimaki, Tachikawa and Yuyama of (black and white) photographs of the unique palm leaf manuscripts, preserving both the verses and the author's autocommentary. When I first took up work on these manuscripts, I was not aware of any published studies. In the intervening years, however, at least two have appeared, Balcerowicz and Nowakowska (1999) and Tola and Dragonetti (2004). Unfortunately, neither of these efforts is fully satisfactory (neither, moreover, took any serious account of the Tibetan translations). Although I prepared an edition and translation years ago, I hesitated to publish it, due to my conviction that without a thorough study not only of the Chinese translations, but also, crucially, of the commentaries, the text in its traditional understanding would remain plagued with problems.

Having reached the conclusion, however, that I was unlikely to be able in the foreseeable future to assemble the team of specialists necessary to adequately engage, most importantly, with the commentaries, preserved only in Tibetan and Chinese, I decided to concentrate on Vasubandhu's texts, to produce critical editions of the Tibetan versions

of the verses and autocommentary and to present them alongside my edition of the Sanskrit text. I have renounced for the present my idea to accompany these with editions of the Chinese translations, since the problems presented even by the translation of Xuanzang (see below) would have both swelled the work beyond a reasonable size, and delayed its presentation indefinitely. (The other two Chinese translations confront us with even greater challenges.) Of the accuracy of the Sanskrit and Tibetan editions presented below I am more or less confident—meaning that even if I have not understood and emended the texts correctly, at least I have reported their readings accurately. Of the accompanying English translation, I remain in some spots in doubt. It illustrates my understanding, to be sure, but that understanding is anything but firm in more than one place—despite the kind and generous help I have received from a number of friends and colleagues who have been willing, over the years, to offer suggestions on these materials.

It is a genuine pleasure, now precisely 90 years after the publication of Lévi's *editio princeps*, to offer a reedition of this fundamental text. I have read it with students, and presented it at a Leiden Linguistics Summer School, and I thank all who participated. One draft was read by Jowita Kramer, whom I thank for her good suggestions. Lambert Schmithausen, with his characteristic charity and humility, shared "some haphazardly noted stray remarks." These many comments—surely needless to say—vastly improved the presentation. In the very few instances when I have still, stubbornly, disagreed with Prof. Schmithausen, I have given my reasons in the notes. Finally, with his well-known generosity my old friend Harunaga Isaacson, joined by Mattia Salvini, carved out some time to go over the Sanskrit edition with me, and this had—again, needless to say—very positive results. It need hardly be emphasized that none of those who have so generously offered advice is in any way responsible for the errors that remain, but these friends and colleagues are severally and collectively certainly to be credited with any merits the present work may have. In conclusion, I thank Prof. Michael Witzel for doing me the honor of including this volume in the Harvard Oriental Series.

In the materials presented here, my editions of the *kārikās* alone, and of the integral text with its commentary, are based for the Sanskrit respectively on manuscripts A (3a4-4a5) and B (in its entirety) published by Mimaki, Tachikawa and Yuyama (1989). I am grateful for the advice on decipherment and other matters given by Diwakar Acharya during the above-mentioned course in which I taught the text in Leiden in 2007. For the Tibetan, I have utilized the following editions of the Tanjur:

For the *Vimśikā-kārikā* (*nyi shu pa'i tshig le'ur byas pa*):

Cone: *sems tsam, shi* 3a4-4a2.

Derge 4056: *sems tsam, shi* 3a4-4a2.

Ganden 3556: *sems tsam, si* 4a3-5a5.

Narthang 4325: *sems tsam, si* 4a5-5a5.

Peking 5557: *sems tsam, si* 3b1-4b1.

For the *Vimśikā-vṛtti* (*nyi shu pa'i 'grel pa*):

Cone: 3557, *sems tsam, si* 4a2-10a3.

Derge 4057: *sems-tsam, shi* 4a3-10a2.

Ganden 3557: *sems tsam, si* 5a5-13a5.

Narthang 4326: *sems tsam, si* 5a5-10b7.

Peking 5558: *sems tsam, si* 4b1-11a1.

As one would expect, Cone and Derge almost always agree against Ganden, Narthang and Peking. However, this does not mean that the readings of the former are always to be preferred, although they often are. In at least three places, it is clear that all editions have perpetuated an error (XV [B], XIX [G], XIV [I]).

Alongside the 'canonical' Tibetan translation of the verses, we are also lucky to have what plainly represents an earlier form of the translation, preserved in a single manuscript found at Dunhuang, now kept in Paris as Pelliot tibétain 125 (below, PT 125). This was recorded by Lalou (1939: 43) as follows:

- 1) *Vimśikākārikā* (*biñ ċi ka / ka ri ka*). *Ñi-çu-pa dgos-par byed-pa'o*.
Complet? fin: *ñi-çu-pa rjogso*. Cf. *Tanjur*, Mdo LVII,2.
- 2) *Trimśikākārikā* (*triñ ċi ka / ka ri ka*). *Sum-čhu-pa dgos-pa byed-pa'o*. Cf. *Tanjur*, Mdo, XVII, 1.
- 3 f. (7.4 x 28.2) non pag.; 6.1, règl. estampées, petites marges noires, trou à gauche non cerclé; ponct. inters. avec deux points. Papier pelucheux.

I will have nothing further to say here about the *Trimśikā*, but the entire manuscript was earlier transcribed by Ueyama (1987). On the basis of color photographs available on the Artstor website, I have re-read the former portion of the manuscript, containing the verses of the *Vimśikā*, and been able to correct a few of Ueyama's readings. I agree with the following important conclusions offered by Ueyama: copyist errors prove that this manuscript is not an original or fair-copy coming from the translator's pen, but a copy of another manuscript. The similarity of the text to that eventually established in the Tanjurs shows that this version does not represent a different text or translation altogether, but is an earlier form of the later revised translation. There is no chance that it was translated from Chinese. (Ueyama is more cautious, saying that it is not made at least from any of the presently known Chinese versions, but as I show below, errors in understanding of the Sanskrit prove that its direct source must have been in Sanskrit.)

Although I have remarked on some points of interest in the notes to the edition, here I wish to point out some of the peculiarities of this version, in light of both the Sanskrit text and the 'canonical' translation. The first is that unlike the *Vṛtti*, but like the independent translation of the verses in the Tanjurs and Manuscript A of the Sanskrit, PT 125 contains the first verse. This verse also reveals the oddity that PT 125, which elsewhere translates *vijñapti* with *rnam shes*, here renders it *rnam rig*. When *vijñāna* appears in verse 6, PT 125 renders this too with *rnam par shes pa*, the (later?) standard translation equivalent. Further evidence for the copying of PT 125 is found in 1d, which is unmetrical. We might presume that *skra zla la stsogs pa myed mthong bas so* should be understood *skra zla lastsogs pa myed mthong baso*, which would provide (graphically at least) seven syllables. Finally, I do not under-

stand *shes bya ba*, normally *iti*, in 1a; was what is now *evedam* in Sanskrit somehow written in a way that led the Tibetan translators to understand an *iti* there? Verse 2 illustrates the fact that PT 125 follows the Sanskrit word order slavishly; this is particularly clear in d where *vijñaptir yadi nārthataḥ* appears as *rnam shes +on te don myed na+o*. (I do not understand what it means that this verse is followed not by a double shad, as is normal, but by something resembling ལྟེན་པའི་མཐོང་པོ་). A number of other examples of literal rendition of Sanskrit word order are to be found throughout

Verse 15, besides proving that it is based on a Sanskrit (rather than Chinese) original, provides an extreme illustration of the fact that the text in PT 125 required revision. The first line alone contains nothing but errors: the Sanskrit text has *ekatve na krameṇetir*, ‘If [the sense object] were singular, there would be no gradual motion,’ which PT 125 renders *gchigis dang nī rims zhes pa*. Here *gchigis* [*gcig gis*] = **ekatvena* in place of *ekatve na*, and *rims zhes pa* = **krameṇa iti*, understanding *iti* as the quotative particle rather than as a verb (the second member of the compound is perhaps more commonly spelt *eti* than *iti*; for the grammar see Verhagen [1996: 28; 40n96], and my note to this passage). This word evidently motivated some possible misunderstanding in India as well, since the manuscript of the *Vṛtti* includes what I understand as a gloss in XV (C), *gamanam ity arthaḥ*, which would not be necessary unless the word *iti/eti* was liable to misunderstanding. While a detailed study of PT 125 must await another occasion, it is certain that the text recorded in PT 125 (although to be sure not this precise manuscript version) stood behind the revision later enshrined in the Tanjurs. Moreover, that this older version was in some way available at least to the translators of the *Vṛtti* in its unrevised form is shown by 20d, in which the *Vṛtti* preserves the reading of PT 125 against that in the Tanjur version of the *kārikās*.

The present work is nothing more than one step toward a more satisfactory and wholistic philological treatment of the *Vimśikā* (to say nothing of a contextualized philosophical study). What has not been taken into account in this treatment of the text are its Chinese transla-

tions (with only a few exceptions in the notes), and its commentaries, which comprise the following sources:

- Weishi lun* 唯識論, T. 1588, translated by Prajñāruci 瞿曇般若流支.
Dasheng weishi lun 大乘唯識論, T. 1589, translated by Paramārtha.
Weishi ershi lun 唯識二十論, T. 1590, translated by Xuanzang. (On these three, with the Tibetan translation, see inter alia Sasaki 1924 and Akashi 1926)
 Dharmapāla's *Cheng weishi baosheng lun* 成唯識寶生論, T. 1591, translated by Yijing 義淨 (see Liebenthal 1935).
 [Kui] Ji's [窺]基 *Weishi ershilun shuji* 唯識二十論述記, T. 1834 (see in part Hamilton 1938).
 Vinītadeva's *Prakaraṇaviṃśatikā*, *Rab tu byed pa nyi shu pa'i 'grel bshad*, Derge 4065, *sems tsam*, shi 171b7-195b5 (see Yamaguchi and Nozawa 1953: 1-131, and Hillis 1993).
 Vairocanarakṣita's subcommentary on Vinītadeva, *Viṃśikāṭikā-vivṛti*, edited in Kano 2008.

Concerning the proper title of the work, it has long been referred to in modern scholarship as the *Viṃśatikā*, a mistake found in the Sanskrit manuscript of the *Vṛtti* which has at last been corrected by Kano (2008: 350. Note however that Lévi (1925b: 17) does already call the text “Viṃśatikā ou Viṃśikā”). Aside from the detailed Pāṇinian analysis provided by Vairocanarakṣita, as Kano points out there has long been abundant evidence for the correct title *Viṃśikā*. This includes a Chinese transcription in [Kui] Ji's commentary, and Tibetan transcriptions. In this regard, we should note that *pace* Kano, the Tanjurs do not read *viṃśika* (or even *biṃśika*) but rather clearly they have only a single vowel in almost all cases, therefore yielding at best *viṃśaka*, perhaps not coincidentally the reading of the colophon in MS (A), *viṃśakā-vijñaptiprakaraṇaṃ*, and that contained at least in the Derge edition's title of Vinītadeva's commentary, *Prakaraṇaviṃśatikā*. It is interesting to note that in PT 125, although Lalou read *bing*, a comparison with other examples of vowels on the same folio shows that it is only possible to understand here *beng*. We should also note that the Tanjurs have the Tibetan title of the verses as *nyi shu pa'i tshig le'ur byas pa*, while PT

125 has instead *nyī shu pa dgos par byed pa+o*. Here *dgos par byed pa* seems to be an attempt to etymologically render *kārikā*, connecting it with the root \sqrt{kr} . I have not found this elsewhere.

I have imposed the sentence numbering on the text in an effort to make comparison between versions, and reference to the translation, more transparent. The identification of objections in the translation owes much to the commentaries, but I hasten to emphasize that I have not made a proper study of these, and this aspect of the work (as so much else) must remain highly provisional. I have retained in so far as practical the punctuation of the Sanskrit manuscript, although it must be admitted that the result often seems somewhat inconsistent.

The *Vimśikā* has been translated into modern languages a number of times. Among the best efforts may be that of Frauwallner (1994: 366-383; 2010: 392-411), and I have profited much from consulting it. A step toward further improved understanding of the text will involve close study of both the Chinese translations, and the commentaries, listed above.

The text has been often studied by modern scholars, but I make no pretence here to contribute to the doctrinal, philosophical or historical study of the text (see recently the very interesting Kellner and Taber 2014). I am, moreover, aware that Vasubandhu's text probably had significant influence on later works (such as Dharmakīrti's *Santānāntarasiddhi*; see Yamabe 1998). My notes attempt to do no more than provide clues focused, in the first place, on philologically relevant aspects of the establishment of the Sanskrit text, rather than engagement with the text's contents *per se*. It would thus be otiose here to attempt a (perforce very partial) listing of relevant studies on the doctrine of the *Vimśikā*.

I adopt the following conventions:

Tibetan:

I do not distinguish between *pa/ba*, or *nga/da*, selecting in all cases the 'correct' form.

I ignore for the most part Narthang's frequent abbreviated spellings, such as *sem̃n* for *sems can*, *rnam̃r* for *rnam par* and so on.

I mostly do not note minor orthographic oddities which may be due to breaks on the printing blocks (missing vowels, for instance).

In PT 125, I may have been ungenerous to the scribe; he writes *pa/pha* almost identically, and unless I am sure he intended *pha*, I transcribe this letter as *pa*.

ĩ transcribes the reversed *gi-gu* (*gi gu log*).

+ transcribes the 'a-*rten* with a flag on its right shoulder འ.

Sanskrit:

(*Italics*) within parenthesis in the Sanskrit text indicate a reconstruction based on Tibetan and context. These usually but not always agree with the suggestions of Lévi.

[] Brackets in the Sanskrit indicate a partially legible character.

< > Angle brackets indicate a supplement to the text.

+ A + indicates a missing letter, the number determined by the available space in the manuscript.

. One dot indicates either a consonant or a vowel missing.

* An asterisk after a letter indicates that the manuscript has a special form of the letter which does not include a vowel, or a virāma (typically with t and sometimes m̃).

Bold characters indicate the first akṣara on a line of the manuscript.

Folio numbers are supplied in small notation to indicate folio and side.

When I have altered the text more than to make a trivial correction, I make a note on the same page. All changes, even trivial, are noted in the apparatus.

Punctuation marks are as in the manuscript, unless otherwise noted.

The *daṇḍa* is indicated with | , half *daṇḍa* (rare) with ^l, a mark more or less like ^l、 with ; , and one more or less like 、 with , .

When *avagraha* is not written in the manuscript, as needed I add it between < > ; in other cases, I transcribe it as written in the manuscript.

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Chinese texts are cited according to the Taishō edition.

Pāli texts are referred to in the Pali Text Society editions, with the standard sigla.

Tibetan sigla:

- C: Cone Tanjur
- D: Derge Tanjur
- G: Golden (Ganden) Tanjur
- N: Narthang Tanjur
- P: Peking Tanjur

Sanskrit Manuscript A
Tibetan Tanjur Critical Edition
and
Pelliot tibétain 125
of the
Vimśikā-kārikā

With an English Translation

Vimśikā-Kārikā

Sanskrit Text	Tanjur	PT 125
In principle, manuscript A	C: Cone D: Derge G: Ganden (Golden) N: Narthang P: Peking	

O	namaḥ sarvvajñāya	rgya gar skad du bingsha ka kā ri ka bod skad du nyi shu pa'i tshig le'ur byas pa 'jam dpal gzhon nur gyur pa la phyag 'tshal lo	༄ rgya gar kyī skad du beng shī ka ka rī ka bod skad du nyī shu pa dgos par byed pa+o
		a: bingsha] Written འོ་ཤ་ in all versions kā ri ka] C: kā ri kā b: byas pa] CDN: byas pa	

1	vijñaptimātram evedam asadarthāva- bhāsanāt* yadvat taimirakasyāsatkeśoṇḍūkādi- darśanam*	'di dag rnam par rig tsam nyid yod pa ma yin don snang phyir dper na rab rib can dag gis skra zla la sogs med mthong bzhin	༄ : rnam rig tsam ste shes bya ba myed pa+i don snang ba+i phyiro ji ltar rab rib can gyisu skra zla la stsogs pa myed mthong bas so
			c: can] MS cin with i vowel cancelled
	Not in the <i>Vṛtti</i> .		shes bya ba = ?
<p>This [world] is just Manifestation-Only, because of the appearance of non-existent external objects, as in the case of the seeing of nonexistent hair-nets and the like by one with an eye disease.</p>			

2	na deśakālaniyamaḥ santānāniyamo na [ca] na ca kṛtyakriyā yuktā vijñaptir yadi nārthataḥ	gal te rnam rig don min na yul dang dus la nges med cing sems kyang nges med ma yin la bya ba byed pa'ang mi rigs 'gyur	yul dang dus la chad pa myed rgyud kyang ma chad ma yin zhing bya ba byed pa yang rigs pa myed rnam shes +on te don myed na+o ལྟོས་ལྟེན་པ་དང་མཚན་པ་ལྟེན་པ་ལྟོས་ལྟེན་པ་
			b: rgyud] MS rgud
			rgyud = santāna (sems) chad = niyama (nges) rnam shes = vijñapti (but in 1a rnam rig; below = vijñāna) +on te = yadi, following Sanskrit word order don myed na = nārtha (don min na)
<p>If manifestation does not [arise] from an external object, it is not reasonable that there be restriction as to time and place, nor nonrestriction as to personal continuum, nor causal efficacy.</p>			

3	deśāḍiniyamaḥ siddhaḥ svapnavat pretavat punaḥ santānāniyamaḥ sarvvaiḥ pūyanadyādi- darśane	yul la sogs pa nges 'grub ste rmi 'dra'o sems kyang nges pa med yi dags bzhin te thams cad kyis klung la rnag la sogs mthong bzhin	yul la stsogs pa chad grub ste rmī +dra+o yī dags bzhīn du yang ma chad rgyud do thams chad dag rnag chu la stsogs mthong baso
		c: yi dags] G yi dwags	c: ma chad rgyud] MS ma chad de rgyud
			rnag chu = pūyanadī (klung la rnag)
<p>Restriction as to place and so on is proved, as with dreams.</p> <p>Moreover, nonrestriction to personal continuum [is proved] as with hungry ghosts, in their all seeing the river of pus and so on.</p>			

4	svapnopaghātavat kṛtyakriyā narakavat punaḥ sarvvan narakapālādidarśane taiś ca bādhane	bya byed rmi lam gnod pa 'dra thams cad sems can dmyal ba bzhin dmyal ba'i srung ma sogs mthong dang de dag gis ni gnod phyir ro	rmi lam gnod pa +dra bya ba dang bya+o sems dmyal bzhin du yang kun de sems dmyal srung la stsogs mthong zhing de+is bda+ baso
		d: de dag gis] G: de dag gi	b: Ueyama read bye'i = byed'i, but it is clearly bya+o d: zhing de+is] MS zhing pa de+is
			bda' ba [to chase] ≠ bādhane (gnod). (In a, both have gnod = upaghāta)
Causal efficacy [is proved] as in ejaculation in a dream. And again as with hell all [four aspects are proved], in the seeing of the hell guardians and so on, and in being tortured by them.			

5	tiraścārṃ sambhavaḥ svargge yathā na narake tathā na pretānāṃ yatas tajjan duḥkhan nānu- bhavanti te	ji ltar dud 'gro mtho ris su 'byung ba de ltar dmyal ba min yi dags min te 'di lta bur de yod sdug bsngal des mi myong	byol songs mtho ris +byung ba dag jī bzhin sems dmyal myed de bzhin myī +dre gang las der skyes gyi sdug bsngal myī myong de de dago
	b: yathā na] MS (A) erroneously yathā ca ḍ: duḥkhan] MS (A) written duṣkhan or duḥkhan	c: yi dags] G yi dwags min te] C: min ta	b: dmyal] MS dmyal
		<i>Vṛtti</i> in c: de for 'di	byol songs = tiraśca (dud 'gro) +dre = preta (yi dags) gang las = yataḥ de dag = te
<p>Animals are not born in hell as they are in heaven, nor are hungry ghosts, since they do not experience the suffering produced there.</p>			

6	yadi tatkarmmabhis tatra bhūtānām sam- bhavas tathā iṣyate pariṇāmaś ca kiṃ vijñānasya neṣyate	gal te de yi las kyis der 'byung ba dag ni 'byung ba dang de bzhin 'gyur bar 'dod na go rnam par shes par cis mi 'dod	de ste de+i las gyis der +byung ba dag de bzhin du +dod ching +gyur ba rnams kyang na rnam par shes pa jir myi +dod
		a: de yi] GN: de'i	de+i] MS da+i der] MS red
		<i>Vṛtti</i> in a: de'i for de yi	
<p>If you accept that gross material elements arise there in this fashion through the karmic deeds of those [beings], and [you accept their] transformation, why do you not accept [the transformation] of cognition?</p>			

7	karmmaṇo vāsanānyatra phalam anyatra kalpyate tatraiva neṣyate yatra vāsanā kin nu kāraṇam	gzhan na las kyi bag chags la 'bras bu dag ni gzhan du rtog gang na bag chags yod pa der ci yi phyir na 'dod mi bya	las kyī bag chags gzhan du la +bras bu dag nī gzhan du rtog gang na ba der myi +dod na bag chags ji+i phyir zhig du
		<i>Vṛtti</i> in d: ci'i for ci yi	
<p>The perfuming of the karmic deed you imagine to be elsewhere than the result; What is the reason you do not accept [that the result is] in precisely the same location where the perfuming [takes place]?</p>			

8	rūpādyāyatanāstitvan tadvineyajānam prati abhiprāyavaśād uktam upapādukasatvavat*	gzugs sogs skye mched yod par ni des 'dul ba yi skye bo la dgongs pa'i dbang gis gsungs pa ste rdzus te 'byung ba'i sems can bzhin	gzugs stsogs +du mched yod par ni des gdul +gro ba dag la +o dgongs pa+i dbang gis gsungs pa ste rdzu ba+i sems chan bzhin
		b: 'dul ba yi] G: 'dul ba ni	
			+du mched ≠ āyatana (skye mched; homonym 'du byed normally = saṃskāra) +gro ba = jana (yi skye); dag suggests plural?
<p>The existence of the sense-fields of material form and the rest were spoken of [by the Blessed One] with a special intention directed toward the individual to be guided by that [teaching], as [in the case of the mention of] beings born by spontaneous generation.</p>			

9	yataḥ svabijād vijñaptir yadābhāsā pravarttate dvididhāyatanatvena te tasyā munir abravīt*	rang gi sa bon gang las su rnam rig snang ba gang 'byung ba de dag de yi skye mched ni rnam pa gnyis su thub pas gsungs	gang bdag sa bon las rnam shes gang snang rab du +jug pa ni +du mched rnam pa gnyis pasna de dag de+ir thub pas gsungs
	d tasyā] MS (A) ac tasyā plus an extra (unnecessary, hence erased) vertical line for long vowel		
		<i>Vṛtti</i> in b: 'byung for byung	rab du +jug pa = pravarttate ('byung ba)
<p>A manifestation arises from its own proper seed, having an appearance corresponding to that [external object]. The Sage spoke of the two [seed and appearance] as the dual sense field of that [manifestation].</p>			

10	tathā pudgalanairātmyapraveśo hy anyathā punaḥ deśanā dharmmanairātmyapraveśaḥ kalpitā- tmanā	de ltar gang zag bdag med par 'jug par 'gyur ro gzhan du yang bstan pas chos la bdag med par 'jug 'gyur brtags pa'i bdag nyid kyis	de ltar gang zag bdag myed par +jug pa+o gang pyir gzhan phyir yang bshad pa chos la bdag med par +jug pa brtags pa bdagis so
	cd dharmanairātmya°] MS (A) dharmmanairātmya°	b: 'jug par] C: jug par	
		<i>Vṛtti</i> in c: bstan pa'i (D: bstan pa)	bshad pa = deśanā (bstan pa)
<p>For in this way there is understanding of the selflessness of persons. Moreover, teaching in another way leads to the understanding of the selflessness of the elemental factors of existence in terms of an imagined self.</p>			

11	na tad ekaṁ na cānekaṁ viśayaḥ paramāṇuśaḥ na ca te saṁhatā yasmāt paramāṇur na sidhyati	de ni gcig na'ang yul min la phra rab rdul du du ma'ang min de dag 'dus pa 'ang ma yin te 'di ltar rdul phran mi 'grub phyir	de ni myi gchig du ma+ang myed yul ni rdul pran dag'iso de bsdus myin gang phyi ru rdul pran myi +grub pa+is so
	d paramāṇur na] MS (A) erroneously adds ca in margin by na	c: pa'ang ma] N: pa'i ngam	
<p>That [sense-field of form and the rest] is not a unitary nor atomically plural sense object, neither are those [atoms] compounded, since the atom [itself] is not proved.</p>			

12	ṣaṭkena yugapadyogāt paramāṇoḥ ṣaḍamśatā ṣaṇṇām samānadeśatvāt piṇḍaḥ syād aṇu- mātrakaḥ	drug gis cig car sbyar ba na phra rab rdul cha drug tu 'gyur drug po dag ni go gcig na gong bu rdul phran tsam du 'gyur	drugis chig char ldan bas na rdul phran cha nī drug du+o drug rnams mnyam ba+ī yul bas na gong bu rdul tsam du +gyur ba+o
	^a yugapadyogāt] MS (A) yugpadayogāt		
		<i>Vṛtti</i> in a: sbyar bas na In c: drug po dag kyang go gcig na	ldan ba = yoga (sbyar ba) mnyam ba+ī yul ba = amānadeśa (go gcig)
<p>Because [either] in the simultaneous conjunction with a group of six [other atoms], the atom [would have to] have six parts. [Or] because, the six being in a common location, the cluster would be the extent of a [single] atom.</p>			

13	paramāṇor asaṁyoge tatsaṁghāte (')sti kasya saḥ na cānavayavatvena tatsaṁyogo na sidhyati	rdul phran sbyor ba med na ni de 'dus yod pa de gang gis cha shas yod pa ma yin pas de sbyor mi 'grub ma zer cig	rdul pran myi +du ba yin na de+i bsdus yod su+i de+ bag bag kyang ma yin myin bas de+i +du ba myi +grubo
	^c na] MS (A) ac nā ^d tatsaṁyogo na sidhyati] MS (A) ac repeats tatsaṁyogo na sidhyati.		
		ma zer cig = ? ('do not say!'). In prose (B) = <i>na vaktavyam</i> .	+du ba = saṁyoga (sbyor ba) bag bag = anavaya ? (cha shas)
<p>Given that there is no conjunction of atoms, what is [conjoining] when those [atoms] are compounded? But it is also not due to their partlessness that the conjunction of those [atoms] is not proved.</p>			

14	<p>digbhāgabhedo yasyāsti tasyaikatvaṁ na yujyate chāyāvṛti katham vānyo na piṇḍaś cen na tasya te </p>	<p>gang la phyogs cha tha dad yod de ni gcig tu mi rung ngo grib dang sgrib par ji ltar 'gyur gong bu gzhan min de de'i min </p>	<p>pyogs cha tha dad gang yod pa de+i gchig du myi rung ngo drib dang sgrib kyang ji ltar +gyur pung myin gal te de de myin </p>
	<p>^c chāyāvṛti] MS (A) °vṛttī ^c vānyo na] MS vā anyonya; MS (A) syātāṁ na ^d cen na] MS (A) nna added below the line > MS (A): In the margin below tām na pi in another (more modern) hand is written mi li tā. Harunaga Isaacson suggests that this (as militāḥ) may be a gloss on piṇḍa: ‘[the atoms] connected/combined’.</p>	<p>b: de ni] N: da ni</p>	
			<p>pung (phung) = piṇḍa (gong bu)</p>
<p>It is not reasonable that something with spatial differentiation be singular. Or how is there shadow and obstruction? If the cluster is not other [than the atoms], the two [shadow and obstruction] would not be [properties] of that [cluster].</p>			

15	ekatve na krameṇetir yugapan na grahāgrahau vicchinnānekavṛttiś ca sūkṣmānikṣā ca no bhavet*	gcig na rim gyis 'gro ba med zin dang ma zin cig car med ris chad du mar gnas pa dang mig gis mi gsod phra ba'ang med	gchigis dang ni rims zhes pa gchig char bzung dang ma bzung myed bar chad du ma +jug pa dang phra dang myi mthong myed par +gyurd
	^a krameṇetir] MS (A) krameṇeti ^d sūkṣmā°] Both MSS sūkṣmā°	^a : gcig na] CD: gcig ni ^b : zin cig] CD: zan cig ^d : mi gsod] CD: mi sod	
		mar gnas pa = ? <i>Vṛtti</i> in d: <i>mi sod</i> (N <i>mi bsod</i>). mig gis mi gsod: in the <i>Vinayasūtra-vyākhyāna</i> of Prajñākara (Derge Tanjur 4121, 'dul ba, ru 122b1) we find: <i>mthong ba'o zhes pa yin te mig gis gsod pa'i srog chags yod na gdod nyes par 'gyur ba'o</i> .	gchigis = ekatvena! (≠ ekatve na) rims zhes pa = krameṇa iti! (≠ krameṇetiḥ) bzung dang ma bzung = grahāgraha (zin dang ma zin) bar chad du = vicchinna (ris chad du) ma +jug pa = ? myi mthong = anikṣa (≠ mig gis mi gsod; what is gsod?)

If [the sense object] were singular,
there would be no gradual motion,
no simultaneous apprehension and non-apprehension,
nor divided multiple existence, nor the invisible microscopic.

16	pratyakṣabuddhiḥ svapnādaḥ yathā sā ca yadā tadā na so <'>rtho dṛśyate tasya pratyakṣatvaṁ katham mataṁ	mngon sum blo ni rmi sogs bzhin de yang gang tshe de yi tshe khyod kyi don de mi snang na de ni mngon sum ji ltar 'dod	rmī laṁ stsogs mngon sum blo jī ltar de+ang gang tshe de+i tshe de+i de dag don myi snang mngon sum du nī ji ltar phye
	a pratyakṣabuddhiḥ] MS (A) °buddhi b tadā] MS (A) ac tādā	c: khyod kyi don] D: khyod kyi den	a: blo] MS lo c: de+i tshe] MS de+i tshe de
			phye = mata?
<p>The idea that there is direct perception [of the external object takes place] as in a dream and so on. Additionally, that external object is not seen [at the moment] when one has [the idea that there is direct perception of an external object]; [so] how can you consider that [the external object] is directly perceived?</p>			

17	uktaṁ yathā tadābhāsā vijñaptiḥ smaraṇan tataḥ svapnadrgviṣayābhāvan nāprabuddho vagacchati	dper na der snang rnam rig bzhin bshad zin de las dran par zad rmi lam mthong ba yul med par ma sad bar du rtogs ma yin	smras pa gang tshe de+is snang na nī rnam par shes pas dran baso rmyi lam mthong bas yul myed par ma sad par nī myi chud do
	b vijñaptiḥ] MS (A) vijñapti d nāprabuddho] MS (A) nāpramābuddho	d: ma sad] G: ma zad	
			gang tshe ≠ yathā (rather = *yadā) chud = avagacchati (rtogs)
<p>As I discussed, manifestation has the appearance of that [external object].</p> <p>Recollection [comes] from that.</p> <p>One who is not awake does not understand the non-existence of a sense-object seen in a dream.</p>			

18	anyonyādhīpatitvena vijñaptiniyamo mithaḥ middhenopahataṃ cittaṃ svapne tenāsamaṃ phalaṃ	gcig la gcig gi dbang gis na rnam par rig pa phan tshun nges sems ni gnyid kyis non pas na de phyir rmi dang 'bras mi mtshungs	gchig la gchigi dbang gis na rnam shes chad pa pan tshun tu+o gnyid gyis nye bar non pa+i sems rmi lam de dang +bras myi mnyam
	b mithaḥ] MS (A) mitha, with tha overwritten.	a: gis na] C: gi ni	b: chad pa] MS interlinear addition below c: bar] ba+i written, +i cancelled and ra added below ba
<p>Mutual shaping of manifestation is due to their influence on each other. When one dreams, the mind is overpowered by sloth; thus the result is not the same.</p>			

19	<p>marāṇaṃ paravijñaptiviśeṣād vikriyā yathā smṛtilopādikānyeṣāṃ piśācādimanovaśāt </p>	<p>'chi ba gzhan gyi rnam rig gis bye brag las te dper bya na 'dre la sogs pa'i yid dbang gis gzhan gyi dran nyams 'gyur sogs bzhin </p>	<p>gsod pa gzhan gyi rnam shes gyi bye bragis pye ji lta bar gzhan gyi dran ba nyams par gyurd sha za la stsogs pa+i dbang gis </p>
	<p>^a marāṇaṃ] MS (A) marāṇa</p>	<p>a: rig gis] P: rigs gis b: dper bya na] N: dpang byin? d: nyams] N: nyis?</p>	
		<p>yid dbang = manovaśa (PT 125 omits an equivalent for manas)</p>	<p>gsod pa = marāṇa ('chi ba) sha za= piśāca ('dre)</p>
<p>Death is a transformation due to a particular manifestation of another, just as the transformation of memory loss and the like of others is due to the mental force of demons and so on.</p>			

20	katham vā daṇḍakāraṇyaśūnyatvam ṛṣikopataḥ manodaṇḍo mahāvadyaḥ katham vā tena sidhyati	drang srong khros pas dan ta ka'i dgon pa ji ltar stongs par 'gyur yid nyes kha na ma tho cher de yis ji ltar 'grub par 'gyur	dbyig pa+i dgon pa ji ltar na drang srong khros pas stong pa bar yid gyis nyes pa sdig tshe bar ji ltar de+is grub pa yin
		a: khros] N: bros dan ta] GNP: dante b: stongs par 'gyur] GNP: stong par gyur d: de yis] CD: de mis	d: grub] MS bsgrub
		<i>Vṛtti</i> in d: ji ltar de yis 'grub par 'gyur NB: this reading ≈ PT 125!	dbyig pa = daṇḍa nyes pa sdig tshe ba = mahāvadyaḥ (kha na ma tho cher)
<p>Otherwise, how did the Daṇḍaka forest become emptied by the sages' anger? Or how does that prove mental violence is a great violation?</p>			

21	<p>paracittavidāṃ jñānam ayathārtham katham yathā svacittajñānam ajñānād yathā buddhasya gocaraḥ </p>	<p>gzhan sems rig pa'i shes pa ni don bzhin ma yin ji ltar dper rang sems shes pas sangs rgyas kyi spyod yul ji bzhin ma shes phyir </p>	<p>pha rol sems rīg pa+is shes jī bzhin myī don jī +ji ltar bdagī sems shes myī shes pas ji ltar sangs rgyas spyod yulo </p>
	<p>^b ayathārtham] MS (A) rtha overwritten, no m visible ^c ajñānād] MS (A) adds °nā° in top margin with °</p>	<p>a: rig pa'i] CD: rig pas b: ma yin] N: ma</p>	
		<p><i>Vṛtti</i> in a: sems rig pas (CD) or sems rigs pas (GNP) in c: rang sems shes pa</p>	<p>pha rol sems = paracitta (gzhan sems) jī bzhin myī don = ayathārtha (don bzhin ma yin) bdagī sems = svacitta (rang sems)</p>
<p>How is the knowledge of those who know other minds inconsistent with reality? [Reply:] It is as with knowledge of one's own mind. Because one does not know [other minds or even one's own] in the way that [such knowing of minds] is the scope of a Buddha.</p>			

22	vijñaptimātratāsiddhiḥ svaśaktisadṛśī mayā kṛteyaṁ sarvathā sā tu na cintyā buddha- gocaraḥ	rnam rig tsam du grub pa 'di bdag gis bdag gi mthu 'dra bar byas kyi de yi rnam pa kun bsam yas sangs rgyas spyod yul lo	rnam shes tsam du +grub paru bdagis bdagi mthu +dra bas +di bgyis rnam pa thams chad de+o sangs rgyas spyod yul bsam du med
	^c kṛteyaṁ] MS (A) kṛteyaṁ		
			rnam pa thams chad = sarvathā (rnam pa kun) bsam du med = na cintya (bsam yas)
<p>I have composed this proof of [the World as] Manifestation-Only according to my ability, but that [fact that the World is nothing but Manifestation-Only] is not conceivable in its entirety. It is the scope of the buddhas.</p>			

C	<p>viṃśakāvijñaptiprakaraṇaṃ samāptam* </p> <p>śloka 20</p>	<p>nyi shu pa'i tshig le'ur byas pa slob dpon dbyig gnyen gyis mdzad pa rdzogs so rgya gar gyi mkhan po dzi na mi tra dang shī len dra bo dhi dang dā na shī la dang zhu chen gyi lo tsā ba ban de ye shes sdes bsgyur cing zhus te gtan la phab pa'o </p>	<p>nyi shu pa rdzogso </p>
	<p>20] MS (A) written as 2 with ṛi above The following namaḥ sarvavāide no doubt belongs with the following Triṃśikā-kārikā.</p>	<p>shī] N: shi len dra] GN: lendra; P: landra bo dhi dang] CD: bo dhi dang tsā] N: tsa ban de] GNP: bande</p>	
<p>The Twenty Verses written by the Venerable Vasubandhu. Translated by the Indian masters Jinamitra, Śilendrabodhi and Dānaśīla, and the great translator Ye shes sde, it has been corrected.</p>			

Sanskrit Manuscript B
and
Tibetan Tanjur Critical Edition
of the
Vimśikā-vṛtti

With an English Translation

o

rgya gar skad du | bingshi ka br̥itti ||
 bod skad du | nyi shu pa'i 'grel pa |
 'jam dpal gzhon nur gyur pa la phyag 'tshal lo ||

I

^{A)} theg pa chen po la khams gsum pa rnam par rig pa tsam du rnam par
 gzhaḡ ste | ^{B)} mdo las | kye rgyal ba'i sras dag 'di lta ste | khams gsum pa
 'di ni sems tsam mo zhes 'byung ba'i phyir ro || ^{C)} sems dang yid dang |
 rnam par shes pa dang | rnam par rig pa zhes bya ba ni rnam grangs su
 gtogs pa'o || ^{D)} sems de yang 'dir mtshungs par ldan pa dang bcas par
 dgongs pa'o || ^{E)} tsam zhes bya ba smos pa ni don dgag pa'i phyir ro || ^{F)}
 rnam par shes pa 'di nyid don du snang ba 'byung ste | ^{G)} dper na rab rib
 can rnams kyis skra zla la sogs pa med par mthong ba bzhin te | ^{H)} don
 gang yang med do ||

I

..... ^{H)} nārthaḥ kaścid asti |

[Vasubandhu]

^{A)} The Great Vehicle teaches that what belongs to the triple world is established as Manifestation-Only, because it is stated in scripture: ^{B)} “O Sons of the Conqueror, what belongs to the triple world is mind-only.” ^{C)} Mind, thought, cognition and manifestation are synonyms. ^{D)} And here this ‘mind’ intends the inclusion of the concomitants [of mind]. ^{E)} “Only” is stated in order to rule out external objects. ^{F)} This cognition itself arises having the appearance of an external object. ^{G)} For example, it is like those with an eye disease seeing non-existent hair, a [double] moon and so on, but ^{H)} there is no [real] object at all.

II

A) 'dir 'di skad ces brgal te |

gal te rnam rig don min na ||
 yul dang dus la nges med cing ||
 sems kyang nges med ma yin la ||
 bya ba byed pa'ang mi rigs 'gyur || [2]

B) ji skad du bstan par 'gyur zhe na | C) gal te gzugs la sogs pa'i don med
 par gzugs la sogs pa'i rnam par rig pa 'byung ste gzugs la sogs pa'i don
 las ma yin na | D) ci'i phyir yul la lar 'byung la thams cad na ma yin | E) yul
 de nyid na yang res 'ga' 'byung la thams cad du ma yin | F) yul dang dus
 de na 'khod pa thams cad kyi sems la nges pa med pa 'byung la 'ga' tsam
 la ma yin | G) ji ltar rab rib can nyid kyi sems la skra la sogs pa snang gi |
 gzhan dag la ni ma yin ||

II

.....

na deśakālanīyamaḥ santānānīyamo na [ca] |
 na ca kṛtyakriyā yuktā vijñaptir yadi nārthataḥ || 2 ||

[Objection:]

A) To this it is objected:

**If manifestation does not [arise] from an external object,
 it is not reasonable that there be restriction as to time
 and place, nor nonrestriction as to personal continuum,
 nor causal efficacy. [2]**

B) What is being stated here? C) If there is the arising of manifestation of material form and so on without any external object of material form and so on, and [consequently the manifestation] does not [arise] from a [real] external object of material form and so on, D) why does [such a manifestation] arise in a particular place, and not everywhere; E) why does it arise only in that place at some time, not always; and F) why does it arise without restriction in the minds of all those present there in that place at that time, and not in [the minds] of just a few? G) For instance, while a hair and so on may appear in the mind of one with eye disease, it does not [appear] to others [free of that disease].

II

H) ci'i phyir gang rab rib can gyis mthong ba'i skra dang | sbrang bu la
 sogs pas skra la sogs pa'i bya ba mi byed la | de ma yin pa gzhan dag gis
 ni byed | I) rmi lam na mthong ba'i bza' ba dang btung ba dang bgo ba
 dang dug dang mtshon la sogs pas zas dang skom la sogs pa'i bya ba mi
 byed la | de ma yin pa gzhan dag gis ni byed | J) dri za'i grong khyer yod
 pa ma yin pas grong khyer gyi bya ba mi byed la | de ma yin pa gzhan
 dag gis ni byed | K) 'di dag don med par med du 'dra na yul dang dus nges
 pa dang | sems nges pa med pa dang | bya ba byed pa 'di dag kyang mi
 rung ngo zhe na |

II

क)-niyamahḥ santānāniyamahḥ kṛtyakriyā ca na yujyate ,

ह) Why is it that the hair, bee and so on which appear to one with eye disease have no causal efficacy of a hair and so on, while for those others without [eye disease, those hairs, bees and so forth which appear to them] do have [causal efficacy]? १) The food, drink, clothing, poison, weapons and so on seen in a dream do not have causal efficacy [to address] hunger, thirst and the like, but those others not [in a dream] do have such [causal efficacy]. २) A mirage city, being non-existent, does not have the causal efficacy of a city, but other [cities] not [unreal like] that do. क) If these [things like dream food] resemble the non-existent in lacking any [real external] object, restriction as to time and place,¹ nonrestriction as to personal continuum, and causal efficacy are not reasonable.

1: Here begins the Sanskrit manuscript; the translation hereafter is from the Sanskrit.

III

A) mi rung ba ma yin te | 'di ltar |

yul la sogs pa nges 'grub ste ||
rmi 'dra'o || [3ab]

B) rmi lam du rmis pa dang mtshungs pas na rmi 'dra'o || C) ji lta zhe na |
D) rmi lam na yang don med par yul la la na grong dang | kun dga' ra ba
dang | skyes pa dang bud med la sogs pa ji dag snang la thams cad na
ma yin yul de nyid na yang res 'ga' snang la dus thams cad du ma yin
pas E) don med par yang yul la sogs pa nges par 'grub po ||

D)
thams cad na ma yin yul de nyid na yang res 'ga' snang la] GNP: ø

III

^{A)} na khalu na yujyate , yasmāt* ||

deśādiniyamaḥ siddhas svapnavat*

^{B)} svapna iva svapnavat* < | > ^{C)} katham ^{D)} tāvat svapne vināpy
 arthena kvacid eva deśe kiñcid grāmārāmastrīpuruṣādikaṁ dṛśyate na
 sarvatra tatraiva ca deśe kadācid dṛśyate na sarvakālam ^{E)} iti siddho
 vināpy arthena deśakālaniyamaḥ ||

[Vasubandhu]

^{A)} They are certainly not unreasonable, since:

Restriction as to place and so on is proved, as with dreams.

[3ab]

^{B)} “As with dreams” means as in a dream. ^{CD)} Well, how, first of
 all, [do you explain that] even without an external object, some village,
 grove, man, woman or the like is seen in a dream at a particular place,
 rather than everywhere, and at that particular place at some specific
 time, rather than always? ^{E)} For this reason, restriction as to time and
 place is established, even in the absence of an external object.

D)

grāmārāmastrīpuruṣādikaṁ] MS: bhramarā°

III

sems kyang nges pa med |
 yi dags bzhin te | [3bc]

f) grub ces bya bar bsnyegs so || g) yi dags rnams kyi dang mtshungs pas
 na yi dags bzhin no || h) ji ltar 'grub |

thams cad kyis |
 klung la rnag la sogs mthong bzhin || [3cd]

III

pretavat punaḥ
santānāniyamah ||

f) siddha iti vartate ; g) pretānām iva pretavat* | h) katham
siddhaḥ | i) samam

sarvaiḥ pūyanadyādidarśane || [3 ||]

Moreover, nonrestriction to personal continuum [is proved] as with hungry ghosts. [3bc]

f) “Is proved” is carried over [from the previous foot]. g) “As with hungry ghosts” means as in the case of hungry ghosts. h) How is this proved? i) Collectively

In their all seeing the river of pus and so on. [3cd]

III

j) rnag gis gang ba'i klung ni rnag gi klung ste | k) mar gyi bum pa bzhin
 no || l) las kyi rnam par smin pa mtshungs pa la gnas pa'i yi dags rnams
 ni kun gyis kyang mtshungs par klung rnag gis gang bar mthong ste |
 gcig 'gas ni ma yin no || m) rnag gis gang ba ji lta ba bzhin du gcin dang |
 ngan skyugs dang | me ma mur dang | mchil ma dang | snabs kyis gang
 ba dang | dbyig pa dang | ral gri thogs pa'i mi dag gis srung ba yang de
 bzhin te | sogs pa zhes bya bar bsdu'o || n) de ltar na don med par yang
 rnam par rig pa rnams kyi sems nges pa med par 'grub bo ||

III

_{J)} pūyapūrṇṇā nadī pūyanadī | _{K)} ghṛtaghaṭavat* | _{L)} tulya-
 karmmavipākāvasthā hi pretāḥ sarve ⟨'⟩pi samaṁ pūyapūrṇṇān nadīm
 paśyanti naika eva | _{M)} yathā pūyapūrṇṇām evaṁ mūtrapurīṣādi-
 pūrṇṇām daṇḍāsīdharaiś ca puruṣair adhiṣṭhitām ity ādigrahaṇena | _{N)}
 evaṁ santānāniyamo vijñaptīnām asaty apy arthe siddhaḥ ||

_{J)} “The river of pus” means a river filled with pus, _{K)} as [one says]
 a pot of ghee [when one means a pot filled with ghee]. _{L)} For hungry
 ghosts in a state of equally experiencing fruition of their actions
 collectively *all* see the river filled with pus, not just one of them alone.
_{M)} The word “and so on” is mentioned to indicate that as [they see the
 river] filled with pus, they [also see it] filled with urine, feces and the
 like, and guarded by persons holding staffs and swords. _{N)} Thus the
 nonrestriction of manifestations to [a specific] personal continuum is
 proved even without the existence of an external object.

IV

bya byed rmi lam gnod pa 'dra || [4a]

A) grub ces bya bar rig par bya'o || B) dper na rmi lam na gnyis kyis gnyis
phrad pa med par yang khu ba 'byung ba'i mtshan nyid ni rmi lam gyi
gnod pa'o || C) de ltar re zhig dpe gzhan dang gzhan dag gis yul dang dus
nges pa la sogs pa bzhi 'grub bo ||

IV

svapnopaghātavat kṛtyakriyā |

A) siddheti veditavyam* | B) yathā svapne dvayasamāpattim
antareṇa śukraṇvisarggalakṣaṇaḥ svapnopaghātaḥ | C) evaṁ tāvad anyā-
nyair dṛṣṭāntair deśakālanīyamādicatuṣṭayam siddham* |

Causal efficacy [is proved] as in ejaculation in a dream. [4ab]

A) “Is proved” is to be understood. B) [Causal efficacy is establish-
ed] as with ejaculation in a dream [that is, a wet dream], which is
characterized by the emission of semen in a dream in the absence of
[actual] sexual union. C) In this way at the outset is proved, through
these various examples, the four-fold [characterization, namely] the
restriction to time and place and the rest.

C)
anyānyair] MS: anyānair

IV

thams cad sems can dmyal ba bzhin || [4b]

_{D)} grub ces bya bar rig par bya'o || _{E)} sems can dmyal ba dag na yod pa
dang mtshungs pas sems can dmyal ba bzhin no || _{F)} ji ltar 'grub ce na |

IV

narakavat punaḥ

sarvaṁ*

_{D)} siddham iti veditavyaṁ | _{E)} narakeṣv iva narakavat* < | > _{F)}
kathaṁ siddham |

And again as with hell all [four aspects are proved]. [4bc]

_{D)} “Are proved” is to be understood. _{E)} “As with hell” means like in the hells. _{F)} How are they proved?

IV

dmyal ba'i srung ma sogs mthong dang ||
 de dag gis ni gnod phyir ro || [4cd]

g) dper na sems can dmyal ba dag na sems can dmyal ba'i sems can
 rnams kyis sems can dmyal ba'i srung ma la sogs pa mthong ste | yul
 dang dus nges par 'grub bo || _{h)} khyi dang bya rog dang lcags kyi ri la
 sogs pa 'ong ba dang 'gro bar yang mthong ba ni sogs pa zhes bya bar
 bsdu ste | _{i)} thams cad kyis mthong gi | gcig 'gas ni ma yin no || _{j)} de dag
 gis de dag la gnod pa yang 'grub ste | dngos po la sems can dmyal ba'i
 srung ma la sogs pa med par yang rang gi las kyi rnam par smin pa
 mtshungs pa'i dbang gi phyir ro || _{k)} de bzhin du gzhan yang yul dang
 dus nges pa la sogs pa bzhi po 'di dag thams cad grub par rig par bya'o ||

IV

narakapālādidarśane taiś ca bādhane || 4 ||

^{G)} yathā hi narakeṣu narakāṇām narakapālādidarśanam deśa-
kālaniyamena siddham < | > ^{H)} śvavāyasāyasaparvatādyāgamanagama-
nada_{ca2b1} rśanañ cety ādigrahaṇena < | > ^{I)} sarveṣāñ ca naikasyaiva < | > ^{J)}
taiś ca tadbādhanaṁ siddham asatsv api narakapālādiṣu samānasva-
karmmavipākādhityāt* | ^{K)} tathānyatrāpi sarvam etad deśakālaniya-
mādicatuṣṭayaṁ siddham iti veditavyaṁ* |

**In the seeing of the hell guardians and so on, and in being
tortured by them.** [4cd]

^{G)} Just as it is proved that in the hells hell beings see the hell
guardians and so on with restriction as to time and place ^{H)} —“and so
on” means that they see the dogs, crows, the iron mountains and so on
coming and going— ^{I)} and all [hell beings see these], not merely one, ^{J)}
and [just as it is] proved that they are tortured by them, even though
the hell guardians and so on do not exist, because of the domination of
the generalized common fruition of their individual karmic deeds— ^{K)}
Just so it should be understood that the entirety of this four-fold
[characterization, namely] the restriction to time and place and the
rest, is proved elsewhere too [and not only in the separate examples].

IV

_{L)} ci'i phyir sems can dmyal ba'i srung ma dang bya rog dang khyi la sogs
pa de dag sems can du mi 'dod ce na |

_{M)} mi rigs pa'i phyir ro || _{N)} de dag ni sems can dmyal bar mi rigs te | de
bzhin du sdug bsngal des mi myong ba'i phyir ro || _{O)} gcig la gcig gnod
pa byed na ni 'di dag ni sems can dmyal ba pa dag go || 'di dag ni sems
can dmyal ba'i srung ma dag go zhes nam par gzhag pa med par 'gyur
ro || _{P)} byad gzugs dang bong tshod dang stobs mtshungs pa dag ni gcig
la gcig gnod pa byed kyang ji lta bur 'jigs par mi 'gyur ro || _{Q)} lcags rab tu
'bar ba'i sa gzhi la tsha ba'i sdug bsngal yang mi bzod na ni ji ltar de na
gzhan la gnod pa byed par 'gyur | _{R)} sems can dmyal ba pa ma yin pa dag
sems can dmyal bar 'byung bar ga la 'gyur |

IV

^{L)} kim punaḥ kāraṇaṁ narakapālās te ca śvāno vāyasās ca satvā neṣyante |

^{M)} ayogāt* | ^{N)} na hi te narakā yujyante tathaiva tadduḥkhāprati-
samvedanāt* | ^{O)} parasparaṁ yātayatām ime narakā ime narakapālā iti
vyavasthā na syāt* | ^{P)} tulyākṛtipramāṇabalānāṁ ca parasparaṁ yāta-
yatān na tathā bhayaṁ syāt* | ^{Q)} dāhaduḥkhaṁ ca pradīptāyām ayo-
mayyāṁ bhūmāv asahamānāḥ kathaṁ tatra parān yātayeyuḥ | ^{R)}
anārakāṇāṁ vā narake kutaḥ sambhavaḥ < | >

[Objection]

^{L)} For what reason, then, do you not accept the hell guardians, and dogs and crows, as really existent beings?

[Vasubandhu]

^{M)} Because it is not reasonable. ^{N)} For it is not reasonable for those [guardians and so on] to be hell beings, since they do not experience the sufferings of that [place] in precisely that same way. ^{O)} If they were torturing each other, there would be no differentiation that ‘these are the hell beings; these the hell guardians.’ ^{P)} And if those of equal form, size and strength were torturing each other, they would not be so very afraid. ^{Q)} And how could [those guardians], unable to tolerate the suffering of burning on a flaming iron ground, torture others there? ^{R)} On the other hand, how could non-hell beings be born in hell [in the first place]?

V

_{A)} 'o na dud 'gro dag kyang ji ltar mtho ris su 'byung ste | _{B)} de bzhin du
 sems can dmyal bar yang dud 'gro dang yi dags kyi bye brag sems can
 dmyal ba'i srung ma la sogs pa 'byung bar 'gyur ro zhe na |

V

^{A)} kathan tāvat tiraścām svarge sambhavaḥ | ^{B)} evaṁ narakeṣu
tiryakpretaviśeṣāṇām narakapālādīnām sambhavaḥ syāt* ||

[Objection]

^{A)} [Well,] to begin, how [—as you admit as well—] could
animals be born in heaven? ^{B)} In the same way, animals and certain
hungry ghosts might be born in the hells as hell guardians and others.

V

ji ltar dud 'gro mtho ris su ||
 'byung ba de ltar dmyal ba min ||
 yi dags min te de lta bur ||
 de yod sdug bsngal des mi myong || [5]

c) dud 'gro gang dag mtho ris su 'byung ba de dag ni snod kyi 'jig rten na
 de'i bde ba myong bar 'gyur ba'i las kyis der 'byung ba dag ste | de na
 yod pa'i bde ba so sor myong ngo || d) sems can dmyal ba'i srung ma la
 sogs pa dag ni de bzhin du sems can dmyal ba'i sdug bsngal mi myong
 ngo || e) de'i phyir dud 'gro dag der 'byung bar mi rigs so || f) yi dags kyi
 bye brag dag kyang ma yin no ||

V

tiraścārṃ sambhavaḥ svarge yathā na narake tathā |
na pretānām yatas tajjaṃ duḥkhan nānubhavanti te || [5 ||]

c) ye hi tiryāñcaḥ svarge sambhavanti te tadbhājanalokasukha-
saṃvarttanīyena karmmaṇā tatra sambhūtās tajjaṃ sukhaṃ pratyānu-
bhavanti | d) na caivaṇ narakapālādayo nārakaṃ duḥkhaṃ pratyānu-
bhavanti e) tasmān na tiraścārṃ sambhavo yukto f) nāpi pretānām* < | >

[Vasubandhu]

**Animals are not born in hell as they are in heaven,
Nor are hungry ghosts, since they do not experience the
suffering produced there. [5]**

c) For, those who are born in heaven as animals, being born
there through their karmic deeds conducive to happiness [performed]
in the Receptacle World, experience the happiness produced there [in
heaven], d) but the hell guardians and so on do not experience hellish
suffering in a similar fashion. e) Therefore, it is not reasonable that
animals are born [in hell], f) nor is it so for hungry ghosts.

VI

A) sems can dmyal ba de dag gi las rnams kyis der 'byung ba'i bye brag
 dag 'di lta bur 'byung ste | mdog dang byad gzugs dang bong tshod dang
 stobs kyis bye brag gang gis sems can dmyal ba'i srung ma la sogs pa'i
 ming thob pa'o || B) gang lag pa brkyang pa la sogs pa bya ba sna tshogs
 byed par snang ba de lta bur yang 'gyur ste | de dag 'jigs pa bskyed pa'i
 phyir ro || dper na lug lta bu'i ri dags 'ong ba dang | 'gro ba dang | lcags
 kyis shal ma li'i nags tshal tsher ma kha thur du lta ba dang gyen du lta
 bar 'gyur ba lta bu ste | C) de dag ni med pa yang ma yin no zhe na |

B)
 'gyur] CD: 'grub

VI

A) teṣān tarhi nārakāṇām karmmabhis tatra bhūtaviśeṣāḥ sambhavanti varṇṇākṛtipramāṇabalaviśiṣṭā ye naraka_{<3a1>}pālādisamjñāṁ pratilabhante | B) tathā ca pariṇamanti yad vividhāṁ hasta-vikṣepādikriyāṁ kurvanto dṛśyante bhayotpādanārthaṁ yathā meṣākṛtayaḥ parvatā āgacchanto gacchantaḥ (*ayaḥśālmālī*)vane ca kaṇṭakā adhomukhībhavanta ūrdhamukhībhavantaś ceti | C) na te na sambhavanty eva ||

[Objection]

A) Then, particular types of gross material elements arise there through the karmic deeds of those hell beings, which, particularized as to color, form, size and strength, obtain the designations ‘hell guardian’ and so on. B) And they transform in such a manner that they appear performing activities like waving their hands and so on, in order to instill fear, as mountains in the shape of rams coming and going and thorns in the forest of iron thorn trees turning themselves down and turning themselves up [likewise appear in hell instilling fear]. C) Therefore, it is not that those [hell guardians and so on] are not born at all.

B)
āgacchanto] MS: āganto

VI

gal te de'i las kyis der
 'byung ba dag ni 'byung ba dang |
 de bzhin 'gyur bar 'dug na go |
 rnam par shes par cis mi 'dod || [6]

_{D)} de'i las rnam kyis der rnam par shes pa nyid der de lta bur 'gyur ba
 ci'i phyir mi 'dod la | _{E)} ci'i phyir 'byung ba rnam su rtog |

VI

yadi tatkarmmabhis tatra bhūtānām sambhavas tathā |
iṣyate pariṇāmaś ca kiṃ vijñānasya neṣyate || 6 ||

_{D)} (νi)jñānasyaiva tatkarmmabhis tathāpariṇāmaḥ kasmān
neṣyate < | > _{E)} kim punar bhūtāni kalpyante || _{F)} api ca ||

[Vasubandhu]

**If you accept that gross material elements arise in
this fashion through the karmic deeds of those [beings],
And [you accept their] transformation, why do you not
accept [the transformation] of cognition? [6]**

_{D)} Why do you not accept that the transformation thus brought
about by the karmic deeds of those [beings] is [a transformation] of
cognition itself? _{E)} Why, moreover, are gross material elements
imagined [to play any role at all]? _{F)} What is more:

VII

gzhan na las kyi bag chags la ||
 'bras bu dag ni gzhan du rtog ||
 gang na bag chags yod pa der ||
 ci'i phyir na 'dod mi bya || [7]

^{A)} sems can dmyal ba pa rnam kyi las gang gis der 'byung ba dag de lta
 bur 'byung ba dang | 'gyur bar yang rtog pa'i las de'i bag chags de dag
 nyid kyi rnam par shes pa'i rgyud la gnas te | gzhan ma yin na ^{B)} bag
 chags de gang na yod pa de dag nyid la de'i 'bras bu rnam par shes par
 gyur pa de 'dra bar ci'i phyir mi 'dod la | ^{C)} gang na bag chags med pa der
 de'i 'bras bu rtog ba 'di la gtan tshigs ci yod |

VII

karmmaṇo vāsanānyatra phalam anyatra kalpyate |
tatraiva neṣyate yatra vāsanā kin nu kāraṇaṁ || 7 ||

A) yena hi karmmaṇā nārakāṇāṁ tatra tādṛśo bhūtānāṁ sambhavaḥ kalpyate pariṇāmaś ca tasya karmmaṇo vāsanā teṣāṁ vi[jñā]na(*saṁtāna*)sanniviṣṭā nānyatra , B) yatraiva ca vāsanā tatraiva tasyāḥ phalaṁ tādṛśo vijñānapariṇāmaḥ kin neṣyate < | > C) yatra vāsanā nāsti tatra tasyāḥ phalaṁ kalpyata iti kim a(t)ra kāraṇaṁ |

**The perfuming of the karmic deed you imagine to be
elsewhere than the result;**

**What is the reason you do not accept [that the result is]
in precisely the same location where the perfuming
[takes place]? [7]**

A) You imagine such an arising and transformation of gross material elements of hell beings there [in hell] as due to their karmic deeds, while the perfuming of those karmic deeds is lodged in their individual continua of cognition, not elsewhere. B) So why do you not accept that such a transformation of cognition as the result of those [karmic deeds] is precisely where the perfuming itself is? C) For what reason, in this case, do you imagine that the result of those [karmic deeds] is somewhere where the perfuming is not?

VII

d) smras pa | lung gi gtan tshigs yod de | e) gal te rnam par shes pa nyid
 gzugs la sogs par snang gi | gzugs la sogs pa'i don ni med na gzugs la
 sogs pa'i skye mched yod par ni bcom ldan 'das kyis gsung bar mi 'gyur
 ro zhe na |

VII

^{D)} āgamaḥ kāraṇam | ^{E)} yadi vijñānam eva rūpādipratibhāsam
 syān na rūpādiko ⟨'⟩rthas tadā rūpādyāyatanāstitvaṁ bhagavatā
 noktaṁ syāt* |

[Objection]

^{D)} The reason is scripture. ^{E)} If there were nothing but cognition with the appearance of material form and the rest, and no external objects characterized as material form and the rest, then the Blessed One would not have spoken of the existence of the sense-fields of material form and the rest.

VIII

A) 'di ni gtan tshigs ma yin te | 'di ltar |

gzugs sogs skye mched yod par ni ||
 des 'dul ba yi skye bo la ||
 dgongs pa'i dbang gis gsungs pa ste ||
 rdzus te byung ba'i sems can bzhin || [8]

B) dper na bcom ldan 'das kyis rdzus te byung ba'i sems can bzhin yod
 do || zhes gsungs pa yang phyi ma la sems kyi rgyud rgyun mi 'chad pa
 la dgongs nas dgongs pa'i dbang gis gsungs pa ste |

VIII

A) akāraṇam etat* yasmāt* ,

rūpādyāyatanāstitvaṁ tadvineyajanam prati |
abhiprāyavaśād uktam upapādukasatvavat* || [8 ||]

B) yathāsti satva upapāduka ity uktam bhagavatā 'bhiprāyavaśāc
cittasantatyanucchedam ā<3br>yatyām abhipretya |

[Vasubandhu]

A) This is not a reason, since:

The existence of the sense-fields of material form and the rest were spoken of [by the Blessed One] with a special intention directed toward the individual to be guided by that [teaching], as [in the case of the mention of] beings born by spontaneous generation. [8]

B) By way of example, the Blessed One with a special intention said "There are beings of spontaneous birth," intending [allusion to] the nonannihilation of the continuum of mind in the future. D) [We know this] because of the [scriptural] statement:

VIII

c) 'di na bdag gam sems can med ||
 chos 'di rgyu dang bcas las byung ||

d) zhes gsungs pa'i phyir ro || e) de bzhin du bcom ldan 'das kyis gzugs la
 sogs pa'i skye mched yod par gsungs pa yang de bstan pas 'dul ba'i skye
 bo'i ched du ste | bka' de ni dgongs pa can no ||

VIII

c) nāstīha satva ātmā vā dharmmās tv ete sahetukāḥ < || >

d) iti vacanāt* | e) evaṁ rūpādyāyatanāstitvam apy uktam bhagavatā taddeśanāvineyajanam adhikṛtyety ābhiprāyikaṁ tad vacanaṁ |

c) Here [in our teaching] there is no being or self,
but [only] these elemental factors of existence along with their
causes.

e) Thus, although the Blessed One did speak of the existence of
the sense-fields of form and the rest, that [scriptural] statement is of
special intention since it is directed toward the individual who is to be
guided by that teaching.

IX

A) 'dir ci las dgongs she na |

rang gi sa bon gang las su ||
 rnam rig snang ba gang byung ba ||
 de dag de yi skye mched ni ||
 rnam pa gnyis su thub pas gsungs || [9]

IX

A) ko ⟨'⟩trābhiprāyaḥ |

yataḥ svabījād vijñaptir yadābhāsā pravarttate |
 dvividhāyatanatvena te tasyā munir abravīt* || [9 ||]

A) In this regard, what is the special intention?

**A manifestation arises from its own proper seed, having
 an appearance corresponding to that [external object].
 The Sage spoke of the two [seed and appearance] as the
 dual sense field of that [manifestation]. [9]**

IX

^{B)} 'di skad du bstan par 'gyur zhe na | ^{C)} gzugs su snang ba'i rnam par rig
 pa rang gi sa bon 'gyur ba'i bye brag tu gyur pa gang las byung ba'i sa
 bon de dang | snang ba gang yin pa ^{D)} de dang de dag ni de'i mig dang |
 gzugs kyi skye mched du bcom ldan 'das kyis go rims bzhin du gsungs
 so || ^{E)} de bzhin du reg byar snang ba'i rnam par rig pa'i bar du rang rang
 gi sa bon 'gyur ba'i bye brag tu gyur pa'i sa bon gang las byung ba'i sa
 bon de dang | snang ba gang yin pa ^{F)} de dang de dag ni bcom ldan 'das
 kyis de'i lus dang reg bya'i skye mched du go rims bzhin du gsungs te | ^{G)}
 'di ni 'dir dgongs pa'o ||

IX

^{B)} kim uktam bhavati | ^{C)} rūpapratibhāsā vijñaptir yataḥ svabījāt
 pariṇāma-viśeṣaprāptād utpadyate tac ca bījaṁ yatpratibhāsā ca ^{D)} sā te
 tasyā vijñaptēś cakṣūrūpāyatanatvena yathākramam bhagavān abravīt*
 | ^{E)} evaṁ yāvat spraṣṭavyapratibhāsā vijñaptir yataḥ svabījāt pariṇāma-
 viśeṣaprāptād utpadyate , tac ca bījaṁ yatpratibhāsā ca ^{F)} sā te tasyāḥ
 kāyaspraṣṭavyāyatanatvena yathākramam bhagavān abravīd ^{G)} ity
 aya[m] (*abhi*)prāyaḥ |

^{B)} What is being stated? ^{C)} The proper seed from which—when
 it has attained a particular transformation—arises a manifestation
 having the appearance of visible form, and that as which this
 [cognition] appears: ^{D)} the Blessed One spoke of these two as,
 respectively, the sense field of visual perception [“seeing eye” = seed]
 and the sense field of visible form [= the object] related to that
 manifestation. ^{E)} The same [applies to all items in the stock list] up to:
 The Blessed One spoke of the proper seed from which—when it has
 attained a particular transformation—arises a manifestation having
 the appearance of the tangible, and that as which this [manifestation]
 appears: ^{F)} [the Blessed One spoke] of these two as, respectively, the
 sense field of tangible perception [“body” = seed] and the sense field of
 the tangible [= the object] related to that [manifestation]. ^{G)} This is the
 special intention.

E)
 pariṇāma-viśeṣaprāptād] MS: pariṇāma-viśeṣād

A) de ltar dgongs pa'i dbang gis bstan pa la yon tan ci yod ce na |

de ltar gang zag la bdag med par

'jug par 'gyur ro || [10ab]

B) de ltar bshad na gang zag la bdag med par 'jug par 'gyur te | C) drug po
gnyis las rnam par shes pa drug 'byung gi | lta ba po gcig pu nas reg pa
po'i bar du gang yang med par rig nas gang dag gang zag la bdag med
par bstan pas 'dul ba de dag gang zag la bdag med par 'jug go|

X

^{A)} evaṃ punar abhiprāyavaśena deśayitvā ko guṇaḥ ||

tathā pudgalanairātmyapraveśo hi ||

^{B)} tathā hi deśyamāne pudgalanairātmyaṃ praviśanti | ^{C)} dva(ya)ṣ[a](*tkābhyāṃ vijñā*)naṣaṭkaṃpravarttate na tu kaścīd eko draṣṭāsti na yāvan mantety evaṃ viditvā ye pudgalanairātmyadeśanā-vineyās te pudgalanairātmyaṃ praviśanti ||

[Objection]

^{A)} And what is the advantage of having explained things in this way by recourse to special intention?

[Vasubandhu]

For in this way there is understanding of the selflessness of persons. [10ab]

^{B)} For when it is being taught in this way [those individuals to be guided] understand the idea of the selflessness of persons. ^{C)} The six cognitions come about from the two sets of six [= the twelve sense-fields], but when they understand that there is no distinct seer at all—[and all members of the stock list] up to—no distinct thinker, those who are to be guided by the teaching of the selflessness of persons understand the idea of the selflessness of persons.

X

gzhan du yang |
 bstan pa'i chos la bdag med par
 'jug 'gyur || [10bcd]

_{D)} gzhan du yang zhes bya ba ni rnam par rig pa tsam du bstan pa'o || _{E)} ji
 ltar chos la bdag med par 'jug ce na | _{F)} rnam par rig pa tsam 'di nyid
 gzugs la sogs pa'i chos su snang bar 'byung ste | _{G)} gzugs la sogs pa'i
 mtshan nyid kyi chos gang yang med par rig nas 'jug go ||

X

anyathā punar
deśanā dharmanairātmyapraveśaḥ ||

^{D)} anyatheti vijñaptimātradeśanā | ^{E)} katham dharmmanair-
ātmyapraveśaḥ | ^{F)} vijñaptimātram idaṁ rūpādidharmmapratiḥhāsam
utpadyate ^{G)} na tu rūpādilakṣaṇo dharmma(*ḥ kaścīd astī*)_{<4a1>}ti viditvā |

Moreover, teaching in another way leads to the understanding of the selflessness of elemental factors of existence. [10bcd]

^{D)} “In another way” refers to the teaching of Manifestation-Only.
^{E)} How does this lead to understanding the selflessness of elemental factors of existence? ^{F)} [One understands this by] knowing that this Manifestation-Only arises with the semblance of elemental factors of existence such as material form and the rest, ^{G)} but actually there is no existing elemental factor of existence having as its characteristic mark material form and the rest.

X

ཨ) gal te chos rnam pa thams cad du med na rnam par rig pa tsam zhes
bya ba de yang med pas de ji ltar rnam par gzhas ce na |

X

^{H)} yadi tarhi sarvathā dharmmo nāsti tad api vijñaptimātram
nāstīti < | > katham tarhi vyavasthāpyate |

[Objection]

^{H)} If, then, no elemental factor of existence exists in any fashion,
Manifestation-Only does not exist either. How, then, could [your posi-
tion] be established?

X

1) chos ni rnam pa thams cad du med pa ma yin pas de ltar chos la bdag
med par 'jug par 'gyur te |

brtags pa'i bdag nyid kyis | [10d]

X

᳚ na khalu sarvathā dharmmo nāstīty evaṃ dharmmanair-
 ātmyapraveśo bhavati (| ᳚ a)pi tu |

kalpitātmanā , [| 10 ||]

[Vasubandhu]

᳚ It is not the case that one comes to understand the selfless-
 ness of elemental factors of existence by thinking that the elemental
 factors of existence do not exist in any fashion at all. ᳚ But rather [such
 understanding comes in thinking that elemental factors of existence
 exist only]:

In terms of an imagined self. [10d]

X

ཀ) gang byis pa rnam kyis chos rnam kyis rang bzhin kun brtags pa'i
 bdag nyid des de dag bdag med kyis ཁ) sangs rgyas kyis yul gang yin pa
 brjod du med pa'i bdag nyid kyis ni med pa ma yin no || ར) de ltar rnam
 par rig pa tsam yang rnam par rig pa gzhan gyis kun brtags pa'i bdag
 nyid kyis bdag med par rtogs pa'i phyir rnam par rig pa tsam du rnam
 par gzhag pas chos thams cad la chos la bdag med par 'jug pa yin gyi |
 yod pa de la yang rnam pa thams cad du skur pas ni ma yin no || ལ)
 gzhan du na ni rnam par rig pa gzhan yang rnam par rig pa gzhan gyi
 don du 'gyur bas rnam par rig pa tsam nyid du mi 'grub ste | rnam par
 rig pa rnam don dang ldan pa'i phyir ro ||

X

_{K)} yo bālair dharmāṇām svabhāvo grāhyagrāhakādīḥ parikalpi-
 tas tena kalpitenātmanā teṣām nairātmyam _{L)} na tv anabhilāpyenātma-
 nā yo buddhānām viṣaya iti | _{M)} evam vijñā[pti](*mātrasyā*)**pi** vijñapty-
 antaraparikalpitenātmanā nairātmyapraveśād vijñaptimātravyavasthā-
 panayā sarvadharmmāṇām nairātmyapraveśo bhavati na tu sarvathā
 tada(s)t(i)tvāpavād(*ā*)t* | _{N)} itarathā hi vijñapter api vijñaptyantaram
 arthaḥ syād iti vijñaptimātratvan na sidhyetārthavatītvād vijñaptīnām |

_{K)} The reference is to the selflessness of those elemental factors
 of existence the intrinsic nature of which—characterized by subject
 and object and so on—fools fantasize in terms of an imagined self. _{L)}
 [The reference] is not to [the selflessness of elemental factors of exist-
 ence] in terms of the inexpressible self, which is the domain of the
 Buddhas. _{M)} In this way, Manifestation-Only also leads to an under-
 standing of the selflessness of all elemental factors of existence
 through the establishment of the fact of Manifestation-Only because
 of an understanding of selflessness in terms of a self fantasized by
 another manifestation, not because of a denial of the existence of
 those [elemental factors of existence] in each and every respect. _{N)} For
 otherwise one manifestation would have another manifestation as its
 external object, and therefore the fact of Manifestation-Only could not
 be proved, because manifestations would possess external objects.

XI

^{A)} bcom ldan 'das kyis dgongs pa 'dis gzugs la sogs pa'i skye mched yod
 par gsungs kyī | gzugs la sogs pa gang dag yod bzhin du de dag nam
 par rig pa so so'i yul du mi 'gyur ro zhes bya ba de ji ltar rtogs par bya
 zhe na |

XI

^{A)} kathaṁ punar idaṁ pratyetyam anenābhiprāyeṇa bhagavatā rūpādyāyatanāstitvam uktaṁ na punaḥ santy eva tāni yāni rūpādivijñaptīnām pratyekaṁ viṣayībhavantīti |

[Objection]

^{A)} How, then, should one understand this, namely, that while the Blessed One spoke of the existence of the sense-fields of visible form and the rest with this special intention, those things which come to be the corresponding sense objects of the manifestations of visible form and the rest do not actually exist at all?

XI

B) 'di ltar |

de ni gcig na'ang yul min la ||
 phra rab rdul du du ma'ang min ||
 de dag 'dus pa 'ang ma yin te ||
 'di ltar rdul phran mi 'grub phyir || [11]

XI

B) yasmān

na tad ekaṁ na cānekaṁ viṣayaḥ paramāṇuśaḥ |
na ca te saṁhatā yasmāt paramāṇur na sidhyati || [11 ||]

[Vasubandhu]

B) Since:

**That [sense-field of form and the rest] is not a unitary nor
atomically plural sense object, neither are those [atoms]
compounded, since the atom [itself] is not proved. [11]**

XI

^{c)} ji skad du bstan par 'gyur zhe na | ^{d)} gang gzugs la sogs pa'i skye mched
 gzugs la sogs pa rnam par rig pa so so'i yul yin du zin na de ni gcig pu
 zhig yin te | ji ltar bye brag pa rnam kyis cha shas can gyi ngo bor brtag
 pa'i lta bu 'am | rdul phra rab du ma 'am rdul phra rab de dag nyid 'dus
 pa zhig tu 'gyur grang na | ^{e)} gcig pu de ni yul ma yin te | cha shas rnam
 las gzhan pa cha shas can gyi ngo bo gang la'ang mi 'dzin pa'i phyir ro ||
^{f)} du ma'ang yul ma yin te | rdul phra rab so so la mi 'dzin pa'i phyir ro ||
^{g)} de dag 'dus pa yang yul ma yin te | 'di ltar rdul phra rab rdzas gcig tu
 mi 'grub pa'i phyir ro ||

XI

c) iti < | > kim uktam bhavati | d) yat tad rūpādikam āyatanam rūpādivijñaptīnām pratyekam viṣayaḥ syāt tad ekam vā syād yathā 'vayavirūpaṁ kalpyate vaiśeṣikaiḥ anekam vā paramāṇuśaḥ saṁhatā vā ta eva paramāṇavaḥ | e) na tāvad ekam viṣayo bhavaty avayavebhyo <'>nyasyāvayavirūpasya kvacid apy agrahaṇāt* | f) nāpy anekam <4b1> paramāṇūnām pratyekam agrahaṇāt* | g) nāpi te saṁhatā viṣayī-bhavanti | yasmāt paramāṇur ekam dravyam na sidhyati |

c) What is stated here? d) Whatever sense-field, consisting of visible form and the rest, would be the corresponding sense object of the manifestations of visible form and the rest, would be either unitary—as the Vaiśeṣikas imagine material form as a part-possessing whole—or it would be atomically plural, or it would be compounded of those very atoms themselves. e) First of all, the sense object is not unitary, because there is no apprehension anywhere at all of a material form as a part-possessing whole separate from its parts. f) Nor is it plural, because there is no apprehension of atoms individually. g) Nor would those [atoms], compounded, come to be the sense object, since the atom is not proved to be a singular substance.

XII

A) ji ltar mi 'grub ce na |

B) 'di ltar ||

drug gis cig car sbyar bas na ||
phra rab rdul cha drug tu 'gyur || [12ab]

C) phyogs drug nas rdul phra rab drug gis cig car du sbyar na ni rdul phra
rab cha drug tu 'gyur te | gcig gi go gang yin pa der gzhan mi 'byung ba'i
phyir ro ||

XII

A) katham na sidhyati |

B) yasmāt* |

ṣaṭkena yugapadyogāt paramāṇoḥ ṣaḍaṅsatā ||

C) ṣaḍbhyo digbhyaḥ ṣaḍbhiḥ paramāṇubhir yugapadyoge sati paramāṇoḥ ṣaḍaṅsatā prāpnoti ¹ ekasya yo deśas tatrānyasyāsambhavāt* |

[Objection]

A) How is [the atom as a singular substance] not proved?

[Vasubandhu]

B) Since:

Because [either] in the simultaneous conjunction with a group of six [other atoms], the atom [would have to] have six parts, [12ab]

C) If there were simultaneous conjunction with six atoms from the six directions [of possible orientation], this would result in the atom having six parts, because where there is one thing another cannot arise.

XII

drug po dag kyang go gcig na ||
 gong bu rdul phran tsam du 'gyur || [12cd]

_{D)}ji ste rdul phra rab gcig gi go gang yin pa de nyid du drug po rnams kyi
 go yang yin na ni _{E)}des na thams cad go gcig pa'i phyir gong bu thams
 cad rdul phra rab tsam du 'gyur te | phan tshun tha dad pa med pa'i
 phyir _{F)}gong bu gang yang snang bar mi 'gyur ro || _{G)}kha che'i bye brag
 tu smra ba rnams nyes pa 'di 'byung du 'ong ngo zhes te | rdul phra rab
 rnams ni cha shas med pa'i phyir sbyor ba ma yin gyi | 'dus pa dag ni
 phan tshun sbyor ro zhes zer ba _{H)}de dag la 'di skad du | _{I)}rdul phra rab
 rnams 'dus pa gang yin pa de de dag las don gzhan rnams ma yin no
 zhes brjod par bya'o ||

XII

ṣaṇṇām samānadeśatvāt piṇḍaḥ syād aṇumātrakaḥ || [12 ||]

^{D)} atha ya evaikasya paramāṇor deśaḥ sa eva ṣaṇṇām < | > ^{E)} tena sarveṣāṃ samānadeśatvāt sarvaḥ piṇḍaḥ paramāṇumātraḥ syāt paras-parāvyatirekād ^{F)} iti na kaścit piṇḍo dṛśyaḥ syāt* | ^{G)} naiva hi paramāṇavaḥ saṃyujyante niravayavatvāt < | > mā bhūd eṣa doṣaprasaṅgaḥ < | > saṃghātās tu parasparaṃ saṃyujyanta iti kāśmīravaibhāṣikās < | > ^{H)} te idaṃ praṣṭavyāḥ | ^{I)} yaḥ paramāṇūnām saṃghāto na sa tebhyo 'rthāntaram iti ||

[Or] because, the six being in a common location, the cluster would be the extent of a [single] atom. [12cd]

^{D)} Or, the place in which there are six atoms would be precisely the same as the place of the single atom. ^{E)} For this [reason], because all of them would be in a common location, the entire cluster would be the extent of a [single] atom, because they would not exclude one another. ^{F)} Thus no cluster would be visible at all. ^{G)} The Kashmiri Vaibhāṣikas say: “Atoms do not at all conjoin, because of being partless—absolutely not! But compounded things do conjoin one with another.” ^{H)} They should be questioned as follows: ^{I)} Since a compound of atoms is not something separate from those [atoms],

G)
niravayavatvāt] MS: niravayatvāt

XIII

rdul phran sbyor ba med na ni ||
 de 'dus yod pa de gang gis || [13ab]

A) sbyor ba zhes bya bar bsnyegs so ||

cha shas yod ba ma yin pas ||
 de sbyor mi 'grub ma zer cig | [13cd]

B) ji ste 'dus pa dag kyang phan tshun mi sbyor ro zhe na | rdul phra rab
 rnams ni cha shas med pa'i phyir sbyor ba mi 'grub bo zhes ma zer cig |
 'dus pa cha shas dang bcas pa yang sbyor bar khas mi len pa'i phyir ro ||
 C) de bas rdul phra rab rdzas gcig pu mi 'grub bo || D) rdul phra rab sbyor
 bar 'dod kyang rung mi 'dod kyang rung ste |

XIII

paramāṇor asaṁyoge tatsaṁghāte (')sti kasya saḥ ||

A) saṁyoga iti varttate |

na cānavayavatvena tatsaṁyogo na sidhyati || [13 ||]

B) atha saṁghātā apy anyonyaṁ na saṁyujyante na tarhi paramāṇūnāṁ niravayavatvāt saṁyogo na sidhyatīti vaktavyaṁ* | sāvayava-syāpi hi saṁghātasya saṁyogānabhyupa(*gamāt* | C) *ataḥ pa*)ramāṇur ekaṁ dravyaṁ na sidhyati | D) yadi ca paramāṇoḥ saṁyoga iṣyate yadi vā neṣyate |

Given that there is no conjunction of atoms, what is [conjoining] when those [atoms] are compounded? [13ab]

A) “Conjoining” is carried over [from the previous].

But it is also not due to their partlessness that the conjunction of those [atoms] is not proved. [13cd]

B) If you now were to claim that even compounds do not conjoin with one another, then you [Kashmiri Vaibhāṣikas] should not say that the conjunction of atoms is not proved because of their partlessness, for a conjunction of the compounded, even with parts, is not admitted. C) Therefore, the atom is not proved as a singular substance. D) And whether a conjunction of atoms is accepted or not:

B)
niravayavatvāt] MS: niravayatvāt

XIV

gang la phyogs cha tha dad yod ||
 de ni gcig tu mi rung ngo || [14ab]

^{A)} rdul phra rab kyi shar phyogs kyi cha yang gzhan pa nas 'og gi cha'i
 bar du yang gzhan te | phyogs kyi cha tha dad na de'i bdag nyid kyi rdul
 phra rab gcig pur ji ltar rung |

grib dang sgrib par ji ltar 'gyur || [14c]

XIV

digbhāgabhedo yasyāsti tasyaikatvan na yujyate |

A) anyo hi paramāṇoḥ [p]ū(*rvadig*)[bh](*āgo*) ^{<5a1>} yāvad adho-
digbhāga iti digbhāgabhedo sati katharṁ tadātmakasya paramāṇor eka-
tvaṁ yokṣyate |

chāyāvṛtī katharṁ vā |

**It is not reasonable that something with spatial differentia-
tion be singular.** [14ab]

A) If there were spatial differentiation of an atom—namely, the
front part is different [and so are all the other sides] including the
bottom part—how would the singularity of an atom with that
[multiple] nature be reasonable?

Or how is there shadow and obstruction? [14c]

XIV

_{B)} gal te rdul phra rab re re la phyogs kyi cha tha dad pa med na ni nyi
 ma shar ba'i tshe ngos gzhan na ni grib ma 'bab par ji ltar 'gyur te | _{C)} de
 la ni gang du nyi ma mi 'bab pa'i phyogs gzhan med do || _{D)} gal te phyogs
 kyi cha tha dad par mi 'dod na rdul phra rab la rdul phra rab gzhan gyis
 sgrib par yang ji ltar 'gyur | _{E)} rdul phra rab gang la yang cha shas gzhan
 med na gang du 'ong ba'i phyogs la gcig la gcig thogs par 'gyur | _{F)} thogs
 pa med na ni thams cad go gcig tu gyur pas 'dus pa thams cad rdul phra
 rab tsam du 'gyur te | de ni bshad zin to ||

XIV

^{B)} yady ekaikasya paramāṇor digbhāgabhedo na syād ādityo-
 daye katham anyatra pā(rs̥v)[e] <chāyā> bhavaty anyatrātapah | ^{C)} na hi
 tasyānyaḥ pradeśo <'>sti yatrātapo na syāt* | ^{D)} āvaraṇaṁ ca katham
 bhavati paramāṇoḥ paramāṇvantareṇa yadi digbhāgabhedo ne[ṣya]te |
^{E)} na hi kaścīd a(nya)ḥ parabhāgo <'>sti yatrāgamanād anyenānyasya
 pratighātaḥ syāt* | ^{F)} asati ca pratighāte sarveṣāṁ samānadeśatvāt
 sarvaḥ saṁghātaḥ paramāṇumāt[r]a[h sy]ā[d] i[ty] (*uktam* |)

^{B)} If no single atom were to have spatial differentiation, how is it that
 when the sun rises in one place, there is shadow in one place, sunshine
 in another? ^{C)} For that [atom] does not have another portion on which
 there would be no sunshine. ^{D)} And how is an atom obstructed by
 another atom if spatial differentiation is not accepted? ^{E)} For [an atom]
 has no other separate part whatsoever, from contact with which one
 [atom] would be resisted by another. ^{F)} And if there were no resistance,
 then because all of them would share a common location, the entire
 compound would be the extent of a [single] atom, as has [already]
 been discussed [in verse 12cd, above].

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g) grib ma dang sgrib pa rdul phra rab kyi ma yin yang | ci gong bu'i yin
pa de ltar yang mi 'dod dam |

h) rdul phra rab rnams las gong bu gzhan zhig yin par 'dod dam ci na de
dag de'i yin |

i) smras pa | ma yin no ||

XIV

g) kim evaṃ neṣyate piṇḍasya te cchāyāvṛtī na paramāṇor iti |

h) kiṃ khalu paramāṇubhyo 'nyaḥ piṇḍa iṣyate yasya te syātāṃ
 ⟨|⟩

i) nety āha |

[Objection]

g) Do you not accept in this way that the two, shadow and obstruction, belong to the cluster, not to the atom?

[Vasubandhu]

h) Do you, for your part, accept that the cluster which would possess those two [shadow and obstruction] is something other than the atoms ?

[Opponent]

i) We say: no.

XIV

gong bu gzhan min de de'i min || [14d]

ᠵ) gal te rdul phra rab mams las gong bu gzhan ma yin na de dag de'i ma
yin par grub pa yin no ||

ᠬ) yongs su rtogs pa 'di ni gnas pa'i khyad par te | gzugs la sogs pa'i
mtshan nyid ni ma bkag na rdul phra rab ce 'am | 'dus ba zhes bsam pa
'dis ci zhig bya zhe na |

XIV

anyo na piṇḍas cen na tasya te (|| 14 ||

ḍ) *yadi nā*)nyaḥ paramāṇubhyaḥ piṇḍa iṣyate na te tasyeti
siddham bhavati |

ḳ) sanniveśaparikalpa eṣaḥ < | > paramāṇuḥ saṁghāta iti vā kim
anayā cintayā < | > lakṣaṇan tu rūpā(*dīnām*) na pratiṣidhyate |

[Vasubandhu]

**If the cluster is not other [than the atoms], the two
[shadow and obstruction] would not be [properties] of
that [cluster].** [14cd]

ḍ) If you do not accept the cluster as something other than the
atoms, then it is proved that the two [shadow and obstruction] are not
[properties] of that [cluster].

[Objection]

ḳ) This is mere imaginative speculation about construction.
Why do you have this worry about whether it is an atom or a
compound? In any case, the characteristic of visible form and the rest
is not negated.

XIV

^{L)} de dag gi mtshan nyid gang yin |

^{M)} mig la sogs pa'i yul nyid dang || sngon po la sogs pa nyid do ||

^{N)} gang mig la sogs pa'i yul sngon po dang | ser po la sogs ba 'dod pa de ci
rdzas gcig pu zhig gam | 'on te du ma zhig ces de dpyad par bya'o ||

XIV

_{L)} kim punas teṣāṁ lakṣaṇaṁ

_{M)} cakṣurādiviṣayatvaṁ nīlāditvaṁ ca

_{N)} tad evedaṁ sampradhāryate < | > yat tac cakṣurādīnāṁ viṣayo
nīlapītādikam iṣyate kin tad ekaṁ dravyam (*atha vā ta*)d anekam iti |

[Vasubandhu]

_{L)} Then what *is* their characteristic?

[Objection]

_{M)} Being a sense-field of visual perception and the rest, and blueness and the like [are the characteristic of visible form].

[Vasubandhu]

_{N)} This is precisely what is being determined: is the sense-field of visual perception and the rest you accept as blue, yellow and so on a single substance, or rather multiple?

XV

A) 'dis ci zhig bya zhe na |

B) du ma'i nyes pa ni bshad zin to ||

gcig na rim gyis 'gro ba med ||
 zin dang ma zin cig car med ||
 ris chad du mar gnas pa dang ||
 mig gis mi sod phra ba 'ang med || [15]

B)

nyes pa] All editions: *nges pa*

XV

A) kiñ cātaḥ |

B) anekatve doṣa uktaḥ ||

ekatve na krameṇetir yugapan na grahāgrahau |
vicchinnānekavṛttiś ca sūkṣmāṇikṣā ca no bhavet* || [15 ||]

[Objection]

A) And what [follows] from this?

[Vasubandhu]

B) The fault if it is [judged to be] multiple has already been discussed.

If [the sense object] were singular, there would be no gradual motion, no simultaneous apprehension and non-apprehension, nor divided multiple existence, nor the invisible microscopic. [15]

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c) gal te mig gi yul sngon po dang ser po la sogs pa gang yin pa de ris su
 ma chad de rdzas gcig par rtogs na sa la rim gyis 'gro bar mi 'gyur te |
 gom pa gcig bor bas thams cad du son pa'i phyir ro || d) tshu rol gyi cha
 zin la pha rol gyi cha ma zin pa cig car du mi 'gyur te | de'i tshe zin pa
 dang ma zin pa de mi rigs so ||

XV

c) yadi yāvad avicchinnam n[ī](*lādi*)_{<5bl>} **kañ** cakṣuṣo viṣayas tad
 ekaṁ dravyam kalpyate pṛthivyām krameṇetir na syāt < | > gamanam
 ity arthaḥ | sakṛtpāda(*k*)[ṣ]epeṇa sarvasya gatatvāt* | d) a(*r*)vā[g]-
 bhā[g]asya ca grahaṇam parabhāgasya cāgra(*haṇam*) yugapan na syāt
 < | > na hi tasyaiva tadānīm grahaṇañ cāgrahaṇañ ca yuktam* |

c) If one imagines the visual sense-object, blue and the rest, as long as it is undivided, to be a single substance, there would not be gradual motion on the ground—going, that is to say—because everything would be traversed with a single foot-step. d) And the apprehension of a facing portion and the non-apprehension of the non-facing portion would not be simultaneous, because the apprehension and non-apprehension of the very same thing at that [same] time is not reasonable.

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^{E)} glang po che dang rta la sogs pa'i ris su chad pa du ma gcig na 'dug par
 mi 'gyur te | ^{F)} gcig gang na 'dug pa de nyid na gzhan yang 'dug na de dag
 ris su chad par ji ltar rung | ^{G)} de gnyis kyis gang non pa dang ma non pa
 de dag gcig tu ji ltar rung ste | bar na de dag gis stong pa gzung du yod
 pa'i phyir ro || ^{H)} gal te mtshan nyid tha dad pa nyid kyis rdzas gzhan
 kho nar rtog gi gzhan du ma yin na go | chu'i skye bo phra mo rnams
 kyang chen po dag dang gzugs mtshungs pas mig gis mi sod par mi
 'gyur ro ||

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^{E)} vicchinnasya cānekasya hastyaśvādikasyaikatra vṛttir na syāt
 (|) ^{F)} yatraiva hy ekan tatraivāparam iti kathan tayor vicche(*do yujya*)te
 | ^{G)} katham vā tad ekaṁ yat prāptaṁ ca tābhyāṁ na ca prāptam antarāle
 tacchūnyagrahaṇāt* | ^{H)} sūkṣmāṇāṁ codakajantūnāṁ sthūlaiḥ samāna-
 rūpāṇāṁ anīkṣaṇaṁ na syāt* | yadi la(*kṣaṇabhe*)dād eva dravyāntara-
 tvaṁ kalpyate , nānyathā ,

^{E)} And there would be no existence of divided and multiple elephants, horses and so on in a single place; ^{F)} because one thing would be just precisely where another is, how could a division between them be reasonable? ^{G)} Or on the other hand, how is [it reasonable that] that [place] is single which is [both] occupied by those two [elephant and horse] and not occupied, since one apprehends that the gap between them is empty of the two? ^{H)} And, if you were to imagine [the two] to have a difference in substance purely because of a distinction in characteristic feature, not otherwise, microscopic aquatic creatures, having forms like macroscopic [creatures], would not be invisible.

E)
 hastyaśvādikasyaikatra] MS: hastyaśvādikasyān ekatra

G)
 tad ekaṁ] MS: tadaikaṁ

XV

ཉ) de'i phyir nges par rdul phra rab tha dad par brtag par bya ste | ཉ) de
 dag gcig tu mi 'grub bo || ཀ) de ma grub pas gzugs la sogs pa yang mig la
 sogs pa'i yul nyid du mi 'grub ste | ལ) rnam par rig pa tsam du grub pa yin
 no ||

XV

₁₎ tasmād avaśyaṁ paramāṇuśo bhedaḥ kalpayitavyaḥ < | > ₂₎ sa caiko na
 sidhyati | ₃₎ tasyāsiddhau rūpādīnāṁ cakṣ(u)rādiviṣayatva(*m asiddham*
₄₎ *i*)ti siddham* vijñaptimātram bhavatīti |

₁₎ Therefore [since this is not the case], one must certainly imagine a
 distinction atomically. ₂₎ And that [atom] is not proved to be singular. ₃₎
 Since [the singular atom] is not proven, the fact that visible form—and
 the rest—are sense-fields of the visual—and the rest—is unproven; ₄₎
 therefore Manifestation-Only comes to be proved.

1)
 avaśyaṁ] MS: avavaśyaṁ

XVI

^{A)} tshad ma'i dbang gis na yod dam med pa dmigs kyis dbye bar 'gyur la |
 tshad ma thams cad kyi nang na mngon sum gyi tshad ma ni mchog
 yin no || ^{B)} don de med na 'di ni bdag gi mngon sum mo snyam pa blo 'di
 ji ltar 'byung zhe na |

XVI

^{A)} pramāṇavaśād astitvaṁ nāstitvaṁ vā nirddhāryate < | >
 sarveṣāñ ca pramāṇānāṁ pratyakṣam pramāṇaṁ gariṣṭham ^{B)} ity asaty
 arthe ka(*tham*) iyaṁ buddhir bha(*vatīdam me*) **pratyakṣam** iti ||

[Objection]

^{A)} Existence or non-existence is settled on the strength of the valid means of cognition, and of all valid means of cognition, direct perception is the most important valid means of cognition. ^{B)} Therefore, if an external object does not exist, how does this awareness come about, namely ‘this is before my eyes’?

A)
 pramāṇānāṁ] MS: praṇānāṁ

XVI

mngon sum blo ni rmi sogs bzhin || [16a]

c) don med par yang zhes sngar bstan pa nyid do ||

de yang gang tshe de yi tshe ||

khyod kyi don de mi snang na ||

de ni mngon sum ji ltar 'dod || [16bcd]

XVI

pratyakṣabuddhiḥ svapnādau yathā |

c) vināpy artheneti pūrvam eva jñāpitaṁ* |

sā ca yadā tadā |

na so (')rtho dṛśyate tasya pratyakṣatvaṁ kathaṁ mataṁ* ||

[16 ||]

[Vasubandhu]

The idea that there is direct perception [of the external object takes place] as in a dream and so on. [16ab]

c) I already earlier made the point that “Even without an external object” [is understood].

Additionally, that external object is not seen [at the moment] when one has [the idea that there is direct perception of an external object]; [so] how can you consider that [the external object] is directly perceived?

[16bcd]

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D) gang gi tshe yul 'di nyid ni bdag gi mngon sum mo snyam du mngon
 sum gyi blo de byung ba de'i tshe khyod kyi don de mi snang ste | yid
 kyi rnam par shes pas yongs su bcad pa dang | mig gi rnam par shes pa
 yang de'i tshe 'gags pa'i phyir ro || EF) lhag par yang skad cig mar smra
 bas de mngon sum du ji ltar 'dod || de ltar na de'i tshe gzugs dang rol
 sogs pa de dag ni 'gags zin to ||

XVI

^{D)} yad(*ā*) ca sā pratyakṣa(*buddhir bhava*)tīdaṁ me pratyakṣam iti tadā
na so (')rtho dṛśyate manovijñānenaiva paricchedāc cakṣurvijñānasya
ca tadā niruddhatvād ^{E)} iti katham tasya pratyakṣatvam iṣṭam | ^{F)}
vi[ś]eṣ[e]ṇa tu kṣaṇika(*vādino*) ^{<6a1>}yasya tadānīm niruddham eva tad
rūpaṁ rasādikaṁ vā |

^{D)} And [at the moment] when that idea [that there is] direct perception
[of the external object] comes about with the thought “This is my
direct perception,” that external object is not seen [at that same
moment], because the discerning takes place only by means of mental
cognition, and because at that time the visual cognition [which
precedes the mental cognition] has ceased. ^{E)} Given this, how can you
accept that that [object] is directly perceived? ^{F)} What is more, [this
holds] especially for one who advocates the momentariness [of all
things], for whom [the respective] visible form, or flavor and the rest,
has [already] entirely ceased at that time.

XVII

^{A)} myong ba med par yid kyi rnam par shes pa dran par mi 'gyur bas ^{B)}
 don gdon mi za bar myong bar 'gyur te | de ni de mthong ba yin no || ^{C)}
 de ltar de'i yul gzugs la sogs pa mngon sum du 'dod do zhe na |

XVII

^{A)} nānanubhūtam manovijñānena smaryate < | > ^{B)} ity avaśyam
 arthānubhavana bhavitavyam tac ca darśanam ity ^{C)} evam tadviśayasya
 rūpāde(h) p(r)atyakṣatvaṁ matam |

[Objection]

^{A)} What was not [previously] experienced cannot be recollected
 by mental cognition. ^{B)} Therefore, there must be experience of an
 external object, and that is spoken of as 'seeing'. ^{C)} In this way I consider
 it to be a case of an direct perception of that sense-object, [namely]
 material form and the rest.

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^{D)} myong ba ni don dran pa yin no || zhes de ma grub ste | 'di ltar |

dper na der snang rnam rig bzhin ||

bshad zin | [_{17ab}]

^{E)} dper na don med par don du snang ba mig gi rnam par shes pa la sogs
pa'i rnam par rig pa 'byung ba de bzhin te bshad zin to ||

de las dran par zad | [_{17b}]

XVII

^{D)} asiddham idam anubhūṭasyārthasya smaraṇam bhavatīti |
yasmāt* |

uktaṁ yathā tadābhāsā vijñaptiḥ ||

^{E)} vināpy arthena yathārthābhāsā cakṣurvijñānādikā vijñaptir
utpa(*dya*)te tathoktaṁ ||

smaraṇam tataḥ |

[Vasubandhu]

^{D)} This [argument about] recollection [being] of an experienced
external object is unproved, since:

**As I discussed, manifestation has the appearance of that
[external object].** [17ab]

^{E)} I have discussed how, even in the absence of an external
object, a manifestation consisting of visual cognition and so forth
arises with the appearance of an external object.

Recollection [comes] from that. [17b]

XVII

^{F)} rnam par rig pa de las dran pa dang mtshungs par ldan pa der snang
 ba nyid gzugs la sogs pa la rnam par rtog pa yid kyi rnam par rig pa
 'byung ste | ^{G)} dran pa byung ba las don myong bar mi 'grub bo ||

^{H)} dper na rmi lam gyi rnam par rig pa'i yul yod pa ma yin pa de bzhin
 du | gal te gnyid kyis ma log pa'i tshe na yang ^{I)} de ltar yin na ni de kho
 na bzhin du de med par 'jig rten rang rang gis khong du chud pa'i rigs
 na | ^{J)} de ltar yang ma yin te | ^{K)} de'i phyir rmi lam bzhin du don dmigs
 pa thams cad don med pa ma yin no zhe na |

XVII

^{F)} tato hi vijñapteḥ smṛtisamprayuktā tatpratibhāsaiva rūpādivikalpikā manovijñaptir utpadyata ^{G)} iti na smṛtyutpādād arthānubhavaḥ sidhyati |

^{H)} yadi yathā swapne vijñaptir abhūtārthaviṣayā tathā jāgrato <'>pi syāt ^{I)} tathaiva tadabhāvaṁ lokaḥ svayam avagacchet* < | > ^{J)} na caivam bhavati < | > ^{K)} tasmān na swapna ivārthopalabdhiḥ sarvā nirarthikā |

^{F)} For from that manifestation arises a mental manifestation associated with memory, which has precisely the appearance of that [material form] and conceptually fantasizes itself [to refer to] material form and so on; ^{G)} thus the arising of a memory does not prove the experience of an external object.

[Objection]

^{H)} If a manifestation were to have as its sense-object an unreal external object also for one awake, just as is the case in a dream, ^{I)} in precisely that way everyone would understand by themselves the non-existence of that [external object]. ^{J)} But that is not how it is. ^{K)} Therefore, it is not so that all referential objectifications of external objects are, as is the case in a dream, [actually] devoid of external objects.

XVII

^{l)} de ni gtan tshigs su mi rung ste | 'di ltar |

rmi lam mthong ba yul med par ||

ma sad bar du rtogs ma yin || [_{17cd}]

^{m)} de ltar log par rnam par rtog pa la goms pa'i bag chags kyi gnyid kyis
log pa'i 'jig rten ni rmi lam bzhin du yang dag pa ma yin pa'i don
mthong te | ⁿ⁾ ma sad kyi bar du de med par ji lta ba bzhin du rtogs pa
ma yin gyi | ^{o)} gang gi tshe de'i gnyen po 'jig rten las 'das pa rnam par mi
rtog pa'i ye shes thob nas sad par gyur pa de'i tshe de'i rjes las thob pa
dag pa 'jig rten pa'i ye shes de mngon du gyur nas yul med par ji lta ba
bzhin du khong du chud de de ni mtshungs so ||

XVII

^{L)} idam ajñāpakam* | yasmāt* |

svapnadṛgviṣayābhāvaṃ nāprabuddho 'vagacchati || 17 ||]

^{M)} evaṃ vitathavikalpābhyāsavāsanānidrayā prasupto lokāḥ
svapna ivābhūtam artham paśyann ^{N)} aprabuddhas tadabhāvaṃ
yathāvaṃ nāvagacchati , ^{O)} yadā tu tatpratipakṣalokottaranirvikalpa-
jñānalābhāt prabuddho bhavati tadā tatprṣṭhalabdhasūddhalaukika-
jñānasammukhībhāvād viṣayābhāvaṃ yathāvad avagacchatīti
samānam etat* |

[Vasubandhu]

^{L)} You cannot draw a conclusion from this, since:

**One who is not awake does not understand the non-
existence of a sense-object seen in a dream.** [17cd]

^{M)} Just so everyone, asleep with the sleep of repeated perfuming
of erroneous conceptual fantasy, sees unreal external objects, as in a
dream; ^{N)} being unawakened, they do not properly understand the non-
existence of the [external object]. ^{O)} But when they are awakened
through the acquisition of supramundane non-discriminative insight
which is the antidote to that [erroneous imagination], then they
properly understand the non-existence of the sense-object because the
subsequently obtained pure worldly insight becomes present. This
[situation] is the same.

XVIII

^{A)} gal te rang gi rgyud gyur pa'i khyad par nyid las sems can rnam kyi
 don du snang ba'i rnam par rig pa 'byung gi | don gyi khyad par las ma
 yin na | ^{B)} brten pa de dang bshad pa de med pas sdig pa'i grogs po dang
 | dge ba'i bshes gnyen la brten pa dang | dam pa dang dam pa ma yin
 pa'i chos mnyan pa las sems can rnam kyi rnam par rig pa nges pa ji
 ltar 'grub par 'gyur |

XVIII

A) yadi svasantānapariṇāmaviśeṣād eva satvānām arthaprati-
 bhāsā vijñaptaya utpadyante nārthaviśe_{<6b1>}ṣāt* | B) tadā ya eṣa pāpa-
 kalyāṇamitrasaṁparkāt sadasaddharmaśravaṇāc ca vijñaptiniyamaḥ
 satvānām sa katham [si]dhyati , asati sadasatsaṁparke taddeśanāyāñ
 ca |

[Objection]

A) If manifestations with the appearance of external objects
 were to arise for beings only through particular transformations of
 their own mental continua, not through particular external objects, B)
 then how is it proved that association with bad or good spiritual
 guides, and hearing true and false teachings, shape the manifestations
 of beings, if that association with the good and the bad and that
 teaching do not [actually] exist?

XVIII

gcig la gcig gi dbang gis na ||
 rnam par rig pa phan tshun nges || [18ab]

c) sems can thams cad kyi rnam par rig pa phan tshun gyi dbang gis
 phan tshun du rnam par rig pa rnams nges par 'gyur te | ci rigs su sbyar
 ro || d) gcig la gcig ces bya ba ni phan tshun no || e) de'i phyir rgyud gzhan
 gyi rnam par rig pa'i khyad par las rgyud gzhan la rnam par rig pa'i
 khyad par 'byung gi don gyi khyad par las ni ma yin no ||

XVIII

anyonyādhipatitvena vijñaptiniyamo mithaḥ ||

c) sarveṣāṃ hi satvānām anyonyavijñaptiādhipatyena mitho
vijñapter niyamo bhavati yathāyogaṃ | d) mitha iti parasparataḥ | e) ataḥ
santānāntaravijñaptiviśeṣāt santānāntare vijñaptiviśeṣa utpadyate
nārthaviśeṣāt* |

Mutual shaping of manifestation is due to their influence on each other. [18ab]

c) Because all beings exert an influence on each others' manifestations, there comes to be mutual shaping of manifestation, according to the circumstances. d) "Mutually" means "reciprocally." e) Therefore, a distinct manifestation arises within one mental continuum because of a distinct manifestation within another mental continuum, not because of a distinct external object.

XVIII

f) dper na rmi lam gyi rnam par rig pa'i don med ba bzhin du gal te
 gnyid kyis ma log pa'i yang de lta na gnyid kyis log pa dang ma log pa
 na dge ba dang mi dge ba'i las kun tu spyod pa'i 'bras bu phyi ma la 'dod
 pa dang mi 'dod pa 'dra bar ci'i phyir mi 'gyur |

sems ni gnyid kyis non pas na ||
 de phyir rmi dang 'bras mi mtshungs || [18cd]

h) de ni 'dir rgyu yin gyi don yod pa ni ma yin no ||

XVIII

^{F)} yadi yathā svapne nirarthikā vijñaptir evañ jāgrato ⟨'⟩pi syāt
kasmāt kuśālākuśalasamudācāre **suptāsuptayos** tulyaṁ phalam
iṣṭāniṣṭam ātyān na bhavati ⟨ | ⟩

^{G)} yasmāt* |

middhenopahatañ cittaṁ svapne tenāsamaṁ phalaṁ

[[18]]

^{H)} idam atra kāraṇaṁ na tv arthasadbhāvaḥ |

[Objection]

^{F)} If [as you claim] a manifestation were devoid of an external object likewise also for one awake, as is the case in a dream, why do those asleep and those not asleep not come in the future to have the same [karmic] result, desired and undesired [respectively], of [their] wholesome and unwholesome behavior?

[Vasubandhu]

^{G)} Since:

When one dreams, the mind is overpowered by sloth; thus the result is not the same. [18cd]

^{H)} This is the cause in this case, and not [some alleged] real existence of an external object.

XIX

^{A)} gal te 'di dag rnam par rig pa tsam du zad na gang la yang lus dang
 ngag kyang med pas shan pa la sogs pas gsod pa na lug la sogs pa 'chi
 bar ji ltar 'gyur | ^{B)} 'chi ba de des ma byas na ni shan pa la sogs pa srog
 gcod pa'i kha na ma tho ba dang ldan par ji ltar 'gyur zhe na |

XIX

^{A)} yadi vijñaptimātram evedaṁ na kasyacit kāyo (')sti na vāk*
 katham upakramyamāṇānām aurabhrikādibhir urabhrādīnām
 maraṇam bhavati , ^{B)} atatkr̥te vā tanmaraṇe katham aurabhrikādīnām
 prāṇātīpātāvadyena yogo bhavati ||

[Objection]

^{A)} If this [world] is nothing but Manifestation-Only, and no one
 has a body or voice, how does the death of rams and others being
 attacked by butchers come about? ^{B)} Or if their death is not due to
 those [butchers], how does there come to be a connection between the
 butchers and the crime of taking life?

A)
 upakramya°] MS: anukramya°

XIX

'chi ba gzhan gyi rnam rig gi ||
 bye brag las de dper bya na ||
 'dre la sogs pa'i yid dbang gis ||
 gzhan gyi dran nyams 'gyur sogs bzhin || [19]

c) dper na 'dre la sogs pa'i yid kyi dbang gis gzhan dag gi dran pa nyams
 pa dang | rmi ltas su mthong ba dang | 'byung po'i gdon phab par 'gyur
 ba dang | d) rdzu 'phrul dang ldan pa'i yid kyi dbang gis te | e) dper na
 'phags pa kā tyā'i bu chen po'i byin gyi brlabs kyi sa ra ṇas rmi ltas su
 mthong ba dang | f) drang srong dgon pa pa'i yid 'khrugs pas thags
 zangs ris g) bzhin du gzhan gyi rnam par rig pa'i bye brag gis sems can
 gzhan gyi srog gi dbang po dang mi mthun pa'i 'gyur ba 'ga' 'byung ste |
 des skal ba 'dra ba'i rgyud kyi rgyun chad pa zhes bya ba 'chi bar rig par
 bya'o ||

XIX

marāṇaṃ paravijñaptiviśeṣād vikriyā yathā |
 smṛtilopādikānyeṣāṃ piśācādimanovaśāt* || [19 ||]

c) yathā hi piśācādimanovaśād anyeṣāṃ smṛtilopasvapna-
 darśanabhūtagrahāveśavikārā bhavanti | d) ṛddhivanmanovaśāc ca | e)
 yathā sāraṇasyāryamahākātyāyanādhiṣṭhānāt svapnadarśanaṃ | f)
 āraṇyakaṛṣimanaḥpradoṣāc ca vema[c]itrīṇa<7a1>ḥ parājayaḥ | g) tathā
 paravijñaptiviśeṣādhipatyāt pareṣāṃ jīvitendriyavirodhinī kācid vikri-
 yotpadyate yayā sabhāgasantativicchedākhyam marāṇaṃ bhavatīti
 veditavyaṃ |

**Death is a transformation due to a particular manifes-
 tation of another, just as the transformation of memory
 loss and the like of others is due to the mental force of
 demons and so on. [19]**

c) Just as, due to the mental force of demons and so on others
 come to experience dislocations [including] memory loss, dream
 visions and possession by ghouls of illness, d) and [this also takes place]
 due to the mental force of those possessed of superpowers— e) For
 example, Sāraṇa had a dream vision due to the controlling power of
 Ārya-Mahākātyāyana, f) and the conquest of Vemacitrin was due to the
 hostility of the forest ascetics— g) Just so, it is due to the influence of a
 particular manifestation of another that there arises some
 transformation of others obstructing the life force, by which there
 comes to be death, designated as the cutting off of related [mental]
 continuities. This is how it should be understood.

XX

drang srong khros pas dan ta ka'i ||
 dgon pa ji ltar stongs par 'gyur || [20ab]

^{A)} gal te gzhan gyi nam par rig pa'i bye brag gis sems can dag 'chi bar mi
 'dod na | ^{B)} yid kyi nyes pa kha na ma tho ba chen po dang bcas pa nyid
 du bsgrub pa na | bcom ldan 'das kyis khyim bdag nye ba 'khor la bka'
 stsal pa | ^{C)} khyim bdag khyod kyis dan ta ka'i dgon pa dang | ka ling ka'i
 dgon pa dang ma tang ka'i dgon pa de dag ci zhig gis stongs pa dang |
 gtsang mar gyur pa ci thos zhes smras pa dang | ^{D)} des gau ta ma drang
 srong rnams khros pas de ltar gyur ces thos so zhes gsol to ||

XX

katham vā daṇḍakāraṇyaśūnyatvam ṛṣikopataḥ |

^{A)} yadi paravijñaptiviśeṣādhipatyāt satvānām maraṇam neṣyate |
^{B)} manodaṇḍasya hi mahāsāvadyatvam sādhatā bhagavatopālir
gr̥hapatiḥ **pr̥ṣṭaḥ** ^{C)} kaccit te gr̥hapate śrutam kena tāni daṇḍakāraṇyāni
mātaṅgāraṇyāni kaliṅgāraṇyāni śūnyāni medhyībhūtāni < | > ^{D)} tenok-
tam śrutam me bho gautama ṛṣiṇām **manaḥpradoṣeṇeti** ||

**Otherwise, how did the Daṇḍaka forest become emptied by
the sages' anger?** [20ab]

^{A)} If you do not accept that beings die because of the influence
of a particular manifestation of another [how do you account for what
happened in the Daṇḍaka forests?]. ^{B)} For the Blessed One, in proving
that mental violence is highly objectionable, asked the householder
Upāli: ^{C)} “Have you heard anything, householder? By whom were the
Daṇḍaka forests, the Mātaṅga forests, and the Kaliṅga forests emptied
and made ritually pure?” ^{E)} He said: “I have heard, O Gautama, it was
through the mental hostility of the sages.”

XX

yid nyes kha na ma tho cher ||
 ji ltar de yis 'grub par 'gyur || [20cd]

_{E)} gal te 'di ltar rtog ste || de la dga' ba mi ma yin pa de dag gis de na gnas
 pa'i sems can rnams kha btag gi | drang srong rnams kyis yid 'khrugs
 pas dogs pa ni ma yin no zhe na | _{F)} de ltar na las des lus dang ngag gi
 nyes pa rnams pas yid kyi nyes pa ches kha na ma tho ba chen po dang
 bcas par 'grub par ji ltar 'gyur te | _{G)} de'i yid 'khrugs pa tsam gyis sems
 can de snyed 'chi bar 'grub bo ||

XX

manodaṇḍo mahāvadyaḥ kathaṁ vā tena sidhyati || 20 ||

^{E)} yady evaṁ kalpyate , tadabhiprasannair amānuṣais tadvāsi-
naḥ satvā utsāditā na tv ṛṣīṇāṁ* **manaḥpradoṣān mṛtā** ity ^{F)} evaṁ sati
kathaṁ tena karmmaṇā manodaṇḍaḥ kāyavāgdaṇḍābhyām mahā-
vadyatamaḥ siddho bhavati < | > ^{G)} tan manaḥpradoṣamātreṇa tāvatāṁ
satvānāṁ* maraṇāt sidhyati |

Or how does that prove mental violence is a great violation?

[20cd]

^{E)} If you were to imagine as follows: beings dwelling there were
annihilated by non-humans favorable to those [sages], rather than
dying due to the mental hostility of the sages— ^{F)} if such were the case,
how does that action prove mental violence to be a much greater
violation than physical or verbal violence? ^{G)} That is proved by the
death of so many beings solely on account of mental hostility.

XXI

_{A)} gal te 'di dag rnam par rig pa tsam du zad na gzhan gyi sems rig pas ci
 gzhan gyi sems shes sam 'on te mi shes she na | _{B)} 'dis ci zhig bya | _{C)} gal
 te mi shes na ni gzhan gyi sems rig pa zhes kyang ci skad du bya | _{D)} ji
 ste shes na yang |

XXI

^{A)} yadi vijñaptimātram evedam paracittavidaḥ kiṃ paracittam
 jānanty , atha na , ^{B)} kiñ cātaḥ ¹ ^{C)} yadi na jānanti katham paracittavido
 bhavanti | ^{D)} atha jānanti |

[Objection]

^{A)} If this [world] is nothing but Manifestation-Only, do then
 “those who know other minds” [really] know other minds, or not? ^{B)}
 And what [follows] from this? ^{C)} If they do not know, how do they
 become those who [are spoken of as ones who] know others minds? ^{D)}
 Or they do know [which is only possible if external objects do really
 exist, in which case]:

XXI

gzhan sems rig pas shes pa ni ||
 don bzhin ma yin ji ltar dper ||
 rang sems shes pa | [21abc]

^{E)} de yang ji ltar don ji lta ba bzhin du ma yin zhe na |

sangs rgyas kyi
 spyod yul ji bzhin ma shes phyir | [21cd]

^{F)} ji ltar de brjod du med pa'i bdag nyid du sangs rgyas kyi spyod yul du
 gyur pa de ltar des ma shes pa'i phyir de gnyi ga yang don ji lta ba bzhin
 ma yin te | ^{G)} log par snang ba'i phyir ro || ^{H)} gzung ba dang 'dzin pa'i
 rnam par rtog pa ma spangs pa'i phyir ro ||

XXI

paracittavidāṃ jñānam ayathārtham* katham* yathā ,
svacittajñānam*

_{E)} tad api katham ayathārtham* |

ajñānād yathā buddhasya gocarāḥ || [21 ||]

{F)} yathā tan nirabhilāpyenātmanā b(u){<7b1>} **ddh**ānāṃ gocarāḥ |
tathā tadajñānāt < | > tad ubhayaṃ na yathārtham _{G)} vitathapratibhāsa-
tayā _{H)} grāhyagrāhakavikalpasyāprahīṇatvāt* |

**How is the knowledge of those who know other minds
inconsistent with reality?**

[Reply:] **It is as with knowledge of one's own mind.** [21abc]

_{E)} How is that [knowledge of one's own mind] also inconsistent
with reality?

**Because one does not know [other minds or even one's
own] in the way that [such knowing of minds] is the
scope of a Buddha.** [21cd]

_{F)} Because we do not know that in the way that that [know-
ledge] is the scope of the buddhas, with respect to its nature as inex-
pressible. Both [knowledges, of one's own mind and of those of
others,] are inconsistent with reality, _{G)} because [all that non-buddhas
are able to know is an] erroneous appearance. _{H)} This is because they
fail to reject the conceptual fantasy of subject and object.

XXII

^{A)} rnam par rig pa tsam gyis rab tu dbye ba rnam par nges pa mtha' yas
la gting mi dpogs shing zab pa'i |

rnām rig tsam du grub pa 'di ||
bdag gis bdag gi mthu 'dra bar ||
byas kyi de yi rnam pa kun ||
bsam yas | [22abcd]

XXII

^{A)} anantaviniścayaprabhedāgādhagāmbhīryāyām vijñaptimātra-
tāyām 〈 | 〉

vijñaptimātratāsiddhiḥ svaśaktisadṛśī mayā |
kṛteyaṁ sarvathā sā tu na cintyā ,

^{A)} Because [the idea of] Manifestation-Only has unfathomable depth, its explanations and divisions endless,

I have composed this proof of [the World as] Manifestation-Only according to my ability, but that [fact that the World is nothing but Manifestation-Only] is not conceivable in its entirety. [22abcd]

XXII

_{B)} bdag 'dra bas rnam pa thams cad ni bsam par mi nus te | rtog ge'i
 spyod yul ma yin pa'i phyir ro || _{C)} 'o na de rnam pa thams cad du su'i
 spyod yul snyam pa la |

sangs rgyas spyod yul lo [_{22d}]

zhes bya ba smos te | _{D)} de ni sangs rgyas bcom ldan 'das rnam kyī
 spyod yul te | shes bya thams cad kyī rnam pa thams cad la mkhyen pa
 thogs pa mi mnga' ba'i phyir ro ||

XXII

^{B)} sarvaprakārā tu sā mādrśaiś cintayitum na śakyā tarkkāviṣa-
yatvāt* | ^{C)} kasya punaḥ sā sarvathā gocara ity āha |

buddhagocaraḥ , [| 22 |]

^{D)} buddhānām hi sā bhagavatām sarvaprakāram gocaraḥ sarvā-
kārasarvajñeyajñānāvighātād iti ||

^{B)} However, that [idea of Manifestation-Only] cannot be con-
ceived in all its aspects by those like me, because it is beyond the
domain of logical reasoning. ^{C)} For whom, then, is this [idea] in all
respects the [proper] scope? We reply:

It is the scope of the buddhas. [22d]

^{D)} For it is the scope of the buddhas, the Blessed Ones, in all
aspects, because their knowledge of all objects of knowledge in all
ways is unobstructed.

Colophon

slob dpon dbyig gnyen gyis mdzad pa nyi shu ba'i 'grel pa rdzogs so ||

|| rgya gar gyi mkhan po dzi na mi tra dang | shī len dra bo dhi dang |
zhu chen gyi lo tsā ba ban de ye shes sdes zhus te gtan la phab pa ||

Colophon

viṃśikā vijñaptimātratāsiddhiḥ
kṛtir iyaṃ ācāryavasubandhoḥ ||

This is the Proof of [the World as] Manifestation-Only in Twenty Verses
A composition of the Master Vasubandhu.

Notes and Commentary

I/II

In his edition, Sylvain Lévi (1925: 3) ‘restored’ the missing first leaf of the *Vimśikā* and its autocommentary. Later, Nasu Jisshū (1953: 114) offered a revised version. For these, see below. While most of the reconstructions remain unverifiable, according to the subcommentary of Vairocanarakṣita (Kano 2008: 353), phrase I (H) should read *nārthaḥ kaścid asti*. I therefore print this in the Sanskrit text.

Since both of these reconstructions are, with the exception noted above and that discussed below under (B), nothing but speculation, I translate the Tibetan text, distinguishing this translation from that of the extant Sanskrit by use of a smaller type size.

Lévi’s proposal, which has been adopted (uncritically, it seems to me) by almost all scholars, runs as follows, with the insertion of the first verse from his verse manuscript (in roman typeface):

I

A) *mahāyāne traidhātukaṁ vijñaptimātraṁ vyavasthāpyate* | B) *citta-*
mātram bho jinaputrā yad uta traidhātukam iti sūtrāt | C) *cittaṁ mano*
vijñānaṁ vijñaptiś ceti paryāyāḥ | D) *cittam atra sasaṁprayogam abhi-*
pretam | E) *mātram ity arthapratīṣedhārtham* |

vijñaptimātram evaitad asadarthāvabhāsanāt |
yathā taimirikasyāsatkeśacandrādidarśanam ||

II

A) *atra codyate* |

yadi vijñaptir anarthā niyamo na deśakālayoḥ |
santānānasyāniyamaś ca yuktā kṛtyakriyā yuktā na ca || 2 ||

B) *kim uktam bhavati* | C) *yadi vinā rūpādyarthena rūpādivijñaptir utpadyate na rūpādyarthāt* | D) *kasmāt kvaciddeśa utpadyate na sarvatra* | E) *tatraiva ca deśe kadācid utpadyate na sarvadā* | F) *taddeśakālapratiṣṭhitānām sarveṣām saṁtāna utpadyate na kevalam ekasya* | G) *yathā taimirikāṇām saṁtāne keśādyābhāso nānyeṣām* | H) *kasmād yat taimirikaiḥ keśabhramarādi dṛśyate tena keśādikriyā na kriyate na ca tadanyair na kriyate* | I) *yad annapānavastraviṣāyudhādi svapne dṛśyate tenānnādikriyā na kriyate na ca tadanyair na kriyate gandharvanagareṇāsattvān nagarakriyā na kriyate na ca tadanyair na kriyate* | J) *tasmād arthābhāve deśakāla-*

Nasu Jisshū (1953: 114) suggested some modifications on this reconstruction, with somewhat more attention to the Tibetan translation:

I

A) *mahāyāne traidhātukam vijñaptimātram vyavasthāpyate* | B) *cittamātram idam bho jinaputrā yad uta traidhātukam iti sūtre vacanāt* | C) *cittam mano vijñānam vijñaptir iti paryāyāḥ* | D) *tac ca cittam iha asaṁprayogam abhiprāyaḥ* | E) *mātragrahaṇam arthapratīṣedhārtham* | F) *vijñānam evedam arthapratibhāsam utpadyate* | G) *yathā taimirikānām asatkeśacandrādidarśanam* | H) *na tu kaścid artho 'sti* |

II

A) *atraitac codyate* |

na deśakālaniyamaḥ saṁtānāniyamo na ca |
na ca kṛtyakriyā yuktā vijñaptir yadi nārthataḥ || 2 ||

B) *kim uktam bhavati* | C) *yadi vinā rūpādyarthena rūpādivijñaptir utpadyate na rūpādyarthāt* | D) *kasmāt kva cid eva deśa utpadyate na sarvatra* | E) *tatraiva ca deśe kadācid utpadyate na sarvadā* | F) *tatra deśakāle pratiṣṭhitānām sarveṣām saṁtānaniyama utpadyate na kasya cid eva* | G) *yathā taimirikasyaiva saṁtānasya keśādayaḥ dṛśyante nānyeṣām* | H) *kasmād yaḥ taimirikayair dṛśyate keśabhramarādiko na*

keśādikriyāṃ karoti tadanye tu kurvanti |₁₎ *svapne paśyamāno 'nnapāna-
vastraviṣyāyudhādiko nānnapānādikriyāṃ karoti tadanye tu kurvanti
abhūtagandharvanagaram na nagarakriyāṃ karoti tadanye tu kurvanti*
|₂₎ *vinārthena eṣv asatsamaneṣu deśakāla-*

A)

There is little question that the first word of the treatise is indeed *Mahāyāne*. For this reason I translate as I do, a bit unnaturally in English. Better would be “according to the Great Vehicle,” but in order to preserve the priority of the fundamental term *mahāyāna*, I make this choice in English.

B)

This scripture citation has been much discussed. As La Vallée Poussin (1912: 67n3) and Lévi (1932: 43n1) point out, it should undoubtedly be traced to the *Daśabhūmika-sūtra* (Kondō 1936: 98.8–9), which contains the sentence *cittamātram idaṃ yad idaṃ traidhātukam*. Various forms of the same are found cited in a range of sources. The inclusion of *bho jinaputrā*, and whether, with Tibetan *dag*, it should be taken as a plural, seems to me to have unnecessarily occupied the attentions of Harada 2000 who, however, does not pay attention to some of the citations offered by Lévi in the above mentioned note (he confessed in 1999: 101n2 that he did not “yet” have access to this book). See also for useful references Harada 2003.

C)

Lévi (1932: 43n2) points to *Abhidharmakośa* II 34ab (Pradhan 1975: 22) *cittam mano 'tha vijñānam ekārtham*, which of course does not take account of *vijñapti*.

FG)

While the Tibetan (and Chinese) translations present these two sentences as prose, the separate Sanskrit manuscript of the verses of the *Viṃśatikā* preserves instead a verse:

vijñaptimātram evedam asadarthābabhāsanāt |
yadvat taimirakasyāsatkeṣaṇḍūkādidaśanam ||

This [world] is just Manifestation-Only, because of the appearance of non-existent external objects, as in the case of the seeing of nonexistent hair-nets and so on by one with an eye disease.

There is some discussion concerning the reading of the word *keṣoṇḍūka*. In particular, how to read the shape under *ṇḍ* has been questioned. Dictionaries tell us to expect *-u-*, but a reading with the manuscript of *ū* is superior from a metrical point of view. On the first two verses see Funahashi 1986 (perhaps one of the first, if not the very first, to have made direct use of the Nepalese manuscripts); not much seems to have been added by Hanneder 2007.

As already noted by La Vallée Poussin (1912: 67n7, and see Lévi 1932: 44n1), the same verse is quoted in the *Lokatattvanirṇaya* of the Jaina scholar Haribhadrāsūri, where it appears in the following form (verse I.74; Suali 1905: 283.16–284.1): *vijñaptimātram evaitad asamarthāvabhāsanāt | yathā taimirakasyeha kośakīṭādidarśanam ||*, in which at the very least *kośa*^o must be read *keśa*^o. [Ui 1917:2–3 cites the verse, crediting La Vallée Poussin for its discovery and identification, although most Japanese scholars appear to overlook the clear attribution offered by Ui, as well as La Vallée Poussin’s earlier article itself.]

For a partial translation and some observations on Dharmapāla’s commentary on *timira*, see Chu 2004: 120ff.

III

As La Vallée Poussin (1912: 70n1, followed by Lévi 1932: 46n1) points out, we find a parallel in the *Nyāyavārttika* (he refers to 528.12 in an edition not available to me; in the edition of Tarkatirtha 1944: 1085.9–13): *asaty arthe vijñānabhedo dṛṣṭa iti cet | atha manyase yathā tulyakarmavipākotpannāḥ pretāḥ pūyapūrṇāṁ nadīm paśyanti | na tatra nady asti na pūyam | na hy ekaṁ vastv anekākāraṁ bhavitum arhati | dṛṣṭaś ca vajñānabhedaḥ | kecit tām eva jalapūrṇāṁ paśyanti kecid rudhira-pūrṇāṁ ity ato ’vasīyate yathā ’dhyātme nimittāpekṣam asati bāhye nimitte vijñānam eva tathotpadhyate iti*. This is translated by Jha (1919: 261) as follows: “But even in the absence of real objects we find diversi-

ty in the cognitions.' You mean by this as follows: —'From among persons born under the influence of similar destinies, while some (on death) have sight of a river full of pus—though in reality neither the river nor the pus are there; and though one and the same thing cannot have several forms, yet in regard to the same *river* we find diversity in the cognitions: Some other persons see that same river as full of water, others again as full of blood, and so forth; from all [of] which it follows that in each case the Cognition appears in that particular form in accordance with the inner consciousness of each person, and it has no external basis in the shape of an object.'" The passage continues (Tarkatirtha 1944: 1085.16–1086.4; Jha 1919: 262): *deśādinīyamaś ca prāpnoti | ekasmin deśe nadīm pūyapūrṇāṁ paśyanti no deśāntareṣu | asaty arthe nīyamahetur vaktavyaḥ | yasya punar vidyamānaṁ kenacid ākāreṇa vyavasthitaṁ tasya śeṣo mithyāpratyaya iti yuktam | mithyāpratyayāś ca bhavanto na pradhānaṁ bādhanta iti pūyādipratyayānāṁ pradhānaṁ vaktavyam iti | yathā pūyādipratyayānāṁ evaṁ māyāgandharvanagara-mṛgatṛṣṇāsālilānāṁ iti |*. "Further (under the Opponent's doctrine) there can be no restriction as to place &c.; that is, when no object exists, what would be the reason for the fact that persons see the river of pus in one place, and not another? He for whom there is something really existing in a definite form,—for him it is quite possible that all cognition in any other form should be wrong; and wrong cognitions, if they appear, never completely discard (do away with) their (real) counterpart; so that it behoves the Opponent to explain what is the counterpart of the cognitions of 'pus' and the rest; and just as in the case of the cognition of 'pus' so also in the case of the cognitions of magical phenomena, imaginary cities, miragic water and so forth (it would be necessary to point to real counterparts)."

CD)

Tib. takes *katham* as a separate question, thus for the sake of indicating the correspondence between the versions I add (D) to the Sanskrit text, although in fact there is no boundary here.

DE)

Note that *vināpy arthena* is translated both *don med par* and *don med par yang* in (D) and (E) respectfully. Moreover, the same phrase is translated with the latter in XVI (C), and with the former in XVII (E).

E)

Tib. has no equivalent for *kāla*, instead reading *yul la sogs pa*, ‘place etc’.

I)

Tib. has no equivalent for *samaṁ*, which I also do not see in Vinītadeva (176b6–7).

M)

For the Skt. text's *mūtrapuriṣādi*, Tib. has *gcin dang | nḡan skyugs dang | me ma mur dang | mchil ma dang | snabs*, namely *mūtrapuriṣa*, with the addition of hot ashes (**kukkula*), phlegm/saliva (**kheṭa*), and snot/mucus (**siṅghāṇaka*). The last two are a set combination, as are the first two, but the inclusion of ashes I have not noticed elsewhere in such a context. The commentary of Vinītadeva and the translations of Paramārtha and Xuanzang agree almost completely with the Skt. text, but Prajñāruci (T. 1588 [XXXI] 65b8–9) lists pus 膿, blood 血, urine 小便, feces 大便, liquid iron 流鐵, and flowing water 流水.

IV

I)

In brackets “see” is added on the basis of Tibetan *mthong*.

J)

Chu (2011: 36): “The word *ādhipatya* is a special term in the Yocācāra system: it refers to the mutual influence between different living beings.”

L)

Tib. reverses the order of “dogs and crows” (and adds “et cetera”) both with respect to the Skt. and its own mention in (H) above.

V

A)

Tib. has *kyang* (**api*) after its equivalent of *tiraścām*.

B)

Tib. has *yang* (**api*) after its equivalent of *narakeṣu*.

F)

Tib. *yi dags kyi bye brag dag* suggests **pretaviśeṣāṇām* in place of the text's *pretāṇām*.

VI

B)

The *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (Pradhan 1975: 164.2–4) speaks of: “The forest of iron thorn trees, the sharp thorns of which are 16 fingers long. The thorns turn themselves downwards on beings who climb them, tearing their bodies, and turn themselves upwards on those who descend,” *ayaḥśālmāvanam tikṣṇaṣoḍaśāṅgulakaṇṭakam | teṣāṃ sat-tvānām abhirohatām kaṇṭakā avāṇmukhībhavantaḥ kāyaṃ bhīndanti avataratām cordhvībhavantaḥ*.

6c

On the function of *go* in the Tib. see Silk 2016. I do not understand the reading in the *Vṛtti* with *'dug* in place of *'dod*, found in the verse-only translation.

D)

Two cases of *der* (**tatra*) in the Tib. trans. do not have any correspondent in Skt.

VII

7ab: La Vallée Poussin (1912: 73n4) points out that the half-verse is found in the *Nyāyavārttika* 529.7 (in the edition of Tarkatīrtha 1944: 1086.4; Jha 1919: 262).

D)

Tib. *smras pa* often renders *āha* (as it does in XIV [I], below)

VIII

B)

An important passage for trying to understand the text here is no doubt that in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* chapter 9 (Pradhan 1975: 468.10–15; Lee 2005: 90.1–8; cf. La Vallée Poussin 1923–1931, v.258): *asty eva pudgalo yasmād uktam nāsti sattva upapāduka iti mithyādṛṣṭiḥ | kaś caivam āha nāsti sattva upapāduka iti | sattvas tu tathāsti yathā vibhakto bhagavateti brūmaḥ** | *tasmād yaḥ paratropapādukasattvā-khyaskandhasamntānāpavādam karoti tasyaiṣā mithyādṛṣṭir nāsti sattva upapāduka iti | skandhānām upapādukatvāt | athaiṣā mithyādṛṣṭiḥ pudgalāpavādikā satī kimprahātavyā bhavet | na hy eṣā satyadarśana-bhāvanāprahātavyā yujyate | pudgalasya satyeṣv anantarbhāvāt |* A very tentative translation of this passage might run: “[The Pudgalavādins assert that] the person really exists because the expression “There does not exist a spontaneously born being” was called a mistaken view. But who [claimed] in this way that “There does not exist a spontaneously born being”? We rather assert that a being does exist, [however] in just the fashion analyzed by the Blessed One. Therefore, this mistaken view that “There does not exist a spontaneously born being” belongs to whomever denies that a continuum of aggregates denominated ‘being’ may be spontaneously born in another [realm], because it is a fact that the aggregates are spontaneously born. Now, if [you hold that] this denial of the person is a mistaken view, [you must state] how it could be abandoned. For it is not reasonable that it could be abandoned by [the four noble] truths, by vision or by mental cultivation, because the person is not included in the [four noble] truths.” *: The MS adds *mānuṣyakasūtre*, but this seems to be an error. See Lee 2005: 90n340, Honjō 2014: 905, §9024. The expression *na ’tthi sattā opapātikā* does occur, however, in MN (117) iii.71,30, *Mahācattārī-sakasutta*. More investigation is required to understand the relation between Vasubandhu’s positions in the present passage and in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*. Note also that the statement denying the existence of the spontaneously arisen being (*nāsti sattva upapādukaḥ*)

is found cited in several sources, such as the *Samṅhabhedavastu* of the Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya (Gnoli 1978: 220.28), and the *Prasannapadā* (La Vallée Poussin 1903–1913: 356.7, at which point La Vallée Poussin's n6 refers to DN i.55,18, which contains the same sequence). See also the following.

C)

This half verse is frequently cited, for instance in the *Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya* chapter 9 (Pradhan 1975: 466.9; Lee 2005: 74.12), *Prasannapadā* (La Vallée Poussin 1903–1913: 355.4) and in the *Paramārthagāthā* 4cd (Wayman 1961: 168).

IX

F)

Should we follow the expression in (D) and restore *tasyāḥ* ⟨*vijñāptes*⟩? Note that Tib. has the term neither in (F) nor above in (D).

G)

The expression *ity aya[m]* (*abhi*)*prāyaḥ* is rendered in Tib. *'di ni 'dir dgongs pa'o*, which might suggest that we restore instead (*atrābhi*)-*prāyaḥ*, but there does not appear to be enough room in the missing portion of the manuscript leaf to allow this.

X

A)

The expression *ko guṇaḥ* appears to be idiomatic. Edgerton (1953 s.v. *guṇa*) suggests that the meaning 'advantage,' for which he refers to the *Mahāvastu*, "is not recorded in this use" in Skt. or Pāli. For another example in a work of Vasubandhu, see the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (Pradhan 1975: 439.6). I have the impression that it occurs in non-Buddhist works as well.

C)

The reconstruction of Tibetan *drug po gnyis* presents problems. What is visible in the MS is *dva*, and *va* is certain. We must reconstruct *vijñāna*, of course. The expression in question means 'two sets of six' or

‘two times six,’ namely twelve, the twelve āyatanas (Vinītadeva 183a6–183b1). The, or a, normal Sanskrit way to say this, however, is *dviṣaṣ*, but there is no vowel above *dva*. Paramārtha has here (T. 1589 [XXXI] 71c29) 從唯六雙但六識生, and Xuanzang (T. 1590 [XXXI] 75b28) 謂若了知從六二法有六識轉. I follow the suggestion of Harunaga Isaacson that we reconstruct *dva(ya)ṣ[a](tkābhyāṃ vijñā)naṣaṭkaṃ*, without—as Isaacson emphasizes—insisting that this was indeed the original reading. But it certainly fits the context.

For the Skt. *mantā*, Tib. has *reg pa po* = **spraṣṭā*. Paramārtha has this same reading (見者乃至爲觸者), as does Vinītadeva (183b1), while Xuanzang has 見者乃至知者 and Prajñāruci (T. 1588 [XXX] 67a1) 覺者, agreeing with *mantā*. Akashi (1926: 160n2) wonders whether we should emend the Tibetan to *rig pa po* (which Sasaki 1924: 48 prints), but seems unconvinced by his own suggestion. *reg pa po* corresponds to the fifth, but not the sixth, item in the relevant list. The confusion, wherever it lies, seems to come from the (apparent?) contradiction of the presentation in IX (C-E), which limits itself to the visible through the tangible, but X (C) then states the listing to contain $2 \times 6 = 12$ members, not 10. One version of a listing is found in the *Mañjuśrīvikrīḍitā*: *mthong pa po, nyan pa po, snom pa po, za ba po, reg pa po, rnam par shes pa po = draṣṭā, śrotā, ghrātā, bhoktā, spraṣṭā, vijñātā* (draft ed. J. Braarvig at <https://www2.hf.uio.no>). The (non-Buddhist) list in the *Mahābhārata* is slightly different (14.20.21): *ghrātā bhakṣayitā draṣṭā spraṣṭā śrotā ca pañcamah | mantā boddhā ca saptaite bhavanti paramartvijah ||*. The matter should be carefully considered, paying attention also to Vinītadeva’s commentary.

10c

The Tibetan translation of the verses has *bstan pas* for what in the *Vṛtti* is read *bstan pa’i* (D: *bstan pa*).

H)

Tib. adds *yang* after its equivalent of *vijñaptimātram iti*, with *rnam par rig pa tsam zhes bya ba de yang med pas* representing something like **vijñaptimātram ity tad api nāst(īti)*, instead of *tad api vijñaptimātram*

nāstīti, although it seems that *iti* is made to do double duty here as the quotative *zhes bya ba* and as the reason represented by *pas*.

J)

api tu is not represented in Tib.

K)

Skt. *grāhyagrāhakādīḥ parikalpitas* is omitted in Tib.

L)

Tib. has its equivalent for *na tv anabhilāpyenātmanā yo buddhānām viṣaya iti* as *sangs rgyas kyi yul gang yin pa brjod du med pa'i bdag nyid kyis ni med pa ma yin no*, which La Vallée Poussin (1912: 76) rendered: “mais elles [= les choses, *dharmāḥ*] ne sont pas sans exister de l'indicible manière d'être qui est du domaine des Bouddhas.” Paramārtha has (T. 1589 [XXXI] 72a9–10) 不由不可言體諸佛境界說諸法空, and Xuanzang (T. 1590 [XXXI] 75c8) 非諸佛境界離言法性亦都無故名法無我, the latter of which suggests something closer, perhaps, to the Tib. understanding.

M)

For *nairātmyapraveśo* Tib. has *chos la bdag med par 'jug pa*, **dharmā-nairātmyapraveśo*, as we see in (I).

XII

12:

La Vallée Poussin (1912: 78n1, with additions by Lévi 1932: 52n1) notes a number of citations of this verse, including Prajñākaramati's *Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā* ad IX.87 (La Vallée Poussin 1901–1914: 503.7, with the expression *yad uktam ācāryapādaiḥ*) and *Nyāyavarttika* (Tarkatīrtha 1944: 1068.20–21; Jha 1919: 243), and see La Vallée Poussin's detailed note to his translation of the *Sarvadarśanasamgraha* (1901–1902: 179n77), as well as the citation in the *Sarvasiddhāntasamgraha* III.12 (edited in La Vallée Poussin 1901–1902: 403).

12b

Here and below, Tib. renders Skt. *mātra* with *tsam* but (as here) when it means ‘extent’ not ‘only,’ perhaps Tib. *tshod* would be better.

G)

In the manuscript we find the reading *niravayatvāt*, for what we would expect as *niravayavatvāt*, and the same in XIII (B). The form *niravayava* is well attested, for instance in *Brahmasūtra* 2.1.26: *kṛtsnaprasaktir niravayavatvaśabdakopo vā*. However, there are also a number of instances in which the form without final *-va* also appears. It is not possible at this moment to be absolutely sure that they are erroneous. In the *Ekādaśamukhaḥṛdayam* (Dutt 1939: 35–40; input and corrected by Somadeva Vasudeva at http://gretil.sub.uni-goettingen.de/gretil/1_sanskrit/4_rellit/buddh/ekmuhr_u.htm, based on the published manuscript [see von Hinüber 2014: 104, item 33a]), corresponding to Dutt's 38.5–8 we find *evaṁ mahārthiko 'yaṁ mama bhagavat hr[dayam] eka-velāṁ prakāśitvā catvāro mūlāpattayaḥ kṣa[yaṁ] gacchanti | pañcān-
taryāṇi karmāṇi niravaya<va>ṁ tanvikariṣya<n>ti | kaḥ punar vādo
athābhāṣitaṁ pratipatsyanti |*. Here Vasudeva has restored the form *niravayava*, although the manuscript writes only *niravaya*. In the edition of the *Mīmāṃsāsālokavārttika* with the commentary *Kāśikā* of Sucaritamīśra we find (sub 5.4.103) a sentence printed *yadā kaścit
sautrāntikaṁ pratyevaṁ sādhayati | ātmā nityaḥ niravayatvāt vyomavad
iti tadā dharmadharmidvayasya bādhanam bhavati*. However, Kei Kataoka writes to me as follows (email 11 IX 2014): “I checked the Adyar manuscript of the *Kāśikā*. It has *anavayavatvāt* on p. 1863.6. (neither *niravayavatvāt* nor *niravayatvāt*) [manuscript preserved in the Adyar Library, Chennai, No. 63358, TR 66–4]. I noticed another instance of *niravayatve* in the *Nyāyamañjarī*, Mysore edition Vol. II 420.6. But the manuscript reads *niravayavatve* [manuscript preserved in Government Oriental Manuscript Library, Madras (Chennai), R 3583. Malayalam]. So the mistake *niravayavatva* > *niravayatva* does happen.” Somdev Vasudeva points out to me several other instances in which at least the electronically available versions of the *Nyāyamañjarī*, Jayatīrtha's *Nyāyasudha* and several other texts also have the latter form, without *-va*.

I)

Skt. *arthāntaram* is pluralized in Tib. *don gzhan rnams*. There are several other places in this text where the Tibetan appears to be plural corresponding to singular forms in Sanskrit. In this sentence, I follow the advice of Prof. Schmithausen and connect it with the following verse, but note that this is not the understanding of the Tib. translation, or of Frauwallner, who understands things quite a bit differently here (for convenience I cite the English [2010: 402], but the German is the same [1994: 375]): “(Opponent:) The Individual atoms do not combine with one another because they are partless. Thus, this mistake need not result. When aggregated, they do, however, combine with one another; so say the Vaibhāṣikas of Kaśmir. (Answer:) But the amassment of atoms is nothing other than they themselves.” The Chinese of Parmārtha renders the passage (T. 1589 [XXXI] 72b3–7): 若汝言:「隣虛不得聚集,無方分故。此過失不得故起。是隣虛聚更互相應」。罽賓國毘婆沙師作如此說。則應問之:如汝所說:「隣虛聚物,此聚不異隣虛」, while Xuanzang has (T. 1590 [XXXI] 76a3–5): 加濕彌羅國毘婆沙師言:非諸極微有相合義,無方分故。離如前失。但諸聚色有相合理有方分故。此亦不然。 All of these versions, it seems to me, understand the thought to be completed here, rather than continuing into the following verse. Despite this, it is very clear that the Skt. expects a question (*te idam praṣṭavyāḥ*), and the question does not come until 13ab.

XIV

14ab:

La Vallée Poussin (1912: 79n1) notes the citation in Prajñākaramati's *Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā ad IX.87* (La Vallée Poussin 1901–1914: 50210–11), and in *Nyāyavārttika* 522.10 (Tarkatirtha 1944: 1070.4; Jha 1919: 245), where it is read as *digdeśabhedo yasyāsti tasyaikatvaṁ na yujyate*.

B)

The MS has *pā* and another illegible character. Tib. *ngos* suggests the restitution *pā(rśv)*e (see already La Vallée Poussin 1912: 80). A problem

is that we need **chāyā* (Tib. *grib ma 'bab par*), while the text has only *ātapa* ('sunshine'). Moreover, the syntax with *anyatra pārśve bhavaty anyatrātapah* suggests, if it does not make quite certain, that something has dropped out between *pārśve* and *bhavaty*, which I here conjecturally restore as *chāyā*. Under this understanding, Skt. *anyatrātapah* is missing from Tib. However, we find in Vinītadeva (187a7) the following: *gal te rdul phra rab cha shas med pa'i phyir phyogs kyi cha tha dad pa med na de'i dus na nyi ma shar ba'i tse ngos gcig la grib ma 'bab pa gcig tu nyi ma shar bar ji ltar 'gyur*, indicating that the text available to Vinītadeva must have had something very close to what I conjecture. See Yamaguchi's note in Sasaki 1924: 17 (n3 to §14). We find the following in the *Nyāyavarttika* (Tarkatīrtha 1944: 1071.5–10; Jha 1919: 245–246): *chāyāvṛtī tarhi na prāpnutaḥ paramāṇor adeśatvād iti | na deśavattvāc chāyāvṛtī | kim tarhi | mūrtimat sparśavattvāt mūrtimat sparśaviśiṣṭaṁ dravyaṁ dravyāntaram āvṛṇoti | kim idam āvṛṇoti | svasambandhitvenatarasya sambandhaṁ pratiśedhatīti | chāyā tu tejaḥparamāṇor āvṛṇāt mūrtimatā paramāṇunā tejaḥparamāṇur āvrīyate yan na chāyeti virala-tejaḥsambandhīti dravyaguṇakarmāṇi chāyety abhidhīyate sarvato vyāvṛttatejaḥsambandhīni tu tāni tamaḥsaṁjñākānīti | tad evaṁ chāyāvṛtyor anyathāsiddhatvād ahetuḥ |*. “In that case, as there would be no points of space in the Atom, there should be no shadow, nor screening.’ But shadow and screening are due, not to presence of space-points, but to corporeality and tangibility; it is only a corporeal and tangible object that screens another object. ‘What is the meaning of this screening?’ What it means is that the Object being itself connected (with something) prevents the connection (with that same thing) of another object. *Shadow* also is due to the screening of the atoms of light; i.e., the corporeal Atom screens the atom of Light; and there is ‘Shadow’ where this screening takes place. In fact ‘Shadow’ is the name applied to such substances, qualities and actions as are connected with the smaller amount of Light (than the adjacent things); and when those same substances have all light completely turned away from them, they come to be called ‘Darkness.’ Thus, as the phenomena of ‘shadow’ and

‘screening’ are capable of being otherwise explained, they cannot serve as valid reasons (in support of the proposition that Atoms are made up of parts).”

F)

The MS reads *sarvaṃ saṃhātaḥ*, which I emend to *sarvaḥ saṃghātaḥ*. Tib. *’dus pa thams cad*. The whole sentence is found as follows in Paramārtha (T. 1589 [XXXI] 72b24–25): 若無有障, 一切六方隣虛同一處故, 則一切聚同隣虛量. These translations demonstrate that *sarva* must govern *saṃghāta*. Note, however, that in Xuanzang (T. 1590 [XXXI] 76a21–23): 既不相礙, 應諸極微展轉處同, 則諸色聚同一極微量, this relation is not made clear (as usual, Prajñāruci will require some sorting out).

I)

The reading of all Tanjurs, *yin no*, must be emended in light of the Skt. to **ma yin no*. Vinītadeva’s commentary (187b6) has *mdo sde pas smras pa ma yin no zhes bya ba smos so*. See Yamaguchi’s note in Sasaki 1924: 17 (n5 to §14).

14cd

vānyo na] MS (B): *vā anyonya*; MS (A): *vā syātām na*. Part of the confusion of the reading may have come about by the commentary’s dissolution of the feet of the verse. Tib. has lines cd as *grib dang sgrib par ji ltar ’gyur gong bu gzhan min de de’i min*, (PT 125: *drib dang sgrib kyang ji ltar ’gyur phung myin gal te de de myin*). For cd Paramārtha has (T. 1589 [XXXI] 74b1): 影障復云何 若同則無二, while Xuanzang has (T. 1590 [XXXI] 76a16): 無應影障無 聚不異無二. These versions variously suggest the presence in cd of *anya*—*gzhan*, *kyang*, 同 = *anya na*, more literally 不異. At the same time, however, the *’gyur* might suggest itself as an equivalent for *syātām*, although in the prose of (H) where precisely this verb is found in Skt. it is translated with *yin*.

M)

Tib. appears to have taken this as a verse. However, none of the Chinese versions do so, and the Skt. as we have it is not metrical.

Lévi (1932: 54n1) quotes (and translates) the *Sphuṭārthā Abhidharmakośavyākhyā* of Yaśomitra (Wogihara 1936: 26.11–16) as follows: *Vaibhāṣikāṇām ayam abhiprāyaḥ. nīlādigrahaṇam ātapālokagrahaṇam vā saṁsthānanirapekṣaṁ pravartate. kāyavijñaptigrahaṇam tu varṇa-nirapekṣaṁ. pariśiṣṭarūpāyanagrahaṇam tu varṇasaṁsthānāpekṣaṁ pravartata iti. Sautrāntikapāṣikas tu ayam ācāryo nainam arthaṁ prayacchati. na hi cākṣuṣam etat saṁsthānagrahaṇam. mānaṁ tv etat parikalpitaṁ.*

XV

B)

The emendation to *nyes pa* is supported by the sense, the Skt. and Vinītadeva (188a7): *gcig bu'i nyes pa 'ang bshad pa nyid de*. See also Yamaguchi's note in Sasaki 1924: 18 (n8 to §14).

C)

Tib. *sngon po dang ser po la sogs pa gang yin pa* suggests **nīlapītādika*. Schmithausen suggests the reading and restoration *n(īlādi)kañ*, writing that the “akṣara nā in the ms. may well be a mutilated nī.” This is certainly an attractive solution; immediately earlier in the line in the word *sūkṣmānīkṣā* (MS: *śūkṣmānīkṣā*) we see the akṣara nī, the shape of which is compatible with what is left here at the end of the line (without color photos it is difficult to tell more), and there is likely enough space for two additional akṣaras, as Schmithausen suggests. The Chinese versions have: Prajñāruci (T. 1588 [XXXI] 68b2–4): 若純一青物不雜黃等, 若人分別眼境界者, 行於地中不得說言有次第行; Paramārtha (T. 1589 [XXXI] 72c8–9): 若一切青黃等無有隔別, 是眼境界執爲一物, 於地則無次第行; Xuanzang (T. 1590 [XXXI] 76b4–5): 若無隔別所有青等, 眼所行境執爲一物, 應無漸次行大地理. Paramārtha's version agrees with Tib. in listing blue and yellow, while the others have only blue, supporting the suggested restoration of Skt.

Skt. *gamanam ity arthaḥ* looks like a gloss to clarify *krameṇetir*; it is omitted in Tib., but it is possible that in Prajñāruci's translation cited immediately above, 不得說言有次第行, “we cannot say that there is

gradual motion,” is meant to stand for *na syād gamanam ity arthaḥ*. Verhagen (1996: 39n95–40n96) points to similar expressions in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (Pradhan 1975: 138.2), *eti gaty-arthaḥ*, and in the *Prasannapadā* (La Vallée Poussin 1903–1913: 5.1), *etir gaty-arthaḥ*.

E)

The Skt. MS's *anekatra* (MS *hastyaśvādikasyānekatra*) is understood in Tib. (*gcig na*) and elsewhere as **ekatra*. Vinītadeva (188b7): *de'i tshe gnas gcig gi steng na 'dug pa'i glang po che dang rta la sogs pa du ma ris su chad par 'dug par mi 'gyur ro*; Prajñāruci (T. 1588 [XXXI] 68b13) 一處, and Xuanzang (T. 1590 [XXX] 76b7) 一方處 (Paramārtha [T. 1589 (XXXI) 72c11] is unclear). There is no easily imaginable graphic way to account for the manuscript reading as a writing error.

F)

I restore the lacuna in the MS *vicche(do yujya)te* in light of Tib. *rung*. That is, *de dag ris su chad par ji ltar rung* = *katham taylor vicche(do yujya)te*.

G)

The MS has *tadaikam*, for which I read *tad ekam*. However, Tib. *de dag gcig tu* might suggest **te ekam(?)*.

I add 'reasonable' on the basis of Tib. *rung*. See (F) above.

H)

On the grammatical function of *go* in the Tib. see Silk 2016.

J)

Tib. *de dag* seems to correspond to Skt. *sa*.

XVI

16c

I do not understand Tib. *khyod kyi don* as equivalent of *so 'artha*.

D)

Tib. *yul 'di nyid* apparently corresponds to *idam*. Here the expression *yad(ā) ca sã pratyakṣa(buddhir bhava)tīdaṁ me pratyakṣam iti* is rendered *gang gi tshe yul 'di nyid ni bdag gi mngon sum mo snyam du mngon sum gyi blo de byung ba*, but above in (B) *ity asaty arthe ka(tham) iyaṁ*

buddhir bha(*vatīdam me*) pratyakṣam iti is rendered *don de med na 'di ni bdag gi mngon sum mo snyam pa blo 'di ji ltar 'byung zhe na*.

Skt. *na so* (ʾ*rtho dṛśyate*) appears in Tib. as *khyod kyi don de mi snang ste*.

In *manovijñānenaiva*, Tib. has no equivalent for *eva*.

EF)

The Skt. expressions *iti katham tasya pratyakṣatvam iṣṭam | viśeṣ(e)ṇa tu kṣaṇika(++++yasya tadānīm niruddham eva tad rūpaṃ rasādikaṃ vā* | correspond to Tib. *lhag par yang skad cig mar smra bas de mngon sum du ji ltar 'dod || de ltar na de'i tshe gzugs dang rol sogs pa de dag ni 'gags zin to ||* This suggests something like **katham kṣaṇikavādinā tasya pratyakṣatvam iṣṭam | evaṃ tu tadānīm niruddham tadrūpaṃ rasādikaṃ vā*, perhaps: 'How do the advocates of the doctrine of momentariness accept direct perception of that [object], given that at that time visible form, flavor and the rest have entirely ceased in that fashion?' Lévi suggested restoring (*sya viśa*), but I see no trace of **viśaya* in Tib. I follow Schmithausen (following Tib. and Frauwallner) in offering *kṣaṇika(vādino)*. Paramārtha (T. 1589 [XXXI] 73a2–4) has: 是塵云何可證, 若人說剎那滅。此人是時執色乃至觸已謝, while Xuanzang translates (T. 1590 [XXXI] 76b24–25): 剎那論者有此覺時, 色等現境亦皆已滅。如何此時許有現量。 While the first two support the restitution of *vādin*, Xuanzang's version seems close to that in Tib.

XVII

H)

Tib. *yod pa ma yin pa* as a translation of *abhūta*, which below is *yang dag pa ma yin pa*.

L)

Tib. *gtan tshigs*, here equivalent to *jñāpaka*, elsewhere renders *kāraṇa*. I wonder if this could be due to a confusion, in light of, for example, *Mahāvīyutpatti* §446o *jñapakahetu* = *shes par byed pa'i gtan tshigs*.

M)

The *Nyāyabhāṣya* (Tarkatīrtha 1944: 1077.4–1078.5; Jha 1919: 255) argues as follows: *svapnānte cāsanto viṣayā upalabhyante ity atrāpi hetvabhāvaḥ | pratibodhe 'nupalambhād iti cet | pratibodhaviṣayopalambhād apratiṣedhaḥ | yadi pratibodhe 'nupalambhāt svapne viṣayā na santīti tarhi ya ime pratibuddhena viṣayā upalabhyante upalambhāt santīti | viparyaye hi hetusāmarthyam | upalambhāt sadbhāve saty anupalambhād abhāvaḥ siddhyati ubhayathā tv abhāve nānupalambhasya sāmarmthyam asti*. “In fact there is no reason to show that what are cognised during dreams are non-existent things. ‘Inasmuch as things dreamt of are not perceived when the man wakes up, (they must be regarded as *non-existent*).’ [According to this reasoning of yours] inasmuch as we do apprehend the things cognised during the waking state, the existence of these cannot be denied; if, from the fact of our not apprehending, on waking, the things cognised in dreams, you infer that these things are not existent,—then it follows that the things that we do apprehend when awake are *existent*, because they *are* apprehended; so that the reason you put forward (in proof of the unreality of things dreamt of) is found to have the power of proving a conclusion contrary to your tenets. It is only when the existence of things can be inferred from their apprehension, that you can infer their non-existence from their non-apprehension. And if under both circumstances (of dream as well as of waking) things were equally non-existent, then non-apprehension could have no power at all (of proving anything).”

N)

Tib. *ma sad kyi bar du* for *aprabuddha* understands it as ‘while they are not awake.’

XVIII

B)

In *sadasatsamparke*, Tib. omits *sadasat*.

18a

On *ādhipatya* see the note above to IV(J).

C)

The expression *yathāyogam*, ‘according to the circumstances,’ is explained by Vinītadeva (192a3–4) as referring to the ways in which one manifests good and bad physical forms in response to interactions with good and evil companions, and the same with good and bad teachings producing mental forms, although there are no externally existing actions at all.

18cd

Chu (2011: 36) refers to Dharmakīrti’s *Santānāntarasiddhi* and its commentary (so far available only in fragments), which a propos *anyā-dhipatyā* (see the verse here, 18a) reads: *viññānavādino middhābhibhavavibhramād eva puṃso ’nyasya jñānasyādhipatyam sahakāritvaṃ | tena śūnyasya jñānasya vṛttir bhaviṣyati |*. “For the Viññāvādin, precisely for the reason of being overpowered by torpor, of illusion, the influence of another person’s cognition is [only] a co-operative causal factor (*sahakāritva*), the cognition empty of that [influence] would take place.”

H)

In *arthasadbhāvaḥ*, Tib. omits *sad*.

XIX

A)

Skt. *idam* is rendered *’di dag*, and precisely the same in XXI (A), where again we get the expression *yadi viññaptimātram evedam* rendered *gal te ’di dag rnam par rig pa tsam*.

Ui (1953: 21 from back) emends the MS’s *anukramyamāṇānām* to *upakramyamāṇānām*, and I accept this, although it is hard to explain how the error might have come about. Kano (2008: 356) cites the suggestion of Schmithausen to read *anupakramyamāṇānām* (Prof. Schmithausen suggests to me that this arose through the simple omission of *-pa-* in the MS). A meaning of *upa√kram*, however, is ‘attack, do violence to,’ and thus its usage here seems to me fitting. All Chinese versions support this as well. Tib. *gsod pa* is also used by Vinītadeva

(193a1). Prof. Schmithausen, however, writes to me: “Actually, a negation is found here in Paramārtha’s rendering of the passage In this case, we may translate: “If everywhere there is only vijñapti, then there is no body and no speech. Why should cows, sheep and other animals, without being injured by the butchers, die? If their death is not effectuated by the butchers, why are the butchers guilty of killing living beings?” Paramārtha’s version reads (T. 1589 [XXXI] 73b8–10): 問: 若一切唯有識, 則無身及言。云何牛、羊等畜生非屠兒所害而死。若彼死非屠兒所作, 屠兒云何得殺生罪。The passage in Xuanzang’s translation reads (T. 1590 [XXXI] 76c27–28): 若唯有識無身語等, 羊等云何爲他所殺。若羊等死不由他害, 屠者云何得殺生罪: “If there is only consciousness, without body or speech, how are rams and the like killed by others? If rams and the like die without being violently treated by others, how does a butcher produce the sin of killing?” Prajñāruci’s translation (T. 1588 [XXXI] 69b4–8) has: 問曰: 若彼三界唯是內心, 無有身口外境界者。以何義故。屠獵師等殺害猪羊及牛馬等。若彼非是屠獵師等殺害猪羊牛馬等者, 以何義故。屠獵師等得殺生罪。是故, 應有外色香等身口境界. At the very least the translation of Xuanzang seems to me to support my suggested reading, with the single negation corresponding to *atatkṛte vā tanmaraṇe*. Schmithausen suggests that the first negation (“without being injured by the butchers”) supports the retention of the negation in **an-upakramyamāṇām*.

F)

Skt. *parājayaḥ* omitted in Tib. (noted already by Lévi 1925b: 18).

The story of Vemacitra is discussed in detail by Lévi (1925b: 17–26), translating a Chinese *Saṃyuktāgama* text (T. 99 [1115] [II] 294c19–295b23) alongside the Pāli of SN XI.9ff. [For Sāraṇa, Lévi refers to his own earlier article (1908: 149–152).] For Lévi (1925b: 25), “Il n’est guère douteux que Vasubandhu, en rappelant ‘la défaite de Vemacitra due à la malfaisance mentale de moines forestiers,’ ait en vue le sūtra du Saṃyukta Āgama.”

G)

Skt. *pareṣām* corresponds to Tib. *sems can gzhan gyi*.

I accept the GNP reading *'byung ste | des* under the assumption that *des* is meant to render Skt. *yayā*.

The term *sabhāgasantati* refers to the continuity of moments of mentality, one like moment following the next. Cp. for instance the expression from the *Pitṛputrasamāgama* quoted in the *Śikṣāsamuccaya* (Bendall 1897–1902: 253.5): *anantarasabhāgā cittasamntati*.

XX

Lévi (1925b: 26–35) discusses the Upāli sūtra in detail, and as he says (1925b: 27) “Par une rencontre singulière, j’ai découvert à la Bibliothèque du Durbar, à Katmandou, un feuillet où se retrouve la citation incorporée par Vasubandhu dans son commentaire.” This folio has been edited anew in Chung and Fukita (2011: 329–337), alongside its Chinese parallel.

C-E)

The quotation in Vasubandhu’s text —*kaccit te gṛhapate śrutam kena tāni daṇḍakāraṇyāni mātaṅgāraṇyāni kaliṅgāraṇyāni śūnyāni medhyābhūtāni tenoktaṃ śrutam me bho gautama ṛṣiṇām manaḥpradoṣeṇeti*— is parallel to that found in the Upāli-sūtra edited by Chung and Fukita (2011: 335, §17–19): *(k)iñcit t(e) gṛhapate śrutam santi daṇḍakāraṇyāni kaliṅgāraṇyāni mataṅgāraṇyāni śūnyāni medhyāny arāṇyabhūtānīti | śrutam me bho gautama | kiñcit te gṛhapate śrutam kena tāni daṇḍakāraṇyāni kaliṅgāraṇyāni mataṅgāraṇyāni śūnyāni medhyāny arāṇyabhūtānīti | ... (§25) śrutam me bho gautama ṛṣiṇām manaḥprakopenti*.

XXI

A)

See note to XIX (A) above.

B)

This expression, which is found in Tib. and Xuanzang but not the other two Chinese versions, may be meant to be Vasubandhu’s words, but might be a rhetorical device of the opponent.

D)

I take the liberty of quoting in full, with his permission, what Prof. Schmithausen wrote to me:

D looks defective. We have an objection in the form: If this world is only manifestation, then what about the *paracittavidaḥ*? Do they know others' mind or not (*atha na*)? *kiṃ cātaḥ*? ... What regularly follows in such cases is pointing out difficulties in the case of both alternatives: If (*yadi*) x, then difficulty X; if however (*atha*, very often used in the sense of "if however", "if on the other hand") y, then difficulty Y. What is missing here is Y, which might have run thus: "then how can you maintain that there is only *viññapti* but no external object [because in this case the object, viz., the mind of others, does exist outside the cognition of the *paracittavid*]" (thus Paramārtha and, similarly, Prajñāruci), or: "then *viññaptimātratā* would not be proved [in this case]" (Xuanzang). I think there is good reason to assume that a piece of text has dropped out here in part of the manuscript tradition, including ms. B and also the manuscript used by the Tibetan translators.

The Chinese of Paramārtha referred to here reads (T. 1589 [XXXI] 73c2–3): 若不知, 云何得他心通。若知, 云何言識無境。Prajñāruci has (T. 1588 [XXXI] 69c29–70a1): 若不知者, 云何說言知於他心。若實知者, 云何說言無外境界, while Xuanzang (T. 1590 [XXXI] 77a19–21) has: 若不能知, 何謂他心智。若能知者, 唯識應不成。雖知他心, 然不如實。With the exception of what may be a gloss added by Xuanzang (not mentioned by Schmithausen), "although they know other minds, [their knowledge] is not in accord with reality," these three translations agree quite closely with one another.

G)

In accord with the Tib. translation, I attach this to the preceeding. I believe this is also the understanding of Paramārtha (T. 1589 [XXXI] 73c7–8): 此二境界不如是, 此顯現故。能取所取分別未滅故, and Xuanzang (T. 1590 [XXXI] 77a27–28): 此二於境不如實知, 由似外境虛妄顯現故。所取能取分別未斷故。

XXII

D)

Skt. *sarvaprakāraṃ* is omitted in Tib.

Colophon

As noted in the Introduction, the title is given wrongly by the manuscript: for the manuscript reading *Viṃśatikā* we must read, with all other sources, *Viṃśikā* or *Viṃśaka*. It is probably needless to point out that the text contains not twenty verses but either (with MS [A]) twenty two, or (with MS [B]) (most probably) twenty one.

Sanskrit Variant Readings

The two first verses are found only in the independent verse MS (A); the commentary MS (B) is missing the first folio. It begins with *niyamah* on folio 2. Only in the case of verses is an indication of source necessary, since only MS (B) contains the prose commentary.

ac = before correction

pc = after correction.

II

J)

santānāniyamah] MS: wrongly santānānniyamah, as if santānān niyamah.

III

D)

tāvat swapne] MS: tāvan swapne

gramārāmastrīpuruṣādikaṁ] MS: reads bhramarā°. The correction is supported by Tib. and all Chinese versions.

L)

pūyapūrṇṇān] MS: ac pūyaṁ pūrṇṇan

IV

C)

anyānyair] MS: anyānair; reading anyonyair would also be possible, but when this Skt. term appears below in XVIII (C) it is translated in Tib. with the very common *phan tshun*, while here we have *gzhan dang gzhan dag gis*.

V

B)

tiryak°] I read a virāma under the ka.

5b

yathā na] MS (A): erroneously yathā ca

5d

duḥkhan] MS (A): written duṣkhan or duḥkhan

C)

°saṁvarttanīyena] MS: nī added in lower margin in the same script with caret to indicate insertion.

VI

A)

narakapālādīsaṃjñāṃ] MS: ac nana° with second na erased.

B)

āgacchanto] MS: āganto

gacchantāḥ] MS: ḥ is not legible or even not present

ayaḥśālmali°] Parts of two letters visible but undecipherable; mali??

6d

vijñānasya neṣyate] MS (B): vijñāna(sya) neṣ(ya)t(e)

VII

7c

neṣyate] MS (B): n(e)ṣy(ate), at the very best (mostly illegible)

VIII

8c

uktam] MS (B): ac uktaṃ, possible but not clear.

C)

sahetukāḥ < || >] MS: sahetukā

IX

9c

dvividhāyatanatvena] MS (A): dvividhāyatatvena

9d

tasyā] MS (A): ac tasyā plus an extra (unnecessary, hence erased) vertical line
for long vowel

C)

rūpapratibhāsā] MS (A): ac rūpā°.

utpadyate tac ca] MS: utpadyate | tac ca

E)

pariṇāmaviśeṣaprāptād] MS: pariṇāmaviśeṣād

spraṣṭavya°] MS: spaṣṭavya°

F)

kāyaspraṣṭavyāyatanatvena] MS: kāyaspaṣṭavyāyatatvena

X

C)

dva(ya)ṣ[a](tkābhyāṃ vijñā)naṣaṭkaṃ] MS: dva(+).ṣ.(++ vijñā)naṣaṭkaṃ

10b

punar] MS (A): punaḥ

10cd

deśanā dharmmanairātmyapraveśaḥ] MS (B): de[śa]nā dha(r)[m](manai)r-
ātmyapraveśaḥ; MS (A): °dharmmyanairātmyapraveśaḥ

10d

kalpitātmanā |] MS (B): ///tātmanā

M)

nairātmyapraveśād] MS: nairātmyapraveśā

XI

11d

paramāṇur na] MS (A): erroneously adds ca in margin by na

D)

vaiśeṣikaiḥ anekaṁ] MS: vaiśeṣikaiḥ | anekaṁ

XII

12a

yugapadyogāt] MS (A): yugpadayogāt

C)

ṣaḍaṁśatā] MS: ṣaḍaṁśatāṁ

D)

parasparāvyatirekāḍ] The MS has a small mark resembling a cursive roman letter v between ra and vya, used to indicate that the vowel is to be extended.

G)

niravayavatvāt] MS (B): niravayatvāt. See in the notes above.

saṁghātās] MS (B): saṁhātās

kāśmīravaibhāṣikāḥ < | >] MS (B): kāśmīravaibhāṣikās

I)

saṁghāto] MS (B): saṁhāto

XIII

13b

tatsaṁghāte] MS (B): tatsaṁhāte

B)

saṁghātā] MS (B): saṁhātā

niravayavatvāt] MS (B): niravayatvāt (see above XII (G)).

sāvayavyāpi hi] MS (B): pc sāvayavyāpi hi with syāpi hi rewritten

saṁghātasya] MS (B): saṁhātasya

13c

na] MS (A): ac nā

13d

tatsaṃyogo na sidhyati] MS (B): ta(tsa)ṃyogo na (s)idhyati; MS (A): ac
repeats tatsaṃyogo na sidhyati.

XIV

A)

[p]ū(*rvadig*)[bh](*āgo*)] There seems to have been space for 2 more akṣaras to
be restored after *go*.

iti digbhāgabhedo] MS (B): iti digbhāga added above line with caret.

14c

chāyāvṛti] MS (A): °vṛtī

B)

pā(*śv*)[e] <chāyā> **bhavaty**] MS (B): pā . [e] **bhavaty**, to which I add the
conjectured chāyā (see notes above).

F)

sarvaḥ saṃghātaḥ] MS (B): sarvaṃ saṃghātaḥ

14cd

anyo na] MS (B): anyonya; MS (A): syātān na. See the note above.

cen na] MA (A) nna added below line; MS (A): In the margin below tān na pi
in another (more modern) hand is written mi li tā. Harunaga Isaacson
suggests that this (as militāḥ) may be a gloss on piṇḍa: '[the atoms]
connected/combined'.

K)

saṃghāta] MS (B): saṃhāta

XV

15a

krameṇeti] MS (A): krameṇeti

15d

sūkṣmā°] Both MSS: śūkṣmā°

C)

syāt < | > gamanam] MS (B): syād gamanam

D)

syāt < | > na hi] MS (B): syān na hi

E)

hastyaśvādikasyaikatra] MS (B): hastyaśvādikasyān ekatra. See the discussion
above.

na syāt < | > _F yatraiva] MS (B): nna syād _F yatraiva

G)

tad ekaṃ] MS (B): tadaikaṃ

I)

avaśyaṃ] MS (B): avavaśyaṃ

XVI

A)

pramāṇānāṃ] MS (B): praṇānāṃ

16a

pratyakṣabuddhiḥ] MS (A): °buddhi

16b

tadā] MS (A): ac tādā

XVII

17b

vijñaptiḥ] MS (A): vijñapti

17d

nāprabuddho] MA (A) nāprambuddho

XVIII

18b

mithaḥ] MS (A): mitha, with tha overwritten.

XIX

A)

upakramya°] MS (B): anukramya° (Ui 1953: 21 from back).

maraṇaṃ] MS (B): ac smaraṇaṃ

B)

tanmaraṇe] MS (B): tat°

19a

maraṇaṃ] MS (A): maraṇa

G)

jīvitendriyavirodhinī] MS (B): jītendriyavirodhinī

XX

20b

ṛṣikopataḥ] MS (B): ṣi of ṛṣi° inserted in top margin

C)

kaccit] MS (B): kacci

F)

karmmaṇā] MS (B): karmmanā

XXI

A)

, atha na] MS (B): atha , na

21b

ayathārthaṁ] MS (A): rtha overwritten, no ṛ visible

21c

ajñānād] MS (A): adds °nā° in top margin with ˇ

G)

°grāhakavikalpasyāpra°] MS (B): pc kalpasyā rewritten in cramped space

XXII

22c

kṛteyaṁ] MS (A): kṛtyeyaṁ

22d

Colophon

viṁśatikā] MS (B): ac viṁśitikā

ācāryavasubandhoḥ ||] The scribe adds: grantha<pra>māṇam asya bhāṣyasya

160. MS (A): has the colophon viṁśakāvijñaptiprakaraṇaṁ samāptam ||

Tibetan Variant Readings of the *Vṛtti*

O

bing shi ka bṛtti ||] C: bing shi ka britti ||; D: bingshi ka bṛdhi ||

I

A)
gzhag ste] NP: bzhag ste

B)
mdo las |] CD: mdo las
phyir ro] N: phyiro

C)
nam par rig pa] N: rnamr rig pa

E)
don dgag pa'i phyir ro] P: don dgag gi
phyir ro

G)
skra zla] C: ska zla; N: sgra zla

II

2a)
don min na] D: don man na

B)
zhe na |] C: zhe na ||

D)
'byung la] N: 'byung ba
ma yin |] N: ma yin ||

E)
res 'ga'] D: ras 'ga'
'byung la] GN(?)P: 'byung ba
ma yin |] G: ma yin ||

F)
ma yin |] G: ma yin ||

G)
snang gi |] C: snang gi
ma yin ||] P: ma yin |

H)
sbrang bu] D: sgrang bu
byed la |] CG: byed la ||

I)
mi byed la |] CG: mi byed la ||

III

3a
 'grub ste ||] C: 'grub sta ||; G: 'grub ste |;
 NP: 'gyur te |
 C)
 ji lta] NP: ji ltar
 zhe na |] N: zhe na
 D)
 thams cad na ma yin yul de nyid na
 yang res 'ga' snang la] GNP: ø
 3b
 nges pa med |] G: nges pa med ||
 3c
 yi dags] G: yi dwags (consistently
 below, not further noted)

G)
 rnams kyi dang] N: rnams kyis
 H)
 ji ltar 'grub |] G: ji ltar 'grub ||
 J)
 rnag gi] N: rnagi
 L)
 klung rnag gis] GNP: klung rnag gi
 M)
 rnag gis gang ba] GNP: rnag gi gang ba
 me ma mur] GNP: me mar mur
 dbyig pa dang |] GP: dbyig pa dang
 srung ba] GNP: bsrungs pa

IV

4a
 gnod pa 'dra ||] C: gnod pa 'dra |
 A)
 grub ces] GNP: 'grub ces
 rig par bya'o ||] DN rig par bya'o |
 C)
 bzhi 'grub bo] CDG: bzhin 'grub bo
 D)
 grub ces] GNP: 'grub ces
 E)
 pas sems can] N: pas semn
 (occasionally used, without
 discernable pattern; not noted
 further)
 4c
 dmyal ba'i] N: dmyal ba'i |
 mthong dang ||] GNP: mthong dang |
 G)
 sems can rnams kyis] NP: sems can
 rnams kyi
 I)
 thams cad kyis mthong gi |] GNP:
 thams cad kyis mthong gis
 gcig 'gas ni] GNP: gcig 'gas na
 yin no] N: yino (occasionally below;
 not further noted)

O)
 sems can dmyal ba pa dag go ||] CG:
 sems can dmyal ba pa dag go |
 mnam par gzhas pa] N: mnam par bzhas
 pa
 med par 'gyur ro ||] D: med par 'gyur ro
 |; N: med par 'gyuro | (such
 abbreviations not further noted)
 P)
 gcig gnod pa byed kyang ji lta] C: gcig
 gnod pa byed kyang ji lta |
 ji lta bur] C: ji lta | bur
 'jigs par] GNP: 'jig par
 Q)
 sa gzhi] N: sa bzhi
 gnod pa byed par 'gyur |] GNP: gnod pa
 byed par 'gyur
 R)
 'byung bar ga la 'gyur |] GN: 'byung bar
 ga la 'gyur ||

V

- A)
'byung ste |] P: 'byung ste || (end of folio)
5c
de ltar] verse version has 'di ltar
- E)
de'i phyir] GNP: de'i
yi dags kyi] GNP: yi dags

VI

- A)
de dag gi] GNP: de dag gis
las rnam kyis] GNP: las rnam kyi
- B)
de lta bur yang 'gyur ste |] CD: de lta
bur yang 'grub ste |
dags 'ong ba dang |] N: dags 'ong ba
dang ||
shal ma li'i] GNP: shal ma la'i
nags tshal] N: nag tshal
'gyur ba lta bu ste] GNP: 'gyur ba de lta
bu ste
6a
de'i las kyis] GNP: de'i las kyi
- 6b
'byung ba dang] CD: byung ba dang
6c
'dug na go |] D: 'dug na go ||
6d
mi 'dod ||] P: mi 'dod |
D)
mi 'dod la |] CGN: mi 'dod la ||
E)
rnam su rtog |] GNP: rnam su rtog

VII

- 7b
rtog ||] D: rtog ; GNP: rtogs ||
- 7d
mi bya ||] N: mi bya |
- A)
bag chags de dag] GNP: bag chags dag
- B)
rnam par shes par gyur pa] GNP: rnam
par shes par 'gyur pa
de 'dra bar] C: de 'da bar
- C)
ci yod |] N: ci yod ||
E)
snang gi |] D: snang gi ||
gsung bar mi 'gyur ro] N: gsung par mi
'gyur

VIII

- A)
ma yin te |] D: ma yin te ||
- 8b
'dul ba yi] GNP: 'dul ba'i
- 8d
rdzus te] CD: brdzus te (P: ba may have
been removed)
- B)
rdzus te] CD: brdzus te
bzhin yod do ||] GNP: yod do
zhes] C: zhis
sems kyi rgyud] GNP: sems kyi
C)
las byung ||] GN: las byung |

IX

- A)
she na |] P: she na ||
gc
de yi] GNP: de'i
B)
zhe na |] N: zhe na ||
C)
de dang | snang ba] CD: de dang snang
ba
- D)
bcom ldan 'das kyi] GNP: bcom ldan
'das kyi
go rims] G: go rim
E)
bye brag tu] G: bye brag tu pa'i bye brag
tu
F)
bcom ldan 'das kyi] G: bcom ldan 'das

X

- C)
shes pa drug] P: shes pa
gcig pu] GNP: gcig po
'jug go |] D: 'jug go ||
ioc
bstan pa'i] D: bstan pa
iod
'jug 'gyur ||] GNP: 'jug 'gyur |
D)
rig pa tsam du] GNP: rig pa tsam nyid
du
F)
nyid gzugs la] N: nyid gzugs (end of
line)
- G)
mtshan nyid kyi] N: mtshan nyid kyi
'jug go || C: 'jug go]; GNP: 'jug |
L)
sangs rgyas kyi yul] NP: sangs rgyas kyi
spyod yul
M)
rtogs pa'i phyir] GNP: rtog pa'i phyir
rnam par gzhag pas] GNP: rnam par
bzhag pas
N)
don du 'gyur bas] N: don du 'gyur bas
followed by 20 spaces filled with
tsegs

XI

- A)
dgongs pa 'dis] D: dgongs pa 'das
skye mched yod par] D: skye mched
yang par
gzugs la sogs pa] GNP: gzugs la sogs pa'i
rnam par rig pa] N: rnam par rig par
ji ltar rtogs par] GNP: ji ltar rtog par
B)
'di ltar |] CD: 'di ltar
- C)
zhe na |] C: zhe na ||
D)
ngo bor brtag pa'i] GNP: ngo bor brtags
pa'i
rab du ma 'am] GNP: rab du ma 'am |

XII

A)
 ce na |] CD: ce na
 'di ltar ||] GNP: 'di ltar
 12a
 drug gis] GNP: drug gis |
 C)
 gcig gi go] NP: gcig gis go
 12c
 gcig na ||] N: gcig na |
 D)
 ji ste] N: ji snyed
 na ni] N: nad (see next)

E)
 des na] N: ni na
 G)
 ma yin gyi |] G: ma yin gyis ||; NP: ma
 yin gyis |
 I)
 yin pa de de dag] GNP: yin pa de dag
 gzhan rnam] GNP: gzhan nam gzhan

XIII

13d
 de] GNP: de'i
 B)
 rdul phra rab] GNP: rdul phra rab gyi
 rnam] N: rnam
 shas med] G: shes med
 zer cig |] D: zer cig
 yang sbyor bar] GNP: yang sbyor bas

C)
 de bas] N: de bas na
 phra rab rdzas] N: phra rab brdzas
 D)
 rdul phra rab] C: rdul rab

XIV

A)
 rdul phra rab kyī] GP: rdul phra rab gyi
 14c
 grib dang sgrib] CD: sgrib dang sgrib
 B)
 re re la phyogs] GNP: re re la yang
 phyogs
 grib ma 'bab par] GNP: grib mi 'bab par
 C)
 de la ni] N: de lta ni
 D)
 phyogs kyī cha] CD: phyogs kyī phyogs
 ji ltar 'gyur |] N: ji ltar 'gyur ||
 E)
 gzhan med na] GNP: gzhan med na |
 thogs par 'gyur |] GN: thog par 'gyur ||;
 P: thog par 'gyur |

F)
 'gyur te |] G: 'gyur to |H)
 rnam las] CD: rnam la (either form
 seems grammatical)
 de'i yin |] GNP: de'i yin
 I)
 smras pa |] GNP: smras pa
 14d
 gong bu] N: gang bu
 K)
 yongs su rtogs pa] GNP: yongs su rtog
 pa
 L)
 yin |] CP: yin ||; N: yino ||
 M)
 dang ||] GN: dang |
 sngon po] N: sngon pa

XV

- B)
nyes pa] All editions: nges pa
15d
mi sod] N: mi bsod
C)
gom pa gcig bor] GNP: goms pa gcig
bor
D)
cha ma zin pa] GNP: cha ma zin pa |

- H)
yin na go |] D: yin na go ||
mi 'gyur ro] N: 'gyuro
J)
dag gcig] G: dagcig; P dag cig

XVI

- A)
thams cad kyi] N: thams cad kyis
nang na] CD: nang na yang
16b
tshe de yi] GP: che de'i; N: tshe de'i
16c
khyod kyi] GNP: khyod kyis
de mi] CD: de min

- D)
bdag gi] GNP: bdag gis
khyod kyi] GNP: khyod kyis
E)
ji ltar 'dod ||] DP: ji ltar 'dod |
F)
zin to ||] DP: zin to |

XVII

- B)
de ni de] CD: de ni da ma
D)
yin no ||] GNP: yin no
'di ltar |] CGNP: 'di ltar
17a
rig bzhin ||] GNP: rig bzhin |
17b
bshad zin] GNP: bshad zin nas
E)
bzhin te] D: bzhin ta; GNP: bzhin de
G)
'grub bo ||] D: 'grub bo |

- I)
rigs na |] GNP: rig na |
J)
de ltar] GNP: de lta
L)
'di ltar |] GNP: 'di ltar
17d
rtogs ma] GNP: rtog ma
M)
mthong te |] GNP: mthong ste |

XVIII

A)
las sems can] C: las sems can followed
by 25 spaces filled with tsegs
'byung gi |] GNP: byung gi
B)
brten pa] GNP: rten pa
de dang] N: de dang followed by 7
spaces filled with tsegs
bshes gnyen la brten pa] N: bshes
gnyen la rten pa
sems can rnams kyi] GNP: sems can
rnams kyi
ji ltar 'grub] GNP: ji ltar grub
'gyur |] N: 'gyur ||
C)
dbang gis] N: dbang gi

E)
rgyud gzhan gyi] GNP: rgyud gzhan
gyis
'byung gi don] GNP: 'byung gi | don
F)
ma log pa na] P: ma log pa ni
kun tu spyod] GNP: kun tu spyad
'dod pa 'dra bar] GNP: 'dod par 'dra bar
mi 'gyur |] N: mi 'gyur
18d
rmi] N: mi
H)
rgyu yin gyi] N: rgyu yin gyis

XIX

A)
ji ltar 'gyur |] GN: ji ltar 'gyur ||
19a
rnam rig gi ||] C: rnam rig gi |; GN:
rnam rig gi; P: rnam par rig gi
19b
bya na ||] GP: bya na |
C)
yid kyi dbang gis] GN: yid kyi dbang gi;
P: yid kyi dbang gis
gzhan dag gi] GNP: gzhan dag gis
D)
rdzu 'phrul dang] C: rdzu 'phrul dang |

E)
kā tyā'i] GNP: ka ta'i
byin gyi] GNP: byin gyis
brlabs kyi] N: brlab ma gyis
F)
thag zangs ris] GNP: thag bzangs rigs
[this is the form found in
dictionaries]
G)
'byung ste | des] CD: 'byung ste de
skal ba] All editions: bskal pa
rgyud kyi rgyun chad pa] GNP: rgyud
kyis rgyun 'chad pa
zhes bya ba] C: zhas bya ba

XX

20a

khros pas] GNP: khros pa'i

dan ta] GNP: danta

stongs par] NP: stong par

A)

rnam par rig pa'i] GNP: rnam par rig

bye brag gi] G: bye brag gi [folio flip]

gi; NP: bye brag gi

mi 'dod na |] GNP: mi 'dod na

B)

kha na ma] GP: kha na

chen po dang] G: chen po dang |

bsgrub pa na |] GNP: sgrub pa na |

bdag nye ba] GNP: bdag nye bar

C)

dan ta] GNP: danta

ling ka'i] NP: lingga'i

dgon pa dang] GNP: dgon pa dang |

tang ka'i] GNP: tangga'i

stongs pa]] GNP: stong pa

D)

zhes smras pa] GNP: zhes rmas pa (this

is a rarer verb, but smras agrees with

ukta; the Buddha's question itself is

translated with bka' stsal pa)

F)

rtog ste ||] NP: rtog ste |

drang strong rnams kyis] GNP: drang

strong rnams kyi

XXI

A)

sems rig pas] GNP: sems rigs pas

21a

shes pa ni ||] N: shes pa ni |

XXII

A)

rig pa tsam gyis] GNP: rig pa tsam gyi

rnam par nges pa] C: rnam par [folio

flip] par nges pa

mi dpogs shing] GNP: mi dpog shing

C)

spyod yul snyam] GNP: spyod yul yin

snyam

D)

spyod yul te] GNP: spyod yul yin te

Colophon

dbyig gnyen gyis mdzad pa] GNP: dbyig

gnyen gyi mdzad pa'i

len dra] GNP: lendra

ban de] GNP: bande

Sanskrit Reading Text

of the

Vimśikā-vṛtti

I

... H) nārthaḥ kaścid asti |

II

.....

na deśakālaniyamaḥ santānāniyamo na ca |
na ca kṛtyakriyā yuktā vijñaptir yadi nārthataḥ || 2 ||

.....-niyamaḥ santānāniyamaḥ kṛtyakriyā ca na yujyate ,

III

A) na khalu na yujyate , yasmāt ||

deśādiniyamaḥ siddhas svapnavat

B) svapna iva svapnavat | C) kathaṁ D) tāvat svapne vināpy
arthena kvacid eva deśe kiñcid grāmārāmastrīpuruṣādikaṁ dṛśyate na
sarvatra tatraiva ca deśe kadācid dṛśyate na sarvakālam E) iti siddho
vināpy arthena deśakālaniyamaḥ ||

pretavat punaḥ

santānāniyamaḥ ||

F) siddha iti vartate ; G) pretānām iva pretavat | H) kathaṁ siddhaḥ
I) samaṁ

sarvaiḥ pūyanadyādidaśane || 3 ||

J) pūyapūrṇā nadī pūyanadī | K) ghṛtaghaṭavat | L) tulyakarma-
vipākāvasthā hi pretāḥ sarve 'pi samaṁ pūyapūrṇān nadīm paśyanti
naika eva | M) yathā pūyapūrṇām evaṁ mūtrapuriṣādipūrṇām daṇḍā-
sidharaiś ca puruṣair adhiṣṭhitām ity ādigrahaṇena | N) evaṁ
santānāniyamo vijñaptinām asaty apy arthe siddhaḥ ||

IV

svapnopaghātavat kṛtyakriyā |

^{A)} siddheti veditavyam | ^{B)} yathā svapne dvayasamāpattim anta-
reṇa śukravisargalakṣaṇaḥ svapnopaghātaḥ | ^{C)} evan tāvad anyānyair
dṛṣṭāntair deśakālanīyamādicatuṣṭayaṁ siddham |

narakavat punaḥ

sarvaṁ

^{D)} siddham iti veditavyam | ^{E)} narakeṣv iva narakavat | ^{F)} katham
siddham |

narakapālādidarśane taiś ca bādhane || 4 ||

^{G)} yathā hi narakeṣu narakāṇāṁ narakapālādidarśanaṁ deśa-
kālanīyamena siddham | ^{H)} śvavāyasāyasaparvatādyāgamanagamana-
darśanaṁ cety ādigrahaṇena | ^{I)} sarveṣāṁ ca naikasyaiva | ^{J)} taiś ca
tadbādhanaṁ siddham asatsv api narakapālādiṣu samānasvakarma-
vipākādhipatyāt | ^{K)} tathānyatrāpi sarvam etad deśakālanīyamādicatuṣ-
ṭayaṁ siddham iti veditavyam |

^{L)} kim punaḥ kāraṇaṁ narakapālās te ca śvāno vāyasās ca satvā
neṣyante |

^{M)} ayogāt | ^{N)} na hi te narakā yujyante tathaiva tadduḥkhāprati-
samvedanāt | ^{O)} parasparaṁ yātayatām ime narakā ime narakapālā iti
vyavasthā na syāt | ^{P)} tulyākṛtipramāṇabalānāṁ ca parasparaṁ yāta-
yatān na tathā bhayaṁ syāt | ^{Q)} dāhaduḥkhaṁ ca pradīptāyām
ayomayām bhūmāv asahamānāḥ katham tatra parān yātayeyuḥ | ^{R)}
anarakāṇāṁ vā narake kutaḥ sambhavaḥ |

V

^{A)} kathan tāvat tiraścāṁ svarge sambhavaḥ | ^{B)} evaṁ narakeṣu
tiryakpretaviśeṣāṇāṁ narakapālādīnāṁ sambhavaḥ syāt ||

tiraścāṁ sambhavaḥ svarge yathā na narake tathā |
na pretānāṁ yatas tajjaṁ duḥkhan nānubhavanti te || 5 ||

^{C)} ye hi tiryañcaḥ svarge sambhavanti te tadbhājanalokasukha-
samvartanīyena karmaṇā tatra sambhūtās tajjaṁ sukhaṁ pratyānu-
bhavanti | ^{D)} na caivan narakapālādayo narakāṁ duḥkhaṁ pratyānu-
bhavanti ^{E)} tasmān na tiraścāṁ sambhavo yukto ^{F)} nāpi pretānāṁ |

VI

^{A)} teṣān tarhi nārakāṇām karmabhis tatra bhūtaviśeṣāḥ sambhavanti varṇākṛtipramāṇabalaviśiṣṭā ye narakapālādisamjñām pratilabhante | ^{B)} tathā ca pariṇamanti yad vividhām hastavikṣepādikriyām kurvanto dṛśyante bhayotpādanārthaṁ yathā meṣākṛtayaḥ parvatā āgacchanto gacchantāḥ ayaḥśālmalivane ca kaṇṭakā adho-mukhībhavanta ūrdhamukhībhavantaś ceti | ^{C)} na te na sambhavanty eva ||

yadi tatkarmabhis tatra bhūtānām sambhavas tathā |
iṣyate pariṇāmaś ca kiṁ vijñānasya neṣyate || 6 ||

^{D)} vijñānasyaiva tatkarmabhis tathāpariṇāmaḥ kasmān neṣyate | ^{E)} kim punar bhūtāni kalpyante || ^{F)} api ca ||

VII

karmaṇo vāsanānyatra phalam anyatra kalpyate |
tatraiva neṣyate yatra vāsanā kin nu kāraṇam || 7 ||

^{A)} yena hi karmaṇā nārakāṇām tatra tādṛśo bhūtānām sambhavaḥ kalpyate pariṇāmaś ca tasya karmaṇo vāsanā teṣām vijñānasamtānasanniviṣṭā nānyatra , ^{B)} yatraiva ca vāsanā tatraiva tasyāḥ phalam tādṛśo vijñānapariṇāmaḥ kin neṣyate | ^{C)} yatra vāsanā nāsti tatra tasyāḥ phalam kalpyata iti kim atra kāraṇam |

^{D)} āgamaḥ kāraṇam | ^{E)} yadi vijñānam eva rūpādipratibhāsam syān na rūpādiko 'rthas tadā rūpādyātanāstitvaṁ bhagavatā noktaṁ syāt |

VIII

^{A)} akāraṇam etat yasmāt ,

rūpādyātanāstitvaṁ tadvineyajanam prati |
abhiprāyavaśād uktam upapādukasatvavat || 8 ||

^{B)} yathāsti satva upapāduka ity uktam bhagavatā 'bhiprāyavaśāc cittasantatyanucchedam ātyāyām abhipretya |

c) nāstīha satva ātmā vā dharmmās tv ete sahetukāḥ ||

d) iti vacanāt | e) evaṁ rūpādyāyatanāstitvam apy uktam bhagavatā taddeśanāvineyajanam adhikṛtyety ābhiprāyikaṁ tad vacanaṁ |

IX

a) ko 'trābhiprāyaḥ |

yataḥ svabījād vijñaptir yadābhāsā pravarttate |
dvididhāyatanatvena te tasyā munir abravīt || 9 ||

b) kim uktam bhavati | c) rūpapratibhāsā vijñaptir yataḥ svabījāt pariṇāmaviśeṣaprāptād utpadyate tac ca bījaṁ yatpratibhāsā ca d) sā te tasyā vijñapteś cakṣūrūpāyatanatvena yathākramaṁ bhagavān abravīt | e) evaṁ yāvat spraṣṭavyapratibhāsā vijñaptir yataḥ svabījāt pariṇāmaviśeṣaprāptād utpadyate , tac ca bījaṁ yatpratibhāsā ca f) sā te tasyāḥ kāyaspraṣṭavyāyatanatvena yathākramam bhagavān abravīd g) ity ayam abhiprāyaḥ |

X

a) evaṁ punar abhiprāyavaśena deśayitvā ko guṇaḥ ||

tathā pudgalanairātmyapraveśo hi ||

b) tathā hi deśyamāne pudgalanairātmyaṁ praviśanti | c) dvayaṣaṭkābhyāṁ vijñānaṣaṭkaṁpravartate na tu kaścīd eko draṣṭāsti na yāvan mantety evaṁ viditvā ye pudgalanairātmyadeśanāvineyās te pudgalanairātmyaṁ praviśanti ||

anyathā punar
deśanā dharmanairātmyapraveśaḥ ||

d) anyatheti vijñaptimātradeśanā | e) katham dharmanairātmyapraveśaḥ | f) vijñaptimātram idaṁ rūpādidharmapratibhāsam utpadyate g) na tu rūpādilakṣaṇo dharmāḥ kaścīd astīti viditvā |

h) yadi tarhi sarvathā dharmo nāsti tad api vijñaptimātram nāstīti | katham tarhi vyavasthāpyate |

^{I)} na khalu sarvathā dharmo nāstīty evaṁ dharmanairātmya-praveśo bhavati | ^{J)} api tu |

kalpitātmanā , | 10 ||

^{K)} yo bālair dharmāṇām svabhāvo grāhyagrāhakādiḥ parikalpitas tena kalpitenātmanā teṣāṁ nairātmyaṁ ^{L)} na tv anabhilāpyenātmanā yo buddhānām viśaya iti | ^{M)} evam vijñaptimātra-syāpi vijñaptyantaraparikalpitenātmanā nairātmyapraveśād vijñaptimātravyavasthāpanayā sarvadharmāṇām nairātmyapraveśo bhavati na tu sarvathā tadastitvāpavādāt | ^{N)} itarathā hi vijñapter api vijñapti-antaram arthaḥ syād iti vijñaptimātratvan na sidhyetārthavatītvād vijñaptīnām |

XI

^{A)} katham punar idam pratyetyam anenābhiprāyeṇa bhagavatā rūpādyāyatanāstitvam uktam na punaḥ santy eva tāni yāni rūpādivijñaptīnām pratyekaṁ viśayībhavantīti |

^{B)} yasmān

na tad ekaṁ na cānekaṁ viśayaḥ paramāṇuśaḥ |
na ca te saṁhatā yasmāt paramāṇur na sidhyati || 11 ||

^{C)} iti | kim uktam bhavati | ^{D)} yat tad rūpādikam āyatanam rūpādivijñaptīnām pratyekaṁ viśayaḥ syāt tad ekaṁ vā syād yathā 'vayavirūpaṁ kalpyate vaiśeṣikair anekaṁ vā paramāṇuśaḥ saṁhatā vā ta eva paramāṇavaḥ | ^{E)} na tāvad ekaṁ viśayo bhavaty avayavebhyo 'nyasyāvayavirūpasya kva cid apy agrahaṇāt | ^{F)} nāpy anekaṁ paramāṇūnām pratyekaṁ agrahaṇāt | ^{G)} nāpi te saṁhatā viśayībhavanti | yasmāt paramāṇur ekaṁ dravyaṁ na sidhyati |

XII

^{A)} katham na sidhyati |

^{B)} yasmāt |

ṣaṭkena yugapadyogāt paramāṇoḥ ṣaḍaṁśatā ||

^{c)} ṣaḍbhyo digbhyaḥ ṣaḍbhiḥ paramāṇubhir yugapadyoge sati paramāṇoḥ ṣaḍaṇśatā prāpnoti | ¹ ekasya yo deśas tatrānyasyāsambhavāt |

ṣaṇṇām samānadeśatvāt piṇḍaḥ syād aṇumātrakah || 12 ||

^{d)} atha ya evaikasya paramāṇor deśaḥ sa eva ṣaṇṇām | ^{e)} tena sarveṣāṁ samānadeśatvāt sarvaḥ piṇḍaḥ paramāṇumātraḥ syāt parasparāvyatirekāḍ ^{f)} iti na kaścit piṇḍo dṛśyaḥ syāt | ^{g)} naiva hi paramāṇavaḥ saṁyujyante niravayavatvāt | mā bhūd eṣa doṣaprasaṅgaḥ | saṁghātās tu parasparaṁ saṁyujyanta iti kāśmīravaibhāṣikās | ^{h)} te idaṁ praṣṭavyāḥ | ⁱ⁾ yaḥ paramāṇūnām saṁghāto na sa tebhyo 'rthāntaram iti ||

XIII

paramāṇor asaṁyoge tatsaṁghāte 'sti kasya saḥ ||

^{A)} saṁyoga iti varttate |

na cānavayavatvena tatsaṁyogo na sidhyati || 13 ||

^{B)} atha saṁghātā apy anyonyaṁ na saṁyujyante na tarhi paramāṇūnām niravayavatvāt saṁyogo na sidhyatīti vaktavyaṁ | sāvayavasyāpi hi saṁghātasya saṁyogānabhyupagamāt | ^{c)} ataḥ paramāṇur ekaṁ dravyaṁ na sidhyati | ^{d)} yadi ca paramāṇoḥ saṁyoga iṣyate yadi vā neṣyate |

XIV

digbhāgabhedo yasyāsti tasyaikatvan na yujyate |

^{A)} anyo hi paramāṇoḥ pūrvadigbhāgo yāvad adhodigbhāga iti digbhāgabhedo sati katham tadātmakasya paramāṇor ekatvaṁ yokṣyate |

chāyāvṛtī katham vā |

^{B)} yady ekaikasya paramāṇor digbhāgabhedo na syād ādityodaye katham anyatra pārśve chāyā bhavaty anyatrātapah | ^{c)} na hi tasyānyaḥ pradeśo 'sti yatrātapo na syāt | ^{d)} āvaraṇaṁ ca katham bhavati

paramāṇoḥ paramāṇvantareṇa yadi digbhāgabhedo neṣyate | ^{E)} na hi kaścīd anyāḥ parabhāgo 'sti yatrāgamanād anyenānyasya pratighātaḥ syāt | ^{F)} asati ca pratighāte sarveṣāṁ samānadeśatvāt sarvaḥ saṁghātaḥ paramāṇumātraḥ syād ity uktam |

^{G)} kim evaṁ neṣyate piṇḍasya te chāyāvṛtī na paramāṇor iti |

^{H)} kiṁ khalu paramāṇubhyo 'nyaḥ piṇḍa iṣyate yasya te syātām |

^{I)} nety āha |

anyo na piṇḍaś cen na tasya te || 14 ||

^{J)} yadi nānyaḥ paramāṇubhyaḥ piṇḍa iṣyate na te tasyeti siddham bhavati |

^{K)} sanniveśaparikalpa eṣaḥ | paramāṇuḥ saṁghāta iti vā kim anayā cintayā | lakṣaṇaṁ tu rūpādīnām na pratiṣidhyate |

^{L)} kim punas teṣāṁ lakṣaṇam

^{M)} cakṣurādiviṣayatvaṁ nīlāditvañ ca

^{N)} tad evedaṁ sampradhāryate | yat tac cakṣurādīnām viṣayo nīlapītādikam iṣyate kin tad ekaṁ dravyam atha vā tad anekam iti |

XV

^{A)} kiñ cātaḥ |

^{B)} anekatve doṣa uktaḥ ||

ekatve na krameṇetir yugapan na grahāgrahau |
vicchinnānekavṛttiś ca sūkṣmānikṣā ca no bhavet || 15 ||

^{C)} yadi yāvad avicchinnam nīlādikañ cakṣuṣo viṣayas tad ekaṁ dravyam kalpyate pṛthivyām krameṇetir na syāt | gamanam ity arthaḥ | sakṛtpādakṣepeṇa sarvasya gatavāt | ^{D)} arvāgbhāgasya ca grahaṇam parabhāgasya cāgrahaṇam yugapan na syāt | na hi tasyaiva tadānīm grahaṇaṁ cāgrahaṇaṁ ca yuktam |

^{E)} vicchinnaśya cānekasya hastyāśvādikasyaikatra vṛttir na syāt | ^{F)} yatraiva hy ekan tattraivāparam iti kathan taylor vicchedo yujyate | ^{G)} katham vā tad ekaṁ yat prāptaṁ ca tābhyāṁ na ca prāptam antarāle tacchūnyagrahaṇāt | ^{H)} sūkṣmāṇāṁ codakajantūnāṁ sthūlaiḥ samāna-rūpāṇāṁ anīkṣaṇaṁ na syāt | yadi lakṣaṇabhedād eva dravyāntaratvaṁ kalpyate , nānyathā , ^{I)} tasmād avaśyaṁ paramāṇuśo bhedaḥ kalpayitavyaḥ | ^{J)} sa caiko na sidhyati | ^{K)} tasyāsiddhau rūpādīnāṁ cakṣurā-diviṣayatvam asiddham ^{L)} iti siddhaṁ vijñaptimātram bhavatīti |

XVI

^{A)} pramāṇavaśād astitvaṁ nāstitvaṁ vā nirddhāryate | sarveṣāṁ ca pramāṇānāṁ pratyakṣam pramāṇaṁ gariṣṭham ^{B)} ity asaty arthe katham iyaṁ buddhir bhavatīdaṁ me pratyakṣam iti ||

pratyakṣabuddhiḥ svapnādau yathā |

^{C)} vināpy artheneti pūrvam eva jñāpitaṁ |

sā ca yadā tadā |
na so 'rtho dṛśyate tasya pratyakṣatvaṁ katham mataṁ
|| 16 ||

^{D)} yadā ca sā pratyakṣabuddhir bhavatīdaṁ me pratyakṣam iti tadā na so 'rtho dṛśyate manovijñānenaiva paricchedāc cakṣurvijñānasya ca tadā niruddhatvād ^{E)} iti katham tasya pratyakṣatvam iṣṭam | ^{F)} viśeṣeṇa tu kṣaṇikavādino yasya tadānīṁ niruddham eva tad rūpaṁ rasādikam vā |

XVII

^{A)} nānanubhūtam manovijñānena smaryate | ^{B)} ity avaśyam arthānubhavana bhavitavyaṁ tac ca darśanam ity ^{C)} evaṁ tadviṣayasya rūpādeḥ pratyakṣatvaṁ mataṁ |

^{D)} asiddham idam anubhūtasāryasya smaraṇam bhavatīti | yasmāt |

uktaṁ yathā tadābhāsā vijñaptiḥ ||

^{E)} vināpy arthena yathārthābhāsā cakṣurvijñānādikā vijñaptir
utpadyate tathoktaṃ ||

smaraṇaṃ tataḥ |

^{F)} tato hi vijñapteḥ smṛtisamprayuktā tatpratibhāsaiva rūpādi-
vikalpikā manovijñaptir utpadyata ^{G)} iti na smṛtyutpādād arthānu-
bhavaḥ sidhyati |

^{H)} yadi yathā swapne vijñaptir abhūtārthaviśayā tathā jāgrato 'pi
syāt ^{I)} tathaiva tadabhāvaṃ lokaḥ svayam avagacchet | ^{J)} na caivam
bhavati | ^{K)} tasmān na swapna ivārthopalabdhiḥ sarvā nirarthikā |

^{L)} idam ajñāpakam | yasmāt |

swapnadṛgviśayābhāvaṃ nāprabuddho 'vagacchati || 17 ||

^{M)} evaṃ vitathavikalpābhyāsavāsanānidrayā prasupto lokaḥ
swapna ivābhūtam artham paśyann ^{N)} aprabuddhas tadabhāvaṃ
yathāvan nāvagacchati , ^{O)} yadā tu tatpratipakṣalokottaranirvikalpa-
jñānalābhāt prabuddho bhavati tadā tatprṛkṣhalabdhaśuddhalaaukika-
jñānasammukhībhāvād viśayābhāvaṃ yathāvad avagacchatīti
samānam etat |

XVIII

^{A)} yadi svasantānapariṇāmaviśeṣād eva satvānām arthapra-
tibhāsā vijñaptaya utpadyante nārthaviśeṣāt | ^{B)} tadā ya eṣa pāpakalyāṇa-
mitrasaṃparkāt sadasaddharmaśravaṇāc ca vijñaptiniyamaḥ satvānām
sa kathaṃ sidhyati , asati sadasatsaṃparke taddeśanāyāñ ca |

anyonyādhipatitvena vijñaptiniyamo mithaḥ ||

^{C)} sarveṣāṃ hi satvānām anyonyavijñaptiyādhipatyena mitho
vijñapter niyamo bhavati yathāyogaṃ | ^{D)} mitha iti parasparataḥ | ^{E)} ataḥ
santānāntaravijñaptiviśeṣāt santānāntare vijñaptiviśeṣa utpadyate
nārthaviśeṣāt |

^{F)} yadi yathā swapne nirarthikā vijñaptir evaṃ jāgrato 'pi syāt
kasmāt kuśalākuśalasamudācāre suptāsupṭayos tulyaṃ phalam
iṣṭāniṣṭam āyatyān na bhavati |

^{G)} yasmāt |

middhenopahatañ cittam svapne tenāsamañ phalañ || 18 ||

^{H)} idam atra kāraṇaṃ na tv arthasadbhāvaḥ |

XIX

^{A)} yadi vijñaptimātram evedaṃ na kasyacit kāyo 'sti na vāk
katham upakramyamāṇānām aurabhrikādibhir urabhrādīnām
maraṇam bhavati , ^{B)} atatkr̥te vā tanmaraṇe katham aurabhrikādīnām
prāṇātipātāvadyena yogo bhavati ||

maraṇam paravijñaptiviśeṣād vikriyā yathā |
smṛtilopādikānyeṣāṃ piśācādimanovaśāt || 19 ||

^{C)} yathā hi piśācādimanovaśād anyeṣāṃ smṛtilopasvapna-
darśanabhūtagrahāveśavikārā bhavanti | ^{D)} ṛddhivanmanovaśāc ca | ^{E)}
yathā sāraṇasyāryamahākātyāyanādhiṣṭhānāt svapnadarśanaṃ | ^{F)}
āraṇyakaṛṣimanahpradoṣāc ca vemacitriṇaḥ parājayah | ^{G)} tathā para-
vijñaptiviśeṣādhipatyāt pareṣāṃ jīvitendriyavirodhinī kācid
vikriyotpadyate yayā sabhāgasantativicchedākhyam maraṇam
bhavatīti veditavyam |

XX

katham vā daṇḍakāraṇyaśūnyatvam ṛṣikopataḥ |

^{A)} yadi paravijñaptiviśeṣādhipatyāt satvānām maraṇam neṣyate
| ^{B)} manodaṇḍasya hi mahāsāvadyatvaṃ sādhayatā bhagavatopālir
gṛhapatiḥ pṛṣṭaḥ ^{C)} kaccit te gṛhapate śrutaṃ kena tāni daṇḍakāraṇyāni
mātaṅgāraṇyāni kaliṅgāraṇyāni śūnyāni medhyībhūtāni | ^{D)} tenoktaṃ
śrutaṃ me bho gautama ṛṣiṇām manahpradoṣeṇeti ||

manodaṇḍo mahāvadyaḥ katham vā tena sidhyati || 20 ||

^{E)} yady evaṃ kalpyate , tadabhiprasannair amānuṣais tad-
vāsinaḥ satvā utsāditā na tv ṛṣiṇām manahpradoṣān mṛtā ity ^{F)} evaṃ
sati katham tena karmaṇā manodaṇḍaḥ kāyavāgdaṇḍābhyām mahā-
vadyatamaḥ siddho bhavati | ^{G)} tan manahpradoṣamātreṇa tāvatām
satvānām maraṇāt sidhyati |

XXI

^{A)} yadi vijñaptimātram evedam paracittavidaḥ kiṃ paracittam
jānanty , atha na , ^{B)} kiñ cātaḥ ^I ^{C)} yadi na jānanti katham paracittavido
bhavanti | ^{D)} atha jānanti |

paracittavidāṃ jñānam ayathārtham katham yathā ,
svacittajñānam

^{E)} tad api katham ayathārtham |

ajñānād yathā buddhasya gocaraḥ || 21 ||

^{F)} yathā tan nirabhilāpyenātmanā buddhānāṃ gocaraḥ | tathā
tadajñānāt | tad ubhayam na yathārtham ^{G)} vitathapratibhāsatayā ^{H)}
grāhyagrāhakavikalpasyāprahīṇatvāt |

XXII

^{A)} anantaviniścayaprabhedāgādhagāmbhīryāyām
vijñaptimātratāyām |

vijñaptimātratāsiddhiḥ svaśaktisadrśī mayā |
kṛteyaṃ sarvathā sā tu na cintyā ,

^{B)} sarvaprakārā tu sā mādṛśaiś cintayitum na śakyā
tarkkāviṣayatvāt | ^{C)} kasya punaḥ sā sarvathā gocara ity āha |

buddhagocaraḥ , | 22 ||

^{D)} buddhānāṃ hi sā bhagavatām sarvaprakāram gocaraḥ
sarvākārasarvajñeyajñānāvighātād iti ||

viṃśikā vijñaptimātratāsiddhiḥ
kṛtir iyam ācāryavasubandhoḥ ||

English Reading Text
of the
Vimśikā-vṛtti

I

[Vasubandhu]

A) The Great Vehicle teaches that what belongs to the triple world is established as Manifestation-Only, because it is stated in scripture: B) “O Sons of the Conqueror, what belongs to the triple world is mind-only.” C) Mind, thought, cognition and manifestation are synonyms. D) And here this ‘mind’ intends the inclusion of the concomitants [of mind]. E) “Only” is stated in order to rule out external objects. F) This cognition itself arises having the appearance of an external object. G) For example, it is like those with an eye disease seeing non-existent hair, a [double] moon and so on, but H) there is no [real] object at all.

II

[Objection:]

A) To this it is objected:

**If manifestation does not [arise] from an external object,
it is not reasonable that there be restriction as to time
and place, nor nonrestriction as to personal continuum,
nor causal efficacy. [2]**

B) What is being stated here? C) If there is the arising of manifestation of material form and so on without any external object of material form and so on, and [consequently the manifestation] does not [arise] from a [real] external object of material form and so on, D) why does [such a manifestation] arise in a particular place, and not everywhere; E) why does it arise only in that place at some time, not always; and F) why does it arise without restriction in the minds of all those present there in that place at that time, and not in [the minds] of just a few? G) For instance, while a hair and so on may appear in the mind of one with eye disease, it does not [appear] to others [free of that disease].

^{h)} Why is it that the hair, bee and so on which appear to one with eye disease have no causal efficacy of a hair and so on, while for those others without [eye disease, those hairs, bees and so forth which appear to them] do have [causal efficacy]? ⁱ⁾ The food, drink, clothing, poison, weapons and so on seen in a dream do not have causal efficacy [to address] hunger, thirst and the like, but those others not [in a dream] do have such [causal efficacy]. ^{j)} A mirage city, being non-existent, does not have the causal efficacy of a city, but other [cities] not [unreal like] that do. ^{k)} If these [things like dream food] resemble the non-existent in lacking any [real external] object, restriction as to time and place, nonrestriction as to personal continuum, and causal efficacy are not reasonable.

III

[Vasubandhu]

^{A)} They are certainly not unreasonable, since:

Restriction as to place and so on is proved, as with dreams.

[3ab]

^{B)} “As with dreams” means as in a dream. ^{cD)} Well, how, first of all, [do you explain that] even without an external object, some village, grove, man, woman or the like is seen in a dream at a particular place, rather than everywhere, and at that particular place at some specific time, rather than always? ^{E)} For this reason, restriction as to time and place is established, even in the absence of an external object.

Moreover, nonrestriction to personal continuum [is proved] as with hungry ghosts. [3bc]

^{F)} “Is proved” is carried over [from the previous foot]. ^{G)} “As with hungry ghosts” means as in the case of hungry ghosts. ^{H)} How is this proved? ^{I)} Collectively

In their all seeing the river of pus and so on. [3cd]

^{j)} “The river of pus” means a river filled with pus, ^{k)} as [one says] a pot of ghee [when one means a pot filled with ghee]. ^{l)} For hungry ghosts in a state of equally experiencing fruition of their actions collectively *all* see the river filled with pus, not just one of them alone. ^{m)} The word “and so on” is mentioned to indicate that as [they see the river] filled with pus, they [also see it] filled with urine, feces and the like, and guarded by persons holding staffs and swords. ⁿ⁾ Thus the non-restriction of manifestations to [a specific] personal continuum is proved even without the existence of an external object.

IV

Causal efficacy [is proved] as in ejaculation in a dream. [4ab]

^{A)} “Is proved” is to be understood. ^{B)} [Causal efficacy is established] as with ejaculation in a dream [that is, a wet dream], which is characterized by the emission of semen in a dream in the absence of [actual] sexual union. ^{C)} In this way at the outset is proved, through these various examples, the four-fold [characterization, namely] the restriction to time and place and the rest.

And again as with hell all [four aspects are proved]. [4bc]

^{D)} “Are proved” is to be understood. ^{E)} “As with hell” means like in the hells. ^{F)} How are they proved?

In the seeing of the hell guardians and so on, and in being tortured by them. [4cd]

^{G)} Just as it is proved that in the hells hell beings see the hell guardians and so on with restriction as to time and place ^{H)} —“and so

on” means that they see the dogs, crows, the iron mountains and so on coming and going—¹⁾ and all [hell beings see these], not merely one,²⁾ and [just as it is] proved that they are tortured by them, even though the hell guardians and so on do not exist, because of the domination of the generalized common fruition of their individual karmic deeds—³⁾ Just so it should be understood that the entirety of this four-fold [characterization, namely] the restriction to time and place and the rest, is proved elsewhere too [and not only in the separate examples].

[Objection]

⁴⁾ For what reason, then, do you not accept the hell guardians, and dogs and crows, as really existent beings?

[Vasubandhu]

⁵⁾ Because it is not reasonable. ⁶⁾ For it is not reasonable for those [guardians and so on] to be hell beings, since they do not experience the sufferings of that [place] in precisely that same way. ⁷⁾ If they were torturing each other, there would be no differentiation that ‘these are the hell beings; these the hell guardians.’ ⁸⁾ And if those of equal form, size and strength were torturing each other, they would not be so very afraid. ⁹⁾ And how could [those guardians], unable to tolerate the suffering of burning on a flaming iron ground, torture others there? ¹⁰⁾ On the other hand, how could non-hell beings be born in hell [in the first place]?

V

[Objection]

¹¹⁾ [Well,] to begin, how [—as you admit as well—] could animals be born in heaven? ¹²⁾ In the same way, animals and certain hungry ghosts might be born in the hells as hell guardians and others.

[Vasubandhu]

**Animals are not born in hell as they are in heaven,
Nor are hungry ghosts, since they do not experience the suffering produced there. [5]**

c) For, those who are born in heaven as animals, being born there through their karmic deeds conducive to happiness [performed] in the Receptacle World, experience the happiness produced there [in heaven], d) but the hell guardians and so on do not experience hellish suffering in a similar fashion. e) Therefore, it is not reasonable that animals are born [in hell], f) nor is it so for hungry ghosts.

VI

[Objection]

A) Then, particular types of gross material elements arise there through the karmic deeds of those hell beings, which, particularized as to color, form, size and strength, obtain the designations 'hell guardian' and so on. B) And they transform in such a manner that they appear performing activities like waving their hands and so on, in order to instill fear, as mountains in the shape of rams coming and going and thorns in the forest of iron thorn trees turning themselves down and turning themselves up [likewise appear in hell instilling fear]. C) Therefore, it is not that those [hell guardians and so on] are not born at all.

[Vasubandhu]

**If you accept that gross material elements arise there in this fashion through the karmic deeds of those [beings],
And [you accept their] transformation, why do you not accept [the transformation] of cognition? [6]**

^{D)} Why do you not accept that the transformation thus brought about by the karmic deeds of those [beings] is [a transformation] of cognition itself? ^{E)} Why, moreover, are gross material elements imagined [to play any role at all]? ^{F)} What is more:

VII

The perfuming of the karmic deed you imagine to be elsewhere than the result;

What is the reason you do not accept [that the result is] in precisely the same location where the perfuming [takes place]? [7]

^{A)} You imagine such an arising and transformation of gross material elements of hell beings there [in hell] as due to their karmic deeds, while the perfuming of those karmic deeds is lodged in their individual continua of cognition, not elsewhere. ^{B)} So why do you not accept that such a transformation of cognition as the result of those [karmic deeds] is precisely where the perfuming itself is? ^{C)} For what reason, in this case, do you imagine that the result of those [karmic deeds] is somewhere where the perfuming is not?

[Objection]

^{D)} The reason is scripture. ^{E)} If there were nothing but cognition with the appearance of material form and the rest, and no external objects characterized as material form and the rest, then the Blessed One would not have spoken of the existence of the sense-fields of material form and the rest.

VIII

[Vasubandhu]

^{A)} This is not a reason, since:

The existence of the sense-fields of material form and the rest were spoken of [by the Blessed One] with a special intention directed toward the individual to be guided by that [teaching], as [in the case of the mention of] beings born by spontaneous generation. [8]

^{B)} By way of example, the Blessed One with a special intention said “There are beings of spontaneous birth,” intending [allusion to] the nonannihilation of the continuum of mind in the future. ^{D)} [We know this] because of the [scriptural] statement:

^{C)} Here [in our teaching] there is no being or self, but [only] these elemental factors of existence along with their causes.

^{E)} Thus, although the Blessed One did speak of the existence of the sense-fields of form and the rest, that [scriptural] statement is of special intention since it is directed toward the individual who is to be guided by that teaching.

IX

^{A)} In this regard, what is the special intention?

A manifestation arises from its own proper seed, having an appearance corresponding to that [external object]. The Sage spoke of the two [seed and appearance] as the dual sense field of that [manifestation]. [9]

^{B)} What is being stated? ^{C)} The proper seed from which—when it has attained a particular transformation—arises a manifestation having the appearance of visible form, and that as which this [cognition] appears: ^{D)} the Blessed One spoke of these two as, respectively, the

sense field of visual perception [“seeing eye” = seed] and the sense field of visible form [= the object] related to that manifestation. ^{E)} The same [applies to all items in the stock list] up to: The Blessed One spoke of the proper seed from which—when it has attained a particular transformation—arises a manifestation having the appearance of the tangible, and that as which this [manifestation] appears: ^{F)} [the Blessed One spoke] of these two as, respectively, the sense field of tangible perception [“body” = seed] and the sense field of the tangible [= the object] related to that [manifestation]. ^{G)} This is the special intention.

X

[Objection]

^{A)} And what is the advantage of having explained things in this way by recourse to special intention?

[Vasubandhu]

For in this way there is understanding of the selflessness of persons. ^[10ab]

^{B)} For when it is being taught in this way [those individuals to be guided] understand the idea of the selflessness of persons. ^{C)} The six cognitions come about from the two sets of six [= the twelve sense-fields], but when they understand that there is no distinct seer at all—[and all members of the stock list] up to—no distinct thinker, those who are to be guided by the teaching of the selflessness of persons understand the idea of the selflessness of persons.

Moreover, teaching in another way leads to the understanding of the selflessness of elemental factors of existence. ^[10bcd]

^{d)} “In another way” refers to the teaching of Manifestation-Only.
^{e)} How does this lead to understanding the selflessness of elemental factors of existence? ^{f)} [One understands this by] knowing that this Manifestation-Only arises with the semblance of elemental factors of existence such as material form and the rest, ^{g)} but actually there is no existing elemental factor of existence having as its characteristic mark material form and the rest.

[Objection]

^{h)} If, then, no elemental factor of existence exists in any fashion, Manifestation-Only does not exist either. How, then, could [your position] be established?

[Vasubandhu]

ⁱ⁾ It is not the case that one comes to understand the selflessness of elemental factors of existence by thinking that the elemental factors of existence do not exist in any fashion at all. ^{j)} But rather [such understanding comes in thinking that elemental factors of existence exist only]:

In terms of an imagined self. [^{10d}]

^{k)} The reference is to the selflessness of those elemental factors of existence the intrinsic nature of which—characterized by subject and object and so on—fools fantasize in terms of an imagined self. ^{l)} [The reference] is not to [the selflessness of elemental factors of existence] in terms of the inexpressible self, which is the domain of the Buddhas. ^{m)} In this way, Manifestation-Only also leads to an understanding of the selflessness of all elemental factors of existence through the establishment of the fact of Manifestation-Only because of an understanding of selflessness in terms of a self fantasized by another manifestation, not because of a denial of the existence of those [elemental factors of existence] in each and every respect. ⁿ⁾ For

otherwise one manifestation would have another manifestation as its external object, and therefore the fact of Manifestation-Only could not be proved, because manifestations would possess external objects.

XI

[Objection]

A) How, then, should one understand this, namely, that while the Blessed One spoke of the existence of the sense-fields of visible form and the rest with this special intention, those things which come to be the corresponding sense objects of the manifestations of visible form and the rest do not actually exist at all?

[Vasubandhu]

B) Since:

That [sense-field of form and the rest] is not a unitary nor atomically plural sense object, neither are those [atoms] compounded, since the atom [itself] is not proved. [11]

C) What is stated here? D) Whatever sense-field, consisting of visible form and the rest, would be the corresponding sense object of the manifestations of visible form and the rest, would be either unitary—as the Vaiśeṣikas imagine material form as a part-possessing whole—or it would be atomically plural, or it would be compounded of those very atoms themselves. E) First of all, the sense object is not unitary, because there is no apprehension anywhere at all of a material form as a part-possessing whole separate from its parts. F) Nor is it plural, because there is no apprehension of atoms individually. G) Nor would those [atoms], compounded, come to be the sense object, since the atom is not proved to be a singular substance.

XII

[Objection]

A) How is [the atom as a singular substance] not proved?

[Vasubandhu]

B) Since:

Because [either] in the simultaneous conjunction with a group of six [other atoms], the atom [would have to] have six parts, [12ab]

C) If there were simultaneous conjunction with six atoms from the six directions [of possible orientation], this would result in the atom having six parts, because where there is one thing another cannot arise.

[Or] because, the six being in a common location, the cluster would be the extent of a [single] atom. [12cd]

D) Or, the place in which there are six atoms would be precisely the same as the place of the single atom. E) For this [reason], because all of them would be in a common location, the entire cluster would be the extent of a [single] atom, because they would not exclude one another. F) Thus no cluster would be visible at all. G) The Kashmiri Vaibhāṣikas say: “Atoms do not at all conjoin, because of being partless—absolutely not! But compounded things do conjoin one with another.” H) They should be questioned as follows: I) Since a compound of atoms is not something separate from those [atoms],

XIII

Given that there is no conjunction of atoms, what is [conjoining] when those [atoms] are compounded? [13ab]

A) “Conjoining” is carried over [from the previous].

But it is also not due to their partlessness that the conjunction of those [atoms] is not proved. [13cd]

B) If you now were to claim that even compounds do not conjoin with one another, then you [Kashmiri Vaibhāṣikas] should not say that the conjunction of atoms is not proved because of their partlessness, for a conjunction of the compounded, even with parts, is not admitted. C) Therefore, the atom is not proved as a singular substance. D) And whether a conjunction of atoms is accepted or not:

XIV

It is not reasonable that something with spatial differentiation be singular. [14ab]

A) If there were spatial differentiation of an atom—namely, the front part is different [and so are all the other sides] including the bottom part—how would the singularity of an atom with that [multiple] nature be reasonable?

Or how is there shadow and obstruction? [14c]

B) If no single atom were to have spatial differentiation, how is it that when the sun rises in one place, there is shadow in one place, sunshine in another? C) For that [atom] does not have another portion on which there would be no sunshine. D) And how is an atom

obstructed by another atom if spatial differentiation is not accepted? ^{e)}
 For [an atom] has no other separate part whatsoever, from contact
 with which one [atom] would be resisted by another. ^{f)} And if there
 were no resistance, then because all of them would share a common
 location, the entire compound would be the extent of a [single] atom,
 as has [already] been discussed [in verse 12cd, above].

[Objection]

^{g)} Do you not accept in this way that the two, shadow and
 obstruction, belong to the cluster, not to the atom?

[Vasubandhu]

^{h)} Do you, for your part, accept that the cluster which would
 possess those two [shadow and obstruction] is something other than
 the atoms ?

[Opponent]

ⁱ⁾ We say: no.

[Vasubandhu]

**If the cluster is not other [than the atoms], the two
 [shadow and obstruction] would not be [properties] of
 that [cluster].** [14cd]

^{j)} If you do not accept the cluster as something other than the
 atoms, then it is proved that the two [shadow and obstruction] are not
 [properties] of that [cluster].

[Objection]

^{k)} This is mere imaginative speculation about construction.
 Why do you have this worry about whether it is an atom or a
 compound? In any case, the characteristic of visible form and the rest
 is not negated.

[Vasubandhu]

^{L)} Then what *is* their characteristic?

[Objection]

^{M)} Being a sense-field of visual perception and the rest, and blueness and the like [are the characteristic of visible form].

[Vasubandhu]

^{N)} This is precisely what is being determined: is the sense-field of visual perception and the rest you accept as blue, yellow and so on a single substance, or rather multiple?

XV

[Objection]

^{A)} And what [follows] from this?

[Vasubandhu]

^{B)} The fault if it is [judged to be] multiple has already been discussed.

If [the sense object] were singular, there would be no gradual motion, no simultaneous apprehension and non-apprehension, nor divided multiple existence, nor the invisible microscopic. [15]

^{C)} If one imagines the visual sense-object, blue and the rest, as long as it is undivided, to be a single substance, there would not be gradual motion on the ground—going, that is to say—because everything would be traversed with a single foot-step. ^{D)} And the apprehension of a facing portion and the non-apprehension of the non-facing portion would not be simultaneous, because the apprehension and non-apprehension of the very same thing at that [same] time is not reasonable.

^{E)} And there would be no existence of divided and multiple elephants, horses and so on in a single place; ^{F)} because one thing would be just precisely where another is, how could a division between them be reasonable? ^{G)} Or on the other hand, how is [it reasonable that] that [place] is single which is [both] occupied by those two [elephant and horse] and not occupied, since one apprehends that the gap between them is empty of the two? ^{H)} And, if you were to imagine [the two] to have a difference in substance purely because of a distinction in characteristic feature, not otherwise, microscopic aquatic creatures, having forms like macroscopic [creatures], would not be invisible.

^{I)} Therefore [since this is not the case], one must certainly imagine a distinction atomically. ^{J)} And that [atom] is not proved to be singular. ^{K)} Since [the singular atom] is not proven, the fact that visible form—and the rest—are sense-fields of the visual—and the rest—is unproven; ^{L)} therefore Manifestation-Only comes to be proved.

XVI

[Objection]

^{A)} Existence or non-existence is settled on the strength of the valid means of cognition, and of all valid means of cognition, direct perception is the most important valid means of cognition. ^{B)} Therefore, if an external object does not exist, how does this awareness come about, namely ‘this is before my eyes’?

[Vasubandhu]

The idea that there is direct perception [of the external object takes place] as in a dream and so on. [16ab]

^{C)} I already earlier made the point that “Even without an external object” [is understood].

Additionally, that external object is not seen [at the moment] when one has [the idea that there is direct perception of an external object]; [so] how can you consider that [the external object] is directly perceived?
[16bcd]

^{D)} And [at the moment] when that idea [that there is] direct perception [of the external object] comes about with the thought “This is my direct perception,” that external object is not seen [at that same moment], because the discerning takes place only by means of mental cognition, and because at that time the visual cognition [which precedes the mental cognition] has ceased. ^{E)} Given this, how can you accept that that [object] is directly perceived? ^{F)} What is more, [this holds] especially for one who advocates the momentariness [of all things], for whom [the respective] visible form, or flavor and the rest, has [already] entirely ceased at that time.

XVII

[Objection]

^{A)} What was not [previously] experienced cannot be recollected by mental cognition. ^{B)} Therefore, there must be experience of an external object, and that is spoken of as ‘seeing’. ^{C)} In this way I consider it to be a case of an direct perception of that sense-object, [namely] material form and the rest.

[Vasubandhu]

^{D)} This [argument about] recollection [being] of an experienced external object is unproved, since:

As I discussed, manifestation has the appearance of that [external object]. [17ab]

^{E)} I have discussed how, even in the absence of an external object, a manifestation consisting of visual cognition and so forth arises with the appearance of an external object.

Recollection [comes] from that. [17b]

^{F)} For from that manifestation arises a mental manifestation associated with memory, which has precisely the appearance of that [material form] and conceptually fantasizes itself [to refer to] material form and so on; ^{G)} thus the arising of a memory does not prove the experience of an external object.

[Objection]

^{H)} If a manifestation were to have as its sense-object an unreal external object also for one awake, just as is the case in a dream, ^{I)} in precisely that way everyone would understand by themselves the non-existence of that [external object]. ^{J)} But that is not how it is. ^{K)} Therefore, it is not so that all referential objectifications of external objects are, as is the case in a dream, [actually] devoid of external objects.

[Vasubandhu]

^{L)} You cannot draw a conclusion from this, since:

One who is not awake does not understand the non-existence of a sense-object seen in a dream. [17cd]

^{M)} Just so everyone, asleep with the sleep of repeated perfuming of erroneous conceptual fantasy, sees unreal external objects, as in a dream; ^{N)} being unawakened, they do not properly understand the non-existence of the [external object]. ^{O)} But when they are awakened through the acquisition of supramundane non-discriminative insight which is the antidote to that [erroneous imagination], then they prop-

erly understand the non-existence of the sense-object because the subsequently obtained pure worldly insight becomes present. This [situation] is the same.

XVIII

[Objection]

A) If manifestations with the appearance of external objects were to arise for beings only through particular transformations of their own mental continua, not through particular external objects, B) then how is it proved that association with bad or good spiritual guides, and hearing true and false teachings, shape the manifestations of beings, if that association with the good and the bad and that teaching do not [actually] exist?

Mutual shaping of manifestation is due to their influence on each other. [18ab]

C) Because all beings exert an influence on each others' manifestations, there comes to be mutual shaping of manifestation, according to the circumstances. D) "Mutually" means "reciprocally." E) Therefore, a distinct manifestation arises within one mental continuum because of a distinct manifestation within another mental continuum, not because of a distinct external object.

[Objection]

F) If [as you claim] a manifestation were devoid of an external object likewise also for one awake, as is the case in a dream, why do those asleep and those not asleep not come in the future to have the same [karmic] result, desired and undesired [respectively], of [their] wholesome and unwholesome behavior?

[Vasubandhu]

^{G)} Since:

When one dreams, the mind is overpowered by sloth; thus the result is not the same. [18cd]

^{H)} This is the cause in this case, and not [some alleged] real existence of an external object.

XIX

[Objection]

^{A)} If this [world] is nothing but Manifestation-Only, and no one has a body or voice, how does the death of rams and others being attacked by butchers come about? ^{B)} Or if their death is not due to those [butchers], how does there come to be a connection between the butchers and the crime of taking life?

Death is a transformation due to a particular manifestation of another, just as the transformation of memory loss and the like of others is due to the mental force of demons and so on. [19]

^{C)} Just as, due to the mental force of demons and so on others come to experience dislocations [including] memory loss, dream visions and possession by ghouls of illness, ^{D)} and [this also takes place] due to the mental force of those possessed of superpowers— ^{E)} For example, Sāraṇa had a dream vision due to the controlling power of Ārya-Mahākātyāyana, ^{F)} and the conquest of Vemacitrin was due to the hostility of the forest ascetics— ^{G)} Just so, it is due to the influence of a particular manifestation of another that there arises some transformation of others obstructing the life force, by which there comes to be death, designated as the cutting off of related [mental] continuities. This is how it should be understood.

Otherwise, how did the Daṇḍaka forest become emptied by the sages' anger? [20ab]

A) If you do not accept that beings die because of the influence of a particular manifestation of another [how do you account for what happened in the Daṇḍaka forests?]. B) For the Blessed One, in proving that mental violence is highly objectionable, asked the householder Upāli: C) “Have you heard anything, householder? By whom were the Daṇḍaka forests, the Mātaṅga forests, and the Kāliṅga forests emptied and made ritually pure?” E) He said: “I have heard, O Gautama, it was through the mental hostility of the sages.”

XX

Or how does that prove mental violence is a great violation?
[20cd]

E) If you were to imagine as follows: beings dwelling there were annihilated by non-humans favorable to those [sages], rather than dying due to the mental hostility of the sages— F) if such were the case, how does that action prove mental violence to be a much greater violation than physical or verbal violence? G) That is proved by the death of so many beings solely on account of mental hostility.

XXI

[Objection]

A) If this [world] is nothing but Manifestation-Only, do then “those who know other minds” [really] know other minds, or not? B) And what [follows] from this? C) If they do not know, how do they become those who [are spoken of as ones who] know others minds? D) Or they do know [which is only possible if external objects do really exist, in which case]:

How is the knowledge of those who know other minds inconsistent with reality?

[Reply:] It is as with knowledge of one's own mind. [21abc]

^{E)} How is that [knowledge of one's own mind] also inconsistent with reality?

Because one does not know [other minds or even one's own] in the way that [such knowing of minds] is the scope of a Buddha. [21cd]

^{F)} Because we do not know that in the way that that [knowledge] is the scope of the buddhas, with respect to its nature as inexpressible. Both [knowledges, of one's own mind and of those of others,] are inconsistent with reality, ^{G)} because [all that non-buddhas are able to know is an] erroneous appearance. ^{H)} This is because they fail to reject the conceptual fantasy of subject and object.

XXII

^{A)} Because [the idea of] Manifestation-Only has unfathomable depth, its explanations and divisions endless,

I have composed this proof of [the World as] Manifestation-Only according to my ability, but that [fact that the World is nothing but Manifestation-Only] is not conceivable in its entirety. [22abcd]

^{B)} However, that [idea of Manifestation-Only] cannot be conceived in all its aspects by those like me, because it is beyond the domain of logical reasoning. ^{C)} For whom, then, is this [idea] in all respects the [proper] scope? We reply:

It is the scope of the buddhas. [22d]

_{D)} For it is the scope of the buddhas, the Blessed Ones, in all aspects, because their knowledge of all objects of knowledge in all ways is unobstructed.

Colophon:

This is the Proof of [the World as] Manifestation-Only in Twenty Verses
A composition of the Master Vasubandhu.